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ABSTRACT 
Where a business becomes insolvent and its rescue is predicated on a going 
concern sale or transfer to another employer, there is a tension between 
employee protection and the rescue of insolvent but viable businesses. There is a 
consensus that employees deserve protection when the business that employs 
them becomes insolvent and is transferred to another employer on a going 
concern basis, yet extensive levels of employee protection can jeopardise going 
concern business sales by increasing the level of liabilities assumed by the 
purchaser.  Business rescue and employee protection goals of insolvency law and 
employment law respectively are not inevitably incompatible. Opinions are 
divided, however, on the best means for achieving compatibility. This thesis uses 
theory to establish how the tension between these goals may be addressed. 
There is a perception that the European-derived provisions concerning the 
protection of employees’ rights, in the context of insolvent business transfers, are 
inimical to the rescue culture in the United Kingdom. While the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE) are necessary 
in ensuring that employees’ rights are not walked over during transfers of 
insolvent businesses, it is equally important that policy makers take into account 
the fact that the rescue and continuity of such businesses would yield a better 
result for the employees, in terms of job security, than would be the case if they 
are liquidated. Accordingly, legislation which seeks to protect the rights of 
employees in insolvency should first contribute to the rescue of insolvent 
businesses. Using theory as a tool for explanation, this research argues that it was 
in a bid to contribute to rescues of insolvent businesses that the Acquired Rights 
Directive (ARD) and TUPE were amended at the European and UK national levels. 
Theory helps in explaining how the changes made have struck the appropriate 
balance between employee protection and business rescue and offers normative 
justifications for these policies in the context of going concern transfers of 
insolvent business.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ON THE 
RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction  
The relationship between the employees and the company they work for is 
‘symbiotic’1 in nature: the employees need the company to attain their economic 
needs just as the company needs the employees for its day to day functioning.  
Both benefit from each other. Thus, neither the company nor the employees 
should exert too much pressure on each other if the long term survival of the 
relationship is to be guaranteed. 
The firm and the shareholder value maximising principle, gained prominence at a 
time when access to large pools of finance capital was considered the most 
important new resource to be mobilized.2 However, the purpose of the modern 
firm is, arguably, no longer to serve the interests of its shareholders. The firm has 
become a place of social relationships enabling the organisation of the worker’s 
economic life.3 Companies develop and grow based on the accumulated know-
how and experiences of their employees.4 Today, employees represent the most 
important asset of every company5 due to the human capital contributions they 
make in a company. The employees’ skills, inter alia, are considered strategic and 
critical assets in the modern firm.6   
                                                          
1  ‘Symbiosis’ is a term in biology. A ‘symbiotic relationship’ is a term commonly employed to explain 
the relationship between two entities that depend on each other to survive and prosper. It is 
therefore a mutually beneficial relationship for the parties (employees and the company in the 
context of this research). The point here is that there is a positive-sum gain from cooperation 
between the employees and the company they work for. 
2  Adolf Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick 1991) 3; A Berle, ‘Modern Functions of the Corporate System’ (1962) 62 Col L Rev 433, 
437; Alfred Dupont Chandler, The Invisible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 
(Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA 1977); Mark J Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political 
Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press Princeton NJ 1994). 
3   J E Stiglitz,`Employment, Social Justice and Societal Well-being’ (2002) 141 Int’l Labour Rev.  
4   Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1959). 
5   Michael Armstrong, A Handbook of Personnel Practice (4th edn., Kogan Page, London 1991). 
6   Peter Drucker, Managing in Turbulent Times, (Harper and Row, New York 1980); Lester C Thurow, 
The Future of Capitalism, (W Morrow & Co, New York 1996). 
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The law regulating business transfers is indispensable for protecting the 
employees’ acquired rights, especially in the context of insolvency. The sale of a 
business on a going concern basis is also desirable because it preserves value in 
comparison to an asset sale. Therefore, it offers the best returns for creditors as 
well as job security for many employees. However, the legal pitfalls of such a law, 
and the adverse effects it could have on employees’ job security generally, 
cannot be overemphasised. Regulations that protect employee rights in business 
transfer situation could deter the purchase and rescue of insolvent businesses due 
to associated employee liability concerns. 
It follows that any law which is aimed at safeguarding the rights of workers, 
especially in situations where the company employing them is insolvent, and its 
business is transferred (wholly or in part) as a going concern to third party 
purchaser, should be flexible and capable of contributing to the rescue of such a 
business.7 Otherwise, a law that was intended to protect the interests8 of the 
employees (jobs wise) could become self-defeating if its strict application were to 
imperil the continuous survival of the insolvent business.9 This is because where 
the business cannot be sold all the employees engaged by the insolvent business 
will lose their jobs. 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the subject of the research to the 
reader. This chapter provides the background to the research and outlines the 
                                                          
7  Anneli Loubser, ‘The Interaction between Corporate Rescue and Labour Legislation; Lessons to be 
Drawn from the South African Experience’ (2005) 14 Int’l Insol. Rev. 57-69. 
8  In general terms, ‘an interest is a demand or desire or expectation which human beings either 
individually or in groups or associations or relations seek to satisfy, of which, therefore, the 
adjustment of human relations and ordering of human behaviour through the force of a politically 
organised society must take into account.’ Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 
Minn 1959). Employees have various kinds of interests in insolvency. An employee has both a right 
and an interest to be paid contractually agreed wages and benefits. When employees invest firm-
specific human capital in the firm, their contribution, it has been argued, ranks in importance as, or 
even more important than, the shareholders' investment of finance capital. See Wanjiru Njoya, 
‘Employee Ownership and Efficiency: An Evolutionary Perspective’ (2004) 33 (3) ILJ 211-241. It follows 
that the employees have a legitimate expectation (that non-insolvency law may not specifically 
protect) that the investment they have made in the firm will be protected and their contribution to it 
rewarded, perhaps, by continuity of employment when the firm is sold (solvent or insolvent) as a 
going concern to a third party purchaser. See Donald R Korobkin, ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ 
(1996) 4 Am Bankr. Inst. L Rev. 5-34; Richard Parr & Nicola Benett, ‘The Rescue Culture v Collective 
Employment Rights’ (2005) 18 (10) Insolvency Intelligence 156-157; Simon Whelan & Leon Zwier, 
‘Employee Entitlements and Corporate Insolvency and Reconstruction’ 
(2005)<http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/research-
papers/Protection%20of%20employee%20entitlements%20_final_1.pdf> accessed 5 May 2010. 
9  Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ 
[2000] CFIL 249-71; Wanjiru Njoya, ‘The Interface between Redundancy and TUPE Transfers’ (2003) 
32 (2) ILJ 123-128. 
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focus of the investigation. The aim is to contextualise the conflict between 
employment protection and the ‘rescue’ of insolvent businesses or undertakings 
arising when such a business or undertaking is transferred as a going concern10 in 
the United Kingdom (UK). Overall, the research is focused on the problems posed 
to business rescues in the UK by the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations (TUPE). These Regulations implemented the European 
Union’s Acquired Rights Directive (ARD) on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of a 
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business, into the UK domestic 
law. The chapter also sets out the hypothesis, the objectives and the analytical 
legal scholarship adopted in the research as well as the overall structure of the 
research. 
1.2 Background 
Corporate insolvency 11  is a phenomenon that is inherent in every market 
economy.12 Insolvency is a business misfortune that is non-selective and non-
respecter of size. Both big and small businesses alike are prone to it. Insolvency 
traverses all sectors of the world’s economies. There is no sector of an economy 
                                                          
10  For the avoidance of confusion, the term ‘going concern sale’ as used in this thesis does not refer 
to liquidation which denotes the conversion of the company’s assets into cash by means of sale as the 
phrase is commonly used in US and some other jurisdictions. Rather, it refers to the sale of the 
undertakings or businesses of a company with all of its assets intact which may then continue under 
new ownership and management, but free from its debts. Thus, the going concern transfer of a 
business must also be treated, as a matter of law, as implying neither a supply of goods, nor a supply 
of services. For further exposition, see J. Armour, A. Hsu and A. Walters, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the 
United Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2008) 5 ECRF 148.  
11  The term ‘insolvency’ has wide usage with different connotations. In one sense it could be used to 
refer to when the assets of a company are less than its liabilities- ‘balance sheet’ insolvency. 
Insolvency laws in most jurisdictions permit inference to be drawn that a debtor is insolvent when it is 
unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Insolvency as a term is not just a descriptor of a company’s 
financial condition it is often also used as a cipher for formal proceedings. Though there may be times 
when the term will be used interchangeably in reference to formal proceedings and inability to pay 
debts, the term ‘insolvency’ as used here refers strictly to the ‘balance sheet’ test of insolvency. See 
e.g. Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (3rd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005); J 
Armour, ‘What has the Financial Crisis Taught Us about Insolvency Law’ in E Vermeulen et al (eds) Met 
Recht: Liber Amicorum for Theo Raaijmakers (Kluwer Rechtswetenschappelijke Publicates, The 
Netherlands 2009) 2.  
12  Bruce G Carruthers & Terrence C Halliday, Rescuing Businesses: The Making of Bankruptcy Law in 
England and the United States (OUP, Oxford 1998) 1. 
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that may be said to be more susceptible to the phenomenon than the others. As 
long as credit13 is involved in the economy, any company can become insolvent. 
Credit is of outstanding significance in the modern economic system of the 
world.14 Credit plays a vital role in business finance.15 In the corporate world, the 
bulk of the world’s trading activity carried out by companies is conducted 
through the use of credit.16  While credit is useful in commerce, it also has its 
down side. Credit gives rise to debt. Arguably, without credit there will be no 
debt. Debt17 is the result of the extension of credit. Credit allows one party 
(creditor) to provide money or other resources to another party (borrower) 
without the latter reimbursing the former immediately. Rather, the party 
borrowing the money or resources will defer, or arrange either to repay or return 
the resources at a later date. This is how debt is generated in the process and the 
borrower becomes technically, the debtor. 18  Thus, credit establishes the 
relationship between the creditor (lender) and the debtor (borrower) in the 
corporate world. 
It has been opined that ‘credit and debt are created and destroyed 
simultaneously.’ 19  The connotation of this statement is simply that since the 
granting of credit by one party means the assumption of a debt by another, the 
repayment of the debt effectively extinguishes the credit.20 Unfortunately, debts 
are not always repaid by debtors when they become due or on demand. Thus, in 
a society where businesses rely on credit, there is always the risk that those who 
                                                          
13  Credit may take the form of loan credit - in which one party advances money to another party on 
terms of repayment, or sales credit - in which case goods, services or other things are supplied by one 
party to another on the basis of payment at a later date. See Goode (n 11) 2. 
14  Sir Kenneth Cork in his report referred to credit as the ‘lifeblood of the modern industrialised 
economy.’ See particularly Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 
8558, 1982) CH. 1, para 10 
15  Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge 
2002) 69; Mrityunjoy Banerjee, Business Organisation: An introductory Analysis (Asia Publishing 
House, Bombay 1964) 112- 13. 
16 Professor Roy Goode has stated unequivocally that: ‘A world without credit is impossible to 
imagine.’ See Goode (n 11) 2.  
17  A debt is a liquidated claim. It is a claim for an amount which is ascertained or can be readily and 
easily ascertained without difficulty. See O’Driscoll v Manchester Insurance Committee [1915] 3KB 
499. For the different types of debts in the context of insolvency, see Insolvency Rule 1986, r. 
13.12(1). 
18 Goode (n 11). 
19 S Joseph, ‘The Importance of Finance and Credit in the Economy’ (2010) 
<http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/334/9/09_chapter1.pdf> accessed 03 January 
2012. 
20   ibid. 
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are owed money (creditors)21 by a debtor company will suffer some setbacks 
when the company becomes unable to pay its debts on the due date.22 There are 
many reasons why a company may become unable to pay its debts as they fall 
due.23 Insolvency, however, is a factual assessment of the company’s financial 
state taken as a whole. This is because a company may be experiencing financial 
difficulties without being technically insolvent. However, financial difficulty is 
often a precursor to a company becoming eventually insolvent while inability to 
pay debts as they fall due24 means that the company is insolvent.25  
Under the English insolvency law, there are two basic tests for determining the 
insolvency of a company. These are the ‘balance sheet’ and the ‘cash flow’ or 
‘commercial’ tests. 26  The basic ‘balance sheet’ test of insolvency considers 
whether the company has negative assets - that is whether its assets are worth less 
than its liabilities. Under this test, a company is deemed insolvent if it is proved to 
the satisfaction of the court that its assets are insufficient to discharge its liabilities, 
‘taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities.’ 27 However, the 
Court of Appeal (CA) has reinterpreted the test for balance sheet insolvency 
under section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 in one of its recent judgments on 
                                                          
21  This also applies to the employees who may be owed back pay when the company becomes 
insolvent. The concept of deferred payment also applies to their pensions which may be threatened 
by insolvency as well. Sometimes, employees could also have deferred pay plans in which part of their 
pays are deferred and invested through a trust arrangement, and returned with any interest at the 
employee’s option such as resignation or retirement. This could be affected by the company’s 
insolvency. 
22  Finch (n 15) 9. Various literatures suggest that the risk may be greater with small companies 
because the directors are more likely to be the controlling shareholders. Professor Keay opines that  it 
is obvious that risk-taking by Directors will always occur especially in closed corporations where the 
directors are also the owners. Andrew Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns 
Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors’ (2003) 66 MLR 665- 669. See also A keay, 
Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (Routledge, 2007) 183. In large corporations however, 
the view is that because management is generally separated from ownership and based on the 
potential consequences for misbehaviour, UK companies’ directors may well have a greater incentive 
to act cautiously to retain their remuneration, reputations and the ability to act as directors of other 
companies in future since breaches of duty may result in civil penalty action under the applicable 
sections of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. See Helen Anderson, ‘Theory and Reality 
in Insolvency: Some Contradictions in Australia’ (2009) Company and Securities Law Journal 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AndersonCLTA09.pdf> accessed 20 
April 2012. See also Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss. 1- 6. 
23 On this see further, John Argenti ‘Corporate Collapse: The causes and Symptoms’ (McGraw-Hill, 
London 1976) 26-33. See also Finch (n 15).  
24 Professor Roy Goode articulates that the phrase ‘as they fall due’ is suggestive of a continuous 
succession of debts rather than a calculation of debts existing on any particular day. Goode (n 12) 96. 
See also the case of Bank of Australasia v Hall [1907] 4 CLR 1514, 1528. 
25 Insolvency Act (hereafter ‘IA’ for convenience) 1986, s.  123. 
26 IA 1986, s. 123 (1) (e). 
27 IA 1986, s. 123 (2).   
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the matter.  In BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL PLC 
& Ors,28 the CA was of the view that it is wrong that a company should be deemed 
balance sheet insolvent in every situation where its liabilities happen to exceed 
its assets. The CA’s decision has the implication that courts will not determine 
balance sheet insolvency by solely making technical calculations off the balance 
sheet. Rather, the courts will ask if the company has reached ‘the end of the road’. 
Thus, in the instant case, Eurosail was not insolvent within the meaning of the 
Insolvency Act, even though its financial statement and management account 
revealed net liabilities of 75 million and 135 million respectively. 
The cash flow perspective on insolvency takes into consideration factors such as 
the company’s present and anticipated cash resources, other means available to 
the company to satisfy its liabilities or pay its debts as they fall due, other non-
cash resources that could be realised either by sale or by secured borrowing and 
when these resources can be realised to meet those liabilities.29 Put differently, 
the courts would have to take into consideration not only factors such as the 
company’s debts currently due and payable, its expected cash flow, its realisable 
assets and its potentials for securing borrowings to make up for the short fall in 
cash pending when this can be remedied,30 but also debts expected to be due in 
the future.31 
A company’s insolvency has ramifications. It is a misconception to think that the 
insolvency of a company has consequences only for the debtor company and its 
creditors. This is because the insolvency of a company touches on numerous 
                                                          
28 [2011] EWCA Civ 227. 
29 Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 53 NSWLR 213, 224 
(Palmer J). 
30 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 130 (Emmett J). 
31 Re Cheyne Finance plc, [2008] 1 BCLC 741. The Court’s decision  Re Cheyne contradicted its earlier 
position in High Berry Ltd v Colt Telecom [2003] BPIR  324 where it would not allow ‘tentative and 
shaky peering into the middle distance’ when attempts were made to establish cash flow insolvency 
of a company in administration. However, it is pertinent to point out that the factual backdrop that 
led to the decision in Re Cheyne was very different to that of Colt Telecom. Cheyne was a structured 
investment vehicle (SIV) experiencing cash flow difficulty and whose future liabilities and the asset 
pool with which to meet them was, without some kind of refinancing, fixed. Cheyne was, or was about 
to become unable to pay its debts to creditors whose claims against it were required to be paid in 
priority as contemplated by section 123 of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Therefore, in Cheyne the 
phrase ‘as they fall due’ gave the assessment its future element. But such an assessment was 
however, fact sensitive since inability to pay its debts as they fall due had to be shown on the ‘balance 
of probabilities’ implying that the company’s inability to pay was more likely than not. See Tim 
Crocker & Nicholas Herrod, `Knowledge: Meaning of “unable to pay debts as they fall due’’’ (2008) 
Allen & Overy, <http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?contentTypeID=1&c> 
accessed 17 August 2008. 
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interests and these interests simultaneously co-exist.32 It has been asserted that 
the particular communities or interests that the insolvency system should 
recognise are those with a substantial nexus to the debtor.33 In the UK, as in most 
other jurisdictions, the interests that may be deemed as having a substantial 
connection to the company would include the management (who may be 
displaced functionally by an external manager during insolvency proceedings), 
the company’s creditors (who may not be paid in full what they are owed by an 
insolvent company), the shareholders of the company (who may not receive 
dividends and most importantly lose their investment) and the employees of the 
insolvent entity who, in addition to being owed back wages may potentially lose 
their jobs.34 
1.3 Context and theory  
The modern company is a means of organising economic life.35 It is a principal 
factor in economic organisation through its mobilisation of property interests in an 
economy.36 An economy is a spatially limited and social network where goods 
and services are exchanged according to demand and supply between 
participants by a medium of exchange with a credit or debit value accepted 
                                                          
32 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (YUP, New Haven 1997) 
19. 
33 ibid. 
34  Frisby (n 9) 
35 A Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick 1991) 3; A Berle, ‘Modern Functions of the Corporate System’ (1962) 62 Columbia Law 
Review, 433, 437. 
36 By property in this context is meant productive property- i.e. ‘property devoted to production, 
manufacture, service or commerce, and designed to offer, for a price, goods or services to the public 
from which a holder expects to derive a return’. See Berle and Means (n 34a) above. At the level of a 
corporation, productive property may be divided into two layers: that fraction which, though not 
managed by active owners, is administered to yield a return by way of interest, dividends or 
distribution of profit, and a second layer dominated and controlled by the representatives and 
delegates of passive owners whose decisions and true position vis-a-vis these properties have elicited 
the much documented ownership and control debates in corporate governance literature. See 
generally, Wendy Carlin, ‘Ownership, Corporate governance, Specialization and Performance: 
Interpretation of recent evidence for the OECD countries’ in Jean-Phippe Touffut (ed.) Does Company 
Ownership Matter? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2009); Brian R Cheffins, ‘Corporate Ownership and 
Control: British Business Transformed’ (OUP, Oxford 2008); Margaret M Blair, Ownership and Control: 
Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (The Brookings Institution, Washington 
DC 1995); Christos  N Pitelis, ‘The Separation of Ownership and Control in the Theory of the Firm: A 
Reappraisal’ (1986) 4 International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 69-86;  Mauro F Guillen, 
‘Corporate Governance and Globalization: Arguments and Evidence against Convergence’ (1999) 
<http://knowledge.emory.edu/papers/839.pdf> accessed 03 March 2012. 
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within the network.37 Economic activity - the supply of all goods and services - in 
every economy is made possible mostly through the vehicular means of 
companies. The goods produced, and the services rendered by companies are in 
turn made possible through the combined resources of the various stakeholders 
or ‘team members’ that make up the company. Team members include the 
shareholders and the employees, inter alia, who provide the capital for the team 
production and the labour needed to convert capital into goods and services 
needed in an economy respectively.38  
It has been opined that the purpose of all economic activity is, or at least ought to 
be, the enhancement of the economic well-being39 of the individuals. Two of the 
key indices often used to measure human well-being are job satisfaction and job 
security. 40 There is also the notion that economic structures that are able to 
achieve these particular purposes are more desirable than those incapable of so 
doing.41 What this suggests in effect is that a prime consideration in the carrying 
on of industry should be the enhancement of the well-being of the men and 
women engaged in it. It follows therefore that a good and balanced industrial 
policy is one which gives equal weight of considerations to the welfare of the 
employees as it does the making of profits for companies. This is also the type of 
policy which, when the need arises, can subordinate the profit-making goal to the 
welfare of the company’s stakeholders, especially the employees of the 
company. 42  While this philosophy appears to be one shared by virtually all 
politicians in every country, in practice, the policies pursued by them often do not 
reflect a commitment to bringing this aspiration to fruition.43   
Most policies championed by politicians are usually antithetical to the above 
ideology. Most industrial policies favour having a flexible labour market which 
                                                          
37 Alfred D Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (HUP, Cambridge, MA, 
1990).  
38 See e.g. John D Rockefeller, Jr, discussing the two as partners in his seminal essay: ‘John D 
Rockefeller, Jr, On Labour and Capital’ published in the New York Times (January 9, 1916) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf> accessed 29 October 2012. See also A A Alchian 
and H Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, (1972), 62 Am Econ. Rev. 
777; Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, ‘Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction’, 
(1998-1999) 24 Journal of Corp. Law 743, 745; Blair and Stout ‘A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Virginia L Rev. 247.  
39 ‘Well-being’ in the context used here refers to remunerative employment, fair wages, reasonable 
working conditions, job security and other employment associated incentives for the employees. 
40 See e.g. I M D Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (OUP, Oxford 1957) 6. 
41  Stiglitz (n 3). 
42  Rockefeller, Jr (n 38).  
43 Stiglitz (n 3). 
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enhances profit making. Although policies that push for ‘labour market 
flexibility’44 are beneficial to the employers and the company in general, these 
tend to operate to the disadvantage of the workers.45 For example, an economic 
policy that advocates that management prioritise the interests of providers of 
capital by working to ensure that this group maximises its wealth without having 
just regard to the rights of the employees, trivialises, or completely discounts the 
human capital contributions made by the employees in the joint venture.46 
It is no exaggeration to say that for a large percentage of the world’s population, 
work or employment of some kind is very important.47 For the individual, while 
not being gainfully employed would raise concerns of a subsistence nature, 
losing a job would be of even greater concern for several reasons.48  For the 
individual, job loss is not just about the loss of income; it is also about the loss of 
that individual’s sense of self-esteem.49 Beyond this, job loss and unemployment 
are associated with a myriad of problems and pathologies.50 Research has shown 
that job loss could lead to alcoholism, increase the rates of suicide, divorce,51 and 
                                                          
44 The term ‘labour market flexibility’ is used here to refer to the ease with which workers and 
employers can negotiate mutually advantageous labour contracts so that remuneration, working 
conditions and workforce size can fluctuate with the least possible interference. For an analysis of the 
four dimensions that comprises labour market flexibility, see Howard Reed, ‘Flexible with the Truth? 
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crime,52 especially in countries that do not have a social security safety net for the 
unemployed.53 From this perspective, it is important that policy-makers pursue 
employment law policies that can keep workers in their jobs (at least in cases 
where there are no grounds for fair dismissals) rather than those that facilitate 
their dismissals and put them back in the job market. 
Unfortunately, in relation to economic policies, the voices of commercial and 
financial interests are often louder, and hearkened to, more than that of labour 
(employees). 54  The adverse effects on employees of the economic policies 
advocating a flexible labour market are aggravated by the main instrument used 
in the construction of market-based economies. In market-based economies, 
companies are fundamentally contract-based 55  Rather than promoting fair 
bargains between parties, contract produces inequalities and power asymmetries 
between the employer and the employee with the former always having the 
upper hand. 56  An employment relationship based on contract does not offer 
protection to the interests and rights of the employee during a going concern 
business transfer in a free market economy.57  
Upon the transfer of an undertaking on a going concern basis and in the absence 
of protection under employment law, continuity of employment would be at the 
discretion of the transferee. To remedy these types of problems, the potential role 
of the government in each state becomes of paramount importance. At the 
minimum, the government can assist in enforcing minimum labour standards that 
would help in the protection of the employees’ rights especially in situations  
where the business they work for becomes insolvent and is transferred  as a going 
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concern to another employer. This will, theoretically, provide a modicum of 
industrial peace by ensuring that the employees’ rights are safeguarded from 
infringement by the employers.58 This could be done through the enactment of 
legislation either at the national level by the governments of individual states, or 
at the supranational level (where the state is a member of a regional organisation) 
as there is with the European Union (EU) in Europe.59 However, in looking to 
government intervention by way of legislation protecting employees’ rights 
during transfers, we have to bear in mind what the ‘evil effects’60 of legislation 
are. It has been contended that legislation aimed at making a change in an 
existing system sometimes worsens the problem it was meant to address.61  
It is hardly contestable that for an employee, security in the job he or she actually 
holds is very important. A secure job is an essential part of an employee’s ‘long-
term economic security’.62 However, in an attempt to provide job security for 
workers, especially in situations involving transfers of insolvent businesses, 
through legislation, the continuous existence of the insolvent business employing 
the worker could be imperilled.63 The point here is that employee rights may in 
one context hamper company reorganisations which is not what this research is 
about. In the context of this research however, employee rights may also hamper 
business rescues. Onerous employment liabilities imposed on employers by 
protective labour legislation (such as TUPE) could deter purchasers and hamper 
the rescues of insolvent businesses. It is with all these considerations in mind that 
we must analyse the positives, as well as the negatives, of the EU-induced 
Transfer Regulations in the UK. 
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1.3.1 The case for employment protection during transfers of 
insolvent undertakings 
In the past three decades most European countries have witnessed profound 
changes in labour markets. Organisations in all sectors of EU economies are 
engaged in continual restructuring 64  to increase productivity, lower unit 
production costs and improve product and service quality. 65  Whilst forms of 
restructuring may vary from sector to sector, the overall outcome is greater 
adoption of advanced technology, the introduction of new working practices (e.g. 
‘non-standard’ work practices like part-time and temporary employment as 
opposed to standard work practice undertaken by employees with permanent 
employment contracts and working full-time for a single employer).66 Sometimes, 
firms transfer their entire production activities, or some aspects of the production, 
to lower cost localities inside and outside the EU.67  
A related tendency has been for large businesses to focus on a core of essential 
functions and to outsource the remainder. In some other cases (especially when 
the business is insolvent), the whole or part of the business or undertaking of the 
company may be sold to a third party purchaser on a going concern basis. 
Structural changes on this scale raise understandable issues of social concern. 
They are often accompanied by high levels of unemployment and job insecurity 
for the workers. At an individual level, unemployment and job insecurity are a 
source of considerable personal economic insecurity. 68  At the EU level, the 
anticipation that a lot of business restructurings would occur in the post-common 
market era, and concerns over the potential effects that these would have on the 
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workers, necessitated the enactment of laws to protect the rights of European 
employees during business transfers in the Member States.69 
Employees working for UK businesses enjoy, in addition to contract rights, a wide 
range of statutory rights.70 These are general rights such as the right to a written 
statement setting out certain basic terms and conditions of employment 
(especially those not covered in the employment contract),71 the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed;72 the right to compensation if made redundant73 and the right 
to continuity of employment where a business is transferred to a third party 
purchaser as a going concern and the latter voluntarily keeps an existing 
employee of the transferred business.74 There are also formal constraints (laws) 
offering employment protection to employees by placing restrictions on an 
employer’s ability to hire workers on non-standard contracts. This is because non-
standard employment contracts also give the employer the flexibility needed to 
easily dispense with the employees at will. The aim is to give workers some 
degree of job security.  
If the employees are statutorily protected when their corporate employer is 
solvent, there may be a valid argument over the desirability of statutory 
protection when the employer is insolvent. From the perspective of employees, 
this is because they have numerous interests in an insolvency setting that deserve 
protection. Also, there is the argument that certain problems confronting 
employees only arise specifically due to the insolvency of their employer.75 For 
example, when a company is insolvent, the prospect of payment of wages 
diminishes. The literature on corporate insolvency also reveals that personal and 
social costs of insolvency often fall disproportionately on the employees.76  There 
is the perception that employees cannot hedge against the risks associated with 
corporate collapse. Unlike the shareholders and the creditors of an insolvent 
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company, employees cannot diversify their investment portfolios. Employees are 
also not able to bargain for security when they contract to join the 
company. 77 Employees make a contribution of firm-specific human capital 
investments to the company. The firm-specific nature of these investments 
restricts their mobility and uses in other industries.78 
In the context of insolvency, financially distressed businesses often tend to see 
employees as the ‘sacrificial lamb’ for remedying their financial situations. For 
most insolvent businesses employees constitute a reducible cost and an easy way 
out of their financial predicaments.79 Sometimes, when a company is insolvent the 
need might arise for it to sell its business or part of it. In such situations, the 
employees are usually seen as the ‘soft target’ in terms of costs cutting and as a 
way of making the business attractive to prospective buyers. 80  Moreover, a 
business transfer under the common law was not in the employee’s interest. The 
transfer of a business operated to terminate all extant employment relationships 
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between the employee and the employer.81 In effect, what this means is that 
where a business was sold to a new owner (and because there was no statutorily 
enshrined right to continued employment), the transferee (new owner) was not 
obliged to take on any of the transferor’s employees. The transferee was also free 
to ‘cherry-pick’ which of the employees he or she wished to retain post-transfer of 
the business.  
Equally, where the transferee took on an employee, no obligation was placed on 
him or her to take on that employee on the same terms and conditions of service 
as he or she enjoyed with the transferor employer. In fact, quite often, the 
opposite was the case. Transferees who voluntarily retained some of the 
transferor’s entire workforce often re-engaged the employees on inferior terms 
and conditions. These types of injustices that the common law visited on the 
employees during transfers of undertakings could justify laws on employee 
protection. 
The problem is that for the employees to be afforded adequate protection, in the 
context of job security during transfers of undertakings, legislation would have to 
be enacted. A sure, but very controversial, way of achieving job security for the 
employees of an insolvent transferor would be to place certain stringent legal 
restrictions on the management’s freedom to dismiss employees with ease when 
seeking to transfer an insolvent business on a going concern basis. This tends to 
be the approach adopted by the EU and, by extension, the UK as demonstrated in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.   
The transfer of undertakings in Member States of the EU is legislated at the 
European level through the Acquired Rights Directive (ARD) enacted in 1977 and 
revised in 1998 and 2001 respectively. The main purpose of this special regime is 
to safeguard the rights of the employees when the business or undertaking 
employing them is transferred to a new owner. In effect, the ARD is social 
legislation aimed at safeguarding jobs for the employees.82 Member States have 
implemented the ARD into their respective national laws. In the UK, the ARD has 
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been implemented through the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations (TUPE) initially in 1981 and revised in 2006.  
TUPE applies to transfers of solvent and insolvent undertakings or businesses. In 
relation to the protection of the employees’ rights during business transfers, the 
TUPE Regulations have proved to be a very effective law. TUPE mitigates or 
neutralises the effects of transfers of undertakings on the employees. The 
Regulations establish for the employees, inter alia, the right to continued 
employment on substantially the same terms and conditions as those originally 
agreed with the previous employer before the business transfer occurred.83  
In relation to insolvent business transfers, this practice is perhaps, recognition 
that ‘in certain situations, employees may have property-like claims’84 on the 
company. That is to say, employees have interests which transcend the terms of 
their employment contracts in the company. 85  The adoption of a proprietary 
approach to employee protection is a reflection of the notion of employment 
security for employees in the business they work for. It is vital that a worker be 
able to have reliance on job security in a market inundated with the supply of 
labour in comparison with the demand for it.  
The implicit model of the firm is one with management at the top and a more or 
less fungible ‘workforce’ at the bottom.86 In an employment relationship what this 
means therefore is that the employees are ‘weak’ while the employers are 
‘strong’.87 That is to say, employers have a lot of bargaining power in comparison 
to the employees. An argument can therefore be made that the protection given 
to the employees during insolvent business transfers is justified because not only 
does it take cognisance of the valuable human capital contribution employees 
make to the business,88 but it also recognises the valuable long-term relationship 
                                                          
83 ARD 1977, Article 3(1) & (2). 
84  Deakin and Njoya (n 56). 
85  ibid. 
86  Wanjiru Njoya, Property in Work: The Employment Relationship in Anglo-American Firm (Ashgate 
Publishing 2007); Deakin and Morris (n 53) 338.  
87  It has to be acknowledged that, given the prevalence of the service economy, the shift from an 
industrial to service/information and digital economy, there will be situations when much of the value 
that is tied up in a workforce could, in truth, has considerable leverage. 
88  O E Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 
(Free Press, New York 1985) 242-3; Margaret M Blair,‘Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the 
Firm’, (2003) Georgetown University Law Center, Business, Economic and Regulatory Policy Working 
Paper No.167848 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=167848> accessed 27 January 2011; Margaret M 
Blair and Lynn Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Virginia L REV. 247; Janis 
38 
 
that exist between the employees and the businesses or companies they work 
for.89  
However, there is the perception that the ARD and TUPE-style protection of UK 
workers during transfers of insolvent undertakings ‘over-deter’ purchasers and so 
undermine the prospects for successful going concern sales. The potential effects 
of these regimes on entrepreneurship have been the subject of various academic 
analysis and criticisms.90 A transferee might be reluctant to honour obligations 
that originate from the previous employment relationship. He or she might prefer 
to make unbridled choices in relation to the running of the undertaking. From the 
transferor’s perspective, the fewer the hindrances to the successful transfer of the 
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undertaking, the less likely it is that the purchase price that will be paid for it will 
be affected. Any burden transferred to the purchaser is likely to be reflected in 
how much the transferee is willing to pay. These types of issues, if not carefully 
handled, could derail, what otherwise could have been successful rescues of 
insolvent businesses resulting in job losses for the employees.  
1.3.2 The tension between employment protection and rescue 
of insolvent businesses 
In the UK, insolvency does not necessarily spell the legal demise of all legal 
persons since rescue is a core policy objective of English insolvency law.91 
Although the English insolvency regime expressly prioritises corporate 
rescue, 92 in reality, business rescue is far more common. 93 Insolvency law 
provides a menu of options for rehabilitating distressed but economically 
viable companies helping them avoid winding-up. One way of doing this is 
through a going concern sale or transfer of the whole or part of the 
undertakings of the company to a new owner.94 Some of the advantages of a 
going concern sale over piecemeal sale include facilitating the continuation of 
the business. A sale is an important mechanism to induce the redeployment of 
the assets of an insolvent company to better uses.95 A partial business sale may 
offer the debtor company an opportunity to solve its debts and illiquidity 
problems by freeing it from its debts.96  
However, the transfer of an undertaking in the UK has a number of mandatory 
legal consequences. Not only is there an automatic and obligatory transfer of all 
relevant employees and their contracts of employment, but there is also a 
statutory requirement that all debts owed to all transferring employees and all 
other liabilities in relation to them and arising in the employment relationship 
must transfer to the transferee.97 This statutory protection accorded to employees 
                                                          
91 Insolvency Act 1986, Schd. B1 para. 3 (a). 
92 ibid. 
93  Sandra Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002’ 67 MLR (2), 247-272; 
Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008). 
94  Lynn M LoPucki & J W Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Fire Sales’ (2007), UCLA School of Law, Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series, 5 research paper No. 07-07  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=980585> 
accessed 22 October 09. 
95  Michael Jensen, ‘Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance’ (1991), 4 Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 13.  
96  LoPucki & Doherty, (n 94). 
97  TUPE 2006, Reg. 4(2). 
40 
 
also applies to the employees where the company they work for becomes 
insolvent and is transferred as a going concern to a third party purchaser. This 
rule, whilst beneficial to the employees, could inhibit the rescues of insolvent 
businesses.  
The sale or transfer of an insolvent business or undertaking inevitably triggers an 
interaction between several bodies of laws. The transfer of an insolvent business 
is conducted under corporate or commercial law, peculiar insolvency matters are 
addressed exclusively by insolvency law while matters affecting employees in the 
context of a business transfer are governed by employment law (TUPE). However, 
it is the interaction between employment law and insolvency law that is of 
relevance to this thesis. The rescue of insolvent companies is an objective of 
insolvency law 98  just as the protection of employment is the objective of 
employment law. The interaction between these two sets of laws is inevitable 
when a company becomes insolvent. The down side to this interaction is that 
employment protection and business rescue objectives conflict with each other. 
In insolvency, and especially where the transfer of the company’s undertaking is 
inevitable, employment legislation seeks to maintain the employees’ existing 
employment status with the business, whereas the employer is intimately 
concerned with how to sell the business with minimal impact of any labour 
encumbrances on the sale price, so as to maximise the going concern value of the 
business. These two divergent aspirations often ‘collide’ with each other during 
transfers of insolvent undertakings. 
To rescue a financially distressed business, some jobs might have to be 
sacrificed. But TUPE limits the employer’s ability to do this. It impinges on 
managerial decision-making powers. TUPE reduces, rather than increases, 
entrepreneurial freedom.99 On the other hand, while the employees benefit from 
its protection, the TUPE-type protection may deter rescuers of insolvent 
undertakings. If the business cannot be rescued, ultimately it is the employees 
that will suffer. The closure of the business means job losses for the employees. 
From this perspective, it can be argued that there is tension between an economic 
rationale that demands greater business flexibility on the one hand, and a social 
                                                          
98 In administration proceedings for example, the administrator of a company is statutorily required to 
perform his functions primarily with the objective of ‘rescuing the company as a going concern.’ IA 
1986, Schd. B1 para. 3(1) (a). 
99  Hardy and Adnett (n 69); Jeffery (n 90) 670. 
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rationale calling for a certain degree of job security for workers on the other 
hand.100 The argument here is that while the social policy underlying both the 
ARD and the TUPE Regulations, aimed at providing statutory protection to EU 
employees during transfers of undertakings and other forms of restructurings was 
able to strengthen the social rights of EU and UK workers respectively, they failed 
to increase entrepreneurial freedom.101  It seems that trade-offs would have to be 
made if an effective balance between these policies’ goals is to be struck.  
1.3.3 Business rescue and employment protection: striking a 
balance between policies’ goals 
The uncertainty in the dynamics of every economy is indicative of the fact that the 
consequences of any policy cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.102 For 
this reason, all decision-making must take into account potential problems that 
policies could engender.103 Thus, every policy structure, whether of a state or an 
organisation, must always take into account the downside of any policies which 
cannot be reversed or easily amended. A policy or law should at least be 
amendable. In the case of the 1977 ARD, when it became evident that the regime 
was having negative effects, not just on business rescues but ultimately, also, on 
the employees, the beneficiary of the regime,  it was amended, first in 1998 and 
then in 2001 to remedy these.  
In a similar vein, the TUPE Regulations which implemented the ARD into UK law 
have also been amended by the government to incorporate the changes made by 
the 2001 ARD. The changes introduced into these regimes have, arguably, struck 
a balance between the employment protection goals of employment law on the 
one hand and the rescue of insolvent companies’ goal of UK insolvency law on the 
other. 
1.4 Research hypothesis 
The hypothesis underlying the study is that while employees deserve protection 
in insolvency generally, and during the transfer of an insolvent business as a 
                                                          
100  Morin & Vicens (n 64) 45. 
101  Hardy and Adnett (n 69) 127; Jeffery (n 90) 670. 
102  Stiglitz (n 3).  
103   ibid. 
42 
 
going concern specifically, employment protection should not be allowed to 
frustrate the ‘rescue culture’ in the UK.  
Obviously, cases where the business rescue objective conflicts with the employee 
protection objective may produce dilemmas for judges since both objectives 
cannot be achieved simultaneously. This presents a ‘hard case’104 scenario for 
courts and tribunals. Trade-offs would have to be made if both objectives are to 
co-exist. This inevitably involves a compromise among individual goals and 
objectives in pursuit of the overall welfare of all affected interests. But which of the 
policies will be sacrificed on the ‘altar’ of decision making? It is the tension 
between business rescue and employment protection in corporate insolvency that 
this thesis seeks to explore. The thesis makes use of theory to analyse the EU’s 
effort to grapple with this problem. The thesis also seeks to show how the UK 
courts and legislature are grappling with the tension between business rescue 
and employee protection in the context of insolvent business transfers.  
1.5 Research objectives 
1. To explore the interaction between insolvency law and employment law 
during insolvent business transfers. 
2. To evaluate the problems posed by employment protection legislation 
to the rescue of insolvent businesses or undertakings in the UK. 
3. To ascertain whether the adoption of the purposive approach to the 
interpretation of EU-derived employment legislation is helpful or 
detrimental to the ‘rescue culture.’ 
4. To offer normative justifications for the different policies implicit in 
transfers of undertakings through the lens of theory. 
1.6 Analytical legal scholarship  
The research, which is library-based, uses several legal sources for its data. 
These consist of primary and secondary legal sources. Primary sources of law 
                                                          
104 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (G. Duckworth, London 1977) 85. 
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consist of statutes, legislation (UK and European), and judicial decisions, policy 
and consultation documents, reports of legislative proceedings (e.g. Hansard). 
Secondary sources of law comprise law reports, case summaries, legal 
monographs, law journals, and writings of scholars.105 Sources are collected 
both electronically, via Nottingham Trent University’s (NTU) linked electronic 
data bases such as Westlaw, Lawtel UK, LexisNexis, Heinonline, and in hard 
copies available in NTU library and other accessible UK Libraries. 
The research adopts an interdisciplinary approach in that it draws upon law 
and economics literature as well as doctrinal insolvency and labour law 
materials from different jurisdictions to inform context. This approach permits a 
proper understanding of the policies underpinning insolvency and 
employment laws and the tradeoffs between business rescue and employment 
protection in the legal sense. Law and economics literature provide insights 
into insolvency law through competing normative theories on the subject.106 
Theories such as the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 107 , the Team Production 
Theory108 and the Authentic Consent Model,109  inter alia, all have implications 
for insolvency law, especially as regards business rescue and employment 
protection. Though all of these theories support an insolvency system that 
fosters rescue, they give differing weight to employee interests in insolvency. 
The labour law theories reveal a fundamental conflict of interests that is central 
to businesses in all capitalist society. 110  They are, however, agreed that 
employees deserve protection in insolvency because they make firm-specific 
investments in the company.111 
In respect of the analytical technique used, standard legal methods that are 
capable of best achieving the aims of the research are applied. Methods such 
as legal analysis, legal reasoning, legal or statutory interpretation techniques, 
and judicial precedent are used to analyse primary legal sources.  
                                                          
105 I McLeod, Legal Method,  (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005). 
106 R Goode (n 11) 41. 
107 Thomas H Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy, (HUP, Cambridge, MA 1986); D G Baird & T 
H Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment 
on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 UCLR 97. 
108 Blair & Stout (n 38a & 38b). 
109 Rizwaan J Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application, (London, OUP 2005). 
110H Collins, K D Ewing & A McColgan, Labour Law: Texts and Materials, (2nd edn, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2005)1. 
111 Korobkin (n 8) 5-34. 
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Legal analysis in the context of this thesis denotes how cases are viewed and 
how they might pertain to other legal matters.112 It involves identifying the 
legal question or the issue being debated, the rule governing the issue, the 
material facts relevant to the rule and then determining how the rule applies to 
the issue at hand. 113  Legal reasoning techniques are used in order to 
reconstruct the mental processes of policymakers and to provide insights into 
the reasoning of judges in reaching decisions in ‘hard cases’ 114  involving 
laudable but conflicting policy issues. 115  The notion is that the law is not 
arbitrary. Law exists to serve certain social ends. Rules derived from cases 
draw their justification from the fact that following them promotes some 
desirable ends. It follows that when rules conflict, judges resolve the conflict by 
considering the purposes that those rules were meant to serve in addition to 
evaluating their relative desirability. 
The use of legal and statutory interpretation techniques in analysing and 
construing legislations and statutes is informed by the understanding that the 
language in which legal prescriptions or norms are usually formulated can 
sometimes be obfuscatory or indeterminate. 116  Legal rules are normally 
expressed in general terms. For this reason, they have been described as rules 
having an ‘open texture.’117 This in turn has rendered legal rules capable of 
interpretation in more than one sense.118 It has been argued that ‘determination 
of ambiguity is the linchpin of statutory interpretation.’119 
Legal interpretation in law denotes the process by which the substantive object 
of the law is creatively developed and how a problematic meaning can be 
                                                          
112  Lee Epstein & Gary King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1–
133. 
113  Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard Posner, ‘Why (And When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis’ (2011) 3 Journal of Legal Analysis (1) 101- 137. 
114  H L A Hart, The Concept of Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961). 
115  Richard Posner, How Judges Think (HUP, Cambridge 2008); William M Landes & Richard A Posner, 
‘Rational Judicial Behaviour: A Statistical Study’ (2009) 1 Journal of Legal Analysis 775–831; Richard S 
Higgins & Paul H Rubin. ‘Judicial Discretion’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 129–138. 
116  Hart (n 114). 
117  ibid. 
118  K Kress, ‘Legal indeterminacy’, (1989) 77 California Law Review, 235. 
119  Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F Guzior & Anup Malani, ‘Ambiguity about Ambiguity: An Empirical 
Inquiry into Legal Interpretation’ (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis (1) 257 300. 
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simplified for a better understanding.120 It also implies an understanding of the 
underlying rules and principles in a legal system and of policy considerations 
likely to influence the courts and tribunals when deciding ‘hard cases.’121  
Statutory interpretation involves the application of different judicial principles 
or rules of statutory interpretation. These include the use of linguistic 
argument, systematic argument and purposed-based argument. Linguistic 
argument denotes the identification of definitions and operational criteria that 
enable key terms in legislation to be applied122 while the latter implies arguing 
from precedents to concrete cases; logical and conceptual argument. These 
are arguments premised on general principles of law and which inform the 
reason behind the design of many laws.  
The purpose-based argument or purposive approach requires courts and 
tribunals to interpret statutes or to base their arguments on the substantive 
purposes that lie behind each legislation. This is often referred to as the 
‘legislators’ intent’ argument - an argument predominantly based on what the 
intent of the legislators was, or could have been, in formulating the law. In 
applying this approach, the judge’s aim is to determine the mischief or defect 
which the statute in question set out to remedy and make a ruling that would 
effectively remedy such a mischief or defect. The intent of the legislator usually 
resides outside the law itself.123  
The use of judicial precedent is informed by the fact that precedent decisions 
reveal the ways in which past conflicts have been authoritatively resolved. Put 
differently, precedents represent past situations where competing factors were 
considered against one another and how a view of their relative importance was 
taken. Precedent reveals preferences amongst different purposes and how 
pending and further disputes could be resolved by such preferences. However, 
                                                          
120 M Bodig, ‘Legal Interpretation, Intentionalism, and the Authority of Law’ (2006) 2 University of 
Aberdeen, College of Arts and Social Sciences, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099433> accessed 
8/12/2009. 
121 Dworkin (n 104)  85. 
122Elina Paunio and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of 
Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal (4) 395-416; 
Hanneke Van Schooten, ‘Law as Fact, Law as Fiction: A Tripartite Model of Legal Communication’ in 
Anne Wagner, Wouter G Werner, Deborah Cao (eds.) Interpretation, law, and the construction of 
meaning: collected papers on Legal Interpretation in Theory, Adjudication and Political Practice 
(Spinger, The Netherlands 2007). 
123 N MacCormick & R S Summers, Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study, (Dartmouth Publishing, 
Aldershot, 1991). 
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not all precedents are binding.124 While decisions of lower courts, for example, 
cannot bind, decisions of the Supreme Court bind all lower courts in the UK.  
In relation to the European Union (EU), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the 
highest court in the EU. Based on the doctrine that EU law supremacy means that 
the UK courts have to follow and or implement EC rulings on EU law, the UK’s 
Supreme Court is not exempt. However, the ECJ is not an appeal court, it is a 
referral court. The ECJ is the referee between Member States, institutions and 
individuals in disputes relating specifically to EU law. Its judgements can affect 
both Member States and individuals. The ECJ makes its rulings binding on states 
and their citizens through the principles of EU law known as ‘direct effect’ and 
‘supremacy’ which the court established in the seminal cases of Van Gend en Loos 
v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 125  and Flamingo Costa v ENEL 126 
respectively. Through these principles the ECJ has gained powers that were 
previously the reserve of the nation states.127 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters. Chapter 1 (which is the current chapter) 
has introduced the subject of the research by laying out the context and theory 
underpinning the study. Chapter II presents an analysis on the ideological divide 
that exists amongst insolvency scholars and considers how the different theories 
proposed by them have shaped the understanding of the underlying problems of 
corporate insolvency. It then situates UK insolvency system within the extant 
insolvency law theories.  
Chapter III traces the genesis of EU social policy which culminated in the 
enactment of the ARD in 1977.  Chapter IV considers the ARD specifically, why it 
was adopted, how the regime operates, its effects on the employees and on 
insolvent transfers. The last part of the chapter considers how the ARD was 
implemented in the UK. Chapter V explores how a business transfer was 
regulated in the UK before the advent of the Transfer Regulations. It then 
                                                          
124 R Cross, Precedent in English Law (4th edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991). 
125 Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1 
126 Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585   
127 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law: Text Cases and Materials (5th edn., OUP, Oxford 2011). 
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considers the first generation TUPE Regulations which implemented the ARD into 
UK law.  
Chapter VI looks at the effects of applying the TUPE regime to transfers of 
insolvent undertakings. It notes that because no balance was struck between 
employment protection and business rescue, the Regulations tended to be self-
defeating in the context of insolvent businesses. Chapter VII explores how the 
revisions made to both the ARD and TUPE legal regimes in 2001 and 2006 
respectively have struck a balance between the rescue of insolvent businesses’ 
objective of insolvency law and the employment protection goal of employment 
law. Here the research seeks to demonstrate how the law has shifted in the 
attempt to resolve the tension between rescues oriented insolvency law and 
employment law. Chapter VIII offers normative justifications on the policies 
underlying the rescue culture and employment protection during transfers of 
insolvent undertakings and then concludes the study.  
1.8 Definition of key terms in the thesis 
Rescue culture: Granted, winding up is the ultimate fate of most insolvent 
companies, not all insolvency result in liquidation. Following the introduction of 
the company voluntary arrangement (almost always within the administration 
procedure) and the revamped administration procedure itself, by the Enterprise 
Act 2002, the expectation was that there would be greater scope for business 
rescues via restructuring and reorganisation where the business was deemed 
economically viable and has good prospects of being returned to profitability. 
Thus, ‘rescue culture’ as used in this thesis is concerned with the preservation of 
the business of an insolvent company, not the company itself.128 
Business rescue: The term ‘business rescue’ in the context of this thesis refers to 
the going concern sale of an insolvent company’s undertaking or business which 
will then enable the undertaking or business sold to continue the same operation 
under new ownership and management free from its debts.129 
                                                          
128See further Hunter Muir, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’ (1999) JBL 491. For the 
origin of the term, see Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) 
129 See further J Armour, A Hsu & A Walters, ‘The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations 
and Costs in Corporate Rescue Proceedings: A Report Prepared for the Insolvency Services’ (2006) 
<http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.96...rep..> accessed 20 April 2012. 
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The European Union: The European Union (EU) as it is known today started life 
as the European Economic Community (EEC). Thus, depending on the stage of 
European integration and the changes made to the name of the original European 
Economic Community, the abbreviations EEC, EC and EU are used as appropriate 
to the context in this thesis. In a similar vein, terms such as the Acquired Rights 
Directive are abbreviated to either ARD or ‘the Directive’ throughout the thesis. 
The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations is 
shortened in most places to the acronym TUPE or the terms the ‘Transfer 
Regulations or ‘Regulations’ are used for convenience. However, where specific 
mention is made to either the 1981 or to the revised 2006 Regulations, TUPE 1981 
or TUPE 2006 are used. 
Social policy: The term social policy in the context of EU law covers legislation 
on health, welfare, free movement of persons etc. However, social policy as used 
in thesis refers specifically to EU- derived employment/employee protection 
legislation in business transfer situations resulting in a change of employer. 
1.9 The law as stated in the thesis 
The law stated herein are, according to sources available to me as at April 30, 
2012. 
The next chapter explores the various theories of insolvency law with a view to 
identifying which of the extant theories can be applied in explaining the existing 
tension between employee protection and business rescue in business transfers 
in the context of insolvency. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
See also what Lord McIntosh of Haringey said concerning objective ‘B’ of the paragraph 3 Schedule B1 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions:  
Rescuing businesses is exactly the kind of outcome that the second objective is 
...intended to recover.  If it is not reasonably practicable to rescue the company, 
selling the constituent businesses as going concerns will almost always be the next 
best thing...the effect of the provisions as drafted will cover and give priority to 
business rescues. 
Hansard, HL Deb 29 July 2002, vol 638, col 768 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CORORATE INSOLVENCY: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction  
A theory is a logical explanation for why something is the way it is, or why it does 
what it does. The objective of this chapter is to consider some of the theories that 
have been applied by scholars in their attempts to explain the phenomenon of 
corporate insolvency. The various theories that will be analysed will provide the 
lens through which to analyse, interpret and offer normative justifications for 
legislative prescriptions made outside of insolvency law (through employment 
law) to protect employees during transfers of undertakings or businesses taking 
place in the context of insolvency, and whether this legislation could inhibit the 
rescues of such undertakings or businesses.  
In relation to insolvency law theories, there are two main strains. These two 
strains originally characterised as ‘economic’ and ‘social’ arguments are currently 
referred to in the literature as ‘Proceduralists’ and the ‘Traditionalists’.1 These two 
camps discussed in section 2.3 below, hold completely different and opposing 
ideological views on corporate insolvency. It will be argued in this chapter that 
the reason for the ideological divide between the above two schools of thought, in 
relation to corporate insolvency law, is because no one theory is universally 
accepted as the best explanation of the phenomenon of corporate insolvency. 
While these two camps agree that employees deserve protection in insolvency, 
they have divergent views on the approach to be used for the attainment of that 
goal. These differences stem from the belief underpinning each theorist’s view on 
what the legitimate province of insolvency law is, or ought to be. 
                                                          
1 This taxonomy is traceable to the writings of Professor Douglas G. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested 
Axioms’  (1998) 108 Yale L.J 573, 576–79; Donald G Baird, `The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations’ (1986) 15 Journal of Leg. Stud. 127,133. See also Edward J Janger, ‘Crystals and Mud 
in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design’ (2001) 43 Ariz. L Rev. 559, 566; Ziad 
Raymond Azar, ‘Bankruptcy Policy, Legal Heritage, and Financial Development: An Agenda for Further 
Research’ (2008) 24 (2) Emory Bankr Devs Journal 382 – 466. Charles W Mooney, Jr., ‘A Normative 
Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure’ (2004) 61 Wash & Lee L Rev. 931. 
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It is intended to show in this chapter that, depending on which school of thought 
or theory that insolvency policy-makers in a state subscribe to, employees of 
insolvent employers may, or may not, enjoy strong protection during transfers of 
insolvent undertakings in that state. 
2.2 The role of theory in this thesis 
A company is a nexus of interests. Even in the solvent state of a company the 
interests of its stakeholders are sometimes at odds with each other. The most 
common conflict in the company is usually characterised as the struggle between 
labour and capital.2 The intractable nature of this conflict led one commentator to 
observe that: 
To make peace between the working-man and his employer grounded in 
justice and stamped in perpetuity is the great social problem of the age. 
Whoever succeeds in doing this will more worthily earn a title to perpetual 
remembrance than any victor in battles.3 
In all corporate relations, so goes the argument, ultimately labour and capital 
share a common interest in the successful achievement of production of goods or 
services in an enterprise through the combination of inputs from both factors of 
production.4 While this observation may be correct, this type of cooperation is, 
however, never ‘conflict-free’. Moreover, the chances for a successful partnership 
between labour and capital are potentially higher during the solvent state of the 
company than in its insolvent state.  In fact, even in the solvent state of a company, 
where labour and capital partner5 to produce goods or services jointly, there are 
always the problems of sharing and fairness. The bone of contention has always 
                                                          
2Hugh Collins, K D Ewing & A McColgan, Labour Law: Texts and Materials, (2nd edn., Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2005) 1; Bruce G Carruthers & Terence C Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of 
Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States (OUP, Oxford 1998) 303. 
3 Albert S Bolles, The Conflict Between Labour and Capital (Elibron Classics Series, 2002) 17. 
4 A A Alchian & H Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,’ (1972) 62 
American Economic Review; Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, ‘Team Production in Business 
Organizations: An Introduction, (1999) 24 Journal of Corp. Law 743; Blair and Stout, ‘A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 V L Rev. 247;  Lynn M LoPucki, ‘A Team Production 
Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2003) UCLA Law School Research Paper No. 3-12 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=397801> accessed 12 December 2009; Collins et al (n 1)1. 
5 John D Rockefeller, Jr, discussing the two as partners in his seminal essay: ‘John D Rockefeller, Jr, on 
Labour and Capital’ published in the New York Times (January 9, 1916) 
<http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf> accessed 21 October 2011. Blair & Stout (n 4b).  
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been determining what would amount to a fair sharing. This is because in 
practice, no sharing method or formula is considered just by either labour or 
capital. The reason for this is because traditionally labour seeks to receive the 
highest price possible available to it while capital on its part seeks to maximise 
the returns on its investment. The problem is that for the owners of capital to 
achieve their goal, the suppliers of labour would not be able to achieve theirs. 
Conversely, paying the highest price available for labour will also cut into the 
profits of those who own capital.6 
Stakeholders’ conflict in the life of a company is not restricted to when the 
company is solvent. It appears that conflicts of interest in corporate relationship 
between labour and capital become irrefragably accentuated upon the 
occurrence of insolvency. Corporate insolvency is very intricate. It is a scene of 
conflict. The interests of the stakeholders with various degrees of economic 
interests in an insolvent company are complex and not easily categorised.7 On 
insolvency, the interests of the stakeholders do not always converge8  for the 
reasons discussed in chapter 1.  
Stakeholders in the context of an insolvent company or business may be defined 
as those with various economic interests in the company or business, or those 
whose investments are at risk in the insolvent entity.9 The divergences of interests 
usually create a tension between them.10 Conflicts in insolvency are inevitable 
due to the expansive reach of the laws especially as regards legislatively 
mandated priorities and other classic areas of insolvency such as transaction 
avoidance. Insolvency is also contentious because of the policy-rich norms 
implicated.11 In the context of this thesis, a typical example of a policy implication 
would be the requirement of the transfer of contracts of employment of the 
employees of an insolvent undertaking on the same terms and conditions to the 
transferee.  
                                                          
6  Collins et al (n 2). 
7  Janis P Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations, 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2003) 57. 
8  Carruthers & Halliday (n 2) 1-8. 
9   Sarra (n 7) 58. 
10  Sarra (n 7); carruthers & Halliday (n 2). 
11  John Pottow, ‘Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy’ (2006) John M 
Olin Center for Law & Economics, University of Michigan 
<http://www.law.umich/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm> accessed 12 January 2010. 
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Insolvency induced conflicts are not, however, without solutions. This is why there 
are laws put in place in every jurisdiction to regulate and address the concerns of 
all those affected by corporate insolvency. However, these solutions are not 
always acceptable to all stakeholders. This is because any solution proffered is 
likely to work in favour of a particular constituency’s interests against that of 
another. In such circumstances, the continued existence of such a policy or law 
would have to be justified normatively.  
In relation to this thesis the question may be posed regarding why legislation 
such as the ARD and TUPE continue to exist despite the general perception that 
they hinder rescues of insolvent businesses in the UK.12 A logical explanation in 
answer to this type of question may require a theory. This is where the role of 
theory as a tool for logical explanation 13   comes in. A Theory is a logical 
explanation for why something is as it is, or does as it does.14 It is, arguably, 
through the lens of theory that conflicts such as the tension between business 
rescue and employment protection arising during transfers of insolvent 
undertakings (due to the policies designed to actualise these differing objectives) 
can best be explained.   
The purpose of the theory chapter in this thesis, therefore, is to explain why 
employment protection legislation (despite its perceived adverse impact on the 
rescue culture) continues to operate side by side with the insolvency policy on 
business rescue in the UK. Theories will also be used to explain the diminution of 
the rights of the employees which has been achieved through the revisions made 
to the ARD and TUPE respectively. It will be argued that these changes were 
necessary for striking an effective balance between the rescue of insolvent 
businesses and employment protection. However, as in every other field of 
academic enquiry, theorists do not always agree with each other, this is why we 
have different theories on the same subject matter. As an area of academic 
enquiry, insolvency is not exempt from differences of opinions. Accordingly, 
                                                          
12 Hugh Collins, ‘Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency’ (1989) 18 ILJ 144-158; S Frisby, ‘TUPE or not 
TUPE: Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and one Unholy Mess’ (2000) 4 CFILR 249-271; John 
Armour, Adrian Walters  & Audrey Hsu, ‘The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations and 
Costs in Corporate Rescue Proceedings’ (2006). 
<http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.96...rep..>accessed 20 April 2012. 
13 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge, London 
1963). 
14  Charles V Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics, (Martin Robertson, London 
1973). 
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there is no unison of opinion on which of the extant insolvency theories accurately 
explains the phenomenon of insolvency. Thus, no one theoretical model currently 
available for explaining the concept of corporate insolvency is capable of being 
all things to all people. There are distinct differences and similarities in all 
insolvency theories (at least, for those presented in this thesis). The lack of 
consensus in opinion is perhaps a product of the ideological differences that exist 
amongst the different schools of thought on the subject matter. The problem with 
having several theories on a subject matter, however, is that the ideological 
content of theories could sometimes cut against their practical utility. This does 
not detract from the fact that these theories all have practical applications, one 
way or the other, to the problems of corporate insolvency. 
Before considering the extant insolvency theories available for explaining the 
phenomenon of corporate insolvency, it is important to first sketch out the two 
most important ideologies that drive these various theories. It is acknowledged 
that the approaches examined below are not the only ones available for use in 
considering insolvency. Indeed, other approaches exist with their own distinct 
merits but they are yet to have any direct and serious practical impacts on the 
day-to-day insolvency work. 
2.3 The ideological divide 
Corporate insolvency has generated much tension between stakeholders of 
insolvent companies globally. Insolvency has also generated more questions than 
there are answers to them. Two of the most recurrent issues that have continued to 
elicit and dominate normative insolvency debates between the different schools 
of thought (discussed below) are usually framed in the questions: what is the 
legitimate province of insolvency law? Whose interests should insolvency law 
serve?  These questions mirror two of the most intractable problems that lie at the 
heart of insolvency law namely: how to balance the interests of an insolvent 
debtor in a fresh start against those of its creditors who wish to be paid and, how 
to balance the interests of competing creditors with claims against the debtor’s 
assets that, in most cases, is often not enough to satisfy the claims of all the 
creditors.15  
                                                          
15 See Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005) 
Ch. 2. On the notion of ‘fresh start’, see generally Thomas H Jackson, ‘The Fresh-Start Policy in 
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Insolvency is problematic because it obliges the law to choose. When a company 
is in formal insolvency proceedings, there is usually not enough money to go 
round. In such circumstances, the law must choose whom to pay. The law’s 
decision on who should bear the risk and who should be protected means that 
there will always be winners and losers in an insolvency setting.16 There have 
been engaging debates, both in the academic literature and in practitioner 
commentaries, regarding the best way to address the above issues. The debates 
which have spanned several decades have so far failed to generate a consensus. 
These debates which, arguably, have influenced court opinions and legislative 
enactments in most jurisdictions, are really about the social policies underlying 
the insolvency process.17 The bulk of the debates have been generated in the 
American bankruptcy literature by bankruptcy scholars there because the US has 
a much more extensive history of bankruptcy restructuring.18 ‘ 
At the hub of the problem of lack of consensus is a theoretical split among the 
different ideological camps’. 19  These theorists have different ideologies 20 
regarding the problems generated by insolvency and often disagree on how 
these might be addressed. According to Professor Douglas Baird, the normative 
debates on insolvency philosophy and policy tend to be contested mostly 
between two major schools of thought. Professor Baird has labelled these schools 
of thought as ‘Proceduralist’ and ‘Traditionalist.’ 21  The essence of their 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bankruptcy Law’ (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393; Charles G Hallinan, ‘The “Fresh Start” Policy in 
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretative Theory’, (1986) 21 U Rich L. Rev. 
49; Charles Jordan Tabb, ‘The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the 
Dischargeability Debate’, (1990) 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 56. For the origin of the term ‘fresh start’, see 
the American cases of  Local Loan Co. v Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) and Williams v United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 US 549, 554–55 (1915). 
16 Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1995) 1; 
Carruthers and Halliday (n 2). 
17 Christopher W Frost, ‘Bankruptcy and Social Welfare Theory’ (2001) Paper presented at the 
Association of American Law Schools’ Workshop on 
Bankruptcy<http://www.aals.org/profdev/bankruptcy/frost.html> accessed 16 December 2008. On 
the notion that the views of these two camps influence bankruptcy decision making by courts and 
policymakers in the US, see Mark Bradshaw, ‘Comment: The Role of Politics and Economics in Early 
American Bankruptcy Law’ (1997) 18 Whittier L Rev 739. 
18 Goode (n 15) 41-42. 
19 Samuel E Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policies through 
the Lens of Theories’ (2011), 32 (4) Company Lawyer 99, 101. 
20 The term ‘ideologies’ is used in this thesis to denote the shared frameworks of mental models that 
groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of insolvency and a prescription as 
to how problems associated with insolvency generally should be resolved. 
21 Baird (n 1) 133. Professor Roy Goode and other commentators on insolvency theory have also 
affirmed that the debate is primarily between these two camps. See generally Goode (n 17) 41-42; 
Janger (n 1); Azar (n 1); Mooney, Jr (n 1). 
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disagreement 22 revolves around the contending theories of insolvency law to 
which each of the two camps subscribe. These two camps are not agreed on what 
the substantive goals of insolvency law are, or ought to be. Each camp is adamant 
that its model of explanation accurately explains and justifies or legitimises the 
extant legal provisions on insolvency.23  
In sum, the main difference between them concerns whether insolvency should 
be used to advance the goals of stakeholders other than creditors. Proceduralists 
see insolvency as a procedural mechanism to distribute the debtor’s assets, 
based on non-bankruptcy entitlements and in an economically efficient manner. 
Traditionalists, on the other hand, support rules designed not just to enhance and 
allocate an insolvent firm’s value among existing entitlement holders. For them, 
insolvency rules should be able to protect parties other than creditors who are 
likely to have been particularly harmed by the debtor’s insolvency but who might 
not be entitled to any of its value under normal collection or priority rules. The 
various attempts made by various theorists to address these issues have resulted 
in the myriad of theoretical possibilities currently available for the resolution of 
insolvency generated conflicts.24  These are considered below. 
2.4 Insolvency theories: background 
To articulate and communicate their views on insolvency, theorists need a 
platform. This platform is usually provided by theories. The normative25 views of 
                                                          
22  Professor Alan Schwartz has noted that :  
A disagreement between scholars can take three forms: First, there can be 
disagreement about the state of the world. In law and economics, this disagreement 
commonly takes the form of contesting the assumptions that underlie a model. 
Second, there can be disagreement about the norms that do or should apply to the 
case under study. Third, there can be disagreement about the analysis. In this third 
category, the issue is whether a scholar's conclusions follow from his premises.  
See Alan Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed’ (1999) Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1090 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1090> accessed 28 April 2012. 
23 Rizwaan Mokal, for example, claims that his Authentic Consent Model is capable of not just 
explaining, but justifying why certain provisions are the way they are in insolvency law. See Rizwaan J 
Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP, Oxford 2005).  
24 Pottow (n 11). 
25 These views are normative because they merely prescribe things or express opinions to be 
preferred or valued. Insolvency theorists use normative theories to plead their causes and to convince 
others to join them or to subscribe to their views. These theorists devote themselves to identifying 
and defining relationships between logical classes, between means and ends, or cause and effect. It is 
common for every normative theory to contain descriptions. Also, for a normative theory to be 
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the ‘Proceduralist’ and the ‘Traditionalist’ schools of thought on insolvency 
matters are usually articulated through various contractarian insolvency theories. 
These theories which are either ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’ in terms of the interests 
to be considered in formal insolvency proceedings are akin to the earliest 17th 
and 18th centuries Social Contract theories developed by the likes of Thomas 
Hobbes (1588 – 1679),26 John Locke (1632-1740)27 and  Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778). 28 These early social contract models had, in various ways, ‘half-
envisaged some historical accord amongst primitive people for cohabiting within 
their respective societies29  in a so-called “state of nature.”’30   
According to Thomas Hobbes, a government was necessary because human 
beings were, in what he characterised as a ‘state of nature.’ In this ‘state of nature’ 
men competed with each other for the scarce resources. Hobbes opined that 
because the abilities of human beings were on a par equal, it led them to be 
natural enemies. Hobbes gave three main reasons why people quarrel with each 
other: competition, diffidence and glory.   
For Hobbes, as long as there was no central power or authority to keep people in 
control, there will be perpetual competition and squabbling amongst them. This is 
the condition that Hobbes referred to as a ‘state of war.’ Thus, Hobbes equated 
the state of nature or the original state (where no central power to keep human 
beings from competing and quarrelling with each other existed) with the state of 
war which lacks control and orderliness. What this implies is that without a central 
controlling authority, each person seeks his own self-interest.31 Given the nexus 
of interests in a company, and without the imposition of a collectivised debt 
collection regime, corporate insolvency would be like the ‘state of war’ scene 
painted by Hobbes. 
The two fundamental elements of a social contract are the characterisation of the 
original state or position and the rationality32 of the contractors. In contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                                      
convincing, it must generally contain elaborate descriptions of real world conditions. See further, L J R 
Herson, The Politics of Ideas: Political Theory and American Public Policy, (Waveland Press, 1984). 
26 Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, (first published 1651, Penguin 1985). 
27 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Awnsham Churchill, 1690). 
28 Jean J Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract or Principles of Political Rights’ (GDH Cole tr, London 1973). 
29 Etukakpan, (n 19).  
30 Hobbes (n 26). 
31 Hobbes (n 26). 
32 The rational choice framework posits that individuals know what is in their self-interest and are 
therefore compelled to act accordingly. See Douglass North, ‘Economic Performance through Time’ 
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normative contractarian theories, (implying theories seeking to ground the 
legitimacy of government or theories that claim to derive a moral ought), the 
original position33 (referred variously in the literature to as the initial situation, the 
initial bargaining position,34 or the state of nature35) which in bargaining theory is 
referred to as the ‘no agreement position,’ represents the starting point for a fair, 
impartial agreement. This is defined as the situation or position to which the 
individuals in a prospective contract will ultimately return if they fail to reach an 
agreement amongst them. 
There is no clear and exact picture that can accurately describe what the state of 
the ‘original situation’ is like. It may be more or less hostile, more or less social, 
depending on what the particular theorist considers to be a true representation of 
‘human nature’ in the absence of rules of justice. Crucial to all contractarian 
theories, however, are the notions of scarcity and co-operation.  The argument is 
that there may be scarcity of resources or motivation for competition in the 
original situation. For social contractarian theorists, competition reflects 
‘ubiquitous scarcity’36 while scarcity induces fear of the depredations of others.37 
It is further contended that where there is scarcity of resources in any situation, 
the situation can only be remedied or ameliorated by the affected parties co-
operating with each other. The point here is simply that scarcity impresses upon 
persons the need to co-operate with each other because there is some potential 
for gains from social interaction and co-operation.38  
Social contract theories also require the existence of the institution39 of rules to 
guide the formation of agreements. Institutions form the incentive structure of 
every society. Since rules precede the contract, there must be some source of 
prior moral norms, whether natural, rational, or conventional. The first rule that is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(1993) The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economics Sciences lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
(December 9, 1993). 
33  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York 1996) 255-58. 
34  David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, (OUP, Oxford 1986) Ch 2. 
35 Hobbes (n 26). 
36  North (n 32). 
37  Jan Neverson, The Libertarian Idea (Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1988) 148. 
38 Co-operation as between the different classes of creditors of the insolvent is the basis on which the 
collective notion of insolvency law for solving the potential collective action problem in insolvency 
derives. 
39 Douglas North has defined institutions as ‘humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction.’ These comprise of formal and informal constraints. Formal constraints are made up of 
rules, laws, constitutions while informal constraints are made up of norms, conventions, and self-
imposed codes of conduct.  North (n 32).  
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normally prescribed is that there must be no force or fraud in the making of the 
agreement. No one is to be ‘coerced’ into an agreement by the threat of physical 
violence.40 Coercion negates the principles of free agreement and is no different 
to the ‘state of nature’ for the party coerced or threatened by coercion.41 Thus, 
any agreement reached under such circumstances lacks security.42   
The major difference between traditional social contract theories and 
contemporary contractarianism, however, is that whilst traditional social contract 
notions were predicated on consent (implying that human beings had basic 
normative autonomy over themselves before consenting to enter into the social 
contract),43 contemporary contractarianism on the other hand, contemplates a 
thought experiment through which the requirements of practical rationality can 
be discovered.44 This denotes the self-conviction of the individual that his or her 
situation could be worse-off if he or she does not enter into the agreement or if he 
or she is unwilling to co-operate with the others.  
It is important to remember however that not all agreements will be concluded 
the way one might ordinarily have wanted them to be concluded. Yet even though 
such an agreement or co-operation may not entirely be favourable to the interest 
of the person in question, he or she would still be better off co-operating with 
others since, in the absence of any agreement or co-operation, the individual in 
question could end up being worse-off. 
2.4.1 The social contract heuristic and corporate insolvency 
When the social contract heuristic is applied to corporate insolvency analysis, ‘a 
thought experiment’ entails that contractarian theorists seek to explain what are 
the basic rules that may be chosen in a hypothetical contract to regulate 
contentious matters arising in insolvency situations. It also entails finding the rules 
that would be rational for self-interested parties to accept as condition precedent 
                                                          
 40 A Cudd, ‘Contractarianism’ (2008) in E N Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/contractarianism/> accessed 21 December 
2010.  
41 This, impliedly, is the distinction between the past economic system of Hobbs and Rousseau’s era 
which was based on coercion (slavery and feudalism) and modern day capitalism which is based on 
consent (i.e. bargain/contract). 
42 Gauthier (n 34) D Gauthier, Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason, (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca 1990). 
43  B Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, (YUP, New Haven, CT 1980) 66.  
44  Gauthier (n 34 & n 42).  
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for partaking in such a contract. 45 On the other hand, the notion of scarcity 
articulated by social contract theorists may be likened to the situation where the 
debtor’s assets are insufficient to meet the claims of all its creditors. From the 
creditor’s perspective, the shortage of resources (on the debtor’s side) to meet all 
of their claims not only informs, but also accentuates the need for co-operation 
amongst them so as to effectively address the collective action problem that may 
arise when their common debtor is in formal insolvency proceedings. The co-
operation of the stakeholders must be voluntary and not coerced. 
The type of social contract entered into by the stakeholders of a company in 
insolvency may be likened to what Jean Hampton calls the ‘alienation contract.’46 
Hampton’s heuristic, and as it applies to insolvency law, may be construed as a 
type of contract in which all stakeholders in insolvency proceedings decide to 
voluntarily ‘alienate their rights’ to adjudicate on all their insolvency-related 
disputes and self-help approaches to a central authority for debt enforcement on 
the conviction that it is the best, and perhaps the only, way to maintain decorum 
or orderliness in the proceedings, given what the consequences of the alternative 
(i.e. self-help and a run on the company’s property) will be for all of them.47  That 
is, they alienate their rights to individual debt enforcement to a ‘dominant 
protective’ body of all the creditors in return for future benefits.48 
However, unlike the fear of the depredation of others often advanced by 
proponents of earlier social contract theories as the reason for this type of co-
operation,49 the reason given for co-operation by the stakeholders in insolvency 
is that there is mutual benefit to be derived from being subject to a ‘collective 
debt enforcement’ arrangement, as against ‘self-help’ or individual debt 
enforcement measures. Thus, from the insolvency perspective, it is by focusing on 
the motivation of co-operation for mutual advantage, rather than on the fear of the 
                                                          
45 For Social Contract theories in general, see John Rawls (n 21) 258; Rousseau (n 19); Samuel 
Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract (OUP, Oxford 2007) 17. See also  F D’Argostino, 
‘Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract’ [2008] Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
<http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/> accessed 7 October 2009. 
46 Jean Hampton, Hobbs and the Social Contract Tradition, (CUP, Cambridge 1988); Political Philosophy 
(Westview Press, 1996). 
47 ibid. 
48 Robert Nozick, for example, argues that a free society should allow people to alienate rights of self-
government to a dominant protective association. For Nozick, ‘the comparable question about an 
individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery.’ To this question, 
Nozick’s response is: ‘ I believe that it would.’  See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic 
Books, New York 1974) 331. 
49 Neverson (n 37) 148. 
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depredations of others, that a more inclusive and positive contractarian 
insolvency theory emerges.  
2.5 Select insolvency theories: analysis 
There are as many theoretical approaches grappling with explaining the structure 
of insolvency law as there are writers in this area of law.50 These ‘complex and 
nuanced’ approaches, proposed under various nomenclatures, have yielded four 
main different ideologies. These may be characterised as debt collection; 
rehabilitation; effective corporate governance in the turnaround of insolvent firms 
and market approaches to insolvency.51  
Some of these theories are discussed briefly below while the last three will be 
given extensive treatment in this chapter. The reason for this is because these 
three, apart from having the four elements listed above, represent the exclusive 
views of the Proceduralist and the inclusive views of the Traditionalist schools of 
thought. Specifically these three theories are among the insolvency theories that 
are able to clearly mirror the tension between the policies underpinning business 
rescues and employee protection in corporate insolvency which is the subject of 
research of this thesis.  
2.5.1 Communitarianism 
The main argument presented by Communitarian theorists is that insolvency law 
should not focus solely on protecting the private rights of the creditors. 52 
Communitarianism therefore advocates that a balance be struck between the 
interests of the creditors and those of the other stakeholders of an insolvent 
company. These include the interests of non-creditor stakeholders such as the 
employees and the community at large. 53  One of the core theses of 
communitarianism is that the economic life of a region in which the insolvent 
business is located should be an important consideration in the design of 
                                                          
50 Peter Walton, ‘When is Pre-Packaged Administration Appropriate? - A Theoretical Consideration’ 
Paper Presented at the Nottingham Trent University International Insolvency Conference 2010. 
http://www.ntu.ac.uk/nls/news_events/insolvency_conference/conference_papers/index.html 
accessed 27 October 2011. 
51 Sarra (n 7)) 51. 
52 ibid. 
53 Kathryn R Heidt, ‘The Automatic Stay in Environmental Bankruptcies’ (1993) 67 Am. Bankr. L.J 69; 
Sarra (n 7). 
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insolvency law. According to these theorists, for insolvency law to operate in a 
way that will be of benefit to the community at large, the rescue of the business, 
where possible, or at least, an orderly liquidation where the survival is 
impracticable, are important factors that policy makers the world over ought to 
take into account when designing insolvency laws.54 This type of argument can be 
buttressed by pointing to a country such as France, where insolvency law was 
reformed in 1985 and ‘expressly given the task’ as claimed, ‘of rescuing an 
insolvent enterprise, preserving employment and eliminating liabilities.’55 
2.5.2 Value-Based Theory 
The value-based theory, which is the brain child of Donald Korobkin,56 is an 
attempt to offer a rich and full exposition on why bankruptcy57 law emerged as a 
system with the varied structures and dimensions that it possesses. Korobkin’s 
value-based theory disapproves of the idea of taking the debtor as a pool of 
assets (i.e. dead property). Rather, he prefers the debtor to be considered as 
having a personality and a dynamic potential. According to Korobkin, these are 
important because like a ‘natural’ (human) debtor, a legal (corporate) debtor is a 
moral, political and social actor.  Korobkin notes: 
A corporation, whether in or out of financial distress, is more than [a 
bankrupt individual]. The law of corporate reorganization developed as a 
corrective to a bankruptcy jurisprudence that would have ignored a 
financially distressed corporation’s dynamic potential. It reflected a means 
of bringing the corporation’s dynamic personality into public view and 
regulating not merely its economic division, but the playing out of its 
moral, political and social values.58 
                                                          
54 See e.g. Karen Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy An Essay’ (1994) 72 
Wash. U.L.Q. 1031; Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven, 
CT: YUP, 1997). 
55 See Axel Flessner, ‘Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: An International Overview’ in Jacob S 
Ziegal (ed) Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 19, 22. 
56  Donald R Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 
717. 
57The terms ‘bankruptcy’ and ‘insolvency’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. While ‘bankruptcy’ 
is the terminology used by American scholars in the American jurisdiction to denote both personal 
and corporate bankruptcies, a distinction exists in the UK jurisdiction. In the UK, the term ‘bankruptcy’ 
is used only to denote a situation where a natural person is unable to pay his debts, while a 
company’s inability to meet its financial obligations is commonly referred to as ‘insolvency.’  
58Korobkin (n 56) 745. 
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The value-based theory juxtaposes the debtor’s estate to a human life arguing that 
just as the decision on what is good for a natural being cannot be made once and 
for all, given the dynamics of life, there exists no fixed answer to what is a ‘good’ 
and ‘all encompassing’ solution to a company’s financial distress since every 
financial distress is in a specific historical context with unique questions of its own. 
For Korobkin, bankruptcy law should not merely be a response to the collective 
action impasse. Its goal should be to address the problems of financial distress 
and create conditions, or provide a context, for a discourse in which values or 
participants may be rehabilitated into a coherent and informed vision of what the 
enterprise shall exist to do.59 
2.5.3 Multiple Value Approach 
There is also what has been described as the multiple value or eclectic 
approach.60 This approach calls for the recognition of the interests of those who 
are not directly creditors alongside the interests of direct creditors. At the 
forefront of this school of thought is Professor Warren who has been very vocal in 
her criticism of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory (CBT), discussed below, for being 
too narrowly focused and its attempt to use collectivism to justify insolvency 
systems as a whole.61 
2.5.4 The Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
Basic corporate law theory, in the solvent state of a company, is premised on the 
shareholder primacy norm which makes the board of Directors (during the 
solvent state of the company), accountable to the shareholders as the primary risk 
bearers. However, when the company becomes insolvent, the shareholders’ 
primacy norm is, or should be, supplanted, according to most literature and case-
law on insolvency, by the creditors’ primacy norm.62 
                                                          
59 ibid. 789. 
60 Vanessa Finch Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge 2009) 
40. 
61 Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L Rev. 775, 800; Warren, ‘Bankruptcy 
Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L Rev. 336-387. 
62 See e.g. Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR 722; West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd 
[1988] BCLC 250 CA (Civ Div) at 252–253; Brady v Brady [1989] AC 755 HL. 
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One of the predominant theories on insolvency is the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
(CBT).63 The CBT was first proposed by Thomas Jackson in an article he published 
in 1982.64 The creditors’ bargain heuristic, as further developed by Jackson,65 
sometimes in collaboration with either Douglas Baird66 or Robert Scott,67 employs 
a neo-Rawlsian contractarian notion to explain and justify the structure of 
corporate insolvency law. From inception, the CBT generated heated debates 
within corporate insolvency law circles and became the focus of attention68 which 
made it the most influential law and economics theory on corporate insolvency. 
The CBT’s aim is to provide a normative theory of what bankruptcy law should be. 
It explains the normative validity of corporate insolvency by reference to a 
hypothetical preference that creditors would express ex ante the extension of 
credit in advance of the debtor’s insolvency. 69  The theory assumes that the 
essential features of the insolvency system were not chosen by the creditors 
themselves, but that these features were imposed on them instead.  The CBT is 
used as a model to explain that when a single debtor having multiple creditors 
becomes insolvent its creditors are potentially going to have a ‘collective action’ 
problem that would require a solution. 70  It is reasoned that because the 
                                                          
63This was true until recently when the standard Jacksonian account of bankruptcy as a solution to a 
collective action problem among similarly situated creditors whose self-interest and collective interest 
are easily identifiable and homogenous began to come under serious attack from within the law and 
economics movement. See generally, James W Bower, ‘Groping and Coping in the Shadow of 
Murphy’s Law: Bankruptcy Policy and the Elementary Economics of Failure’ (1990) 84 Mich. Law Rev., 
2097-2150;  Stuart C Gilson ‘Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from 
Financially Distressed Firms’, (1996) Journal of Finance; Lynn M  LoPucki, & William C Whitford,  
‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganizations of Large Publicly-held Companies’(1993) 
141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review,  669-800; E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 333, 338; R J Mokal,  ‘The Authentic Consent Model: 
Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain, and Corporate Liquidation’ (2001) 21  Legal Studies, 400, 443; 
Mokal (n 23). 
64 Thomas H Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 
91 Yale Law Journal 857, 860. 
65 Thomas H Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 Stan. L Rev. 725; Thomas Jackson, 
The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP, Cambridge, MA 1986) 
66 See e.g. D Baird & T H Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U 
Chicago L. Rev. 97. 
67 T H Jackson & R Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the 
Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 Virginia L. Rev. 155.  
68 Warren,  (n 61a)  775; Douglas G  Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A 
Reply to Warren’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L Rev. 815 
69  Jackson (n 65b). 
70 Jackson (n 65b) Douglas G Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (1987) 50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
173. There is indeed, a substantial literature which questions whether a serious collective action 
problem exists in the first place and, if so, of just what it must necessarily consist and if the problem is 
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insolvency of the corporate debtor renders it unable to meet all of its financial 
liabilities to its creditors in full, this might trigger a ‘race to collect’ amongst its 
various creditors. Given the diversity of interests implicated in the company’s 
financial distress, the individual incentives of each creditor are to act in a way that 
will be self-beneficial but detrimental to the best and overall interests of the 
creditors as a group. Consequently, only those creditors who are ‘strong’ (in the 
sense of the contractual and statutory entitlements which are already in place) 
and are able to press their claims early enough would be paid in full (if paid at 
all), leaving those creditors ‘slow off the blocks’ potentially with nothing. This 
creates a scenario reminiscent of the ‘survival of the fittest’ conundrum in the 
Hobbesian world in which resources are scarce. Scarce resources and different 
objectives, a la Hobbes, make for the possibility of conflict. In the absence of 
social and political institutions enforcing certain standard patterns of behavior in 
human beings, individuals would have to strive to survive. Scarcity ‘forces’ human 
beings to compete with each other for the available resources in a disorderly 
manner (see discussion in section 2.4 above). 
Ex-ante, the creditors would see individual self-help as a serious problem 
militating against their ability to recoup their respective investments in the 
insolvent company and would accordingly agree that their individual self-
interests would be best served if each and every one of them was to surrender 
their individual rights of debt collection in exchange for a collective enforcement 
forum where a joint debt action against their common debtor can be enforced.71 
As a solution, Jackson proposed that the creation of a mandatory collective 
remedy (which mirrors the terms of an idealised multi-creditor contract to co-
operate), would be justifiable as a means of overcoming the collective action 
impasse.  
What Jackson is saying in effect is that there is a notional agreement amongst the 
creditors of an insolvent company, which comprises terms that they themselves 
would consent to before any of them entered into contracts with a company. The 
terms of the agreement reached by them deal with how their respective claims 
should be treated, in the unfortunate event of the company becoming insolvent. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
adequately defined, just how adjusting priorities among creditors addresses it. On this see e.g.  Barry 
E Adler, ‘A World without Debt’ (1994) 72 Wash. U. L. Q 811-827; Adler, ‘Financial and Political 
Theories of American Bankruptcy’ (1999) 45 (2) Stanford L Rev 31-346. 
71 Historically, creditors realised that the one-on-one private creditors’ remedy of seizure and sale was 
adequate only in cases where the debtor had plenty of valuable assets left to be seized.  
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The creditors are then compelled to share the company’s remaining assets by the 
imposition of a collective and compulsory regime. 
A collective debt forum, in Jackson’s view, would avoid the premature termination 
of the debtor’s business through liquidation. That is, it eliminates the wasteful and 
potentially inefficient liquidation of the company’s assets by individual creditors.  
According to Jackson, a collective debt forum will not only preserve any going 
concern surplus by making on behalf of the creditors, a single and all-
encompassing decision regarding the manner in which value can be maximised 
in disposing of the debtor’s business but would also reduce strategic costs.  
The ‘policing’ of the debtor on an individual basis is, for Jackson, administratively 
inefficient and may lead to a nil return to the particular creditor if other creditors 
get to the debtor’s assets first before him or her.  It is Jackson’s view therefore that 
‘a single inquiry into recurring collection questions is likely to be less expensive 
than the multiple inquiries necessary in an individualistic remedies system.’72 
What Jackson appears to be saying here is that an individualistic system of debt 
enforcement puts a premium on ‘racing’ for the debtor’s assets given that the 
desire and determination of each and every creditor to recover debt would 
trigger a ‘race to the courthouse’ even at the slightest inkling that the company is 
operating in the vicinity of insolvency.  
Co-operation amongst the creditors in a collective proceeding would ensure that 
no costly and duplicative monitoring of the common debtor’s solvency 
individually by the creditors is borne. Co-operation enhances administrative 
efficiencies and makes for the maximisation of the debtor’s overall economic 
value since the debtor’s assets may be worth more if kept together in either a 
going-concern liquidation or reorganisation. 73  A collective regime, Jackson 
opines, is also advantageous for risk-averse creditors.74 It would ensure that they 
get a better return on their investments than would otherwise be possible in the 
individualistic system. Jackson believes that these types of creditors would rather 
prefer a lower, but more certain return, on their investments, to a higher, but 
riskier and uncertain return.  
                                                          
72 Jackson (n 64a) 866;Jakson (n 64b). 
73 Jackson (n 64a) 866-68. 
74 On the notion of risk aversion, see Robert Pindyck and Daniel Rubinfeld, Microeconomics (4th edn, 
Prentice Hall, N J 1997) Ch. 5. 
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For Jackson et al, the actual collective forum in real life, characterised by the 
automatic stay, duplicates the effects of this hypothetical ex ante negotiation and 
therefore prevents any costs that real-life creditors would be expected to incur in 
negotiating a moratorium on claims in expectation of the possible insolvency of 
their common debtor.75 
To ensure orderly proceedings, payment of debts must be done in accordance 
with the terms upon which each creditor agreed its pre-insolvency entitlements 
with the debtor.76 This means that a collective forum would also ensure that claims 
are entertained in a rational and orderly manner as against what obtains in the 
individualistic debt collection regime. Under the individual collection system 
claims are met, not in the order in which they arose, but in the order in which they 
are brought. Every creditor will try to be the first in line to collect payment from 
the debtor. The effect is that some creditors may not receive anything at the end 
of the day.  
Added to the above is the informational advantage of a collective forum. It is 
reasoned that any creditor who does not partake in the collective forum could end 
up with nothing since he or she may not learn in good time of the debtor’s 
financial distress and could as a result lose the race to collect what is due to him 
or her. To achieve all of the above results, the way forward, according to the 
Creditors’ Bargain heuristic, is to view the debtor’s assets as a common pool to be 
used for the satisfaction of the debtor’s pre-insolvency liabilities or financial 
obligations to only those creditors with legal rights to those assets.  
Jackson’s hypothetical creditors sit behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’77 which 
ensures that in bargaining they have no knowledge as to their own individual 
characteristics. They operate nescience of whether they are secured or 
unsecured creditors, suppliers, lenders or employees creditors. Such creditors 
would agree to the wealth maximisation model of collective and compulsory 
insolvency procedures because it would be of mutual advantage to them.  
                                                          
75 Jackson (n 64b). 
76 There are obvious exceptions to this rule such as the limited rights of preferential creditors under 
Schd. 6 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Criticisms have been levelled against the CBT for not dealing 
adequately with distributional issues in insolvency. Mokal (n 23) 69. 
77 See Jackson (n 65) 17, referring to the work of Rawls: A Theory of Justice (revised edition Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1999) in which the phrase first appeared. Both Rizwaan Mokal and Donald 
Korobkin have cast aspersions on Jackson’s claim that the creditors’ bargain theory is an application of 
Rawls’ methodology. See Mokal (n 23) 61-62; D G Korobkin ‘Contractarianism and the Normative 
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas Law Review 541. 
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On what the legitimate province of insolvency law is, or should be, Jackson and 
his collaborators insist that insolvency law should limit itself to addressing issues 
arising in insolvency only. One of such issues usually posited by these scholars as 
representing insolvency law’s core mission is the allocation of a debtor’s property 
(or the value of a debtor’s property) to the holders of claims and interests in the 
property only. 78  Regarding who can partake in the collective forum, these 
theorists tenaciously hold the view that insolvency exists, primarily and 
exclusively, for the benefit of the creditors of the insolvent.79  
Though Jackson and his collaborators acknowledge the existence of other 
interests in insolvency, they are adamant in maintaining that when a company 
becomes insolvent, the creditors’ interests should take primacy over all other 
interests. To them, the interests of any other constituency should be considered 
only to the extent that the particular members of those groups are creditors with 
enforceable legal rights against assets of the insolvent company under non-
insolvency law. 80  The basis for the primacy of the creditors’ interests in 
insolvency derives from what these theorists believe is insolvency law’s core role: 
to maximise recoveries for parties with non-insolvency legal entitlements relating 
to financially distressed debtors.  
The basis of this contention is premised on the argument that since, at the heart of 
a bankruptcy case, the legal entitlements relating to a debtor (defined primarily 
as ‘claims’ against a debtor, and in some cases, the interests of a debtor’s equity 
security holders)81 are determined and vindicated, the most fundamental function 
of bankruptcy law therefore is to serve the interests of a debtor’s creditors in 
much the same way as civil procedure vindicates the interests of parties with legal 
entitlements who seek judicial relief or satisfaction via civil litigation.82  
In spite of its prominence and dominance, the CBT has not enjoyed a trouble-free 
reign as the leading theoretical model for analysing corporate insolvency. A lot of 
                                                          
78 James W Bowers, ‘Security Interests, Creditors’ Priorities and Bankruptcy’ (1999) Louisiana State 
University Law Centre,<http://www.scribd.com/.../security-interest-creditors-priorities-and-
bankruptcy->accessed 30 February 2010. 
79 Jackson (n 64b) 860 and (n 51) D G Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (1987) 50 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 173. 
79 See Lynn M LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 57 Vanderbilt 
Law Review (3) 741, 769. 
80  Jackson (n 64b). 
81  Bowers (n 78). 
82 Mooney, Jr (n 1). 
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critical ‘salvos’ have been fired at both the theory and its proponents in recent 
times.83 These criticisms (some of which are evident in the discussions of the 
theorists considered below) have come, as would be expected, from scholars in 
the Traditionalist camp, and still within the economics, or law and economics 
paradigm. Therefore, there are arguments among different flavours of economists 
or economically inclined lawyers.84 
2.5.5 The Authentic Consent Model 
The very idea that anyone could discover a coherent ‘deep structure’ of corporate 
insolvency has been described as an exercise in futility.85 After examining the 
defining features of the CBT: the role of self-interest, consent, as well as its ex ante 
position, Rizwaan Mokal is of the view that the CBT can neither explain nor 
legitimise the coercive collective liquidation regime. He questions how the CBT 
identifies the proposition it claims all creditors would consent to in an insolvency 
scenario. Mokal objects to what he describes as: 
 ...the narrow concerns of the CBM86 which restricts participation in the ex-
ante agreement to those who have contracted for legal rights to the 
debtor’s assets once insolvency has occurred.87 
Evidently, Mokal is merely restating the concerns expressed by the 
communitarian, multiple approach and team production (see below) theorists that 
                                                          
83 In his review of Thomas Jackson’s book, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, David Gray Carlson 
commented that ‘Thomas Jackson has written an unremittingly dreadful book.’ See D G Carlson, 
‘Philosophy in Bankruptcy’ (1987) 85 Mich. L Rev. 1341-1389. See further V Countryman, ‘The Concept 
of Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy’ (1985) 38 Vand. L Rev. 713, 823-5, 827; J L Westbrook, ‘A 
Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts’ (1989) 74 Minn. L Rev. 227, 251; T A Sullivan, E Warren & J 
L Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (OUP, New 
York 1989) 256. 
84 Corporate insolvency law is one area of law to which economic analysis is now being applied. The 
basis for applying economics approach to legal analysis rests on the assumption that those involved 
with the legal system act as rational maximisers of their individual satisfaction. Another argument in 
the law and economics literature is that applying economics to legal analysis can help in designing 
more efficient reforms of the legal system.  See e.g.  Richard A Posner, ‘The Economic Approach to 
Law’ (1974-75) 53 Tex. L. Rev 761 -4. Legal analysis through the lens of economics has revealed that 
the legal system itself has from time always been strongly influenced by a concern with promoting 
economic efficiency. See J W Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History (Da Capo Press, 
New York 1972) 4. 
85 Carlson (n 83) 1389. Carlson argued at page 1341 that Jackson’s book is unhelpful in solving hard 
and interpretative problems. He added that the book will no doubt find ‘some admirers among 
people who think that bad law-and-economics is better than no law-and-economics...’  
86 Note that Mokal uses the terms ‘Creditors’ Bargain Model’ - acronymed ‘CBM’ whereas the terms 
‘Creditors’ Bargain theory’ is used in this thesis. This has been acronymed the ‘CBT’. 
87 Mokal (n 23) 69.  
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the CBT is too narrow and exclusive in the interests it takes into account in 
insolvency. To remedy this, Mokal has developed an alternative model for 
insolvency analysis which he labels: the Authentic Consent Model88 (ACM) based 
on the notion that all principles of corporate insolvency law can be meaningfully 
tested. 
2.5.5.1 Premise of the ACM 
Contractarian theories of insolvency assume that insolvency proceedings will be 
collective. Collectiveness requires that all creditors should have a say in the 
process or at least have their interests fairly protected. But in the real world, 
concerns have been expressed by some real life creditors about how the 
proceedings operate to deny them a voice in insolvency proceedings. The CBT is 
a contractarian theory but under the type of agreement it proposes, not all classes 
of creditors can have a say in actual insolvency proceedings. Mokal believes that 
his ACM offers a voice to all creditors in insolvency. As a model for explaining 
insolvency, the ACM involves a movement away from traditional 
contractarianism89 to a methodological contractualism approach of analysis and 
justification of the provisions of insolvency law. A distinction exists between the 
two as shown below. 
2.5.5.2 Distinction between Contractarianism and 
Contractualism 
By way of distinction, contractarianism, which evolved from the Hobbesian social 
contract ideas (discussed above), is different from contractualism in that unlike 
the latter, it is not trust-based. Contractarianism holds the view that persons are 
primarily self-interested. When applied to the company, contractarianism sees 
the company essentially as a ‘nexus of contracts’ among those that constitute it 
(i.e. its directors, shareholders, creditors, employees, etc.). These explicit and 
implicit contracts reflect the parties’ efforts to maximize their respective 
                                                          
88  ibid. 
89As noted earlier, despite its dominance as a theory for explaining insolvency, the CBT has not gone 
unchallenged. There have been several manifestations of the desire to counter especially Jackson’s 
claims that his Creditors’ Bargain Theory is an application of Rawls’s methodology. In 1993, Donald 
Korobkin constructed a self-consciously Rawlsian alternative to the CBT. See particularly Donald 
Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993), 71 Tex. L Rev. 
541.  While Mokal’s ACM sets off in the same direction or follows a similar route as Korobkin’s model, 
aboth however encapsulate radically disparate visions of the role of insolvency law. Both models also 
reach very different conclusions. 
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economic self-interests under contractarianism. Thus, each of these parties which 
constitute a particular company will, at any given time, seek to ‘opportunistically’ 
maximise their profit from the company without giving due regard to what the 
effects of doing so might be on the other parties.90  
A typical illustration of how and when the ‘selfish’ wealth maximisation pursuit of 
stakeholders manifests in corporate insolvency would be where a contractor 
decides to terminate a contract whose continued existence the contractor knows 
is not just beneficial, but essential for the continuation of the financially distressed 
company. By terminating the contract, the contractor in question obtains a benefit, 
but his benefit is to the detriment of other constituencies because they have been 
deprived of a valuable contract. If in the real world this was the case, in defence of 
the contractor’s behaviour, contractarians could still argue that the type of wealth 
maximisation pursued by the contractor (in the scenario painted above) 
approximates to the contractual terms upon which at the time credit was 
extended, and which the parties to the credit agreement (i.e. the creditor and the 
debtor) would have agreed should govern their rights should the debtor become 
insolvent in the future.91 
Contractarians believe however, that a rational assessment by the contractor of 
the best strategy for maximising its individual self-interests will impress upon the 
actor the need to act morally (where the moral norms are determined by the 
maximisation of joint interests), and lead the contractor to consent to a central and 
unbiased regulating authority for the general good. In other words, individual 
actors are sometimes ‘forced’ to co-operate out of what may be referred to as 
‘enlightened self-interest’ but still within a moral universe where the other co-
operating parties are merely a means to a better end for each and every one of 
them. Exponents of contractarianism argue that individuals are motivated to 
accept morality, first, because they are vulnerable to the depredations of others, 
and second, because they can all benefit from co-operation with others.92  
                                                          
90 David Gauthier, Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1990); 
J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (HUP, Cambridge, 1971); Rawls, Political Liberalism, (Columbia University 
Press, NY, 1993); Korobkin, (n 89) 
91 Robert K Rasmussen ‘An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice’ (1994) 1 University 
of Illinois Law Review 1. 
92 Narveson (n 37) 148. 
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On the other hand, contractualism, which derives from Jean Jacque Rousseau’s 
idea of a social contract, and which has been propagated by the likes of Kant93, 
Scanlon94 and Rawls95 etc., is an ethical theory hinged on the notion of the equal 
moral status of persons. It is used to reflect the view that morality is predicated on 
contract or agreement. Contractualism argues that what people do or the way 
they behave in any given business relationship is determined by the agreement 
reached between them. It is reasoned that the general ‘will’ is what individuals 
will jointly ‘will’ if a perspective that they all are free and equal can be adopted. 
Proponents of Contractualism opine that rationality requires that we respect 
persons, and respect for persons in turn requires that moral principles be 
designed in a way that they can be justified to each person. According to Scanlon: 
...an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour 
that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement.96 
If Rawls’s idea is applied to corporate insolvency law, an insolvency law theory 
based on contractualism is that which bases moral obligation on a tacitly implied 
social contract between hypothetical beings in a setting which demands 
impartiality. Such a theory seeks principles that all rational and autonomous 
agents would accept and agree to issues under certain idealised conditions.  
Thus, unlike contractarianism in which individuals are motivated to act because of 
self-interest, it is the standard of morality to which the individuals will be held 
accountable that drives them to act under contractualism since these standards 
will have to be publicly justified. In an insolvency scenario, for example, this 
would mean that a particular constituency, in seeking to maximise its own 
                                                          
93 See e.g. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, H.J. Paton’s translation, The Moral Law 
(Hutchinson, London 1984). 
94 T M Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds.) 
Utilitarianism and Beyond, (CUP, Cambridge,1982) 103-28; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 
(HUP, Cambridge, MA, 1998);  ‘A  Contractualist Reply’ (2000) 66 Theoria (3)237-245; Scanlon, 
‘Replies’ (2002) 28 Social Theory and Practice (2) 337-358; R J Wallace, 'Scanlon's Contractualism' 
(2002) 112 Ethics (3) 429-470;  S Reibetanz, 'Contractualism and Aggregation' (1988) 108 Ethics (2) 
296-311; David Alm,  ‘Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation’ (2008) 2 Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy . 
95 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (HUP, Cambridge MA 1971); Political Liberalism, (Columbia University 
Press, NY, 1993). 
96  Scanlon (n 94b) 153. 
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interests in a bargain with the others, must pursue those interests in a way that it 
can justify why it did what it did to others who have their own interests to pursue 
in the bargain too. In sum, contractualism is concerned with what reasons, and 
forms of reasoning, are justifiable.97  
2.5.5.3 Contractualism and the ACM  
The ACM is a model built on contractualism. Its antecedents, evidently, lie in 
works by Rawls, Kant and Dworkin. Its proponent claims that this model 
successfully explains and justifies some of the fundamental features of UK 
insolvency law, especially the collective regime and the wide-ranging legal 
practices that buttress this practice.98 The particular features in question include 
the moratorium on the enforcement of certain claims against insolvent debtor 
companies, the priority that insolvency laws of most jurisdictions accord to claims 
stemming from ‘fixed’ security, the nature of the ‘floating’ charge, administrative 
receivership, the administration procedure, the nature and the appropriate place 
of the pari passu principle and the wrongful trading provision of UK insolvency 
law. 
As a model based on contractualism, the ACM is designed to accommodate and 
reconcile the substantive goals of fairness with the procedural goals of transaction 
cost efficiency99 in corporate insolvency. Efficiency is a procedural and not a 
substantive goal of law since it cannot, and does not on its own confer justification 
on any part of law. As a procedural goal of law, efficiency is indispensable 
because once a set of substantive goals of that law has been externally specified, 
efficiency can be used to judge between the available schemes for implementing 
them.100 
2.5.5.4 Substantive goals of law and the ACM 
The substantive goals of law are those goals which bestow justification on that part 
of the law by advancing all the positive aspects of that branch of law. They not 
only demonstrate the need for having that law, but they also accentuate the value 
                                                          
97 Rawls (n 95). 
98  Mokal (n 23). 
99  Reference to efficiency here is to ‘productive’ efficiency rather than to ‘allocative’ efficiency. 
100 Rizwaan .J Mokal, ‘On Fairness and Efficiency,’ (2003) 66 MLR 452;  Mokal, (n 23) 24-25. 
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of having and practicing that corpus of legal doctrine.101 Thus, in the context of 
corporate insolvency, the substantive goals of insolvency law, in Mokal’s view, 
include having a ‘just’ disposition to all stakeholders in insolvency proceedings.  
Just rules must be laid down precisely because, in real life, the individuals in an 
insolvency setting are characteristically either strong or weak, or helpless. For 
these reasons, just rules are needed to regulate insolvency, as it would be both 
unfair and unjust to allow the strong or the powerful (this would be secured 
creditors/banks) to overwhelm and exploit the weak (e.g. employees or 
unsecured creditors) in insolvency proceedings. 102  Justice within the ACM 
framework redresses bargaining advantages while the creditors’ bargain model 
merely reflects them. The ACM-type justice demands the treatment of all 
stakeholders in insolvency as equals. This means that co-operation should be 
facilitated amongst them as moral equals. It also means that equal concern and 
respect should be shown to the interests of each and every party affected by 
issues peculiar to insolvency.  
Co-operation in the ACM’s context means that those confronted by a set of issues 
peculiar to insolvency should co-operate, accept, and be guided by certain rules 
and procedures laid down to govern insolvency. 103  To put this in context, 
reference to issues peculiar to insolvency is reference to the ‘dormant’ social, 
commercial, and legal circumstances unique to a company, and which are 
triggered only when it becomes insolvent.104 In the UK for example, the ranking of 
creditors, adoption of contracts of employment by the administrator and the pari 
passu distribution, etc. are issues that arise in the life of a company only when it is 
insolvent. Although the obligatory transfer of the employee’s contract of 
employment, on the same terms and conditions, the transfer of certain debts owed 
to them and the transferor’s rights and other liabilities to the transferee, is not a 
rule of insolvency law and is not only applicable to transfers of insolvent 
                                                          
101  Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management (Prentice-Hall, New 
Jersey 1992), 22-30. 
102 Rizwaan J Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditors’ Bargain, and 
Corporate Liquidation’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400, 414. 
103  Ibid. 420. 
104  Ibid. 416. 
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businesses,105 the problems this employment law practice pose to going concern 
business transfers are peculiar to insolvency.106 
The co-operation envisaged by the ACM, in relation to issues peculiar to 
insolvency, has to take place on terms that would be reasonably acceptable to 
each party participating in the insolvency proceedings, provided everyone else 
accepts them likewise. The reason for demanding the observation of these 
principles is because the justification for having a particular branch of law, its 
condemnation or rejection, is based on the extent to which the law in question 
promotes or detracts from the moral equality of all those to whom it applies. Non 
observance of these principles could lead to a breach of the right to equal 
concern and respect for all parties likely to be affected by the insolvency 
proceedings. These reasons provide the basis for the ACM advocating that we 
deal fairly with the interests and expectations of those whose economic interests 
would, in different ways, be affected by insolvency. Comparatively, the position 
taken by the ACM is totally at variance with that of the CBT which canvassed the 
prioritisation of the interest of the company’s creditors with legal rights to its 
properties to the exclusion of all non-right holders’ interests. 
 2.5.5.5 Procedural goals of law and the ACM 
The procedural goals of law, on the other hand, are standards or ideals of the way 
and manner in which laws are implemented in order to attain their substantive 
goals.107 The apparent scarcity of social resources makes it a central procedural 
goal of virtually all parts of a legal system to endeavour to implement its 
substantive goals in a way that minimises waste as much as possible so as to be 
able to maximally implement its substantive goals. Thus, in the case of corporate 
                                                          
105 No distinction is made in the TUPE Regulations 2006 between a solvent business transfer and an 
insolvent business transfer. According to Regulation 3 (1) (a), TUPE applies to: 
‘a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or 
business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to 
another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which 
retains its identity.’  
106 The transfer of employees’ contract terms and other rights and liabilities is not particularly 
problematic when the business transferred is solvent. However, in insolvency, and in a going concern 
business transfer, the transfer of contract terms, rights and liabilities need to be handled differently 
and carefully if the continuous survival of the insolvent business is to be guaranteed. 
107  Mokal (n 102). 
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insolvency law, for example, its procedural goals would be tested against the 
extent to which it has provided a means for a fair scheme of co-operation between 
the stakeholders. The ACM methodology provides the means for investigating 
whether principles are wasteful, or whether they are productively efficient in the 
procedural sense of achieving more output with the same amount or even less 
input.108  For example, the ACM methodology would be useful in assessing the 
efficiency or otherwise of the use of default rules in transfers of insolvent 
undertakings regarding employees’ contracts. 
Perusal of the ACM reveals that it is not so different from the CBT discussed 
above. The two are similar in the sense that both models are underpinned by the 
Rawlsian philosophy of a hypothetical consent. Both are agreed that in 
determining the legitimate entitlements of parties, it is most appropriate to ask 
what these parties would consent to in an appropriately defined hypothetical 
bargain. The key difference however, is that while the ACM is a contractualist 
theory and is based on a ‘justice as reciprocity’ principle, the CBT, as a 
contractarian theory, is a ‘justice as mutual advantage’ theory.109  
In other words, unlike the contractarian bargain which is based on justice as 
mutual advantage principle110 (which some maintain is a fatally flawed theory of 
justice because it is too exclusive)111 the ACM’s contractualist bargain is driven 
by considerations of equal mutual respect and reciprocity. Reciprocity acquires a 
different connotation in this context. It implies not making demands of others that, 
if one were required to meet the same demands, one would be unable to meet 
reasonably. What a justice-as-reciprocity theory simply says is that to act in a way 
                                                          
108 See Rizwaan J Mokal, `Contractarianism, Contractualism, and the Law of Corporate Insolvency’ 
(2007) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1074745> accessed 12 October 
2009. 
109 Mokal (n 23) 81. 
110 Under the principle of ‘mutual advantage’, a rule for action, a policy, or an action is judged right if 
it serves the advantage of all concerned. In the context of insolvency, mutual advantage simply 
implies that the best way for a party to secure its self-interest is to secure the general mutual interest 
through establishing or maintaining general order. See David Hume, ‘An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals,’ in L A Selby-Bigge and P H Nidditch (eds) David Hume: Enquiries Concerning 
Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (OUP, Oxford 1975) 195. See further 
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the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency’ (1996) 144 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1987-2020.  
111 See e.g. Peter Vanderschraaf, ‘Justice as mutual advantage and the vulnerable’ (2011) 10 Politics, 
Philosophy & Economics 119-147. 
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that can be justified to others, we must adopt principles no one can reasonably 
condemn or reject.112 
Given the fact that in the life of a company, insolvency is a rather remote event at 
the time when the contracts are bargained, the ACM requires all principles that 
will govern insolvency-related issues to be selected from its ‘choice’ or ‘original’ 
position. What this implies is that all stakeholders are deemed to be ‘dramatically 
ignorant,’ (meaning that they are deprived of any knowledge of personal 
attributes). It is reasoned that their lack of knowledge on what their interests and 
positions will be in the queue upon the insolvency of the corporate debtor would 
make each of them incline to act in an economically rational manner and 
according to a single set of criteria.113  
The ACM-type contract is akin to the Rawlsian contract which is aimed at setting a 
general social framework for a liberal society, rather than seeking to determine 
moral principles. In order to achieve principles of justice (i.e. fairness to all), and 
to reflect his commitment to liberal neutrality, Rawls places his parties to the 
agreement behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, which ensures that they are deprived of 
knowledge of key facts about their own identities. Similarly, by placing his parties 
to the hypothetical agreement in this ‘veiled’ or ‘choice’ position, Mokal argues 
that they would anticipate various conceptions of the good that might come their 
way and would therefore be in a position to provide, rationally, the means 
through which such conceptions would be pursued via their choice of insolvency 
principles. In other words, being in a position of ‘dramatic ignorance’ allows what 
is ‘good’ to be agreed upon rather than to be imposed on the stakeholders. 
Noting the importance of the ‘choice position’ further, Mokal cites the ‘automatic 
stay’ on enforcement of claims as one of the principles in insolvency that parties 
would choose to put in place. The model also demonstrates that because of the 
construction of the ‘choice position’, and the constructive attributes of the parties 
bargaining in that position, not only would the principles that will eventually be 
chosen be fair and just, but that, since these principles would have been chosen 
                                                          
112 T Nagel, Equality and Partiality, (OUP, London 1991). 
113 Charles Mooney has stated unequivocally that ex ante hypothetical bargain theories of insolvency 
law, however colourfully painted, packaged and presented, are susceptible to the objection that they 
amount to little more than an argument that thoughtful, interested, objective and neutral lawmakers 
would arrive at the same conclusions about insolvency as their proponents. Mooney’s comments 
were directed at Donald Korobkin’s theory of value. See Mooney (n 82) 966. 
77 
 
by them in exercise of their autonomy, the implementation of the principles so 
chosen will also be efficient. In essence, the ACM’s choice position is simply a 
means of ensuring that any given set of legal practices can be tested in terms of 
whether it is selective or non-selective, fair or unfair on those that the legal 
practices affect.114 However, for a set of principles or rules to be fair to those it 
will affect, the ACM stresses that there must be consistency in their application. 
The key difference between the ACM and the CBT, in relation to the interests 
insolvency law should cater for, is that unlike the latter, it is not only those 
constituencies with direct financial concerns in the insolvent company that fit the 
`affected parties’ description in the ACM. Rather, the ‘affected party’ tag covers 
any person, irrespective of how remote, but who can show that its interests are 
affected in a way peculiar to corporate insolvency. Consistent with this view, the 
ACM is therefore a more inclusive theory since it makes for the participation of 
parties such as managers, shareholders, employees and all creditors (voluntary 
or involuntary) of the firm, which the Creditors’ Bargain model excludes.  
Conscious however of the danger of over-stretching the ‘affected party’ label, 
presumably for pragmatic rather than principled reason, the ACM rejects the 
view canvassed by Professor Korobkin that the: ‘...problem of financial distress 
affects virtually all persons in society... As a result, all persons in society should 
have representation in the choice of principles’115  for being too wide and open-
ended regarding those whose interests insolvency law should cater for. The 
difficulty that such an ‘all inclusive’ approach faces, it has been opined, is 
ascertaining how courts will weigh these interests against each other or against 
those of the creditors specifically.116 However, to have an inclusive regime will be 
welcomed by a constituency such as the employees. This is because it would 
mean that their interests will be accounted for in the overall scheme of insolvency 
proceedings. 
                                                          
114 Mokal (n 23) Ch. 3. Recall at the very beginning of the analysis on the ACM when it was noted that 
the model is built on the notion that all principles of corporate insolvency law can be meaningfully 
tested. 
115 Korobkin (n 56) 554.  
116 See Barry S Schermer, ‘Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interest of the Community into 
account in Bankruptcy- A Modern Day Tale of Belling the Cat’ (1994) 74 Wash. U. L. Q.1049. 
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Differences of opinion regarding the extent of interests to be considered in 
insolvency notwithstanding, it is evident that Mokal and Korobkin are agreed on 
one point: that the creditors’ interests are not the only interests that insolvency 
law should take into account when a company is insolvent. Mokal is not the only 
theorist advocating for insolvency law to cater for a wider set of interests. Other 
theorists before him have made similar calls in the past,117 and more are still 
convinced that corporate insolvency affects several interests that deserve to be 
given equal weight of consideration as are the creditors’ interests. 
2.6. The Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy 
Reorganization 
Dissatisfaction with the Creditors’ Bargain paradigm for insolvency analysis has 
continued unabated. This has given rise to several theories put forward to explain 
insolvency law. Professor Lynn LoPucki118 has made a very important contribution 
to theories of insolvency law. By applying the team production theory of 
corporate law prevalent in the law and economics literature,119 to bankruptcy 
reorganization of public corporations, LoPucki has developed a normative and 
alternative theory for analysing insolvency law. However, before turning our 
focus to the team production theory of bankruptcy reorganization (hereafter TPT 
for convenience), and its implications for business rescue and employment 
protection in the context of insolvent business transfers, it is important to first 
explore the origin of the theory.  
                                                          
117 See generally Warren (n 43) 775-814; (n 54) 336-387; Gross, (n 36); Vanessa Finch, ‘The Measures 
of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2) 227-251; Finch (n 55). 
118 LoPucki, (n 75) 769. For avoidance of confusion, the word ‘reorganization’ is spelled with a ‘z’ in 
the American way when reference is made specifically to the full title of LoPucki’s theory, but in the 
analysis the English spelling of ‘reorganisation with a ‘g’ is maintained.  
119 See e.g. A A Alchian and H Demsetz, arguing that the firm does not own all its inputs. The defining 
characteristic of the firm locates in a team use of inputs and a centralised position of some party in 
the contractual arrangements of all other inputs. Resource owners increase productivity through 
cooperative specialization. Alchian and Demsetz (n 4) 777-78: 18 years later, Professor Alfred 
Chandler lent support to this view when he noted that the modern industrial firm is ‘a collection of 
operating units, each with its own specific facilities and personnel, whose combined resources and 
activities are coordinated, monitored and allocated by a hierarchy of middle and top managers.’ See 
A. D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press, Cambridge, 
MA, 1990) 13. In is contemporary form, the idea of the firm as a constituent group or team which 
combine resources to achieve team production and which deliberately cedes control or delegates 
ultimate authority over both the direction of the enterprise and the distribution of rents and surplus 
among team members to the corporation’s board of directors is articulated by Blair and Stout. See in 
particular Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, ‘Team Production in Business Organizations: An 
Introduction’ (1998-1999) 24 Journal of Corp. Law, 743, 745; ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law’ (1999) 85 V. L. Rev. 247. 
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2.6.1 TPT: ideological superstructure 
The antecedent of TPT lies in the team production theory of corporate law,120 
which in turn owes its origin to the earlier concepts of ‘team production’ in the 
economics literature.121 The team production theory of corporate law in its current 
form and, in contemporary law and economics literature, owes its development to 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout. 122  The theory has significant normative 
implications for legal debates on corporate governance and, (as would be shown 
later), the governance of corporate insolvency. 
The team production theory of corporate law offers an alternative approach to the 
principal-agent explanation model of corporation law.123 It sheds more light on 
several pivotal doctrines and issues in corporate law that have plagued corporate 
governance and which the agency heuristic as a model of explanation could not 
satisfactorily explain. The theory sheds light on doctrines such as the requirement 
that public corporations should be managed by a board of directors rather than 
by the shareholders themselves directly. It illuminates, inter alia, the meaning and 
function of a corporation’s legal personality, the rules of derivative suit procedure 
and the substantive structure of directors’ fiduciary duties, and the highly-limited 
nature of shareholders’ voting rights etc. It takes a completely different view on 
what is traditionally seen as the raison d’être of the firm and what corporate law in 
general is meant to, or ought to, accomplish. 
The team production theory of the firm challenges two recurrent themes in 
corporate law literature. First, it opposes the view that the main goal of the firm is, 
or ought to be the maximisation of wealth for its shareholders. For decades, the 
literature on corporate governance was inundated with the view that the economy 
is driven by a single ideology: that the purpose of the firm was to increase the 
                                                          
120  Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, ‘Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction’ 
(1998-1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 743; ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 V. L Rev. 247. 
121  Alchian & Demsetz (n 4); Chandler (n 119) 
122  Blair & Stout (n 119). 
123 Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 
Publishers, 1932); Eugene F  Fama & Michael C Jensen, ‘Separation of the Ownership and Control’ 
(1983) 26 Journal of Law & Economics 302; Michael C Jensen & William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305; Milton 
Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its Profits’ New York Times, (September 
13, 1970), Section 6 (Magazine) 32; . E M Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 
45 Harv. L Rev. 1145, 1148; Peter Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, (Transaction Publishers, 1993); 
Thomas A Kochan and Saul A Rubinstein, ‘Towards a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn 
Partnership’ (2000) 11 Organizational Science, 367, 368; D G Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ 
(1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 277, 293. 
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profits it delivered to its shareholders. 124 Although, there were a few voices 
shouting from the margins that the corporation should consider its obligations to 
the society at large,125 wealth maximisation for the shareholders continued to be 
the abiding goal of many a firm for several decades.126   
However, it seems that the stakeholder theory, proposed as an alternative model 
to find an answer to the question of what the real objective of the firm is, or should 
be, has not only grown significantly in popularity in the last two decades,127 but 
has gained widespread acceptance too.128 Recent developments in some ‘Anglo-
American jurisdictions’ 129  (particularly, the introduction of the ‘enlightened 
stakeholder value’ in UK company law, and the enactment of ‘constituency 
statutes’ in most US states)130 point to the fact that the dominance and popularity of 
                                                          
124 See e.g. Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its Profits’ New York 
Times, September 13, 1970, Section 6 (Magazine) 32; David Millon, ‘New Directions in Corporate Law: 
Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law’ (1993) 50 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 
1373, 1374;  L Mitchell, ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law’ (1993) 50 Washington & 
Lee L. Rev. 1477, 1485; L Fairfax, ‘The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric 
on Corporate Norms’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 675, 676; G Crespi, ‘Maximizing the 
Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace’ (2007) 32 Journal of 
Corporation Law, 383, 386. 
125 See e.g. E M Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harv. L R 1145, 1148; 
Peter Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, (Transaction Publishers, 1993); Thomas A Kochan and Saul 
A Rubinstein, ‘Towards a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: The Saturn Partnership’ (2000) 11 
Organizational Science, 367, 368; D G Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 Journal of 
Corporation Law, 277, 293. 
126 One of the key arguments often advanced in support of shareholder primacy is that shareholders 
are residual claimants and that as such, they have the greatest stake in the outcome of the 
corporation. J Macey, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Residual Claims; Obligations to Nonshareholder 
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (1999) 84 Cornell L Rev 1266, 1267. It follows 
that since they are residual claimants, the business should be run for their benefit while the 
corporation is solvent. See F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(HUP, Cambridge Mass, 1999) 36-39. 
127 Andrew Keay, ‘Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can it Survive? Should it Survive?’ (2009) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498065> accessed 27 January 2012. 
128 Michael Jensen notes that the stakeholder theory has been endorsed by many professional 
associations, special interests groups, and governmental organisations and even the British 
government. M C Jensen, ‘Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function’ in M Beer and N Nohira (eds) Breaking the Code of Change (Harvard Business School Press, 
2000). In its ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ published in 1999, the OECD urged board directors 
to take into account interests of stakeholders. Others have pointed to the acceptance of the model by 
pointing out that even traditional pro-business publications such as the Financial Times are in support 
of a stakeholder model of corporate governance. See E Sternberg, ‘Stakeholder Theory Exposed’  
(1996) 2(1) The Corporate Governance Quarterly 4-18. 
129 The term ‘Anglo-American’ is often used by legal, economic and political scholars, to refer to those 
countries or jurisdictions that have similar legal regimes or tradition that are based on the English 
common law. See Andrew Keay (n 127) above. Thus, the term ‘Anglo-America jurisdiction’ is used 
here to refer specifically to the UK and the US, whose legal regimes are based on the English common 
law.  
130 Keay (n 127). 
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the shareholder value doctrine may be beginning to wane.131 While some have, 
boldly and unequivocally, declared the shareholder primacy theory dead, 132 
others have simply opined that, based on the arguments against it, the 
shareholder paradigm should not survive: ‘it should be overtaken by another 
position.’133  
Team production theorists of corporate law, exemplified in Margaret Blair and 
Lynn Stout, who obviously are not shareholder value or shareholder primacy 
acolytes, contend that the shareholder primacy theory of the firm is flawed since 
the shareholders are evidently not the only group that contributes specialised 
inputs to corporate production. 134  The firm, they opine, is an aggregate of 
‘interests’ comprising, but not limited to, shareholders, creditors (secured and 
                                                          
131  There is the view that the recent introduction in the UK, for example, of the concept of 
enlightened shareholder value into company law in the form of section 172 of Companies Act 2006, 
which now requires directors to balance the interests of the various stakeholder of the corporation 
when making decisions, is indicative of the UK’s preparedness to embrace stakeholder value in 
relation to the management of corporations.  S Kiare, ‘At Cross Roads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder 
Value and Enlightened Shareholder Value: Which Road should the United Kingdom Take?’ (2006) 17 
Int’l Corp & Comm L. Rev 329. See also the views of Cynthia and Conley that: 
The expanded social and environmental disclosure mandate in the UK, seen 
within the context of changes in institutional investor legal regulation, 
norms and behaviour, is evidence that a British “enlightened share value" 
corporate governance theory is coming to occupy a unique third position 
between the American shareholder wealth--maximizing position and the 
continental stakeholder model. ... 
...even in the United States, where market pressures have advanced the 
concept of shareholder primacy to a greater extent than in other countries, 
stakeholders’ interests are starting to be articulated with more vigor and 
efficacy within the corporation... Here too, the global CSR movement is 
blurring the edges of the traditional shareholder-- stakeholder distinction. 
Cynthia A Williams and John M Conley, ‘An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Contract’ (2005) 38 Cornell Int'l L.J 493, 493 & 500. For some other scholars who 
share a similar view on the shareholder – stakeholder dichotomy, see generally S William, ‘The Proper 
Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties’ (1991) 21 
Stetson L. Rev 163; E Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes’ (1993) 
61 Geo Wash L Rev 14; E Adams & J Matheson, ‘A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency 
Concerns’ (2000) Emory LJ 1085; k Hale, ‘Corporate Law and Stakeholders; Moving Beyond 
Stakeholder Statutes’ (2003) 45 Arizona L. Rev 823; B McDonnell, ‘Corporate Constituency and 
Employee Governance’ (2004) 30 William Mitchell Law Rev 1227. 
132  See e.g. R Edward Freeman, ‘The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions’ (1994) 4 
Business Ethics Quarterly 409, 413. 
133 Keay (n 127). 
134 Margaret M Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance For The Twenty First 
Century (The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1995) 229; Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, ‘Team 
Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction’ (1998-1999) 24 Journal of Corp. L 743; ‘A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 V. L. Rev. 247.  
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unsecured), employees and managers. 135 The employees, for example, make 
firm-specific human capital contributions to the firm. Human capital has been 
identified as the most important asset in the modern firm.136 
Second, there is an assumption in contemporary corporate law scholarship that 
the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is how to reduce 
agency cost by ensuring that managers and directors continue to remain as loyal 
agents of the shareholders despite the latitude granted them by the latter on 
decision making.137 Team production theorists reject this view and argue instead 
that the central economic function of the public corporation is primarily to 
address the team production problem that arises when a number of individuals 
invest firm-specific resources resulting in the production of non-separable goods. 
Blair and Stout aver that team production problems arise when three conditions 
are met. The first condition is that economic production requires a team. That is, 
production requires the combined inputs (e.g. of time, money and other 
resources) of two or more persons. These persons include the shareholders, 
creditors, directors, managers, employees, and other potential corporate 
stakeholders who in the future may commit firm-specific resources to the firm.138  
The second condition is that some of the resources combined or invested by the 
team members for the production must be ‘team-specific.’ This means that the 
                                                          
135 Using the ‘nexus of contracts’ metaphor to explain corporate relationship in a slightly different 
way, others have argued that the corporation should be seen as ‘a number of complex, private, 
consensual transactions or contract-based relations, either express or implied’ consisting of different 
types of relationships expressed in terms of voluntary association with the corporation by the 
different persons that comprise it. See e.g. Keay (n 127);  F Easterbrook and D Fischel, ‘The Corporate 
Contract’ (1989) 89 Colum L. Rev 1416, 1412; J R Boatright, ‘Contractors as Stakeholders: Reconciling 
Stakeholder Theory with the Nexus-of-Contracts Firms’ (2002) 26 (9) Journal of Banking and Finance 
1837-1842; T Donaldson L E Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence 
and Implications’ (1995) 20(1) Academy of Mgt. Rev. 65-91; K R Conner, ‘A Historical Comparison of 
Resource-based Theory and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We 
Have a New Theory of the Firm?’ (1991) 17(1) Journal of Mgt. 121-154; R E Freeman and W M Evan, 
‘Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Interpretation’ (1990) 19(4) The Journal of Behavioural 
Economics 337-359; R E Freeman and R A Philips, ‘Stakeholder Theory: A Libertarian Defense’ (2002) 
12 (3) Business Ethics Quarterly 331-349; H Hansmann, The Ownership of the Firm (HUP, 1996). 
136 Luigi Zingales, ‘In search of New Foundations’ (2000) 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1632. See also M 
Blair and L Stout, ‘Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law’ (2006) 31 Journal of 
Corporation Law, 719, 738. 
137 See e.g. Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(Transaction Publishers, 1932); Eugene F  Fama & Michael C. Jensen, ‘Separation of the Ownership 
and Control’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law & Economics 302; Michael C Jensen & William H Meckling, 
‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, (1976) 3 J. Fin. 
Econ. 305. 
138 See Lynn M Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 S. Cal. L 
Rev. 1189, 1195-96. 
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resources have significant higher value when used specifically by the team for its 
production than if they were committed to their next best use. The third condition 
is that the gains (economic ‘rent’) resulting from team production has to be joint 
or non-separable. This makes it difficult to attribute any particular portion of the 
gains to the contribution of a single team member at any time.139  
Team production problem, according to Blair and Stout, is not a pre-investment 
problem per se; rather it is a post-investment problem. It is after the three 
conditions discussed above have been met that team production problem may 
arise. What is characterised as team production problem is simply a problem of 
fair sharing of the proceeds from the joint effort of the team members.  It is opined 
that after the team resources have been jointly invested, team members face the 
dilemma of how best to share the gains accruing from the joint production. In such 
situations team members may find it difficult or impossible to draft explicit 
contracts distributing the output of their joint efforts fairly amongst themselves. 
Supposing they agree ex ante to a sharing formula or rule that will divide the 
gains equally among them, such a formula may potentially be plagued with the 
problem of shirking (used in this context to mean an absence of optimum efforts 
on the part of individual team members for the success of a joint project). Equally, 
should the team members decide to wait and share team production gains ex post, 
they will, on the other hand, have to contend with the problem of wasteful rent-
seeking (implying internal squabbling and misapplication of available production 
resources which in turn would reduce the overall wealth available for distribution 
among them).  
Thus, shirking and rent-seeking exposes some of the team members, who have 
made firm-specific investments in the company to the opportunistic behaviour of 
other team members. There is the notion that if this type of behavior on the part of 
some team members is allowed to continue, it could reduce, or completely erode 
any economic gains generated by team production effort eventually.140 These 
problems are compounded by the fact that team members are unable to draft 
explicit contracts capable of distributing the ‘rent’ of their joint efforts according 
to an individual’s contribution and merit. As a solution to this conundrum, team 
members might seek extra-contractual means of protecting themselves, failing 
which the preferred alternative would be to relinquish control over their 
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enterprise to an independent third party.141 This third party is to be entrusted with 
the responsibility of representing the respective interests of the team members 
and allocating rewards among them as fairly as is practicable.  
Two cogent reasons have been advanced by Blair and Stout for delegating 
ultimate decision making authority on business governance and distribution of 
production rents and surplus among team members to an independent board. 
First, the team members intend that all of them should have a share in the rents 
and surplus resulting from the production. This constituent group believes that 
only an independent and neutral board will divide the rents and surplus among 
them fairly based on individual members’ contributions.  
The second reason given for delegation of authority is that team members are 
vulnerable. Their vulnerability makes them unable to effectively protect the firm-
specific investments that each of them has made in the enterprise142 whether by 
‘direct contracting, personal trust, or reputation.’143 Therefore all stakeholders 
decide through the vehicle of the team production contract that the best thing to 
do is to give up control over those resources to a board of directors whom they 
see as an impartial arbiter for their own benefit and protection. 
It is not uncommon for employees and managers to make the kind of investments 
mentioned above in a company in the hope that, in the long run, the firm will 
reward them for their efforts with a raise in wages or salary, job security and even 
promotions.144 But the Blair and Stout team members do not rely on the board of 
directors alone to reward them. Individual members of the team may, and do 
sometimes, negotiate and agree to a contract with the firm guaranteeing them 
some minimum share in the team production.  
The type of contract agreed to will, however, vary according to who the team 
member in question is.  For example, a creditor might negotiate with the firm for 
the right to be paid interest on principal, the repayment of principal on demand 
as well as the right to discontinue and withdraw investment under specified 
circumstances (e.g. default or breach of a loan agreement). For the customer, it 
could be the right to be granted legally binding warranty promises. The 
                                                          
141  In this case:  the Board of Directors. 
142 Margaret M Blair & Lynn A Stout, `Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate 
Board’ (2001) 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 403, 416.  
143 LoPucki (n 79). 
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executives of the firm might negotiate for ‘commensurate’ salary for work done, 
stock options, severance pay, etc.145  
In addition to these legal rights, team members would expect other forms of 
compensations from the firm which are non-legal entitlements (see below). For 
the executives these could be extra bonuses, club membership etc. For lending 
banks, it could be the continuation of lending rapport, with or without, the best 
lending terms being made available to the creditor firm. In a similar vein, the 
employees would expect to be paid above-market wages and benefits (even if 
this will mean shifting costs on to other team members such as the creditors by 
reducing payments of money owing to them). The employees will also expect to 
be provided job security in old age, sickness, during reorganisations or during 
the sale of the firm, or of its business (whether solvent or insolvent) as a going 
concern to a purchaser. This could, for example, justify continued employment of 
some employees even though, economically, the firm knows that it is inefficient to 
do so. For the customers, it might be demand for product support or extension of 
that support beyond stipulated contractual and cost- effective time-span. The firm 
could justify its action on grounds of customer goodwill.146  
The provision of these additional rewards is dependent on several factors. These 
include each member’s actual contribution to team production, production 
requirements and the success enjoyed by the firm at the time. Blair and Stout are 
quick to point out that these additional compensations do not, however, carry 
legal rights. What this means is that where the firm cannot provide them, team 
members cannot therefore litigate against it for failure to provide them. But 
because team members do not see compensations as a gift, but rather as an 
entitlement, it is possible that the firm’s failure to provide these things would 
nonetheless be construed by the team members as a betrayal. This could cause 
low morale and lead to disaffection towards the firm in particular, and team 
production in general. 
The team production model carries important normative implications for legal 
and popular debates over corporate governance, because its core tenet is that 
maximizing shareholder wealth should not be the principal goal of corporate law. 
Shareholders are just other team members of the production team. Thus, directors 
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of corporations should seek to maximize the joint welfare of all the firm's 
stakeholders, which include shareholders, managers, employees, and possibly 
other groups such as creditors or the local community, all of whom contribute 
firm-specific resources to corporate production. Professor Lopucki has adapted 
this stakeholders’ approach to corporate law analysis and incorporated the idea 
into the model of insolvency law analysis he labels ‘team production theory of 
bankruptcy reorganization’ which is analysed below.  
2.6.2 Applying the team production heuristic to bankruptcy 
analysis 
Building on the team production theory of corporate law, Lynn LoPucki has 
developed a team production theory of bankruptcy reorganization (TPT).  TPT 
turns the existing contractarian and the dominant Creditor’s Bargain theory 
upside down. With the TPT, corporate insolvency ceases to be seen through the 
CBT’s lens as a regulation imposed by government on the stakeholders. It instead 
becomes a contract term to which they agree to subordinate their legal rights for 
the preservation of the going concern in the business instead.  
Like the CBT which it strives to disprove, TPT is contractarian. It is contractarian 
because its account is based on mutual self-interest. It looks at those forms of co-
operative behaviour that are mutually advantageous for self-interested parties in 
an insolvent company to engage in. But unlike the CBT, which is based on a 
hypothetical contract, TPT is based on putative actual contracts. LoPucki claims 
that his model ‘... is an empirically testable hypothesis regarding the actual 
bargain among the constituent groups...’ that makes up ‘the public 
corporation’.147 By this Professor LoPucki means that the theory is grounded on 
actual contracts entered by team members. However, the theory is also normative 
as it asserts that actual contracts should be enforced on efficiency grounds. 
TPT starts by identifying the institutions that are economically efficient and makes 
assumptions that contracting parties would choose these institutions. Under TPT 
the company is seen as an aggregation of participants (designated as team 
members) who combine their resources in a production unit. The reason given for 
this team approach to production is because the contracting parties realise that 
they cannot achieve the business results they desire if they seek those results 
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separately and individually rather than by doing so as a team. Team production 
results from the joint resources and efforts of the constituent groups that make up 
the team. Thus, the resources used in team production do not, in an economic (as 
distinct from legal) sense, all belong to one person.148  
The basis of team productivity is mutual trust. The emphasis on mutual trust is 
what sets TPT apart from other contractarian theories such as the CBT (mutual 
advantage), in which trust is seemingly lacking. Thus, TPT is based on the 
hypothesis that team members deliberately delegate the ultimate decision 
making authority over the company and the distribution of rents and surpluses 
among them to the board of directors on trust. The reason for doing this is 
because it is difficult for these matters to be dealt with through explicit contracts. 
Regarding the interests that should be taken into consideration in insolvency, 
LoPucki asserts that a collective insolvency proceeding should account for the 
rights of all stakeholders because in addition to contributing value to the 
company, these parties also have various degrees of economic interests in it. 
LoPucki is of the view that the CBT is nothing more than a bargain that ensures 
that, in the event of insolvency, the creditors would be well positioned to control 
outcomes so that they can get everything from the debtor’s estate.  This is why the 
theory is creditor focused.  
TPT is agitating for the inclusion and consideration of the employees’ interests as 
stakeholders in a company. Employees make human capital contribution to firms. 
Thus, in relation to the employees and their importance to firms, TPT is merely 
echoing the view that suppliers of labour deserve to have their claims considered 
in the same way that suppliers of capital do in corporate insolvency. 149  An 
argument may be made that after all, the value of a company’s commodity and or 
of its services, a la Karl Marx in his labour theory of value, is ultimately derived 
from the labour used to create that commodity.150 In a business (highly dependent 
                                                          
148 Alchian & Demsetz (n 4) 777-95. 
149 David Milman, ‘Priority Rights on Corporate Insolvency’ in Alison Clark (ed.) Current Issues in 
Insolvency Law (Stevens, London, 1991) 57. 
150 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume 1: The Process of Capitalist Production, 
(Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling translation) Frederick Engels & Ernest Untermann (eds) (Charles H. 
Kerr and Co, Chicago, 1909) Ch. 1. 
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on skills, knowhow, services etc. as opposed to capital assets), these investments 
are arguably wrapped up in its goodwill and going concern values.151  
It is an objective of the team production contract to permit the debtor company to 
be reorganised when the need arises and to ensure that it continues to trade 
during insolvency. The debtor should carry on business if the total benefits 
accruable to team members from continuing to trade exceed those that would 
accrue in liquidation. The point here is that reorganisation should occur when it is 
beneficial to team members as a group and not when it is only beneficial to the 
interests of the creditors as canvassed by the CBT.   
The CBT is a model built on the notion that, upon the occurrence of insolvency, if 
the company continues to operate, it should be owned by the creditors. This 
means that the interests of other team members, such as the employees, the 
consumers, the community in which the company operates, etc., would all have to 
play second fiddle to those of the creditors, since consideration of non-creditor 
interests, according to the creditors’ bargain theorists, is economically inefficient. 
For CBT, the employees are not, in a strictly legal if not economic sense, the 
owners of the insolvent company since they have no substantive rights against its 
assets. For this reason the creditors, who, in their view are the ‘legal’ owners of 
the company during insolvency, are at liberty, for example, to close it down 
without considering the interests of the employees if doing so will enable them to 
maximise their wealth.152 
TPT favours continuity of employment. The theory’s position is that the team 
production contract has to continue in force during bankruptcy reorganisation. 
This is because team members intended it to be that way at the time they 
contracted to join the firm. The continuity of the firm, or of its business, requires 
that, at least, some of the team should remain in place and carry on production 
during a reorganisation exercise. What this means in the context of insolvency 
reorganisation is that nothing prevents the firm from making adjustments to the 
team if necessary. For example, the management may need to be fired and 
replaced by the team. Also, if reorganisation takes the form of a sale of the firm’s 
business on a going concern basis, the firm is not prevented from firing some, but 
not all, of its employees in order to be able to continue trading.  
                                                          
151 Gross (n 54). 
152 Jackson (n 64b) 25. 
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Regarding the question of redistribution in insolvency, LoPucki does not see this 
as a case of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’. Put differently, redistribution is not the 
‘Robin Hood’153 of corporate relationship which ‘robs’ holders of legal rights of 
their wealth and gives this to non-rights holders such as the employees, as the 
creditors’ bargain theorists would have us believe. Rather, redistribution is seen 
as one of the objectives of the team production contract. For LoPucki, 
redistribution in the context of insolvency is simply a way of honouring the 
commitments that the company made to the team members in order to entice 
them to join the team.  
For LoPucki, and in relation to the employees’ team members, the fulfilment by 
the company of its pre-insolvency legal obligations to them in a going concern 
transfer of its business should not be affected by its insolvent status. The firm 
should honour its obligations to them due to the firm-specific human capital 
investments the employees make in the company. The rationale for this is that 
while the team members were contracting to join the company, they had 
mandated the company (technically through the board) to honour its 
commitments to the employees’ team members even in insolvency as the 
employees, unlike the creditors’ team members, are unable to protect their 
investments in the firm in other ways. 
What this implies is that, the team production theory accepts, for example, that in 
bankruptcy, the creditors’ or the shareholders’ non-bankruptcy entitlements may 
be altered and wealth may be redistributed to other team members. Thus, in 
relation to the employees’ team members, the fact that the firm is insolvent should 
not prevent it from honouring its team production obligations to them. Rather, the 
firm should honour these obligations even if it means having recourse to the use 
of bankruptcy law to reduce its formal obligations to other team members (such 
as the creditors) in order to meet its legal obligations to the employees team 
members because of the firm-specific investments they have made in the firm. 
Granted, in honouring its commitments to the employee-team members, for 
example, the company might be portrayed as antagonising the creditor-team 
members in respect of their formal claims since it might require actions to be 
                                                          
153 Robin Hood was a heroic outlaw in English folklore. Legend has it that he used to steal from the 
rich and give to the poor. The origin of the legend is claimed by some to have stemmed from actual 
outlaws, or from ballads or tales of outlaws.  See e.g. Howard Pyle’s 1883 novel: The Merry 
Adventures of Robin Hood.  
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taken, such as using insolvency law to alter the latter’s priorities and reducing the 
company’s formal obligation to them which they might not approve of. 
Under the TPT, it is not considered that meeting of its obligation to the employee-
team members by the insolvent company would destroy the rights of the other 
constituencies or team members with legal rights against the company’s assets. 
These groups (i.e. creditors and shareholders) were, in fact, party to the original 
team production agreement or contract which directed that the company’ s board 
should honour its team production obligations to the employee-team members 
even when it is insolvent because of the latter’s very valued firm-specific human 
capital contributions to the firm.   
In spite of the seeming tension between the team members whose formal rights 
may be reduced in insolvency, the company continues to represent them as 
fiduciaries vis-a-vis their team production entitlements. 154  The issue on 
redistribution, it is submitted, needs to be approached with great care. One 
wonders, for example, if secured creditors’ rights were reduced in insolvency to 
allow for redistribution to other aims, whether doing so would lead to an increase 
in the cost and availability of finance. 
What the Team Production Theory of corporate bankruptcy is advocating is 
simply that the interests of all those affected by insolvency should be heard and 
their concerns addressed. Bankruptcy policy should take into account the 
distributional impact of business failure on all stakeholders (team members). This 
would apply to those with a direct financial interest in the failed company as well 
as those with non-financial claims but still an interest in the on-going business.155 
There is the view that the shareholder primacy theories encourage managers to 
treat non-owner stakeholders such as the employees as mere means to the ends 
of the shareholders.156  
                                                          
154  LoPucki (n 79) 764. 
155 Professor LoPucki is not alone in calling for such a forum and role for insolvency law. See e.g. E 
Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 354-55; 
Nathalie D Martin, ‘Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In’ (1998) 
59 Ohio St. L. Rev. 429; A Flessner ‘Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: an International 
Overview’ in Ziegel (ed) Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency 
Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 27. On why bankruptcy might not be redistributional, see Ronald 
J Mann, ‘Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money is it anyway? (1995) 70 
NYU L Rev. 993. 
156  R E Freeman and W M Evan, ‘Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Interpretation’ (1990) 19(4) 
The Journal of Behavioural Economics 337-359. 
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2.7 Relevance of theory to insolvency law 
Insolvency law provides a bundle of diverse legal entitlements for the different 
categories of stakeholders that comprise the insolvent company. It also institutes 
rules to govern how these entitlements should157 be honoured when the company 
is insolvent and is in formal insolvency proceedings.  
Insolvency law theories seek to analyse, inter alia, what these rules are, what each 
of the parties comprising the firm would have bargained for, if they were given a 
chance, before their dealings with the company. Theories also seek answers to 
what legislative scheme would maximise the welfare of each and every 
constituency that comprise the insolvent company. For example, if we see 
insolvency as loss sharing device which should alter or revise original contractual 
entitlements of the parties in light of current facts, then some social welfare theory 
would be needed to provide a basis or normative justification for redefining those 
entitlements.158  
The theoretical and philosophical bases for insolvency law provide a useful lens 
through which to critically analyse all forms of legislative protection159 given to all 
parties affected by insolvency or the values held by these parties. 160  Thus, 
insolvency theories illuminate our understanding of insolvency law. Ultimately, 
the purpose of the debates or arguments based on competing values, as 
articulated by Korobkin, ‘is to compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
plausible arguments, and not to find a clear winner.’161 
2.7.1 Relevance of CBT 
The CBT has been very influential as a model for bankruptcy analysis. It has even 
been given legislative cognizance in some jurisdictions. Creditors bargain is a 
                                                          
157  The word ‘should’ is indicative of the fact that a normative assertion is being made. What this 
means in essence is that the obligations should be honoured only when doing so will be efficient. 
158  Frost (n 17). 
159 Helen Anderson, ‘Theory and Reality in Insolvency Law: Some Contradictions in Australia’ (2009) 27 
Company and Securities Law Journal 506-523 
http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AndersonCLTA09.pdf accessed 10 
March 2012. 
160 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World (1993) 92 Mich. L Rev 336; 
Donald R Korobkin, ‘Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy’ (1991) 91 Colum. L Rev. 
717. 
161 Donald R Korobkin ‘The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates’ (1996) 82 IOWA L Rev. 
75, 108-9. 
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useful way of theorising or thinking about technical issues, and broad issues of 
bankruptcy and corporate reorganisation generally. Its contribution to 
bankruptcy law in general is better appreciated if we ask ourselves the questions: 
Why don’t we just let individual creditors exercise their remedies?  Why have 
bankruptcy proceedings?  
The CBT becomes useful by arguing in the context of insolvency that, if human 
beings are rationally self-interested, they would co-operate knowing that they 
would be better off through collective action than by grabbing assets of the 
debtor individually. Let us assume the situation that a debtor is experiencing 
financial difficulty (i.e. its liabilities exceed its assets), and that it has two creditors 
which it has granted separate loans of £50, 000 each. The insolvent business is 
worth £80, 000 if sold as going concern and £60, 000 if broken up and sold 
piecemeal. If an individual creditor seizes the debtor’s assets, that creditor will 
collect its £50, 000 whereas the second creditor would only get £10, 000.  There is 
an assumption that creditors are risk adverse and so there is a 50% chance of 
even getting the £50, 000. However, if both creditors were to co-operate with 
each other, then they would get £80,000 when the business is sold as a going 
concern.  
The ‘co-operate’ or ‘defect’ hypothetical (that is, the individual versus collective 
enforcement action problem) is essentially the game theory’s ‘prisoners’ 
dilemma’-type problem that arises in insolvency. In other words, when a common 
debtor is insolvent and its assets are potentially not enough to meet its obligations 
to all of its creditors, there is inevitably a problem of co-operation and 
competition for the available assets. This is also a problem of choice between 
selfish behaviour and socially desirable altruism.162 The point here is not that self-
help or individual enforcement action which is to the benefit of the particular 
individual is morally wrong, nor is a collective enforcement action that would 
benefit others at the expense of the individual (if he or she were to act alone), 
always morally required. However, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, both parties 
would prefer the outcome with the altruistic moves to that with the selfish moves. 
                                                          
162  See Steven Khun, ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (2007) in Edward  N Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma/>  accessed 28 March 2011. See also 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 87. The ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ is the direct opposite of Adams Smith’s 
‘Invisible Hand’ theory which holds that self-interested action often forces individuals to act against 
promoting common good rather than work towards it. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
Book IV Ch. 11. 
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This is what Jackson is implying in his creditors’ bargain theory.  Like the 
prisoners’ dilemma, the CBT helps us to understand what governs the balance 
between co-operation and competition in corporate insolvency. 
Jackson has posited several reasons why it pays for the creditors to co-operate in 
insolvency. Cooperation between creditors, according to the CBT, would reduce 
strategic costs. This means that the collective procedure would, for example, save 
costs on monitoring to ensure the other persons are not grabbing assets, 
checking at the court to see if anything has been filed, etc.  Adopting the CBT 
model would also increase the pool of assets (aggregate value) and prevent 
premature termination of insolvent but viable businesses. It will also make for 
greater administrative efficiencies. The value of the debtor’s assets will be 
determined in bankruptcy court rather than in separate debt collection activities.  
Jackson justifies bankruptcy as a mandatory term with the argument that 
individual creditors do not trust each other. A mandatory regime serves to 
prevent one creditor from trying to ‘pull a fast one’ on the others.  In real world, 
none will deny that there are shifting creditors in a business, so agreement to stop 
strategic behaviours would be difficult to negotiate. Therefore, it is better to have 
this as a mandatory term that all creditors have no choice but to abide by. This, 
according to Jackson, is in the creditor’s self-interest to have this procedure in 
place rather than a free-for-all asset grab procedure with creditors of unequal 
abilities.  
The implication of CBT for insolvency law generally is that the law should control 
strategic behaviour undermining bargain once the debtor is insolvent. An 
example would be fraudulent preference,163 that is, a payment to, or advantage 
conferred on, one creditor in fraud of the rights of other creditors by an insolvent 
debtor. Here one creditor is given a preference and paid out when other creditors 
are not.  
The second idea behind the CBT is that the law should not create strategic 
incentives to resort to bankruptcy where it is not to the collective benefit of the 
creditors. Although this point can be related to bankruptcy laws in most 
                                                          
163  Insolvency Act 1986, s. 239. See also Barber v CI Ltd [2006] BCC 927. For a contrary view on the 
court’s decision in that case that a payment susceptible to a challenge as a preference can also be 
challenged as a transaction at undervalue under s. 238, see Look Chan Ho and Rizwaan Mokal, ‘Barber 
v CI –Preference Equals Undervalue? (2006) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=929566> accessed 02 May 
2012. 
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jurisdictions in terms of raising an issue about strategic incentives in their 
respective bankruptcy systems, it is a problem commonly associated with 
jurisdictions such as the US and Canada where there is a ‘two-tiered’ bankruptcy 
law. The differences in state and federal (in the case of US) or federal and 
provincial laws (in Canada) offer strategic incentives for forum shopping, (in the 
US), and for a secured creditor to put a firm into bankruptcy (in Canada), not for 
collective reason, but for example, to reverse the established priorities.164   
However, it is the CBT’s central idea: the assumption that creditors bargain is 
solely for ensuring that those with legal right to assets should be taken account of, 
i.e. to maximise creditor’s pre-existing interests and return that elicits debate.  
The position taken by Jackson in relation to the distribution of the debtor’s 
property would, in practice, require insolvency law to take all creditors’ pre-
insolvency agreed rights as it finds them, honouring both powers and limitations 
under non-insolvency law without modifying or making alterations to them.165 
                                                          
164 In Canada, for instance, under provincial legislation Personal Property Security Act (PPSA first 
enacted in Ontario in 1967. All other Canadian common law jurisdictions have since followed) s. 30(7), 
a security interest is subordinate to a person who is the beneficiary of a deemed trust under the 
Employment Standards Act 2000 s. 40(1) and s. 136 (1)(d), i.e. every employer holds vacation pay in 
trust, and the money that represents that vacation pay will trump a security interest (a super priority).   
However, under s. 136 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1985, there is a list of preferred 
creditors, and under s. 136 (1)(d) there is a preference for wages, salaries, commissions, 
compensation, to the extent of $2000 which includes vacation paid, and then says ‘subject to the 
rights of secured creditors’, so that the vacation pay in bankruptcy, the preference for it, comes after 
the secured creditor has exercised their rights in relation to the property of the debtor.  So that in 
bankruptcy, the employee has a lower priority than they do under the provincial legislation.   
165  Creditors’ bargain theorists’ query: if bankruptcy has an important policy role in balancing the 
various interests, and if wider interests (workers, community) are to be taken into account in 
bankruptcy reorganisation, why restrict this to bankruptcy?  Many firms close without going through 
bankruptcy.  What's special about bankruptcy? Special rules create incentives for strategic behaviour 
e.g. repudiation of collective agreement/contract. CBT’s argument is that if a firm cannot repudiate 
collective agreement when experiencing financial problems, then why should bankruptcy change this?  
This should be dealt with openly through general legislation, not under the cover of bankruptcy 
policy. See e.g. ; Douglas G  Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to 
Warren’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 815; Douglas G Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations’ (1986) 15 (1) The Journal of Legal Studies 127-147; T H Jackson, 165 Thomas H 
Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 91 Yale Law 
Journal 857, 860; Thomas H Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (HUP, Cambridge, MA 
1986); D G Baird & T H Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership 
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U 
Chicago L. Rev. 97. 
A counter argument is that there is a significant change when a company in formal bankruptcy 
proceedings. That is, bankruptcy is a very different situation. Thus, there are a lot of complex issues 
which make it appropriate to balance or consider interests that would not be taken into account 
otherwise. But the question then becomes who is paying for this?  If you take these issues into 
account, there must be a cost of doing so. Is the cost to be taken away from secured creditors, which 
will reduce their interest? The response would be that in the long run, the creditors don't bear the 
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This is because to alter the rule within a bankruptcy context, in Jackson’s view, 
would amount to wealth distribution or the creation of a set of entitlements in 
bankruptcy that is at variance with those that exists outside of bankruptcy and 
would therefore encourage forum shopping.166  
While this is the approach taken by creditor-friendly jurisdictions, it is submitted 
that it is a capitalist philosophy of bankruptcy derived from the shareholders’ 
primacy orientation of corporate governance. This approach focuses on the assets 
of the debtor and those legally entitled to them in insolvency. The CBT 
accordingly sees the debtor’s assets as being subject to the claims of the 
creditors and therefore belonging to them in insolvency. The problem here is that 
the model only considers hypothetical contract creditors and has therefore failed 
to consider the legitimate interests of constituencies such as employees, 
managers, suppliers, their dependents and the community at large who do not 
qualify, or are not characterised as contract creditors. In effect, this means that the 
CBT does not view the protection of non-creditor rights or expectations and other 
public interest objectives such as environmental protection as goals of insolvency 
law.167   
Consequently, while a group such as the employees may have their entitlements 
as creditors taken into account under the CBT, their future as employees of a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
cost; they pass it on to individuals or other corporations in adjusting the terms in which they grant 
credit. See e.g. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World (1993) 92 Mich. L 
Rev 336; Karen Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy An Essay’ (1994) 72 
Wash. U.L.Q. 1031; Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven, 
CT: YUP, 1997). 
166 The argument against non-modification of pre-bankruptcy entitlements is based on an anxiety 
about forum shopping- i.e. the fear that granting a particular constituency inside bankruptcy greater 
rights than it would have outside it, would give that constituency an incentive to forum shop in the 
sense of preferring a bankruptcy to a resolution outside bankruptcy (in the case of the US) under state 
law. Jackson constructed and argued his model based on the American bankruptcy system. The 
American bankruptcy system is, unlike those of other jurisdictions of the world, one bankruptcy law 
for the country. The American bankruptcy system is a hybrid of state law and federal bankruptcy law. 
Under the Butner principle, (Butner v United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979)) Federal bankruptcy courts 
may not alter or change non-bankruptcy law substantive entitlements in bankruptcy unless 
bankruptcy policies compel them to do so. Thus, Butner stands for the proposition that rights created 
by state law will be honored unless a specific bankruptcy provision or policy requires differently.  
See G Marcus Cole and Todd J Zywicki, ‘The New Forum Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy’ (2009) 
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2009-11 
<http://www.accf.nl/uploads/postkantoor/aclewp2009-11(1).pdf> accessed 12 March 2012. Thus, 
dissatisfied parties could seek a more favourable resolution of claims in a federal bankruptcy court 
than that to which they would be entitled under state law. See Jackson (n 60b).See also Douglas G 
Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. 
Rev. 815, 822. 
167  Gross (n 54); Warren (n 56) 800-804; LoPucki (n 75)  741, 778. 
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reorganised, ongoing enterprise is not relevant.168 The problem with the CBT 
heuristic is that strict adherence to the rule it prescribes is likely to result in 
injustice vis-a-vis other interests such as the employees. This is because the 
employees, unlike their creditor counterparts do not hold legal rights in the 
company’s property, but have also made value enhancing contributions to the 
company by investing firm specific human capital169 in it which should not be 
discounted.170 
Some critics have suggested that variations be made to this theme to take account 
of hypothetical groups as involuntary creditors171 comprising tort victims or tax 
authorities who may be owed money by the debtor even though they did not 
voluntarily contract with it.172 Its proponents have simply responded by pointing 
out that an economic analysis cannot, by definition, consider non–economic 
matters such as social, moral, political and personal consequences. These 
debates notwithstanding, the point remains that the inherent creditor wealth 
                                                          
168  Finch (n 60) 28. 
169 Modern growth theory sees human capital as an important growth factor. Human capital is 
defined as the stock of competences, knowledge and personality attributes embodied in the ability to 
perform labours so as to produce economic value. It is the attributes gained by a worker through 
education and experience. It is a means of production, into which additional investment yields 
additional output. Human capital is substitutable, but not transferable like land, labour, or fixed 
capital. For details on human capital see e.g.  Jacob Mincer, ‘Investment in Human Capital and 
Personal Income Distribution’ (1958) Journal of Political Economy. See also Gary S Becker, Human 
Capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to Education (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1964). 
170 On what the CBT means for employees, see the section on theories and implications for employees 
below. 
171 The terms ‘involuntary creditor’ is used here to refer to any creditor who lacks the ability to 
protect itself ex ante. This is usually due to lack of information. For example, while tort creditors do 
not know that they are, will be, or when they will be injured, environment creditors on their part lack 
full information about the conditions on private property. Similarly, tax authorities rely on debtors to 
furnish them with information and may only have the right to question the information so provided 
years after liability has been created. See Stephen J Lubben and Stephanie Ben-Ishai, ‘Involuntary 
Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (2011) Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 1938599 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1938599> accessed 10 February 2012. On calls for these categories of 
creditors to be given priority (even over secured creditors) in insolvency, see Robert Rasmussen, 
‘Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering’ (2000) 98 Mich. L Rev. 2252, 2269; 
Lynn LoPucki ‘The Unsecured Creditors’ Bargain’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, 1887, 1896 -1902; 
Barry Adler, ‘A World Without Debt’ (1994) 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 811, 826; Kathryn R Heidt, ‘Cleaning Up 
Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor’s Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies’ 
(1988) 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 819, 851-63; Heidt, ‘Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status of Tort Claims 
in Bankruptcies in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence’ (2003) Harv. L. Rev. 2541, 2562; Hanoch Dagan, 
‘Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be Preferred’ (2004) 78 Am. Bankr. L J. 247, 277.  
172 See generally Korobkin (n 51) 717; Mokal (n 20); LoPucki (n 75) 741, 778. 
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maximisation objective of the CBT has failed to recognise the legitimate interests 
of many who are not defined as contract creditors. 173  
2.7.2 Relevance of ACM 
Regarding the ACM, its notion of justice, and as this relates to insolvency law, 
connotes that when a company is insolvent, all those affected by issues governed 
by insolvency law are to be regarded as free, reasonable and equal. The core 
reason for this proposition is founded on the fundamental idea of fairness 
espoused elsewhere which holds that: 
 It is fair to require people to submit to procedures and institutions only if, 
given the opportunity, they could in some sense have agreed in advance 
on principles to which they must submit.174  
It follows that inherent in the ACM theoretical framework is the objective of 
fairness: meaning that insolvency laws should be designed so that they are fair to 
the interests they potentially affect. Fairness in this context connotes that not only 
must these interests be identified, consulted or allowed a say in the development, 
formulation or selection of rules and principles that will regulate their rights, 
interests and obligations during insolvency proceedings,175 but their opinions on 
the selection of the governing principles should be accorded ‘equal’ weight of 
consideration.  
From the above perspective, fairness could imply, for example, that insolvency 
law need not be a government regulation mandatorily imposed on the parties 
whose interests it affects without due regard to their concerns. Rather, it should be 
a set of rules democratically agreed and accepted by all parties whose interest 
insolvency affect. The insolvency process should be procedurally and 
substantively fair in spite of the disagreements on the details, for example, 
regarding whose interests entitle them to partake in the process.176  
Fairness could also mean having insolvency rules that reduce the risks to parties, 
especially the unsecured creditors, and the employees, which usually come with 
                                                          
173 Warren (n 56) 800-804; LoPucki (75) 741, 778. 
174 See T Nagel, ‘Rawls on Justice’ in Norman Daniels (ed) Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ “A 
Theory of Justice” (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1989) 4. 
175 Mokal (n 23) 69. 
176  Finch (n 60 ) 52 -63. 
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insolvency. Fairness could also manifest in the form of demanding accountability 
from the office holders in insolvency proceedings. It could also mean having an 
insolvency law which places a duty on the office holder (i.e. the Insolvency 
Practitioner) to perform his or her duties in the interest of the entire body of 
creditors of the company.177  
The proponent of the ACM argues that insolvency rules and principles should be 
fair on all parties notwithstanding their legal wealth, cognitive abilities, and 
bargaining power as these are all morally irrelevant in framing rules of justice.178 
It should not matter whether the parties in question are secured or unsecured, 
voluntary or ‘involuntary’ creditors,179 managers or employees. Each stakeholder, 
by ACM’s standard, is constructively regarded as being motivated to uphold the 
fair terms of co-operation amongst equals, provided that each of the other parties 
to the bargain is also driven by the same motivation. A corollary to this view is 
that, given that insolvency law only deals with insolvency issues, those not 
affected or unlikely to be affected by these principles must therefore be excluded 
and denied a say in the selection of the governing principles. The ACM’s concept 
of fairness becomes of great significance when considered against the backdrop 
of the fact that: 
...in the absence of sufficient assets to pay all creditors in full, sound, 
logical and fair insolvency laws are required to ensure an efficient 
collection, realisation and fair distribution of the debtor’s remaining 
assets.180  
2.7.3 Relevance of TPT 
Turning to how the TPT map unto insolvency law, the idea underlying the theory is 
that, even though those with non-financial claims have no decisive say ultimately 
                                                          
177 In the UK, and under the administration procedure, the administrator is to avoid causing the 
insolvent company ‘unnecessary harm’ if he or her decides to realise its assets. See  IA 1986 Schd B1. 
para 3 (4). 
178 This re-echoes Korobkin’s opinion in his ‘value-based account’ on corporate insolvency where he 
argues that bankruptcy law exists to create a context in which both the economic as well as the non-
economic values of all parties affected by financial distress may be expressed and sometimes 
recognised. Korobkin (n 56) 335. 
179  Some have argued that the exclusion of involuntary creditors in insolvency considerations is 
intentional and for a reason. Bebchuk and Fried, for instance have averred thus: ‘It is by now a 
familiar point in the law review and finance literature that according full priorities to secured claims 
permits a firm to divert value from its tort creditors. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk and Jesse M Fried, ‘The 
Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale L. Rev.  857, 883 . 
180   Anderson (n 159). 
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in the future of the failed enterprise, there should nevertheless be some 
mechanism whereby those about to lose their money or jobs (such as the 
unsecured creditors and the employees of the insolvent firm respectively), would 
have their concerns addressed in the decision making process that potentially 
affects the future of the enterprise they are part of.  Thus, TPT advocates for an 
inclusive insolvency law that will cater for interests wider than those of the 
creditors. 
Using the American insolvency framework, as basis for buttressing the argument 
on the existence of other interests in insolvency that deserves consideration, 
LoPucki points to the statutory authority vested in the bankruptcy court by the 
Bankruptcy Code to appoint a trustee contrary to the American Chapter 11 
‘Debtor In Possession’ (DIP) practice, for example, in circumstances where the 
incumbent management commits egregious wrongdoing. LoPucki contends that 
this is done because such appointment will serve ‘other interests of the estate’181 
beside those of the creditors.  
There is a global recognition of the existence of other interest in an insolvent 
business. For example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), in its legislative guide on insolvency law, in addition to noting 
the importance of treating employees in a special way in insolvency, also notes 
that: 
In some insolvency laws, the importance of maintaining continuity of 
employment in priority to other objectives of insolvency proceedings, 
such as maximization of value of the estate for the benefit of all creditors, is 
evidenced by a focus on sale of the business as a going concern (with the 
transfer of existing employment obligations), as opposed to liquidation or 
reorganizations where these obligations may be altered or terminated.182 
2.8 Implications of theories for the employees  
Given that much of the on-going debate on insolvency policy is essentially about 
the limit of insolvency law and the interests it should cater for, various theories 
                                                          
181 11 U.S.C. s.1104 (b) (2). 
182 See, Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, (UNCITRAL) 2004, 
Vol. XXXV <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/English/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> accessed 28 
January 2011. 
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considered above, and especially those of the CBT, the ACM and the TPT, have 
implications for the employees.  
It may be possible to glean from these theories whether the core principle of the 
insolvency law of a given jurisdiction is exclusively wealth maximisation for the 
creditors or whether it has other inclusive or expansive goals, such as the 
preservation of the corporate entity, which will in turn benefit other stakeholders 
such as the employees.183 Thus, depending on whether policy makers in a given 
jurisdiction subscribe184 to the exclusive or inclusive philosophies of corporate 
insolvency law (which in themselves are a product of the normative choices made 
by their proponents)185 the law governing corporate insolvency in a particular 
jurisdiction will equally reflect how the interests of the stakeholders generally, 
and those of the employees in particular, are treated in insolvency situations 
involving the sale or transfer of a business on a going concern basis. 
2.8.1 The CBT and the employees 
As a creditor primacy driven heuristic, the position taken by the CBT implies that 
certain employee interests would not be considered in insolvency. It follows that 
the non-contractual expectation of continuity of employment post-transfer of a 
business that the employees might have, but which insolvency law does not 
specifically protect, would not be considered by the CBT. It seems that the CBT 
would resent the TUPE-type protection given to UK employees during transfers of 
insolvent undertakings (see chapters 5, 6 and 7). For these theorists, TUPE would 
constitute nothing other than an impediment to the creditors’ ability to capture full 
going concern value from sales of insolvent businesses. 
                                                          
183 For a critique on the use of bankruptcy for expansive goals, see e.g. C W Frost, ‘Bankruptcy 
Redistributive Policies and the Limit of the Judicial Process,’ (1995) 74 N C L Rev. 75, 80. 
184  It seems that policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature that 
exists in insolvency law. In the UK, and prior to the last two decades, it appears that not many 
scholars were interested in doing theory-related work in the field of insolvency law. These tendencies 
are unfortunate because theory is an essential tool of policy making. Ultimately, many policy debates 
on insolvency rest on competing theoretical visions on the subject. Insolvency theory remains 
essential for diagnosing all insolvency-related events, explaining their causes, prescribing responses, 
and evaluating the impact of different policies on stakeholders in insolvency. The gap between theory 
and policy can be narrowed only when the academic community begins to place greater value on 
policy-relevant theoretical research works. 
185 Janis Sarra, ‘Widening the Insolvency Lens: The Treatment of Employee claims’ (2008) in P J Omar 
(ed.) International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008) 49. 
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In refusing to consider non-contractual entitlements of the employees, other than 
their entitlements as creditors in insolvency proceedings, it would appear that 
creditors’ bargain theorists view employees through the classical economic 
theory of labour lens. This perspective sees labour as an economic transaction 
between the worker and the employer. In this sense, labour is nothing other than 
a factor of production with a market value. The employee (labour) offers to carry 
out work in return for pay and other related remuneration. Therefore, wages for 
work done is what an employee is entitled to. This economic analysis of ‘labour as 
a commodity’ has been attacked and refuted from within the economics school of 
thought.186 
The CBT’s vision of insolvency and its prioritisation of the creditors’ interests over 
all other interests has tended to discount the fact that employees have other 
constituent interests in the company that can be impacted by the activity of the 
company in several ways. 187  It has also disregarded the need to safeguard 
enterprises in which firm-specific human capital investments are core to its 
operations. Employees contribute firm-specific human capital to firms. ‘Human 
capital’ denotes the skill and knowledge required to do a job which can only be 
acquired if some investment is committed in time and resources by human 
beings. 188  Because such specialised skills and knowledge help to enhance 
productivity in the firm, they are, in practice, considered a very important part of 
the employment relationship.  
Few, if any, will argue that specialised knowledge and skills relevant to a 
particular enterprise, and the time and efforts invested in achieving the goals of 
that enterprise, are not assets at risk just as equity capital is, once it has been 
committed to a given enterprise. 189 The relevance of employees’ specialised 
skills to the employment relationship and the need to protect them is not just 
borne out of the fact that their acquisitions matter in demarcating what job is 
                                                          
186  See e.g. P O’ Higgins, ‘Labour is not a Commodity’ (1997) 26 IL.J 225. 
187 T Donalson & L Preston, ‘The Stakeholder theory of the corporation- concepts, evidence, and 
implications’ (1995) 20 Academic Management Review (1) 65-91. 
188 G S Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York 1964) 21. 
189 Margaret Blair, ‘Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm’, (2003) Georgetown 
University Law Center Business, Economic and Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 167848 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=167848> accessed 30 November 2009; M Blair & L A Stout, 
‘Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board,’ (2001) 79 Wash. U L Q. 403, 
416. 
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done, by which employee, for a particular firm. Rather, its significance lies, 
perhaps, in the fact that if a firm has been responsible for financing the training of 
an employee and that employee who then quits his or her job and takes up 
another employment with another employer, the capital expenditure of the firm 
that paid for the employee’s training would be (partly) wasted since no further 
return would be collected on it.190 To avoid this happening, the firm must strive to 
retain the services of such an employee even in insolvency and especially in 
going concern reorganisations. In a similar vein, if a worker who paid to acquire 
specific training is fired from the job after receiving such training, he or she 
would be unable to collect any further return on the investment and would suffer a 
capital loss. 
Consequent upon the above examples, the prevailing view is that, in a business 
where investment in firm-specific skills is important, indifference as to ‘whether a 
firm’s labour force always contained the same persons or a rapidly changing 
group,’ 191  can no longer be the case. Rather, in such a business, continuity 
between the firm and the workers must be valued. Moreover, firm-specific human 
capital investment in it must be ‘embedded in a protective governance structure 
lest productive values be sacrificed if the employment relation is unwittingly 
severed.’192 To do so will require a culture of rescuing businesses, as opposed to 
a culture of liquidating insolvent firms, which the CBT is not known for. 
2.8 2 The ACM and the employees 
With regards to the ACM, given that this model preaches showing ‘equal concern’ 
and ‘respect’ for matters affecting all parties with economic interests in an 
insolvent company, it is safe to imply that it is not adverse to employee protection 
in corporate insolvency in general and would probably not see anything wrong in 
protecting employments for them in a going concern business sale.  
                                                          
190 The argument made here has to be considered against the backdrop of the fact most, if not all, 
employees of a firm do benefit from ‘on the job training’ from the company that employs them. Thus, 
the company may be said to have invested in the employees in some way. 
191 Becker, (n 79) 21. 
192  See O E Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting, (Free Press, New York, 1985), 242-43. See also Oliver E Williamson & J Bercovitz, ‘The 
Modern Corporation as an Efficiency Instrument: The Comparative Contracting Perspective’ in Carl 
Kaysen (ed.) The American Corporation Today, (OUP, Oxford 1996); O E Williamson, M L Wachter, and 
J E Harris, ‘Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange’, (1975) 6 
Bell Journal of Economics, 250-80. 
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The ACM’s hypothesis that parties reaching an agreement behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ would be conscious of which category of stakeholder they might turn 
out to be in the event of their mutual debtor’s insolvency would therefore give 
them the incentive to give equal concern to, and respect for interests other than 
those of the creditors in insolvency. This would entail giving greater protection to 
constituencies traditionally deemed vulnerable and unable to protect their 
interests (such as the employees) than to those better able to deal with losses. By 
implication, the ACM is essentially a model that supports the idea that risks 
should be redistributed to those best capable of absorbing them as advocated by 
other welfare insolvency theorists.193 Given that employee-creditors fall under the 
category of vulnerable or weak participants in the company,194 all parties might, 
behind the veil of ignorance, agree to accord greater ex post protection to this 
class of claimants just in case they end up as members of this particular class of 
vulnerable creditors in the real world and in an actual insolvency situation.  
The ACM’s concept of equal respect for the concerns of all those affected by 
peculiar issues in insolvency would mean that the contracting parties would take 
into account employees’ concerns, such as the continuation of their employment 
contracts, possibly on the same terms and conditions post-transfer of their mutual 
debtor to a third party purchaser. They would also think of the possibility of 
making available some form of social security safety nets for those likely to lose 
their jobs. Moreover, since it can be assumed that employees would always 
prefer the business that employs them to be rescued rather than be liquidated, if 
and when it experiences financial difficulty, the ACM’s calculation is that the 
contracting parties would welcome any law, (whether within or without the 
insolvency law framework such as the TUPE Regulations), that can protect 
employment and preserve the continuity of terms and conditions of employment 
contracts when a company or its business is transferred from one owner to 
another.  
However, the rescue of the company, or of its business, and the continuation of the 
employment contracts would be dependent on whether it is cost efficient for all 
parties to do so. That is to say, it would clearly be desirable if, through rescue 
                                                          
193 See e.g. Nathalie D Martin, ‘Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking 
In’ (1998) 59 Ohio St. L Rev. 429; Gross (N 36); E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect 
World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L Rev. 336, 354-55. 
194 See Caruthers & Halliday (n 2). 
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actions, what is gained is worth more than what would have been lost. While a law 
such as the TUPE Regulations may be substantively fair when judged under the 
ACM, it may be procedurally inefficient in that the shifting of costs to the 
purchaser in a situation where buying the business as a going concern would 
rescue it could act as a hindrance to the achievement of a substantively fair 
outcome. Moreover, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the type of change which 
TUPE induces, which could lead to an improvement in the social protection 
employees have in insolvent business transfers, could also lead to a worsening of 
the overall rescue initiative and ultimately imperil the employees’ job security. 
2.8.3 TPT and the employees 
When refined and applied to the UK insolvency system, the team production 
theory of bankruptcy reorganisation has implications for the employees. There is 
the view that the particular constituencies that insolvency law should cater for 
should be those with a substantial connection to the insolvent company. 195 
Employees are an integral part of a company. They are vital to the day to day 
functioning of any company and so have a real and substantial nexus to the 
company.  
TPT gives credence to the claim that the company is an aggregate of interests or 
is made up of several members. These include the employees. Team members 
have various economic interests in the company. These interests, which are 
affected in several ways by insolvency, should be given equal weight of 
consideration. Unlike Jackson and his creditors’ primacy acolytes, LoPucki’s view 
is that no one interest should be privileged over the others.  
If it is accepted that the greatest asset of any business lies in its human capital,196 
then it would be safe to say that employees are the most important assets of any 
business. For this reason, it could be inferred that TPT would support the TUPE-
type protection given to the employees in insolvency generally and, particularly 
in transfers of insolvent businesses resulting in a change in ownership of the 
businesses. Given that TPT does not subscribe to privileging one interest over the 
others, it could also be argued that what the theory is advocating is that a balance 
has to be struck between the interests of the creditors and those of the employees 
                                                          
195  Gross (n 54) 19. 
196  Luigi Zingales, ‘In Search of New Foundations’ (2000) 55 Journal of Finance, 1643. 
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in insolvency. Although classic labour theory is about balancing, the discussion is 
generally couched in a language suggestive that the business is solvent therefore 
the capitalist owners should be in a position to profiteer at the expense of the 
workers. However, what TPT is advocating is to strike a balance between the 
interests of the ‘weak’ (the employees) and the ‘strong’ (the creditors) team 
members who are usually pitted against each other in insolvency.197 Impliedly, 
this means, for example, that the rescue of an insolvent business may only be 
pursued if doing so would save jobs and would not detrimentally affect the 
interests of the creditors too. 
The core tenets of TPT reflect some of the arguments expounded through labour 
law theories in the law and economics tradition on employee protection. There is 
no denying the fact that employment legislation interferes in so many ways with 
the parties’ right to contract with each other on their own terms. However, the 
important role played by legislation in business relations cannot be discounted. 
Those against regulations would argue that companies should be permitted to 
operate free of regulations. However, there is nowhere in the world in which this 
ideal holds true. A world in which businesses operate free of regulations is a 
utopia. The reason is because all states operate a mixed system of market 
freedom and regulatory control.198 In fact, regulations which seek to limit the 
powers of business executives from arbitrary and sometimes abusive usages are 
an age long practice.199 Many decades ago, the French philosopher, Montesquieu 
noted that: 
The freedom of commerce is not a power granted to the merchants to do 
what they please: this would be more properly its slavery. The constraint 
of the merchants is not the constraint of commerce. It is in the freest 
countries that the merchant finds innumerable obstacles; and he is never 
less crossed by laws, than in a country of slaves.200 
                                                          
197 Carruthers &  Halliday (n 2) 303. 
198 Janet Dine, ‘A new look at corporate governance’ (2003) 24 Company Lawyer,’ 130. 
199 In most cases, TUPE is not about this. But the Regulations do seek to prevent abusive and improper 
dismissals through scrutiny whether there is an ETO reason for the dismissal. 
200 Baron de Montesquieu, L’ esprit des lois, (1748) Book 20, Chapter 12, (Thomas Nugent translation: 
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TPT’s stance on employee protection reflects the deregulation versus regulation 
dichotomy in labour law theories.201 Adherents of regulation argue that the law 
has to take cognizance of the weak position of the individual employee vis-a-vis 
the position of strength of his employer (by taking into account the need for the 
worker to be organised in a union in addition to the need for the union to have the 
freedom necessary to redress any imbalance in the relationship). However, there 
is usually a caveat, which requires that notwithstanding how fundamental these 
needs and privileges may be, they must be restricted to what is necessary.202  
Essentially, what this means is that where workers invest in firm-specific skills (as 
they do in team production), an appropriate incentive structure should 
incorporate a degree of protection of the employee against arbitrary treatment by 
management or vulnerability to management caprice203 and some guarantee of 
continuing employment in the life of the company and especially during 
insolvency resulting in going concern transfers of the company’s business to a 
third party purchaser.204  
The basis for TPT’s support for employees’ protection derives, probably, from the 
recognition that the firm-specific nature of the investments employees make in a 
company which is insolvent makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, for them 
to be redeployed to alternative uses. The firm-specific nature of the human capital 
investments committed to the firm by the employees renders these investments 
useless when the employees try to find jobs in industries other than the one they 
currently operate in. 205   Thus, the acquisition of firm-specific training by an 
employee, arguably, ties the economic fortune of such an employee to the fate of 
the firm he or she works for. If the company becomes insolvent and is liquidated, 
rather than rescued, the employee loses his or her job which is based on his or 
her particular skill.206  
Granted, the employee can deprive the company of his or her firm-specific skill 
when the company is still solvent and his services is still needed by the company 
                                                          
201  See e.g. F A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: The Political Order of a Free People, Vol. III 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979) 144. 
202  ibid. 
203 M O’ Connor, ‘The Human Capital Era’ (1993) 78 Cornell L Rev 889, 905-917. 
204 Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A Reappraisal’ (1998) ESRC 
Centre for Business Research University of Cambridge Working Paper (No. 92) 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp092.pdf> accessed 29 October 2011.   
205  Korobkin (n 56) 745. 
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(e.g. by discontinuing to work for it), but it seems there is little or no benefit at all 
that can be derived from doing so since the skill would, as noted, be firm-specific, 
meaning in this context that it might have little or no value at all elsewhere.207 
Based on the foregoing analysis, an assumption may be made that TPT would 
support whatever legal mechanisms (e.g. ARD and TUPE) there are that could be 
used to protect the human capital contributions of the employees in insolvent 
companies. 
TPT equally recognises that there is a lacuna in commercial, contract and 
insolvency laws as regards the provision of robust employee protection in 
insolvency situations generally and in going concern business transfer scenarios 
in particular.  
Commercial law enables the insolvent to be given a ‘second chance’ of survival 
through a going concern sale to a new owner. However, this branch of law does 
not cater for employees’ issues arising as a result of the sale.  While a going 
concern sale of the business can ensure that some employees keep their jobs, it is 
arguable that without any mandatory law requiring the buyer to take on the 
employees in the UK after the sale is completed, the retention of employees by 
the purchased business would, under common law, be at the discretion of the new 
owner.208  Even so, they are most likely to be retained on inferior terms with 
previous service years not counting. 
Contract law on its part provides employees with very few grounds on which to 
challenge or limit the power of an employer regarding job security in 
insolvency.209 Contract law does not provide an avenue for the employees to be 
able to extract a contract from their corporate employer guaranteeing them both 
job security during insolvency restructuring and the preservation and the 
continuation of their contracts of employment on the existing terms and conditions 
                                                          
207   Margaret M Blair, ‘Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm’, (2003) Georgetown 
University Law Center Business, Economic and Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 167848 
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when their insolvent corporate employer is sold to a third party purchaser on a 
going concern basis.210 
Insolvency law on its part has not gone far enough in the above regards. It 
provides to employees very limited protection during transfers out of insolvency. 
In the UK as long as the insolvent company remains the employer during the 
insolvency proceedings, priority creditor status in respect of wages, holiday and 
related entitlements 211 are the main form of protection available to employees. 
For any other entitlements, they have to look to general employment law for 
protection (where they can have recourse to statutory redundancy rights etc.).  
Granted, the employees have rights to the various claims noted above under 
insolvency law, but this body of law does not address what is likely to be the 
employees’ most important concern. If after the opening of insolvency 
proceedings, a company’s business has been rehabilitated and returned to its 
previous trading status, and is sold subsequently on a going concern basis to a 
new owner, one of the employees’ main concerns, it seems, would be their job 
security. That is, how to continue their employment contracts (with all the rights 
‘appurtenant’ thereto) with the new employer.  
A company is a vehicle for organising economic life.212 The employees are an 
important part of that. To achieve this goal, employees’ jobs would have to be 
robustly protected. Given that neither commercial nor contract laws, or especially 
insolvency law, have provided protection for continuity of employment in 
transfers involving insolvent firms, the view taken by LoPucki is that this type of 
protection should, of necessity, be provided to the employees. The theorist 
recognises that achieving this goal may require the application of a special 
regulation other than the ordinary rules of contract law. The employment 
protection ‘lacuna’ left by insolvency law is filled, the team production theorist 
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would argue, extraneously by labour law. 213 Labour law fills this gap through the 
use of labour standards as the basic legal intervention technique. 214  
As a substantive intervention technique for securing justice for employees, legal 
intervention involves rewriting the resulting bargain reached by parties in 
working relationships with unequal bargaining power resulting from contract. 
Usually, this is done through setting minimum wages, maximum hours of work 
legislation, human rights codes, occupational health and safety laws, employment 
protection regulations, etc. The protection of employment is mainly what the 
TUPE 215  legal regime seeks to achieve for employees in transfer situations 
involving insolvent undertakings or businesses in the UK. With the TUPE 
Regulations, matters which were once entirely within the sphere of managerial 
prerogatives or left to collective bargaining are now directly regulated by 
positive legal rights and duties.216 
In making the transfer of employees’ contracts of employment obligatory in going 
concern sales of insolvent businesses, TUPE’s purpose, (even though the regime 
has been berated for undermining insolvency institutions and procedures and for 
having adverse effects on business rescues),217 is not to prevent office holders 
from restructuring their businesses and rescuing distressed businesses.218 Rather, 
TUPE operates to constrain them from pursuing creditors’ welfare at the expense 
of labour in corporate insolvency. The office holder’s capacity to increase 
creditors’ wealth through the reduction of labour costs during insolvent business 
                                                          
213 This perhaps explains why a regime like TUPE operational in the UK jurisdiction is desirable to 
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sales is limited by the extent to which labour law (in this case TUPE) imposes 
rigidity or allows flexibility to shed workers.  
Seen from the above perspective, TUPE arguably, provide a range of institutional 
arrangements such as mandatory standards which cannot easily be derogated 
from for the employees, as the weaker team members to protect themselves. This 
protection, under the team production arrangement, is intended to shield the 
employees against the pursuit of creditors’ wealth maximisation by the board to 
the disadvantage of the employees’ team members. Under team production, the 
team members (the employees inclusive) deliberately delegate their authorities 
to the board for the purpose of sharing equitably the rents accruable from their 
joint resources and team production fairly amongst them according to their 
individual contributions to the team production. TUPE, it should be noted, only 
preserves the employees existing rights. It does not grant them rights over and 
above their existing rights.  
In keeping with the dictates of the parent law, (the ARD219), TUPE does, however, 
attach stricter rules to regulate dismissals of employees and variations to 
contracts of employment terms arising in the context of insolvent business 
transfers. This, TUPE does through the imposition of conditions which permit 
dismissals for an economic, technical or organisational (ETO) reason,220 failing 
which the dismissal would be automatically unfair. 221  It also requires 
consultation 222  with designated representatives of the employees before any 
variations made to the terms and conditions of their employment contracts can be 
valid.  
TUPE is a good illustration of the notion that employees have a claim on the 
company: a claim that should not be overridden just because a change in the 
ownership of the business has occurred.223 In sum, the practice of protecting the 
rights of the employees and serving jobs, at least for some of them, during 
transfers of undertakings (as a result of TUPE) aligns with the underlying 
hypothesis of TPT.  TPT posits that when the company is insolvent, its rescue and 
                                                          
219 See particularly Art. 4 (1) of the Acquired Rights Directive (2001/23/EC). 
220 TUPE 2006, Reg. 4 
221  Delabole Slate Limited v Berriman [1985] IRLR 305 CA. 
222 See TUPE 2006, Reg. 9. 
223 John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Insolvency, Employment Protection and Corporate Restructuring: 
The Effects of TUPE’ (2001) ESRC  Centre for Business Research, Cambridge University Working Paper 
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rehabilitation may warrant the loss of some jobs. However, loss of jobs by the 
employees should not be at the pleasure of the management and without a valid 
reason. A rescue effort may affect some jobs but not all since some of the 
employees will be needed to continue the business post-rehabilitation. 
TPT also acknowledges that in insolvency, the team members’ legal entitlements 
may have to be reduced and their rights derogated if rescue of the company’s 
business is to be achieved. TUPE contributes to rescues of insolvent businesses in 
different ways. The regime allows permitted variations to be made to the 
employees’ contract terms and their dismissals under certain prescribed 
conditions during transfers of insolvent undertakings (see discussions in chapters 
6 and 7). 
2.9 Situating UK insolvency law within extant 
insolvency theories 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the philosophy underpinning English 
insolvency law. The aim is to explore whether the system is debtor-oriented or 
creditor-biased. This will enable the UK’s insolvency system to be properly 
situated within the extant insolvency theories. It will also provide an opportunity 
to assess what the consequences of the system could potentially be for both 
employment protection and business rescues in the UK. 
2.9.1 The philosophy underpinning English insolvency law 
The philosophy underpinning English corporate insolvency law cannot easily be 
stated. Apart from the fact that no such philosophy has ever been explicitly 
articulated,224 English insolvency law does not appear to show a single underlying 
policy or philosophy. Enquiries on the legitimate province of corporate 
insolvency law and the policy basis, both social and economic, for the ordering of 
insolvency entitlements which, for years, have characterised debates in the 
United States of America (US), had for a very long period lay dormant in the UK.  
In the US (as has been shown above), there exists a rich body of literature 
proposing various approaches to the problems generated by corporate 
insolvency, there is in contrast to the US, a dearth of developed comments in the 
                                                          
224 Goode (n 15) 40. 
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UK on the theory steering corporate insolvency law. Only scant attention has been 
paid to insolvency theories in the UK in recent time. In fact, theory-related work in 
the area of insolvency has only in recent time begun to attract the attention of 
some scholars in this jurisdiction.225  
The reason for this, as Professor Roy Goode explained, is due primarily to the 
pragmatic way in which English law has developed. 226  Academics and 
practitioners alike in the UK tended to focus their attentions on statutory 
developments and on case law rather than on developing theoretical frameworks.  
Pragmatism 227  was the dominant approach in England where the law of 
bankruptcy and company winding up functioned until very recently without much 
support from theory or academic exposition.  Professor Axel Flessner captures 
the situation thus: 
It is instructive that until Professor Fletcher wrote his treatise on insolvency 
law in 1990 the law of insolvency in England could be found only in 
detailed practice manuals, which made the law not easily accessible to 
non-bankruptcy lawyers, let alone foreign lawyers.228 
While the American materials or theories on insolvency are helpful, it should be 
remembered that they are of limited applicability in the UK. This is because the 
legal system they address is a federal system. The American system, apart from 
                                                          
225 See however the recent effort by Rizwaan Mokal in developing the ‘Authentic consent Model’ of 
corporate insolvency analysis discussed above. Also, Vanessa Finch has made a good effort in her 
various articles and recent book to address the dearth of insolvency theories by English scholars. 
Vanessa Finch, ‘The Measures of Insolvency Law’ (1997) OJLS 227; ‘Is Pari Passu Passe’ (2000) Insolv. L 
194; ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?’ (1999) 67 MLR 633; Corporate rescue 
processes: the search for quality and the capacity to resolve (2010) 6Journal of Business Law 502-521; 
Finch fn (n 43) above. 
226 Goode, (n 15)). 
227 According to Professor Axel Flessner, ‘Pragmatism as an attitude takes bankruptcy law as it is and 
tries to apply it, case by case, according to business necessities. It is suspicious about comprehensive 
legislation, and it would rather not produce literature for academics or university instruction.’ A 
Flessner, ‘Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: an International Overview’ in Ziegel (ed) Current 
Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1994) 27. The Cork report of 1982 is a prime example of pragmatism in which, for example, the 
benefits of the IVA was adopted and translated into the CVA, and those of the administrative 
receivership regime were harnessed into the administration procedure. See Vanessa Finch, ‘The 
Measures of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 227-251.  On how the 
pragmatic approach in some aspects of English insolvency law may have diverged from principles in 
practice, see Sandra Frisby,’Insolvency Law and Insolvency Practice: Principles and Pragmatism 
Diverge?’ (2011) 64 (1) Current Legal Problems 349-397. 
228 A Flessner, ‘Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: an International Overview’ in Ziegel (ed) 
Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1994) 27.  
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being completely at variance with the UK’s, has some peculiarities which the UK 
system does not possess.229 These features distinguish the American insolvency 
system from the UK’s. However, in order that a coherent insolvency system can 
emerge in the UK, insolvency law theories and policies would have to be 
developed alongside the statutory and case law regimes already in place. 
Theories illuminate policies. They offer normative justifications for laws. 
2.9.2 Approaches in other jurisdictions 
All market-driven economies require insolvency laws and policies. There is no 
universally acceptable approach in the design of insolvency laws amongst the 
various jurisdictions.230 Put differently, there is no ‘one size fits all’ insolvency 
model fitting all countries.  Insolvency regimes globally have evolved in very 
different ways. Based on the different historical heritage or legal origins of 
countries around the world (i.e. common law or civil law), the substance of 
insolvency laws varies considerably from one country to another. Different 
countries have laws focusing on different strategies for dealing with the insolvent 
corporate entity.  
What the above means also is that policy choices on corporate insolvency are not 
universal. Rather, they are jurisdictional. In fact, given the different institutional 
and cultural makeup of the different jurisdictions, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to ‘parachute’ insolvency laws from one country to another and 
expect them to work in much the same way in the ‘importing country’ as they do 
in the country from which they are ‘exported.’231 What is important however is for 
each of these jurisdictions to have policies and laws capable of dealing with the 
problems arising in corporate insolvency.  
                                                          
229 Andrew Keay & Peter Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal (2nd edn Jordan Publishing 
Ltd, 2008) 23. 
230 Philip R Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007)Gerald 
McCormark, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’ (2007) 36 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 515-552; Alan Kornberg, ‘Insolvency in the UK and the US’ 
<http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199579693.pdf>; Samuel E Etukakpan, ‘Business 
Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through the Lens of Theory’ (2011) 32 
Company Lawyer (4) 99, 103.  
231 A Watson, Law Out of Context (Athens, Ga., 2000) 1; A. Watson, Legal Transplants and European 
Private Law, vol 4.4 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, (December 2000) 
<http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html> accessed 30 November 2010; N Foster, ‘Transmigration and 
Transferability of Commercial law in Globalized World’ in  E Örücü  and A Harding  (eds) Comparative 
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The extant insolvency laws of a given jurisdiction also determine the way that 
jurisdiction’s disposition to addressing insolvency-related problems would be 
viewed. National insolvency laws often express the policies and priorities of their 
enacting countries. The specific provisions of these laws reflect different 
normative value judgements in respect of, for example, which creditors should be 
accorded priority and the degree of protection that should be extended to 
secured credit and to employees. 232   Adoption and application of principles 
underlying a specific regime may also mirror a nation’s assessment of the ‘moral 
blameworthiness or lack thereof of a corporation’s financial difficulty.’ 233 The 
choices made by a given country would reflect also its preference either for 
reorganisation or liquidation. 234  But beyond all these, they may also reveal 
something about that jurisdiction’s preference for particular stakeholders 235 
based perhaps on the extent of their economic interests in the insolvent entity or 
on the strength or vulnerability of the particular stakeholder vis-a-vis corporate 
failures. 236  
Virtually all insolvency policies have values underpinning them. Countries have 
insolvency laws which mirror an underlying ‘pro-creditor or pro-debtor’ value.237  
The division of corporate insolvency regimes into creditor-oriented and debtor-
oriented regimes is done on the basis of a few main legal characteristics. This 
does not actually portray the entire picture. For example, there is the perception 
that companies incorporated in the US are more likely to be rescued when 
experiencing financial distress in comparison to their UK counterparts subject to 
                                                          
232 A T Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law 
Review, 2177, 2197-98; Venessa Finch & Sarah Worthington, `The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking 
Restitutionary Rights’ in F. Rose (ed) Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield Press, London 2000) 1. 
233 Sarra (n 153) 30. 
234 Bruce G Carruthers and Terrence C Halliday, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States, (OUP, Oxford 1998) 69. 
235 Bob Wessels, ‘Current Developments Towards International Insolvencies in Europe’ (2004) 13 Int. 
Insolv. Rev. 43, 46. 
236 ibid. 
237 International Monetary Fund (Legal dept.), Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: key Issues, 
(IMF Publication Services, Washington 1999) 1-2. See also Sefa Franken, ‘Creditor-and Debtor-
Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’ (2004), Tilburg University, TILEC Discussion Paper 
(DP 2004-016)1–40; G McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American Evaluation’ 
(2007) 56 ICLQ 1. 
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the jurisdiction of the English courts. The reason for this is mainly because the US 
has a debtor-friendly chapter 11 procedure which facilitates rescues.238  
There is no direct equivalent of this type of procedure in the UK despite efforts by 
the government to foster a ‘rescue’ friendly insolvency regime. The 
administration procedure provided for in the Insolvency Act 1986 very often leads 
to a legal end for most distressed companies as the assets of most distressed UK 
companies often end up being sold off piece meal.239 The point is that, depending 
on which insolvency school of thought policymakers subscribe to, insolvency laws 
in different jurisdictions may either be debtor oriented or creditor biased, rescue 
friendly or not, exclusive or inclusive in respect of the interests to be prioritised 
during insolvency.240  
In general terms, the outcome of an insolvent reorganisation can be very 
different 241  depending on the laws of the country in which the insolvency 
proceeding is run.242 The implication is that in many cases different stakeholders 
in a company may hold the advantage in different jurisdictions. This appears to be 
the case with the English insolvency regime which has tended to give the 
creditors the upper hand in insolvency proceedings.  
2.9.3 Aligning UK’s insolvency law with theories 
In practical terms, English insolvency law, arguably, appears to align quite 
closely with the CBT. In spite of the changes made to the English insolvency law 
framework by the Enterprise Act 2002, it may be argued that the regime remains, 
to a large extent, creditor-driven. The system justifies collective insolvency 
                                                          
238 Scott Simpson and Jay M Goffman, ‘Emergency Sales in the US and the UK’ in Christopher Mallon 
and Shai Y Waisman (eds) The Law and Practice in Restructuring in the UK and US, (OUP, Oxford 2011) 
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proceedings and accords primacy to the secured creditors’ interests in 
insolvency.243 Professor Fletcher puts it succinctly when he observed that in spite 
of the changes made to the system by the Enterprise Act 2002, the: 
  
UK insolvency law has been unable to embrace the “American way” of 
corporate rescue, with debtor-in-possession as its core principle, but has 
instead opted for a ‘rescue’ model in which creditor interests continue to 
assert a dominant influence.244 
English insolvency law focuses on the rights of creditors against a particular 
debtor, and on whether those creditors will be paid the monies that they are 
legally owed by the insolvent company and what they will be paid - where there 
is money to make payments.245  
Until the corporate insolvency law provisions of the Enterprise Act (EA) 2002 
became operative in late 2003, English insolvency laws were generally regarded 
as the most creditor-oriented amongst the European states.246 This may be due to 
the fact the UK is a common law country and because creditor contract rights tend 
to be stronger in common law jurisdictions in comparison to civil law countries.247 
Casting English insolvency law as the most creditor-friendly in Europe was not, 
however, due specifically to the fact the UK is a common law jurisdiction, it was 
mainly attributable to the system being both ‘judicially’248 and structurally biased 
in favour of secured creditors.249  
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Judicially, there was a general bias by the courts towards the creditors. There is 
the view that the judicial bias towards UK creditors in reorganisation insolvencies 
is a reflection of a general social attitude to debt. This social attitude is reflected in 
how the courts treat debtors. English courts tend to punish risk-takers, 
(management) when the risks go wrong, and side with creditors,250 who stand to 
gain or lose the most from the reorganisation process.251 The courts tend to see 
managers of insolvent companies as gambling with the creditors’ money and so 
deserving to be punished for their indiscretions.252  
There is the general perception that when a company is insolvent, or near 
insolvency, the company directors have nothing to lose. Rather, they have much 
to gain by engaging in speculative investments with the company’s resources.253 
The reason why management may undertake overly risky projects, or stall for 
time in hope that the firm’s fortunes will change, is because if the gamble pays off 
they will probably retain their jobs. While the managers might put their 
reputations on the line with a failed gamble, they still may not lose much in 
comparison to, for example, the creditors or the employees’ team members.254 So 
the punitive stance adopted by courts may be to remind directors that it is 
incumbent upon them to take heed of creditors’ interests when the company is in 
the vicinity of insolvency. They must resist the temptation to ‘bet’ 255  the 
company’s future by undertaking risky investments whose remote future benefits 
are doubtful so as to avoid potential losses to the company’s creditors.256 The 
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‘punitive’ approach taken by courts somehow inhibits management’s ability to 
behave strategically to the detriment of the creditors. 
Corporate insolvency strikes at the very heart of two fundamental legal issues: the 
one substantive, the other procedural. 257  UK insolvency law focuses on the 
substantive and procedural issues of priority and control. The substantive aspect 
of English insolvency law is concerned with the order of distribution of assets as a 
matter of substantive law. This means that there is a pecking order of creditors 
who get paid back first, second and last when a company is in formal insolvency 
proceedings. Priority of claims, which is the core argument of the Creditors’ 
Bargain theorists, 258  is largely predicated on pre-insolvency entitlements. 
However, the English system does have circumscribed redistribution aspects 
especially in relation to floating charges.259  
The control of insolvency proceedings is essentially procedural. Structurally, the 
insolvency system in the UK empowers the secured creditors more than any other 
stakeholder. It enhances the secured creditors’ dominance and control of 
insolvency proceedings. The primal position occupied by secured creditors 
within the UK insolvency framework was due to the prominent role the institution 
of administrative receivership played in the English insolvency system. Prior to 
the (partial) abolition 260  of the institution of the administrative receivership, 
English insolvency law adopted an outright contract approach to control.  
One of the means by which a secured creditor holding all-encompassing security, 
granted through fixed and floating charges,261 used to enforce its security in the 
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event that the company defaulted on the loan it granted, was by appointment of an 
administrative receiver. 262  On appointment, the administrative receiver 
displaced, functionally, the incumbent management of the debtor company. 
Receivership was purely a debt enforcement mechanism. As an institution of 
public law, the administrative receivership was purely contractual. Though on 
appointment the administrative receiver was deemed agent of the company 
rather than agent of the appointer (bank),263 the administrative receiver’s primary 
function was to collect in and realise the security to facilitate repayment to the 
appointing secured creditor. Thus, in spite of its agency status at law, an 
administrative receiver’s primary fiduciary duties were owed to the appointor.264  
The administrative receiver’s control of the company’s assets inhibited, to a large 
extent, actions by other creditors.265 He or she held the fort while a liquidator 
waited to move in and liquidate the assets once the lifespan of the administrative 
receivership was completed. In theory, insolvency reorganisation is supposed to 
honour creditors’ claims while preventing the premature liquidation of a viable 
company. In practice, the law was not working as it should and appeared tilted 
toward the creditors to the detriment of the company, other team members 
collectively and society generally. In sum, the situation did not encourage 
business rescue. This in turn had adverse effects on employees’ job security.266  
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English insolvency law has since moved away from the ‘contractualism’ approach 
to a ‘neutral management’ orientation. This has been achieved through the use of 
the administration procedure enabling the appointment of an outside manager to 
take charge of an insolvent company’s affairs in the form of the administrator or a 
liquidator. Although the administration regime has created a three-way entry 
route into administration, one out of the two out of court entry routes allows a 
secured creditor the choice and power of appointing an administrator. 267  A 
creditor holding a qualified floating charge (QFC) in respect of a company’s 
property is, under certain prescribed conditions, able to make an out-of-court 
appointment of an administrator of a company.268 Thus, it can be argued that the 
system is still somehow biased toward the prioritisation of the creditors’ interests. 
The administration procedure is reliant on ‘moratorium.’ Like the CBT in which the 
‘automatic stay’ is a key feature, the appointment of an administrator imposes a 
‘moratorium’ on the enforcement of individual claims.’269 The significance of the 
‘stay’ lies in the fact that it wards off any depredation attempts on the insolvent 
estate by potentially ‘rebellious’ or non-complying creditors. The protection of 
the debtor’s estate is ultimately for the benefit of the secured creditors given that 
insolvency reorganisation transfers interests in the insolvent’s assets, rather than 
the assets themselves, to right holders in the company.270 This is another way in 
which the English insolvency system aligns with the CBT.  
Because the system tilts towards the creditors, it also promotes creditors’ wealth 
maximisation just like the CBT advocates. English insolvency law appears to 
adopt the same position or principle with the CBT that pre-insolvency 
entitlements are to be respected. Both the proponents and exponents of the CBT 
hold the view that insolvency exists primarily for the benefit of the creditors.  The 
UK Insolvency Act 1986 seems to uphold this position especially when viewed 
against the background of what the purpose of administration was meant to be 
and what, ultimately, it usually is.271 In administration proceedings, one of the 
most likely outcomes is the sale of the company’s business.272  
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While ‘rescuing’ the company as a going concern is the primary objective of 
administration,273 rarely is rescue, in the sense of a rehabilitation which enables 
the company to overcome its difficulties and be restored to financial ‘good health’ 
with the survival of the company as an entity intact and no changes in ownership 
and management, achieved.274 Corporate rescue is not the necessary outcome of 
the administration proceedings. Administration may result in the preservation of 
the value of a company heading for failure in order to achieve a better outcome 
than would otherwise be possible if it went into an immediate winding-up.275 It 
may only be possible to sell the assets of the company on a piecemeal basis 
through administration. The administration proceedings can also be used for ‘the 
preservation of the company’s business, comprising its means of economic 
production, to be sold as a going concern’.276 Often, such a sale is pre-agreed in 
principle with the eventual buyer even before the insolvency proceedings 
commenced, under what is termed a pre-packaged sale.277 
In the UK, it is an incontestable fact that when a company is formally insolvent, the 
shareholders’ interests are usually supplanted by the creditors’ interests. In Brady 
v Brady,278 (a case decided in the context of directors’ duties in insolvency), the 
court held that ‘where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully solvent, the 
interests of the company are in reality the interests of existing creditors alone’.  
This position, which has been reaffirmed by the English courts in several 
decisions, has also given credence to, and even enhanced, the secured creditors’ 
primacy both in theory and practice under the UK insolvency system.279 The 
                                                          
273  Insolvency Act 1986, Schd. B1, para 3 (1). 
274  Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue, (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008) 2. 
275  IA 1986 Schd.B1, para. 3 (1) (b). 
276  IA 1986 Schd.B1, para. 3 (1) (b). See also, Frisby (n 272); Parry (n 274). 
277 Sandra Frisby, ‘The Pre-Pack Progression: Latest Empirical Findings’ (2008) Insolvency Intelligence 
154; Frisby, ‘The Second Chance Culture and Beyond: Some Observations on the Pre-Pack 
Contribution’’ (2009) Law and Financial Markets Review 242; Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-
packaged Administration’ (2007) Report to the Association of Business Recovery Professionals 
http://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/publications/press/preliminary_analysis_of_pre-
packed_administrations.pdf accessed 17 March 2012; Vanessa Finch, ‘Pre-packaged Administrations: 
Bargains in the Shadow of Insolvency or Shadowy Bargains?’ [2006] JBL 568; P Walton, Pre-Packaged 
Administrations: Trick or Treat? (2006) 19 Insolvency Intelligence 113; J Moulton, ‘The Uncomfortable 
Edge of Property – Pre-Packs or Just Stitch-Ups?’ (2005) Recovery, 2; A Bloom and S Harris, ‘Pre-
Packaged Administrations – What should be Done Given the Current Disquiet?’ (2006) 19 Insolvency 
Intelligence 122; Bo Xie, ‘Protecting the Interests of General Unsecured Creditors in Pre-Packs: The 
Implication and Implementation of SIP 16’ (2010) 31 Company Lawyer 189-195. 
278 [1987] 3 BCC 535, 552 (Nourse LJ). 
279 This principle which was established in the earlier Commonwealth case of Kinsella v Russell Kinsella 
Pty Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR, was given recognition in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 
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proprietary rights of secured creditors against the assets of the company entitle 
them to be regarded as the company when the latter is formally insolvent.280  
However, there are other circumstances in which the directors’ duties to the 
shareholders might be required to shift to the creditors. These, according to case 
law, include where the company is approaching, nearing, on the verge of, or on 
the borderline of insolvency, 281  doubtfully solvent 282  or subject to a risk of 
insolvency.283 It is also true that the system functions in a way that in a winding-up 
proceeding, only a very limited measure of statutory support is available to 
employees. In administration, the interests of the employees are very low down 
the priority list of most administrators.  
However, as noted above, English insolvency law is no longer solely based on 
contractualism, neither is it totally liquidation biased, even though in most 
proceedings, liquidation is still one of the possible outcomes. The reorganisation 
of the affairs of the insolvent is currently one strong possibility during corporate 
distress. But this comes with a price. While reorganisation functions to gather all 
the claimants in one forum so as to make a collective decision regarding the 
future of the debtor and its assets, it also overrides, alters and redistributes the 
pre-insolvency rights and entitlements of the individual claimants.284  
The change in approach to corporate insolvency in the UK has also brought about 
a marked change in attitude in the way employees, as one of the stakeholders in 
corporate insolvency, are treated. It could be argued that the strengthening of 
‘rescue-oriented’ law by the Enterprise Act (EA) 2002 was to ensure that 
employee-related liabilities did not frustrate business rescues to the detriment of 
the employees themselves. 285  Although under the EA 2002 the employees 
                                                                                                                                                                      
250, 252-53.  In subsequent English cases, the courts have adopted this approach. See e.g. Re Pantone 
485 Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 266, 69; Gwyer v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003]  BCC 885, 74; Re MDA 
Investment Management Ltd [2004] EWHC 42 Ch.; Re Cityspan Ltd [2008] BCC 60. 
280 Lonrho v Shell Petroleum Ltd (1980) 1 WLR 627, 634 (Lord Diplock); West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v 
Dood [1988] BCLC 250, 252-3. 
281 See e.g. The Liquidator of Wendy Fair (Heritage) Ltd v Hobday [2006] EWHC 5803, 66; Gwyer v 
London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003]  BCC 885, 74; Gillespie, Airdrie North Limited [2010] CSOH 132, 
22. 
282 Gwyer v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003]  BCC 885, 74 
283 Kinsella v Russell Kinsella Pty Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR; Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Ltd 
[1986] 1 WLR 1512. 
284 Warren (n 61) 776. 
285 Paragraph 99 of Schedule 1B to the Enterprise Act 2002 makes it very clear that only certain 
specified elements of employee claims should be afforded super-priority status. An administrator is 
allowed a 14-day period to decide whether to adopt the contracts of employees. No liabilities under 
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retained the status of preferential creditors for their arrears of pay and for holiday 
pay claims in insolvency situations, an argument may be made that Parliament 
understood that there would be cases in which the aggregate claims of 
employees who are retained by an administrator would be very substantial. 
Had such liabilities continued to receive super-priority status (as was decided in 
the Paramount Airways case286 which was to right previous wrongs against the 
employees287), there is a tendency that administrators would be unwilling to 
retain employees after appointment, unless they were satisfied that the available 
assets are sufficient to meet employee claims as well as all other costs and 
expenses (including the administrator’s), and that this would still enable a better 
return to creditors than would be possible in liquidation. This would have resulted 
in administrators having to err on the side of caution by retaining very few 
employees, or in some cases even dismissing the entire workforce and closing 
businesses. The consequence would be that the chances of the business being 
rescued as a going concern would be limited or even completely lost. Such an 
outcome would be contrary to the rescue culture which the Insolvency Act 1986 
and subsequent amending legislation288 were intended to promote. It would also 
                                                                                                                                                                      
these contracts which arose during this 14-day period would be granted super-priority status. Case 
law have demonstrated that even after contracts of employment were adopted by an administrator, 
any claims with respect to liabilities under them would be granted super-priority status only if they 
related to wages or salary with respect to services rendered wholly or partly after adoption. See 
generally  Re Allders Department Stores (in administration)  [2005] ICR 867; Re Huddersfield Fine 
Worsteds Ltd, Re Ferrotech Ltd and Re Granville Technology Group Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1072. 
However, in Delaney v Staples [1992] 1 AC 687, the Court of Appeal accepted that, in certain very 
limited circumstances, payments in lieu of notice could be made under a contract of employment and 
would be granted super-priority status. However, such circumstances were limited to instances of 
‘garden leave’, where the departing employee was paid for his notice period in full, but not required 
to attend work. In practice, these will very rarely be encountered in administration situations.  
286  [1994] 2 All ER 513. 
287 See e.g. Re Specialised Mouldings Ltd (unreported) 13 February 1987. In that case, the court 
approved a form of letter to be sent to employees by receivers declaring that they were not adopting 
contracts of employment or assuming any personal liability by virtue of allowing those contracts to 
continue. It became common practice of both receivers and administrators to rely on the decision to 
keep employees, use their services and dismiss them just before transferring the business. In the 
context of receivership, the vulnerability of employees whose contracts of employment continued 
during the life of the receivership was brought to the fore in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Nicoll v 
Cutts [1985] BCLC 322. Although it had been the practice of receivers to pay for services rendered, 
however, here a contract of employment had not been terminated, and the receiver had not paid, 
despite having used the employee's services to a limited extent. 
288  See e.g. Insolvency Act 1994 which restricted the consequence of adoption to ‘qualifying 
liabilities’, which are basically liabilities to pay wages, salaries and contributions to occupational 
pension schemes incurred both while the administrator or administrative receiver is in office, and in 
respect of services rendered after adoption. 
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not be helpful to the employees themselves as they would lose their jobs should 
the business be closed down. 
Granted, in administration proceedings, the administrator once appointed is 
legally the agent of the company, 289  and must perform his functions in the 
interests of the company’s creditors as a whole, 290  the administrator must 
however pursue the paramount statutory objective of rescuing the company as a 
going concern where reasonably practicable.291 Even though in practice business 
rescue is more common in comparison to company rescue, the point is that the 
shift in focus from liquidation to going concern rescues of insolvent businesses is, 
arguably, an indication that there is a change in priority of both interests and 
objectives in English insolvency law.292 While the sale of a business as a going 
concern is not directly aimed at benefiting the employees (the sale is to enable 
the creditors capture full going concern value for the business), a presumption 
could be made that the practice of going concern sales is advantageous for the 
employees as it guarantees continuity of employment, at least, for some 
workers.293  
The point here is that although under the Schedule B1 paragraph 3 overriding 
duty of the administrator, the creditors’ interests appears to take precedence over 
those of other stakeholders, and the preservation of the whole or a substantial part 
of the company intact, is intended to incentivise administration for the company’s 
directors, 294 it could also be argued (despite there being no direct statutory 
evidence to this) that rescuing the company as a going concern, or at least, 
rescuing its business (which is a more common outcome of administration 
proceedings in the UK), may be intended to indirectly benefit other team 
members of the company - especially the employees.295    
                                                          
289 IA 1986 Schd. B1 para 69.  For an explanation of an agency created by agreement to which the 
agent is not a party to it, see Gaskel v Gosling [1896] 1 QB 669 at 692-693 (Rigby L J). 
290 IA 1986 Schd BI, para 3 (2). 
291 IA 1986 Schd. B1, para.3 (1) (a). 
292 Paul Davies, ‘Employee Claims in Insolvency: Corporate Rescues and Preferential Claims,’ (1994) 23 
IL.J 141-151. 
293 This appears to be the global perspective on going concern business rescues. See ‘UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law’ (2005) 287-8   <http://www.uncitral.org> accessed 20 June 2009. 
294 HL Deb., 29 July 2002, Cols 764-767. 
295  The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures; Key 
Issues (1999) Handbook, demanded that the protection of the employees of financially troubled 
enterprises should be taken into account by states when designing insolvency laws as much the 
weight given to economic efficiency. 
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From a judicial perspective, the English courts have long supported business 
rescues that are aimed at saving jobs for the employees. In fact, even before the 
wind of change in insolvency orientation in the UK came, the English courts had 
long been receptive to the notion that saving an insolvent business has the 
potential for preserving jobs for the employees. 296 In Re Welfab Engineering 
Ltd,297 (a case which concerned the scope of the directors’ duties to creditors, and 
when these duties might clash with wider issues such as the duties directors owe 
to the society in general in the context of insolvency) the English court rejected 
the liquidator’s claim that by turning down a higher offer made by one of the 
prospective purchasers in preference for a lower offer made by another, Welfab’s 
directors violated their fiduciary duty to the company’s creditors.  
The court took the view that under the circumstances, the directors’ rejection of 
the higher offer was justified because it was not guaranteed to lead to the survival 
of Welfab’s business as a going concern. This was a ground breaking decision 
which has implications for insolvency law in the UK in general and for 
employment protection in particular. It was a statement by the court that in spite 
of the predominant rule being creditors’ wealth maximisation in insolvency 
reorganisations, employment protection for the company’s employees should be 
given equal consideration just as maximising value for the creditors is.  
Similarly, in DKLL Solicitors v HM Revenue & Customs298 where HMRC as majority 
creditor, opposed the sale of DKLL through a pre-packaged sale, and sought to 
wind it up instead, the submission that the court ought not to have made an 
administration order where it was known that the majority creditor opposed the 
sale was rejected and the winding-up petition was blocked by the court. The 
presiding judge said in that case that he was influenced against granting the 
application by reason of the opposition of HMRC. However, the judge was more 
heavily influenced by the fact that the proposed administrators’ intended sale 
through the pre-pack strategy appeared to be the only way of saving the jobs of 
DKLL’s employees. 
The courts’ positions in the above two cases, arguably, aligns with the developing 
law on stakeholders’ interests in insolvency law. Under section 172 of Companies 
                                                          
296 See Samuel E Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through 
the Lens of Theory’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 99, 105-106. 
297
 [1990] BCC 600 Ch D. 
298 [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch); [2007] BCC 908. 
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Act 2006, the directors of a UK company have a duty to act in a way they consider 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard, inter alia, to the interests of the 
company’s employees.299 
Another principal way in which the hitherto creditor-driven English insolvency 
legal system has undergone significant change is to be found in the duty placed 
on the administrator in relation to the employees of the insolvent company. In 
administration proceedings, the administrator is statutorily obliged to inform and 
consult with the designated representatives of the employees when he or she is 
contemplating a sale of the business. As the transferor of the business, this duty 
requires the administrator to intimate to the employees that a transfer will take 
place, tell them (technically via their representatives) approximately when the 
transfer is expected to take place, the reason for the transfer, the legal and 
economic implications of the transfer for those that will potentially be affected by 
it and the measures that will be taken to ameliorate the impact of the business 
transfer on affected employees.300   
However, it must be stressed that though these duties arise in insolvency in 
general, and particularly during transfers of insolvent businesses; they do not 
originate from insolvency law. Rather, these are duties emanating from a different 
body of law: employment law through the TUPE Regulations. Moreover, these 
employment law rules in themselves are not native to the UK. TUPE owes its origin 
to an EU social policy initiative aimed at safeguarding the rights of the employees 
during business transfers. This is a typical example of how employment law and 
insolvency law interact in corporate insolvency. Here employment law obliges 
the office holder appointed under insolvency law to take into account the interests 
of employees in insolvency situations involving the transfer of the business.  
                                                          
299 Companies Act 2006, s. 172 (1 (b). 
300 TUPE 2006, Regulation 13. According to case law, it seems that there is no duty to provide 
accurate information, but just information that the transferor thinks to be true. See Royal Mail Group 
v Communication Workers Group [2009] EWCA Civ. 1045. While the decision in that case may provide 
an excuse for employers who could argue similar facts and raise a defence that they genuinely did not 
believe that TUPE applied in order to defend claims that they are in breach of the informing and 
consulting obligations, the case also raises many difficult questions about when a belief that TUPE did 
or did not apply can be said to be genuine. Note however, that the rule on information and 
consultation only apply pre-transfer and does not apply post transfer. See e.g. Ucatt v Amicus and 
others; Amicus and another v City Building (Glasgow) LLP and others, EAT/0007/08 & EAT/0014/08. 
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2.10 Conclusion 
The theories that have been considered above show that there is no agreement on 
what the purpose of insolvency law is, or should be. While some theorists favour 
an exclusive creditor protection role for insolvency law, others subscribe to the 
inclusive perspective which requires it to consider a wider set of interests. This 
division also goes to show that insolvency policies cannot be the same 
everywhere and that depending on which ideological camp policymakers in a 
particular jurisdiction belong to insolvency policy of that jurisdiction would be 
either pro-debtor or pro-creditor. The choice will also reflect the normative value 
judgment and determine how the interests of the various stakeholders in the 
insolvent company will be treated in a given jurisdiction. While all the theorists 
are agreed that the employees should be protected in corporate insolvency, they 
however differ on how this should be done. 
Applying the theories to the English insolvency system, it is evident that the 
system is a halfway house between the contract model which allows companies to 
contract ex ante over the allocation of control rights in the event of default301 and 
an insolvency law model which mandatorily imposes particular collective 
procedures on insolvent companies.302 However, even with the changes made to 
the law by the Enterprise Act 2002, which was intended to facilitate a system 
favourably disposed to company rescues, the ‘contract bankruptcy’ 303  model 
which puts secured creditors in vantage position to ‘control’ 304  insolvency 
proceedings continues to loom large.305  
                                                          
301 There is the view that mandatory imposition of particular collective insolvency procedures on 
insolvent companies is undesirable. Rather, companies should be free to contract how control rights 
will be allocated based on anticipated changes in its financial situation. See R. Rasmussen, ‘Debtor 
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1992) 71 Texas Law Review 51; A Schwartz, ‘A 
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy’ (1998) 107 Yale Law Journal 1807. 
302 J Armour, A Hsu & A Walters, ` Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the 
Enterprise Act 2002’ (2008) ECFR 148, 153. 
303 ibid. 
304  Ian Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments – Changes to Administrative 
Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangements – The Insolvency Act 2000, The 
White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law Review, 
119-151. 
305 Even though with the implementation of the relevant part of EA 2002, insolvency process has 
shifted its focal concern –away from debt collection and towards the management of insolvency risks 
and rescues of financially troubled businesses, the ‘spectre’ of debt enforcement continues to hunt 
insolvency proceedings. To a limited degree, administrative receiverships still remain a procedure of 
limited use for floating charge holders. A floating charge holder may still appoint an administrative 
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Insolvency law theories support employee protection in various degrees and 
ways. There are statutory protections in the insolvency laws of various countries 
protecting certain employees’ rights, but there are divergences of opinions how 
employees should be protected in transfers. UK employees enjoy continuity of 
employment under the same terms of employment when the insolvent business 
that employed them is transferred to a third party purchaser, but as indicated 
above this protection is foreign. That is to say, it comes from an extraneous 
source. It is from a different body of law which has been imposed on the structure 
of insolvency law. Thus, the law, taken as a whole, conforms to TPT but it is the 
application of EU employment law to transfers of insolvent undertakings which 
supplies the employees a focus and accommodates the employees’ interest. 
In the next chapter, the focus of analysis will be on the origin of the regime that 
protects employees’ during transfers of insolvent undertakings in the UK.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
receiver in the exceptional situations listed under sections 72H -72H of the Insolvency Act 1986. In 
essence, even the reformed administration procedure is not spared from the control of secured 
creditors either by virtue of their ability to either request the appointment of, or appoint an 
administrator as of right. See Insolvency Act 1986, Schd. B1 paras 12 (1) (c) & 14. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EUROPE AND SOCIAL POLICY: GENESIS OF 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is on the tension between business rescue and 
employment protection in corporate insolvency. Given the problem posed by 
employment protection to the ‘rescue culture’ in the United Kingdom (UK), the 
origin of employee protection legislation during business transfers in the UK 
deserves to be explored. The source of the tension is not internal, it is external. It 
is traceable to the European Union (EU)1 and its legal order. The EU’s social 
policy 2  has impacted significantly on the Member States. EU social policy 
legislation has permeated legal spheres which hitherto used to be the exclusive 
preserve and jurisdiction of the Member States. For example, European law on 
the protection of employees’ rights in business transfers has supplanted the 
domestic legislation of the Member States that govern the rights of the employees 
in business transfer situations.  
Today, it is almost impossible to determine UK national employment law solely by 
its domestic developments without reference to EU labour law. While EU law has 
intruded into the UK domestic employment sphere, it has equally brought with it 
several problems. This is evident in the way European labour legislation has 
changed the way the common law regulated transfers of undertakings in the UK 
and tended to shift the balance in favour of the employees. The EU-derived law on 
transfers of undertakings (discussed in chapter 4) may be regarded as the 
                                                          
1 The European Union as it is known today is the result of the change in nomenclatures and the 
transformations that the original European Economic Community (EEC) founded in 1957 have 
undergone. The three foundation Treaties/Communities of the EEC were merged in 1967 to create 
the European Communities (EC). In 1993, the European Communities was renamed the European 
Community by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, for convenience, the name 
European Union (EU) will be used in this chapter with references to the EEC and EC as appropriate. 
2 The terminology ‘social policy’ as used in this chapter and the entire thesis simply refers to labour 
law which include a whole raft of measures relating, but not limited to, the protection of workers’ 
rights in transfers of undertakings situations, health and safety at work, equal treatment in 
employment and redundancy. 
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genesis of the tension between employee protection and business rescue during 
transfers of insolvent undertakings in the UK.  
One reason why this has been possible is because the UK is, first and foremost, a 
member of the EU. However, the second and perhaps, most important reason 
relates to the legal doctrine of supremacy of EU law. This means that EU labour 
law, for example, takes precedence over the domestic labour laws of the Member 
States.3 The creation of a new legal order of EU law coupled with its supremacy 
and system of qualified majority voting (QMV)4 means that EU institutions may 
create rules affecting employment and industrial relations in Member States 
whether or not they approve of them.5  
Thus, through the doctrine of supremacy, the Europeanisation of employment and 
industrial relations has been fostered by ensuring that EU law applies in those 
areas that fall within its sphere of competence. 6  For example, the EU has 
introduced a protective legal framework for European citizens. It has minimum 
requirements in the labour law field in relation to the rights of workers and work 
organisation. EU legal developments in the labour law field are responsible for 
the legislation that mandatorily transfers the employees’ contracts of employment 
where there is a change in the ownership of the business that employs them 
following a legal transfer or sale to a third party purchaser.7 This was never the 
case when the common law regulated business transfers in the UK. All 
                                                          
3 The supremacy of EU law was established in the landmark ECJ decision in Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v 
ENEL [1964] ECR 585. See also Case C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health 
Authority (No. 2), [1993] ECR I-4367 which reaffirmed the doctrine of supremacy of EU law. 
4 Currently, QMV which is required for the adoption of many internal market measures such as 
employment policies, among others, operates as a system of weighted votes. It is based loosely on 
Member States’ population size. This means that the larger the Member State, the more votes it 
holds. The weighting system on votes is laid out in Article 3 (3, Protocol No. 36 (which is annexed to 
the TEU and TFEU). For an act to be adopted using QMV, at least 255 votes must be cast in favour and 
a majority of Member States has to vote in favour in respect of a Commission’s proposal and two-
thirds otherwise. QMV will be replaced with the ‘double majority’ principle (based on number of 
Member States and population from 1st November 2014. See John Fairhurst, Law of the European 
Union (8th edn., Pearson Education Ltd, Essex 2010) 130-131.   
5 The supremacy of EU law over national law is confirmed by Article 288 TFEU [ex Art.249EC/ Art.189 
EEC]. This article makes it explicitly clear that EU laws have an obligatory value and so ‘cannot 
judicially be contradicted by an internal law, whatever it might be...’ 
6 See e.g. the ECJ’s decision in Case 43/75 G Defrenne v Sabena, (1976) ECR 455. 
7 See Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses. 
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employment relationships were deemed terminated upon the transfer of a 
business.8 
This chapter traces the origin of employment protection legislation as it relates to 
transfers of insolvent undertakings in the United Kingdom, which is a key example 
of the influence of EU law on UK labour law. It is not proposed here to attempt a 
comprehensive and chronological history of the European integration project. 
Rather, the purpose of the chapter is to provide a brief but general account of the 
origin of EU social policy. Granted, there has been significant expansion of the 
social agenda vis-a-vis European integration in the last four decades,9 this chapter 
is however mainly concerned with tracing the several attempts made by the EU to 
tackle employment issues in the early 1970’s. The focus here is on the process of 
European economic integration and particularly on tracing the genesis of EU 
social policy as it relates specifically to employee protection in situations of 
employer insolvencies. 
It is intended to explore briefly the milestones in the European integration project 
up to the time when the ground breaking Social Action Programme (SAP) was 
adopted in 1974. The chapter will then go on to examine briefly social policy 
directives that were the offshoot of the SAP. It argues that the SAP was 
instrumental to the eventual enactment in 1977 of the European-wide regime on 
the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of business transfers resulting 
in a change in ownership of the business: the Acquired Rights Directive (ARD).10 
The ARD is the parent law of the UK’s equivalent: the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE).11 
The specific aim of this chapter therefore, is to explore how the law regulating 
transfers of undertakings (which, in the context of insolvency, is the main source 
of the tension existing between business rescue and employment protection in 
the UK) became legislated on at the European level. The chapter will explore the 
difficulties faced by the then European Economic Community (EEC) in crafting 
                                                          
8 The common law rule on business transfers enunciated in the seminal House of Lords decision in 
Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 (HL). 
9 See e.g. L Hantrais, Social Policy in the European Union (2nd edn., Palgrave Macmillan Press, 
Basinstoke 2000); Robert Geyer, Exploring European Social Policy  (Polity Press,  Cambridge 2000). 
Robert Geyer, Exploring European Social Policy (OUP, Oxford 2000); Robert Geyer, ‘The state of 
European Union Social Policy’ (2000) 21 (3) Policy Studies 245–261. 
10 The ARD is considered in detail in the next chapter (Ch. 4). 
11  TUPE is analysed in chapter 5. 
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social policy legislation even when it finally felt the need to do so.  It will be 
argued that social policy took a back seat in the EU scheme of things due to 
several factors. The purely economic beginning of the EU, the ideological mindset 
of the founding fathers, the differences in the legal traditions or origins of the 
Member States, the differing approaches or responses to social issues and the 
lack of a sound Treaty base for crafting legislation on social policy were factors 
that impeded the EU from legislating and accounted for the low legislative output 
in the area of social policy.  
It is also intended to use this chapter to show that, though legislation on social 
policy was eventually adopted following the rise in unemployment in Europe, 
these laws had an underlying economic rationale for their adoption: they were 
intended to address the social issues that were deemed capable of directly 
impeding the operation, or reducing the benefits that could be derived from the 
common market. That social policy was enacted to eliminate obstacles to the 
functioning of the Common Market goes to further underscore the dominance of 
the economic over social considerations in the EU in the early years. The 
discussion of European integration and social policy legislation sets the stage for 
the discussion of the ARD that follows in chapter 4.  
3.2 The ‘European construction’12: milestones  
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief historical analysis on the EU from 
infancy to the present day. Although 1952 is officially credited as the year when 
the European ‘construction’ began, it is the event of March 25, 1957 in Rome that 
may be considered as the most important milestone in the history and annals of 
European integration. It was on that day that six sovereign western countries13 
signed the agreement that culminated in the establishment of the then European 
Economic Community (EEC). Since that time, the then EEC has undergone 
transformations in its size, composition, name, as well as in the areas and matters 
upon which it can legislate.14 
                                                          
12 This term is used in the context of this research to refer to the conception and institutionalisation of 
the EEC and the common market leading to the present day EU.  
13  These countries were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg. 
14 Currently, the EU comprises 27 member states from the six original member countries in 1957. 
These countries are made up of civil and common law countries in comparison to the original six who 
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3.3 European integration without a ‘social face’  
The European Economic Community (EEC), as its name indicated, was meant to 
be a purely economic community. This is evidenced by the non-interventionist, 
market-oriented legal nature of the 1957 Rome Treaty which created the then 
EEC. The Treaty elaborated a fairly strict separation between the economic and 
social spheres.15 Based on this separation, and on the continuous consolidation of 
an economic union, every other provision (including social provisions) of the 
Treaty was subordinate to economic provisions.16 Thus, as far as the European 
construction project was concerned, not only was ‘social policy’ a late comer in 
the scheme of things, but it played second fiddle to policies designed to achieve 
economic goals.17 It took almost twenty years for the EU to finally put in place a 
social policy programme (see section 3.10.1 below) 
The point here is not that social policy was completely absent within the EU 
framework.18 Rather, the argument is that even though the EU has always had a 
social dimension from inception, its primary rationale, in the initial phases, was 
economic integration among the Member States. The rationale for pursuing 
economic goals was to create an effective and undistorted functioning internal 
market. In that context, social policy played a very minimal role.19 In fact, social 
policy was regarded as the ‘Cinderella’20 of European integration - a term used 
derogatively in indicating the low status and the lack of regard in which social 
                                                                                                                                                                      
were all civil law countries. From EEC, it is known today as the European Union (see fn. no. 1 above) 
and the union now legislates on social policy matters in comparison to its pursuit of mainly economic 
policies in early integration phases. 
15  Franck Lecomte, ‘Embedding Employment Rights in Europe’ (2011) 17 Col. J of Eur. L. 1. 
16 Carlos A Ball, ‘The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy 
and Individual Rights under the European Community’s Legal Order’ (1996) 37 Harvard Int’l L .J. 307, 
309; Stefano Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Labour Law 
Perspective (CUP, Cambridge, 2006) 7. 
17 Paul L Davies, ‘The Emergence of European Labour Law’ in William McCarthy (ed.) Legal 
Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1992) 318; P 
Watson, ‘Social Policy after Maastricht’ (1993) Common Market Law Review 30, 481-513; Sandra 
Fredman, ‘Europe with a Social Face: Equality and Social Rights in the European Union’ (2001) 22 ILJ 
1467-80. 
18  Davies (n 17) above.  
19 N Nevra Esenturk, ‘EU Social Policy: Progressive Development in Legal and Governance Aspects’ 
<http://www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln/Esenturk.pdf> accessed 17 May 2012. 
20 Davies (n 17); Monica Threlfall, ‘The European Union and Social Policy: An Innovative Approach to 
Regional Integration? (2006) 
<http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20060620144201.O-2006-14.pdf> accessed 11 
May 2012; Michael Shanks, ‘The Social Policy of the European Communities’ (1977) 14 CMLR 373. 
134 
 
policy was held in the entire European integration project.21 The dominance of 
economic over social provisions in the foundation Treaties, and the 
preponderance of the former over the latter in the common market policy 
considerations however, was to such an extent that even the agreement by 
Member States on the necessity to promote improvement in the living and 
working conditions of workers was to result from the functioning of the common 
market22 and not through any direct legislative interventions.23 Economic ideals 
effectively trumped social ideals to the extent that social rights only warranted 
protection if they were necessary for the enhancement of an economic goal.24  
3.4 Arguments contra social policy legislation  
The impetus behind the relegating of social policy to the background was two-
fold. First, it was based on the notion that the ‘amalgamation’ of the various 
economies into a single European market would automatically lead to gradual 
harmonisation of social policy throughout the EU thus removing any need for the 
Union to have a social policy of its own.25 Put differently, it was conjectured that 
progress in the social arena would be an automatic ‘by-product’ of economic 
integration26 and as such intervention at the EU level would not be necessary.27 
Thus, in striking contrast to how matters in the economic sphere were dealt with 
by the EU, social matters, particularly matters relating to employment law were to 
be left to the jurisdiction of Member States.28  
                                                          
21 Threlfall (n 19). 
22 On the characteristics of a common market, see John Tilotson & Nigel Foster, Text, Cases and 
Materials on European Union Law (4th edn., Cavendish Publishing, London) 37. 
23  See e.g. Article 117 EEC. 
24  Fredman (n 17). 
25 R  Nielsen & E Szyszczak, The Social Dimension of the European Community, (2nd edn., Viborg, 1993) 
17; P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law (2nd edn., OUP, Oxford, 1998) 5. The relegating of social policy to 
the background, or more accurately, making social considerations subservient to economic 
considerations appears to be the norm even today. This has prompted one commentator to articulate 
that: ‘Social policy issues are addressed at EU level almost entirely through measures consistent with 
policies designed to advance the market and that where social policy measures exist they are largely 
passive and represent some kind of spill over effect.’ See Mary Daly, ‘EU Social Policy after Lisbon’ 
(2006) 44 (3) JCMS 461, 464. 
26 Peter Hoeller and Marie-Odile Louppe, ‘The EC’s International Market: Implementation and 
Economic Effects’ (1994) 23 OECD Economic Studies 55, 417. See also Jo Shaw, Jo Hunt & Chloe 
Wallace, Economic and Social Law of the European Union, (Palgrave McMillan, Hampshire, 2007), 394. 
27  Fredman (n 17) 1467. 
28  J Kenner, EU Employment  Law: From Rome to  Amsterdam  and Beyond  (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2003) 12. 
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Perhaps the above philosophy was borne out of the notion that policies that are so 
closely linked with the ‘social contract’29 between governments and citizens are 
better decided nationally. 30  Perhaps, the reasoning was due to the difficulty 
envisaged in getting a consensus on social policy issues due to the unique 
composition of the EU. The EU comprises both civil law and common law 
countries. These countries have different labour market models existing in 
parallel in the EU. These various national models, which are the result of long and 
complex historical processes,31 include the corporatist32 model in old continental 
Europe and the UK’s Anglo-Saxon ‘at will’ labour law model.33 There are also the 
Scandinavian arrangement of voluntary collective agreement and the diverse set 
of flexible models of the newly acceded Member States in the early 1970s. 34 
Because Member States have different labour market models with different levels 
of social protection, it was (and still is) very difficult to achieve consensus and 
therefore effectively legislate on social matters centrally at the European level.35 
It was thought that any attempts to regulate such a diverse set of labour markets, 
                                                          
29 The ‘social contract’ is the view that the moral and/or political obligations of persons are dependent 
upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. See C Friend, ‘Social 
Contract Theory’ (2004) Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/> 
accessed 20 June 2012. 
30   See Open Europe, ‘Repatriation of EU Social Policy: The Right Focus for a Conservative 
Government’ (2009) <http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/eusocialpolicy.pdf> 
accessed 11 March 2012. 
31 Roger Blanpain, European Labour Law, (11th edn., Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2008) 
797. 
32 Corporatism is a type of organized or coordinated capitalism where power to make important 
economic policies in a state are transferred from the parliament and government to semi-private 
organizations yet subordinate to the state. These are based on economic function or industrial sector 
and include a strong representation of labour interests. See F Pryor, ‘Corporatism as an Economic 
System: A Review Essay’ (1988) 12 Journal of Comparative Economics 317–344. See also Alan Siaroff, 
‘Corporatism in 24 Industrial Democracies: Meaning and Measurement’ (1999) 36 European Journal 
of Political Research 175-205. 
33 Before the enactment of the ARD, which has been implemented in the UK by TUPE, there was no 
obligation from the employer towards the welfare of the employee in Britain’s labour market. This 
created a perverse corporate, economic, and social environment. The ‘at will’ employment law 
doctrine created a culture of trigger-happy executive leadership that seeks to get rid of hundreds 
even thousands of employees at the slightest hint of weakness in corporate profits. Corporate 
restructuring or downsizing was often the first port-of-call rather than the last resort for companies to 
cut costs and increase profitability in times of financial distress. 
34  Simon Deakin & Beth A Ahlering, ‘Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A 
Case of Institutional Complementarity?’ (2005). Uni. of Cambridge Centre for Business Research 
Working Paper No. 312; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 72/2006 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=898184> 
accessed 2 December 2011. 
35 See Thijmen Koopmans, ‘The Birth of the European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions’ 
(1991) 39 (3) American Journal of Comparative Law 493-507. This situation has persisted today and is 
accountable for the innovative approaches that have been adopted by the EU to make legislation in 
the labour and employment sphere discussed in section 3.9 below. 
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without circumspection, would have amounted to inviting trouble. This is because 
while all the Member States share similar values and pursue the same objective 
vis-a-vis the combining of economic performance and competiveness with social 
justice, they however differ markedly in terms of the instruments and approaches 
used in the attainment of these goals.36  
Second, and most importantly, given that those contracting Member States who 
wished to liberate the labour market stood for the free circulation of labour, it was 
of utmost importance that the drafters of the Rome Treaty divorced free movement 
provisions from the other social provisions. Accordingly, the provisions on free 
movement of labour within the EU were included together with free movement 
provisions of goods, services and capital.37 This approach was perhaps intended 
to re-emphasise the economic as opposed to the social nature of the EU.38 This 
approach prevented, from the outset, the provision of a sound legal base for 
initiating policy in the employment law sphere and it has continued to limit the 
EU’s power to initiate policy in that field.39 
 
However, it is noteworthy that the EU’s non-intrusion into the labour law arena 
stance was not an oversight. Rather, it was an informed decision based on the 
opinions of policy and integration experts. The exclusion of policy on labour law 
was based on a report of the group of experts charged with investigating the 
social aspects of European economic co-operation. This report was commissioned 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).40 The experts had concluded in 
their 1956 report that differences in levels of social protection offered to citizens 
by Member States did not create competitive disadvantages of an alarming 
proportion which deserved EU-level intervention. Accordingly, to harmonise 
                                                          
36  Craig and De Burca (n 25). 
37  Davies (n 17) 320. 
38 However, the free movement provisions have been extended by subsequent judicial and legislative 
interventions to include social and tax advantages. See e.g. Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 
February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of 
foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. See 
also Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens and 
of their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
39 Craig & De Burca (n 25). 
40  See Le Comite Intergouvernemental crée par la Conférence de Messine, Rapports des chefs de 
délégation aux Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, Brussels 1956  (Expert Reports)  104-5, 107. 
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measures or policies in the area of labour and employment law was, in their view, 
unnecessary.41  
The above reasons perhaps explain why the EU, in its formative years, was mainly 
focused on developing the framework necessary to establishing a Common 
Market that would enable the achievement of what is characterised in EU 
literature as the four freedoms:42 free movement of goods, persons, capital, and 
the freedom to provide services, considered as necessary ingredients for 
economic integration.43  The idea that Europe would be fully integrated through 
the Common Market and without any properly defined social policy was so 
overwhelming that not even the potential danger posed by ‘social dumping’44 to 
the Member States, and to the overall integration project, could have forced a 
change of opinion on the founding fathers in a hurry. 45 
3.5 The notion of social dumping 
‘Social dumping’ is a generic term used to describe a situation of reduced social 
protection.46 For example, in international trade, this will apply to the practice in 
which the export of goods from country ‘A’ with weak enforced labour standards 
allows the exporter from that country to gain an unfair advantage over an exporter 
from country ‘B’ because his costs of production are lower than those of his 
competitor in country B with higher enforced labour standards.47 The reason often 
cited for this inequality is differences in direct and indirect costs of labour.48 
Countries with reduced labour standards invariably have lower wage rates and 
low costs of production. This often encourages the relocation of facilities by 
                                                          
41  ibid. 
42  Hoeller and Louppe (n 26) 91. 
43 Shaw et al (n 26) 394. 
44  See discussion below. 
45  Manfred Weiss, ‘Fundamental Social Rights for the European Union’ (1997) 18 ILJ 417, 418 
46 Jacobien W Rutgers, ‘An Optional Instrument and Social Dumping’ (2006) Centre for the Study of 
European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2006/03 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=969293> 
accessed 24 November 2009. 
47 See e.g.  B Amoroso, ‘A Danish Perspective: The Impact of the Internal Market on the Labour Unions 
and the Welfare State’ (1990) 11 Comparative Labour Law Journal, 483, 491. 
48 Roger Blanpain, ‘1992 and Beyond: The Impact of the European Community on the Labour Law 
Systems of the Member Countries’ (1990) 11 Comparative Labour Law Journal 403, 409. 
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companies from countries with high labour wages to countries where wage rates 
and other social costs are significantly lower.49  
Thus, as it relates to the EU, low labour costs in some Member States could 
encourage relocation of companies from another with higher formal legal 
protection to those with lower or non-existent labour standards creating an 
imbalance in competition with adverse consequences on the functioning of the 
Common Market. The founding fathers of the EU also failed to take into account 
what consequences the free movement of persons could have on the functioning 
of the Common Market.50 Free movement of persons in the context of the EU 
meant that migrants from countries within the territorial scope of the Rome Treaty 
had the right to live and work in any of the Member States. They were also to be 
treated in the same way as the national workers of the host country vis-à-vis 
working conditions, social and tax advantages.51  
3.6 Lack of treaty base for social policy 
One of the primary roles of the EU is to oversee economic co-operation between 
Member States. Consequently, the EU plays a very important and big role in how 
business is conducted throughout Europe.52 To fulfil this role, the Union needs a 
sound legal base to enact legislation not only in the economic but also in the 
social arena. This is why the absence of a legal base in the foundation Treaty for 
enacting social policy raised concerns.  
However, it is important to note that the Treaty that created the original EEC did 
not completely lose sight of the importance of having a social policy. In fact it did 
acknowledge social policy. The 1957 Rome Treaty did actually express the need 
to promote close collaboration between Member States in the social field. The 
areas particularly mentioned therein included matters of employment and labour 
legislation and on the improvement in working conditions.  It also contained a 
                                                          
49 See Marc H Klein, ‘The Single European Act and Social Dumping: A New Appeal for Multinational 
Collective Bargaining’ (1991) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Int’l Bus. Law 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/.../Klein12U.Pa.J.Int'lBus.L.411(1991).pdf> accessed 24 
March 2009. 
50 Shaw et al (n 26) 394; Weiss (n 45) 417. 
51 See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens and 
of their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
52 J McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction (3rd edn., Palgrave 
McMillan, New York 2005). 
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number of other implicit but limited social provisions. These provisions extended 
to concerns beyond those that were necessary for the creation of the common 
market.  
In other words, the Rome Treaty had binding provisions that are aimed at 
establishing freedom of movement of workers (Article 48-49), freedom of 
establishment (Article 52 -58), equal pay for men and women (Article 119), rights 
to social security of migrant workers (Article 51). It also touched on the need to 
put in place laws relating to trade unions, collective bargaining between 
employers and workers as well as those offering protection against occupational 
accidents and diseases (Article 136-140) and to the creation of the European 
Social Fund (Article 125).  
Although all of the above issues touched on by the Treaty had social dimensions, 
they were still not enough reason to vest the EU with power to legislate on social 
policy. As a union of several independent states,53 the EU could not also abrogate 
to itself the power to do so. The lack of a treaty base upon which to enact social 
policy meant that the EU lacked the necessary competence to instigate policies in 
the social field.54  The absence of any affirmative provision in the Treaty for the 
protection of the social rights of the citizens of the EU meant that the Member 
States continued to be individually responsible for social policy in their 
respective states.55  
The lack of competence to legislate on labour and employment matters at the EU 
level left the employees at the mercies of their respective national governments. 
This meant that there was no parallel protection for employees in identical or 
facing similar employment-related issues in the Member States.56  
For example, where there was a business reorganisation in two Member States, 
depending on the labour law provisions of each of the two Member States, an 
employee in one of the states was likely to have more social protection than the 
other.57 It seems that the only time there was justification for enacting legislation 
to protect the rights of the citizens was if it aided the removal of obstacles to the 
functioning of the Common Market. That is, if the legislation aided the 
                                                          
53 There are currently 27 Member States in the EU.  
54 Nielsen & Szyszczak (n 25) 17. 
55 Bob Hepple, ‘The Crisis in EEC Labour Law’ (1987) 16 ILJ 77. 
56 See discussion on the Acquired Rights Directive in chapter 4. 
57  See further section 4.2 of chapter 4. 
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advancement of the EU’s economic goals generally.58 It is not surprising therefore 
that the ARD (as we will see in chapter 4) was adopted on the basis that if the 
labour laws of Member States were not harmonised, differences in their 
employment standards would distort the functioning of the Common Market.59 
The lack of Treaty base to enact social policy legislation meant that the European 
polity struggled to strike a balance between the economic and the social 
spheres.60 This ‘economic versus social paradigm’61 has progressively led to a 
normative conundrum of the post-EU employee protection legislation era.62 The 
problem concerns whether the market should be liberalised to allow free 
competition between the enterprises or whether a level playing field on a much 
wider basis including, for example, equivalent protection for workers potentially 
impacted by corporate restructurings across the EU is required instead?63  
Put differently, the point here is that, as with the goods market, the key concern 
over the protective dimension of EU labour and employment legislation is 
whether ‘market integration would need to be accompanied by more widespread 
standardisation of labour standards.’64 If so, how would the standardisation of 
labour laws ‘interact with the need for greater labour market flexibility which is 
essential for reaping gains from corporate restructuring?’65 It is submitted that a 
good balance between the economic and the social objectives was (and is still) 
needed to strengthen integration. Stimulating economic growth through closer 
European integration requires the support of EU social policy that would ensure 
                                                          
58 Davies (17) 325. 
59  See preamble to the 1977 ARD. 
60 See Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe Social-Self: The ‘Sickness unto Death,’ in Jo Shaw (ed) Social 
Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 325. 
61 Catherine Bernard, ‘British Jobs for British Workers’: The Lindsey Oil Refinery Dispute and the 
Future of Local Labour Clauses in an Integrated EU Market (2009), 38 ILJ 245, 277; Phil Syrpis & Tonia 
Novitz, ‘Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to their 
Reconciliation, (2008) 33 Eur. L. Rev. 411. 
62 Ian H Eliasoph, ‘A Switch in Time for the European Community? Lochner Discourse and the 
Recalibration of Economic and Social Rights in Europe,’ (2008) 14 Col. J Eur. L. 467, 494; Claire 
Kilpatrick, ‘Laval's Regulatory Conundrum: Collective Standard-Setting and the Court's New Approach 
to Posted Workers’ (2009) 34 Eur. L. Rev. 844. 
63 Elspeth Attwool, ‘Constitutional Implications of EU Employment Policy’ (ND) 
<http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/working1attwool.pdf> accessed 8 August 2010. 
64 Hoeller and Louppe  (n 26) 67. 
65 ibid. 
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that employment law assists the integration process, and that the benefits of 
economic growth are evenly spread throughout the EU.66  
To focus solely on the economic aspects of integration to the exclusion of social 
goals tends to discount the notion, a la Alain Supiot, that ‘no legal relationship 
exists that does not have both an economic and a social dimension.’67 In fact, 
European economic and social rights are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are 
interpenetrated. For example, it is obvious that any piece of legislation dealing 
with labour (social), jointly regulates, supports and restrains the power of 
management (economic) or the power of labour.68 This is evident in the ARD 
which, though a social policy legislation, severely limits management powers 
(economic) over labour. In a similar vein, the protection of the employees’ terms 
of employment from unilateral alteration by the relevant employer during 
transfers of insolvent businesses as a social right has an economic connotation: 
remuneration. 
It is equally demonstrable that economic rights have a social dimension. Granted, 
the provisions dealing with the free movement of persons mainly concern a 
limited number of persons (workers), 69  a comparative and historical legal 
analysis has demonstrated however, that the free movement of persons is first and 
foremost a social right. It is a social right in the sense that workers that cannot 
circulate may well face difficulties in earning a sufficient living.70 Based on this 
analysis, it is imperative that economic integration go hand in hand with social 
protections.  
As the EU expanded, it was faced with complex problems in the employment law 
front in the forms of discriminations, redundancies associated with restructurings 
and business transfers resulting in changes in employers, all of which impacted 
on employees’ job security.  Accordingly, cracks began to emerge in the long 
held philosophy that market factors would achieve an optimum social system. The 
                                                          
66 Stephen Hardy and Nick Adnett, `Entrepreneurial Freedom versus Employee Rights’: the Acquired 
Rights Directive and EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam (1999) 9 Journal of European Social Policy, 127, 
128. 
67 Alain Supiot, ‘Critique du Droit du Travail,’ (1st edn Presses Universitaires Du France, 2002) XXIII. 
Supiot’s French version translated by the author himself in to the above quotation reads:’ Il n’est pas 
de lien de droit qui n’ait à la fois une dimension économique et une dimension sociale.’ 
68 Otto Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, (2nd edn.,  Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, 1977) 4 
69 Ian Ward,  A Critical Introduction to European Law, (3rd edn CUP, London 2009) 143. 
70  See Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, 
Employment and Legal Evolution, (OUP, Oxford 2005) 110-200. 
142 
 
emergence of these social problems called for actions to be taken fast. But how 
did the EU address these problems?  This is the focus of the next section. 
3.7 The genesis of EU social policy 
European integration has progressed since 1957 when the EEC Treaty was 
concluded. Similarly, progress has been made in social policy legislation, 
through convergence of trends and policies, the approximation of national laws 
and the harmonisation of various practices. These have in turn facilitated the 
creation of a series of single social areas within the EU.71 EU social policy in the 
context of legislation geared towards addressing employment issues gained 
prominence during the first phase of the Union’s enlargement in 1973 with the 
accession of new member countries. This was the period when the common law 
countries became members of the union.72 The accession of the common law 
countries to the EU was significant for two reasons. The composition of the EU was 
changed. It comprised two distinct legal families or traditions: civil and common 
law families. The accession marked, arguably, the beginning of tensions and 
disagreements, at the European level governance, between the two legal families 
regarding the best way to handle employment oriented social protection issues 
and other issues having a social dimension.73  In the area of social protection, for 
example, the way employment relationships are regulated in each member 
country is different. While some Member States were tolerant of, for example, 
trade unions, others were not. Some states were already used to legislative and 
government involvement in employment relationships, others were used to 
contract as the main instrument in employment relationships. 
                                                          
71 Threlfall (20).  
72 Britain became full member of the EU in 1973. This was after two previous applications to join had 
been vetoed by Charles de Gaulle (the then French president) in 1963 and 1967 respectively. Popular 
opinion has it that he doubted Britain’s political will. However, it is understood that de Gaulle’s real 
fear was that the English language would become the common language of the community. See BBC 
ON THIS DAY 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm> accessed 
05 April 2012. The other non-common law state that also joined the EEC in 1973 was Denmark. 
Greece joined in 1981.  Spain and Portugal became members in 1986 while Austria, Finland and 
Sweden respectively joined in 1995. 
73  One example is the UK’s opposition to the Commission’s proposal for a special social chapter to be 
included in the new Maastricht Treaty. This forced the terms of what would have been the social 
chapter to be relegated to a Protocol on Social Policy. See John T Addison, ‘In the Beginning, There 
was Social Policy: Developments in Social Policy in the European Union from 1972 through 2008’ 
(2009) The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis <http://www.rcfea.org/pr2009/pr01_09.pdf>  
accessed 28 March 2011. 
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3.8 Triggers for social policy legislation 
The enlargement74 of the EU was done with a view to achieving the eventual 
economic integration of Europe into a single market.75  Economic integration has 
negative and positive implications for Member States. From the positive 
perspective, economic advantage is a major stimulant for migration—both for 
individuals seeking economic ‘greener pastures’ and for the States in terms of 
attracting workers to fill labour shortages and skills gaps.76 However, as workers 
moved freely to and from countries, there were several social issues that arose.  
Granted, the free movement of persons in the context of European integration was 
understood as a necessary pre-condition for the effective functioning of the 
common market,77 but this does have negative implications for social policy in the 
Member States.78  The literature on integration-migration trends points to the fact 
that free movement often results in Member States with stronger economies 
having to cope with the influx of economic migrants.79 This was no different in the 
                                                          
74  Enlargement is one of EU’s very useful and powerful tools. According to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) website: 
The pull of the EU has helped to transform Central and Eastern Europe into 
modern, well-functioning democracies. More recently it has inspired far-
reaching reforms in the candidate and potential candidate countries. All 
European citizens benefit from having neighbours that are stable 
democracies and prosperous market economies. Enlargement is a carefully 
managed process which helps the transformation of the countries involved, 
extending peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law across Europe. 
See The official website of the ENP: <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm> accessed 10 
March 2012. 
75 Mark Jeffery, ‘European Labour Laws Relating to Business Restructuring’ (2004) 24 (4) Comp. 
Labour Law & Policy Journal 669, 670 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=655487> accessed 29 October 2009; 
Hoeller & Louppe (n 26). 
76  See e.g. House of Lords’ European Union Committee Report on ‘Economic Migration to the EU’ 
(2005) 14th Report of Session 2005-06, Published by the Stationary Office Limited, London  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/58/58.pdf> Accessed 
01/09/2011. 
77 ‘The underlying premise is that movement of persons for economic activity is not only necessary in 
the interests of EU market integration but positively beneficial to growth and innovation in the EU’. 
House of Lords European Union Committee’s Report on ‘Economic Migration to the EU’ (2005) 14th 
Report of Session 2005-06, Published by The Stationary Office Limited, London. 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/58/58.pdf> accessed 01 
August 2011 
78  Weiss (n 45) 417. 
79  See e.g. Christina Boswell, ‘Migration in Europe’ (2005) A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis 
and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration 
<http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/g
cim/rs/RS4.pdf> accessed 21 May 2012; Kristin Archick, ‘European Union Enlargement’ (2012) 
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context of the European integration. Free movement had a peculiar trend: job 
seekers migrated from the newly acceded and economically ‘unsound’ Member 
States to the older and economically ‘stable’ ones.80 
The influx of job seekers adversely affected the economies of the host countries. It 
led to a rise in unemployment in the old Member States.81 Unemployment was not 
the only social problem facing the EU. Admittedly, the notion of free movement of 
workers within the EU was premised on the principle of non-discrimination, that 
is, migrant workers are to be admitted in their host countries for employment or 
self-employment on equal terms and conditions as the home workers82 but this 
was certainly not the case with migrant workers. There were a number of 
employment-associated discriminations to contend with. This, in relation to 
migrant workers was due, perhaps, to too many workers chasing very few jobs in 
the host countries. Preferences for home country workers were banal as were 
wage discriminations. Home and migrant workers did not receive equal pay for 
equal work done from most employers.83 
Economic integration did, as predicted, 84  trigger a number of business 
restructurings in the Member States. These in turn led to the occurrence of large 
scale redundancies in those circumstances. The problem was that in a 
redundancy situation for example, the absence of a harmonised set of rules meant 
that different provisions were applied to workers in comparable situations in 
different Member States. This, more often than not, produced different results in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Congressional Research Service 7-5700 prepared for Members and Committees of Congress 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21344.pdf> accessed 2 April 2012. 
80  It should be pointed out that each Member State’s need in respect of migrant workers varies. 
While the UK, for example, may prefer highly skilled migrants, Spain, with its large agricultural sector 
would welcome unskilled migrants. See e.g. the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s Report 
on ‘Controlling our Borders: Making Migration Work for Britain-Five Year Strategy for Asylum and 
Immigration’ (Feb. 2005) Home Office, Published by The Stationary Office. 
<http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm64/6472/6472.htm> accessed 01 July 
2011. 
81  Elspeth Guild & Sergio Carrera, ‘Labour Migration and Unemployment: What can We Learn from 
EU Rules on Free Movement of Workers?’ (2012) CEPS Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 46 
<http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/6624> accessed 19 March 2012. 
82 See e.g. House of Lords’ European Union Committee Report on ‘Economic Migration to the EU’ 
(2005) 14th Report of Session 2005-06, Published by The Stationary Office Limited, London  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/58/58.pdf> accessed 01 
August 2011. 
83 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner: Rights of Migrant Domestic 
Workers In Europe 
<http://www.europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Study_Domestic_Migrant_webversion.pdf> 
accessed 19 April 2012. 
84  See Commission’s Explanatory memorandum: Proposal for a Council Directive, COM (94) 300 final. 
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terms of the way affected workers were treated by the extant national laws of their 
respective countries.  
All of the above issues served as a ‘wake-up call’ for the EU to re-assess its stance 
on not having legislation on social policy. There was a sudden consciousness that 
economic integration without legislative intervention was not capable of 
harmonising the national employment laws of the Member States. Thus, it was 
time for the misplaced reliance on the market to harmonise the discrete 
employment laws of the Member States to give way to a more proactive approach 
in that regard. 85  What was needed was social policy legislation that would 
address the social consequences of business restructuring 86  by taking into 
account the individual rights of the workers in such situations.87 However, to move 
in the direction of social policy legislation, the EU would need to navigate 
obstacles in its way. Below is a summary of some of the factors that impeded the 
EU from progressing quickly on the social policy front. 
3.9 Towards an EU-wide employment policy: 
crossing the first sets of hurdles 
Under the regime of the foundation Treaties, European labour and employment 
law could hardly be spoken of.88 While social integration is hampered currently 
by the eagerness of national governments to retain control over welfare provision 
and social expenditure budgets,89 there were different factors that accounted for 
the low legislative output in the social policy field in the developmental phase of 
the EU.  
The first major reason why the EU was not legislatively very active in the social 
field was that it lacked a sound legal base of competence on which to enact social 
                                                          
85 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, (2nd edn., OUP, Oxford 2000), 445. 
86 ibid. 
87 Jeffery (n 75). 
88 Catherine Barnard, ‘Social Policy Revisited in the Light of the Constitutional Debate’, in Catherine 
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89 G De Burca, (2005) EU Law and the Welfare State: in search of solidarity (OUP, Oxford 2005); 
Monica Threlfall, ‘Social Integration in the European Union: Towards a Single Social Area? (2002)’ in M 
Farrell, S Fella & M Newman (eds.) European Unity in Diversity - Challenges for the Twenty-first 
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policy.90 The Rome Treaty did not provide the necessary base of competence91 
upon which social policy could be legislated. This Treaty defect hampered 
legislation on employment matters.  
The second obstacle pertained to the composition of the EU. By the time the EU 
was finally ready to introduce measures on employee protection the union had 
already undergone its first phase of enlargement resulting in the Union being 
comprised of countries with two legal traditions or families: common law and civil 
law countries.92 Legal theory posits that countries with different legal origins or 
traditions use different institutional mechanisms for social control of business.93 
Common law countries rely more on markets and contracts whereas their civil law 
counterparts tend to rely on regulation (government intervention).   
The third problem is directly linked to the second. The two legal families are 
ideologically divided. Thus, there was always a tension between the 
interventionists and the non-interventionists stances of the civil and common law 
countries regarding the involvement of the EU in the employment matters of the 
Member States. Opinions were often divided amongst the Member States also 
over the desirability of new forms of labour-market regulations and the means 
that will be acceptable to all parties for accomplishing them. Some Member States 
(notably the United Kingdom), 94  vigorously resisted any attempts to transfer 
policy making powers in social policy and particularly, in employment law 
                                                          
90 Sebastian Krebber, ‘Status and Potential of the Regulation of Labour and Employment Law at the 
European Level,’ (2009) 30 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 875, 879.  
91 It must be mentioned that Article 117 of the Rome Treaty recognised the need to promote 
improved working condition and living standards for workers so as to make their harmonisation 
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chapter to be relegated to a Protocol on Social Policy. See John T Addison, ‘In the Beginning, There 
was Social Policy: Developments in Social Policy in the European Union from 1972 through 2008’ 
(2009) The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis <http://www.rcfea.org/pr2009/pr01_09.pdf>  
accessed 28 March 2011. 
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domain to the EU.95 Employment matters were perceived then (and continue to be 
so perceived now), as the exclusive preserve of the Member States96 therefore 
control of such ‘a politically sensitive area public policy’ should not be 
surrendered. 97  Moreover, the resistance against granting open-ended 
employment legislation making powers to the EU was also a way of the member 
countries protecting their sovereignties.98  
The fourth obstacle was the applicable voting rule in the social policy domain. 
Proposals on social policy issues could not easily be passed in the Council of the 
European Union because of the unanimity voting system. When unanimity was 
required for a particular legislation, it was always difficult to press ahead with 
proposals on employment matters since any one state could veto any of them. The 
implication of the unanimity rule for employment legislation was that where a 
consensus could not be reached by all the Member States on the issue proposed 
pre-voting, it was doomed to fail. The Treaty of European Union (TEU) extended 
the qualified majority voting (QMV) system to employment legislation.99 Although 
QMV gives countries with demographic advantage the power to sway decisions, it 
ensures that no majority is gained on employment matters without the support of 
at least a proportion of smaller Member States.  
The EU has also developed new flexible techniques and approaches in the 
employment field. The difficulty experienced in securing agreements on 
employment policies has led to the experimentation of more flexible approaches 
such as the open method of coordination (OMC)100 and subsidiarity101 to push 
                                                          
95 See also Martin Rhodes, ‘Employment Policy: Between Efficacy and Experimentation’ in Helen 
Wallace, Mark Pollack and Alistair Young (eds) ‘Policy-Making in the European Union’ (5th edn., OUP, 
Oxford 2005), 279; Jeff Kenner, EU Employment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond’ (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2003) 12. 
96 There is evidence in the Treaty of Rome to support this assertion. Only 12 out of the 248 Articles 
(Articles 117-128) of the Rome Treaty had a social dimension. Moreover, the list of matters relating to 
the social sphere in Article 118, and the limited role given to the European Commission in Title III, Part 
Three of the Rome Treaty is indicative of the fact that, save for very few matters, social policy domain 
was originally considered to be ultra vires the competence/scope of EU institutions. See Andrew 
Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the single market act: National interests and Conventional Statecraft in the 
European Community’ (1991) 45 (1) International Organization 19-56. See further G Majone, ‘Europes 
“Democratic Deficit”: The Question of Standard’ (1998) 4 (10 European Law Journal, 5, 13. 
97 Majone  (n 96). 
98 Moravcsik (n 96) 19-56. 
99 See the Agreement set out in Protocol No 14, which was annexed to the TEU. 
100 The OMC has been described as a ‘soft’ law approach to EU social policy as opposed to the ‘hard’ 
law approach of Council Directives as a means of delivering social policy agendas. See Nick Adnett & 
Stephen Hardy, The European Social Model – Modernisation or Evolution (Edward Edgar, Cheltenham 
UK 2005) 15. ‘Soft law’ may be defined as non-legally enforceable instruments that can assist in the 
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through employment policies. In other words, in relation to employment 
legislation, there is a shift at the European level from ‘hard law’ to ‘soft law’. This 
is intended to yield, what has been termed ‘flexicurity,’ 102  in employment 
relations.  Therefore there is now less likelihood of states having to adopt policies 
against their will. 
3.10 Responding to challenges in the social policy 
arena 
It has been noted in the preceding sections that when the EU was set up in 1957, 
there was little or no ‘social Europe’ worthy of discussion.103 The six founding 
Member States already had in place some fairly sophisticated labour law and 
social security systems, and were content with their respective and extant welfare 
state models. However, as a reaction to concerns on social issues in Member 
States in general, a summit of the Member States’ Heads of Government was held 
in Paris in 1972. The purpose of the summit was to find ways of addressing issues 
of social dimensions. The Paris summit was unanimous in urging the EU to take 
positive steps in addressing social policy issues. The Paris summit was 
instrumental to the eventual adoption of the Council Resolution on the Social 
Action Programme (SAP) discussed below.104  
                                                                                                                                                                      
construction and application of EU law. They may be referred to by the ECJ when construing or 
applying EU law. Examples of ‘soft law’ are recommendations and opinions. See F Snyder, ‘The 
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Process, Tools and Techniques’. (1999) 56 
(19) MLR 32; B Eberlein & D Kerwer, ‘New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical 
Perspective’ (2004) 42 (1) JCMS 121-124 
<http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/eberleinKerwer.pdf> accessed 12 December 2011. 
101 Simon Deakin, ‘Reflective Governance and European Company Law’ (2007) CBR Univ. of Cambridge 
Working Paper (No. 346) <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp346.pdf< accessed 2 July 2012. 
102 Flexicurity is an integrated method for combining simultaneously flexibility and security in the 
labour market. It is a strategy that endeavors to reconcile labour market flexibility with employment 
security. That is, it attempts to marry the employers’ need for a flexible workforce with workers' need 
for job security. See e.g.  Tom Wilthagen, ‘Flexicurity: A New Paradigm for Labour Market Policy 
Reform? (1998) Social Science Research Center Berlin Discussion Paper No. FS I 98-202 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133924> accessed 21 April 2010. See also S Sciarra, ‘Is Flexicurity a 
European Policy?’ (2008) URGE Workin Paper 4/2008 
<http://www.urge.it/files/papers/2_wpurge4_2008.pdf> accessed 12 January 2012. 
103  Barnard (n 92) 109;  Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland, ‘Reviving the “Social Europe” Myth – 
from Ring of Gyges to European Prometheus’ (2012) 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/europeaninstitute/comment_analysis/commentary/socialeurope> accessed 
25 May 2012 
104 1974 (OJ/74/C/13/1.  
149 
 
3.10.1 The social action programme 
The failure of the market to go in the predicted direction of ‘spontaneous 
harmonisation’ and accelerate the raising of the standard of living in the EU105 
provided the impetus for legislation in the social field.106 Legislative activity on 
the social policy front started in earnest in 1974 following the Council of Ministers 
resolution on the SAP.107 The SAP was the precursor to EU social policy. It marked 
the gradual shift in focus from an ‘economic’ Europe to a ‘social Europe.’ 
It is pertinent to note however that the SAP was not, in itself, legislation. Rather, it 
was a set of proposals or declaration of general principles which provided the 
foundation for social policy legislation at the EU level.108 It involved more than 30 
measures that were to be executed over a period of three to four years. Each of 
these measures was to be accomplished subsequently, through the employment 
of appropriate EU legislative channels or procedures.109  The SAP had three main 
objectives. These could be summarised as: the attainment of full and better 
employment in the EU, the improvement of living and working conditions for all 
EU workers, and fostering of the involvement of management and labour in the 
economic and social decisions in businesses with the EU.110 
The resolution by the European Council for the EU to adopt social policy 
legislation was a major policy shift considering the Union’s original pursuit of 
purely economic goals via market integration. 111  The Council’s resolution 
represented, up to that point, the most comprehensive attempt by any of the 
European institutions to identify its task in the area of social policy.112 The sudden 
change in policy direction not only represented, one may argue, an unequivocal 
indication that the governments of the Member States saw intervention by the EU 
in social policy issues as necessary, but it showed also their realisation that social 
policy ought to have been, and in fact should continue to be, an integral part of 
                                                          
105 The ‘Spaak Report’ noted ‘the spontaneous tendency to harmonisation of social systems and of the 
level of wages […] will be favoured by the progressive creation of a common market’. See discussion 
this above in the section entitled ‘arguments contra social policy.’  
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the overall European integration project which should never have been 
overlooked in the first place. 113  Perhaps it was also a tacit rejection of the 
founding fathers’ philosophy regarding social policy even though the change 
itself was couched in terms of pursuit of closer economic and monetary co-
operation by Michael Shanks, who was the Director-General for Social Affairs at 
that time. 
If the EU’s change in attitude regarding social policy legislation was surprising, 
the modus operandi it adopted for achieving it left many in utter consternation. In 
expressing its ‘political will’ 114 to legislate in the social policy arena, the EU 
resorted to the ‘general “gap-filling’’ provisions of the Treaty’ 115 in Articles 100 
and 235 (now 115 and 296 TFEU) of the Treaty of Rome. The consternation in using 
either of these Articles as bases for social policy was that, neither of them had any 
specific link to social policy per se.116 Article 100 Treaty of Rome empowered the 
EU to legislate against distortion of competition. Under Article 100, the Council of 
Ministers can, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission:  
Issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the Common Market. 
On its part, Article 235 merely established a reserve competence for the EU to 
rely on where specific powers granted it did not suffice or where the Treaty had 
not provided the necessary powers for the realisation of any of the EU’s 
objectives. This Article also required unanimity. The implication of the unanimity 
requirement for EU measures was that even a disagreement by one member 
country would block the decision. The problem with the unanimous voting 
requirement was that it could produce an inconclusive end to a decision with the 
consequence that progress on EU measures such as legislation on labour and 
employment matters was very slow. The situation was not helped either by the UK 
led opposition which questioned the EU’s competence to enact legislation on 
employment matters.117  
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If both of these Articles were not the correct legal bases for EU measures and both 
required unanimous voting for legislation to succeed, this then begs the question 
how was the legal problem of using Article 100 navigated by the Council?  As 
Davies articulates, the political consensus over the need for a Social Action 
Programme in the seventies made the requirement of unanimity 
inconsequential.118 In this period, Member States had no choice but to co-operate 
in the social field. They could no longer afford to be indifferent to the shift from an 
‘economic Europe’ to a ‘social Europe’ that was taking place. Thus, they 
unanimously approved actions aimed at combating the adverse effects of the 
Common Market on employment and industrial relations.  
Despite the above shortcomings, the resolution to adopt legislation on social 
policy represented the most comprehensive attempt by any of the European 
institutions to identify its task in the area of social policy.119 The conclusion that 
may be drawn here is that even though prior to 1974 the Council had no base of 
competence, it was determined to adopt measures in social policy sphere.120 This 
was due, perhaps, to how important it perceived this to be to the functioning of 
the Common Market in particular and to the protection of the rights of European 
workers generally. The SAP clearly demonstrates the increased commitment of 
the EU to social integration in that the programme contained wide-ranging social 
protection measures (see the objectives of the 1974 SAP listed above). 
3.10.2 EU social policy: from resolution to substantive law 
As noted above, the 1974 SAP proposed a mandate for more proactive measures 
to be taken in the social policy field. That proposal led to the adoption by the EU 
of a range of labour law measures.  In 1975, the equal pay Directive 121 was 
adopted. The Equal Pay Directive (EPD) sought to ensure that all workers 
received equal pay for the same work, or work to which equal value is attributed. 
It also sought to eradicate remuneration discrimination on grounds of gender.122 
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The EPD was followed in 1976 by the Equal Treatment Directive.123 This was 
aimed at putting into effect the principle of equal treatment for men and women in 
all working relationships including access to employment, promotion and 
dismissal irrespective of whether the person was home or migrant worker.124  
Three further directives, targeted at employment protection and working 
conditions of the employees in businesses seeking to restructure,125 were also 
adopted as a result of the 1974 SAP mandate. These directives which were 
milestones in European social policy are the Redundancy Directive, 126  the 
insolvency Directive, 127 and the Acquired Rights Directive (ARD). 128 The ARD 
(which is the focus of this thesis in general and the subject of discussion in the 
next chapter), is aimed at protecting the employees’ rights when there is a going 
concern transfer of the business or undertaking they work for to a third party 
purchaser. The ARD is perceived as being the root of the difficulty faced by 
rescuers of insolvent businesses in the UK.129 
Perusals of the last three directives reveal one thing in common. They all require 
measures aimed at protecting the employees in different situations to be put in 
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place.130 Thus, these directives were meant to address, in different ways, the 
anticipated social consequences that were to accompany restructuring of 
enterprises in the Member States during, and especially in the years after the 
completion of the European economic integration.131 Granted, the institution of 
these measures may place some sort of burden on employers of labour, the 
function of these directives, as noted by one commentator,132 is not to impede or 
deter employers from restructuring their businesses. Rather, they are meant to 
provide the procedural framework for employers to follow when the need to 
restructure businesses arise even though they have sometimes indirectly 
obstructed business rescues.133 The expectation is that applying these directives 
to restructuring would facilitate the emergence of more competitive and efficient 
businesses in the Member States.134  
3.11 Conclusion 
The EU has been described as ‘a law intensive organisation.’135 However, the 
legislative output on social policy was very slow in comparison to economic 
related legislation during the developmental years of the EU. The core framework 
of the EU in its early construction phase was the creation of a Common Market. 
This entailed the gradual eradication of obstacles to trade, free movement rights 
for workers and the prevention of anti-competitive practices so as to attain 
eventually, full economic integration of Europe. Social policy played a very 
limited and subdued role in the ‘European construction’ process. It was mainly 
geared towards mobile workers and creating gender equality in pay and social 
rights. The peripheral role played by social policy reflected the political conflicts 
that existed between the different legal families that comprise the EU.136 These 
conflicts were a major limiting factor in the evolution of the social dimension of 
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Europe.137 However, the EU’s involvement in the social affairs of the Member 
States has grown since its inception in 1957.138 The Union has moved from being 
an economic community with a focus on the realisation of economic goals to 
taking a proactive role in tackling social problems in Europe. It has become an 
‘influential force in the shaping of social policy regulation within the Member 
States.’139 In the employment space, the EU has intervened in the labour markets 
of the Member States with a view to promoting greater job security for European 
workers.140 Among the employment problems the EU has had to grapple with in 
the member countries is the protection of the rights of the employees’ during 
business transfers. The Union has been responsible for the harmonisation of the 
national employment policies of the member countries regarding the protection 
given to the employees’ acquired rights in business transfers. This, it has done 
through the adoption of the ARD in 1977. With the ARD (discussed in chapter 4), 
certain employee rights have become statutorily defined in common law 
countries such as Britain, rather than being defined according to what the judges 
think they should be.  
The genesis of the EU’s employment protection legislation during transfers of 
insolvent businesses is traceable to the adoption of the ARD. It was through the 
mandatory implementation of the ARD in the UK, by the TUPE Regulations in 1981, 
that the EU became a key player in the protection given to the employees 
impacted by transfers of undertakings in the UK. Thus, from a ‘purely’ economic 
beginning, the EU’s role in the social policy arena has grown making it, from a 
global perspective, a ‘model of social protection’141 for workers particularly in 
transfer situations involving insolvent businesses in Member States. 
The next chapter will consider the ARD in detail. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will set in context the legal regime of the European law-derived 
Acquired Rights Directive1 (ARD) which is the precursor of the regime governing 
business transfers in the UK as outlined in chapter 3. The ARD represents one of 
the many legislative responses by the EU to social issues affecting EU workers.2 It 
was enacted in anticipation of the challenges that European economic integration 
was expected to pose to workers’ job security in the Member States.3  
After the discrete markets of the EU Member States were ‘amalgamated’ into a 
Common Market,4 there were concerns that incidences of business restructuring 
would be on the increase in Member States of the EU.5  The main fear was that, if 
business restructuring occurred on the scale that was anticipated, differences in 
the employment laws of the Member States in relation to the protection afforded 
to employees in business reorganisations resulting in a change in the ownership 
of businesses in those states would have a direct effect on the functioning of the 
Common Market. The EU moved to ‘nip in the bud’ any potential threats to the 
smooth functioning of the Common Market by approximating the discrete 
employment laws of the Member States in this area. It follows that though the 
ARD’s aim is to protect the rights of employees in business transfer situations its 
                                                          
1 Council Directive 77/187/EEC  as amended by Council Directive 2001/23/EC. 
2 There are other responses to other social issues such as the Equal Treatment (social security) 
Directive (79/7/EEC); the Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EEC); Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies and the 
insolvency Directive (Council Directive 80/987 as amended by Council Directive 2002/74), which 
requires Member States to establish ‘guarantee institutions’ to cater for outstanding and unsatisfied 
employees’ claims when their employer becomes insolvent. 
3 There were other measures designed to protect the rights of employees in businesses generally 
which have been discussed under the section: ‘From Council Resolution to Directives’ in chapter 3 of 
this thesis. 
4 The term ‘Common Market’ is used here to refer to a Custom Union featuring provisions to achieve 
the free movement of persons, services, and capital through economic integration. See Catherine 
Barnard, The substantive law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (3rd edn., OUP, Oxford 2010) 8-9. 
5 Jo Hunt, ‘Success at Last? The Amendment of the Acquired Rights Directive’ (1999) European Law 
Review 215-230. 
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adoption was for the economic benefit of the EU as a whole in the first instance.6 
The point here is that it was the desire to protect the economic gains of the 
Common Market, by avoiding distortions to competition that led to the law which 
protects employees’ rights when business transfers take place: the ARD. The ARD 
was intended to help create a level playing field for fair competition between 
firms in Member States through legislative harmonisation. 
The ARD fulfils the very important role of protecting employees in the event of a 
change of employer following a transfer of undertaking. It also specifies the rights 
and obligations of employers affected by the transfer. However, its application to 
insolvent business transfers is deemed problematic. For example, whilst the 
ARD’s default rule on compulsory transfers of employment contracts following a 
business transfer may be good for the employees in terms of job security; this on 
the other hand may impinge on going concern rescues of insolvent businesses 
with dire consequences for employees. 7  The ARD, as implemented by TUPE in 
the UK, may be regarded as the genesis of the existing tension between the 
rescue of insolvent businesses and employment protection in corporate 
insolvency. 
This purpose of this chapter is to analyse the ARD and its implications for EU 
employees. In order to fully appreciate the difference made to the employment 
                                                          
6  Paul Davies, ‘The Emergence of European Labour Law’ (1992) in W McCarthy (edn) Legal 
Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1992) 331-332. In 
explaining the necessity for its introduction, the preamble to the 1977 ARD stated that:  
Economic trends are bringing in their wake, at both national and Community level, 
changes in the structure of undertakings, through transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses to other employers as a result of legal transfers or 
mergers.   
It is necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a change of 
employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded. 
Differences still remain in the Member States as regards the extent of the 
protection of employees in this respect and these differences should be reduced.  
These differences can have a direct effect on the functioning of the common market 
it is therefore necessary to promote the approximation of laws in this field.  
7 The ARD tends to vest employees with rights akin to property rights in undertakings given that their 
‘existing or acquired rights arising from employment automatically bind third parties...such as the 
purchaser of the undertaking.’ See John Armour & Simond Deakin, ‘Insolvency, Employment 
Protection and Corporate Restructuring: The Effects of TUPE’ (2001) ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No 204 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp204.pdf> accessed 09 January 2011. This may not augur well for 
the rescue of insolvent businesses as prospective buyers could be deterred by potential liabilities.  
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relationship in the context of business transfer, it is intended to first put in 
perspective what the legal position of EU workers was before the adoption of the 
ARD in 1977 and how the ARD has changed that position. Thereafter, the reasons 
why the ARD was adopted will be explored. The chapter will then move on to 
discuss the objectives of the regime, its scope and the modus operandi adopted 
by the regime towards achieving those objectives.   
The application of the ARD in the context of insolvency will be considered. The 
aim is to ascertain whether ultimately, the change effected by the regime is 
beneficial to the employees or whether, as contended, ‘a measure ostensibly 
designed to improve security of employment’ has achieved ‘precisely the 
opposite effect.’8 It is intended also to consider the possible range of effects of the 
ARD regime on the UK’s national employment law space and especially its effect 
on the rescues of insolvent businesses.  
4.2 EU workers before the adoption of the acquired 
rights directive 
Prior to the adoption of the ARD in 1977, European Member States’ laws on 
transfers of insolvent undertakings was divided, as were the protections offered to 
affected employees in EU Member States. 9  There were different approaches 
taken by EU Member States regarding the determination of the ‘fate’ of 
employees when the business employing them became insolvent and was 
transferred to a third party purchaser on a going concern basis. The treatment of 
employees’ concerns varied according to the jurisdiction where the business or 
undertaking transferred was located.10   This was because each Member State had 
its own unique way of protecting the rights of employees in transfer situations. 
The EU is made up of both civil and common law (essentially the UK and Ireland) 
countries. These countries have very different legal traditions on employment 
matters. In relation to transfer of undertakings, whilst some member countries 
already had laws similar in effects to those canvassed by the ARD, others did not. 
For example, in a civil law country such as France, from as far back as 1928, there 
                                                          
8  H Collins, ‘Dismissals on Transfer of a Business’ (1986) 15 ILJ, 244, 255. 
9 Marlene Frank, `The Rights of Employees in the Event of the Employer’s Insolvency: A Comparative 
Approach to the Rights of Employees during Restructuring in the United States and Europe’ (2005) 1 
New Zealand Postgraduate Law E-Journal 7. 
10 ibid. 
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have been laws requiring the mandatory transfer of employment contracts from 
the seller to the buyer whenever there was a transfer of an undertaking on a going 
concern basis.11  The justifications for having this type of law are that continuity of 
employment facilitates the transfer of skills that will be deployed to the usage of 
the assets of the undertaking transferred12 and that the transfer of employees’ 
contracts of employment ensures that workers are retained in employment, as 
against dismissing and putting them back on the job market. From this 
perspective, continuity of employment achieves both social as well as economic 
objectives.  
In common law countries, employment relationships are mostly contract based.13 
In Britain, for example, before the advent of legislation on the protection of the 
rights of workers during transfer of undertakings, the traditional view was that the 
employment relationship was a personal one based on personal agreement 
between the employer and the employee. The personal nature of the relationship 
is attributed to the provision of personal service by the employee to his 
employer.14 The notion of personal service, as an essential element of a contract 
of employment, significantly influenced the views of common law countries’ 
judges on change in employer when there was a business transfer. The transfer of 
a business from one employer to another was determinative of the employment 
relationship between the employee and the employer. 15  The practice of 
terminating all employment contracts upon the occurrence of a business transfer 
                                                          
11  See Code du Travail Article L122-12 of 1928 (currently codified in Articles 1224-1 and 1224-2 of the 
French Labour Code of June 28, 1983. It is important to note however that in France, the law does not 
expressly use the words ‘business transfer’. It refers to the modification of the ‘legal situation’ of the 
employer. French case-law has, however, identified this type of modification by reference to the 
business transfer. See further Lovells, ‘Business Transfer Across Europe’ (2010) 
<http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/fd44d5e5-bc19-42b2-a40d-
7f33e91db78f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/639d7e9c-4959-4d0f-8505-
808388a6bf00/CN_Business_Transfers_Across_Europe_June_2010.pdf > accessed 20 March 2012. 
12  Robert Upex and Michael Ryley, TUPE: Law and Practice (Jordan Publishing Limited, 2006) 4. 
13 S Deakin & W Njoya, ‘The Legal Framework of Employment Relations’ (2007) Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 349 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP349.pdf> accessed 29 April 2012. Professor Janet Dine has 
described contract as an instrument of capitalism. J Dine, ‘Post-Concession Company Models in 
Potential European Company Law’ (2010)  paper presented at the ‘Directors' Duties and Shareholder 
Litigation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ conference (University of Leeds Centre for Business Law 
and Practice, September 20, 2010) 
<http://www.law.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/events/directors-duties/dine-post-concession-
company-models.pdf> accessed 12 March 2012. 
 14 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, [1968] 2 QB 497; 
Express & Echo Publications v Tanton [1999] ICR 409. 
15  Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014. See further discussion on this in 
chapter 5 
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rather than having them transfer automatically to the transferee was justified on 
the principle that contracts of employment are personal contracts and so cannot 
be transferred without the consent of the employee.16 
What is evident in the above analysis is that in a situation where there was a going 
concern transfer of an insolvent business in two EU Member States, employees in 
country ‘A’ (France in our example) would have the advantage of continuity of 
employment by virtue of the existing French law which made it possible for 
contracts of employment to transfer automatically upon a transfer from the 
transferor to the transferee. On the other hand, employees in country ‘B’ (Britain 
in our example) would be dismissed in a similar situation, due to the operation of 
a different legal (common law) rule on transfer which did not support automatic 
transfer of employment contracts following a business transfer. However, since 
1977 the dichotomy between continuity and termination of the employees’ 
contracts of employment when there is a change in the ownership of a business 
that employs them following a business transfer has been eliminated. EU workers 
currently enjoy automatic transfers of employment contracts alongside other 
‘parallel’ protections in business transfers in the Member States. This is due 
mainly to the harmonisation of the discrete employment laws of the Member 
States on transfer of undertakings made possible by the adoption of the first 
generation ARD in that year.   
The ARD may have enhanced the rights of the employees in transfers, but it also 
had some effects on businesses in the Member States as discussed at section 4.7 
below. Also, its adoption is said to have signaled the gradual but continuous 
involvement of the EU in the social affairs of the Member States.17  The ARD is, 
arguably, the genesis of the existing tension between employee protection and 
business rescue in UK corporate insolvency setting. In tipping the balance in 
favour of the employees in transfers, and given that the automatic transfer 
                                                          
16  A classic example of the application of rule is found in the House of Lords’ decision in Nokes v 
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940]  AC 1014, where Lord Atkins stated:  
My Lords, I confess it appears to be astonishing that apart from 
overriding questions of public welfare, power should be given to a 
court or to anyone else to transfer a man without his knowledge 
and possibly against his will from the service of one person to the 
service of another. 
17 Andrew L DaSilver, ‘Directive 77/187: The EEC’s Attempt to Protect Employees upon the Sale or 
Transfer of Businesses’ (1998)  11 B. C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 147. See also Dubois, ‘European Social 
Law’, in M Ellis & P Storm (eds) Business Law In Europe: Legal, Tax and Labour Aspects of Business 
Operations in the Ten European Community Countries and Switzerland (Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publishers, The Netherlands, 1982) 59. 
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principle applies to both solvent and insolvent transfers, there is inevitably a 
tension between employment protection (championed by the ARD) and the 
rescue culture (championed by UK insolvency law) in the UK. This is basically a 
conflict between the employment rights of the employees and the rescue of 
insolvent but viable businesses in the UK.18  
In relation to insolvent businesses, the regime is perceived as having adverse 
effects on the going concern rescues of those businesses. This is because with the 
intervention of the ARD, not only do workers who are employed in a UK business 
(immediately before the transfer19) transfer or move across to the transferee, they 
do so on the same terms and conditions of employment they enjoyed with the 
previous employer. Viewed from a social lens, the ARD can easily be justified on 
grounds of offering a measure of social protection of the type canvassed by 
Traditionalists 20  for workers during transfers of insolvent businesses or 
undertakings when their jobs are most likely to be at risk.21 However, from a 
purely business standpoint, and especially from the perspective of the rescue and 
continuity of insolvent businesses, this European law engendered practice could 
cause more harm than good, even for the employees themselves.22 There is the 
view that legislation such as the ARD which aims to provide a measure of job 
security increases costs to transferees.23 A law such as the ARD operates as a 
disincentive to prospective buyers of insolvent undertakings. It restricts their 
entry into the market potentially resulting ultimately in job losses for the 
                                                          
18 Richard Parr & Nicola Bennett, ‘The Rescue Culture Versus Collective Employment Rights’ (2005) 18 
(10) Insolvency Intelligence 156-157. 
19 The meaning given to this phrase by the courts is discussed in chapter 6. 
20 See generally Elizabeth Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 775; Donald G 
Korobkin, ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5; Karen Gross, Failure 
and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (YUP, New Haven 1997); Gross, ‘Taking 
Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1031; L M LoPucki, 
‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review (3) 741, 
769. 
21 M A Rothstein et al, Employment Law (West, St. Paul, 1994) 589; Janis Sarra, ‘Widening the 
Insolvency Lens: The Treatment of Employee Claims’ in Paul J Omar (ed.) International Insolvency Law: 
Themes and Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire 2008); M Gronow, ‘Insolvent corporate 
groups and their employees: The case for further reform’ (2004) Legal Studies Research Paper No.130, 
Melbourne Law School <http://ssrn.com/abstract=81424> accessed 27 January 2011.  
22  Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Insolvency and One “Unholy 
Mess”’ (2000) 3 CFILR 249-271; John Armour & Simon Deakin, ‘Insolvency, Employment Protection 
and Corporate Restructuring: The Effects of TUPE’ (2001) ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge Working Paper No 204 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp204.pdf> 
accessed 09 January 2011. 
23 Adrian Walters, ‘The Impact of Employee Liabilities on the Administrator’s Decision to Continue 
Trading’ (2005) 26 (11) Company Lawyer 321. 
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employees if the cost of the transfer deters the purchase.24 It follows that it is 
absolutely important to balance the statutory protection of the employees of an 
insolvent business against the ‘statutory pursuit of the rescue culture’.25 In the 
next section, the introduction of the ARD will be considered. 
4.3 The Acquired Rights Directive  
In 1977 the Council of the European Community (EC) unanimously adopted 
Council Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses.26 Because the Acquired Rights 
Directive (ARD) contemplated a situation where differences in the level of 
employee protection would remain across the Member States, it was not intended 
to establish a uniform regime on employee protection. Rather, the ARD sets a 
floor, not a ceiling, and permits Member States to confer greater protection on 
employees as they see fit.27 The 1977 ARD was first amended in 1998 by Council 
Directive 98/50/EC, and then in 2001 by Council Directive 2001/23/EC.28 The 
2001 ARD codifies both the 1977 and 1988 legislation on business transfer.  
It will be argued in this thesis that it was the need to balance employee protection 
with rescues of insolvent businesses that provided the impetus for revising the 
ARD. 29 There was a perception that the application of the regime to transfers in 
the context of insolvency impacted negatively on the rescues 30  of insolvent 
businesses in the Member States.31 As discussed in this thesis, the ARD has been 
                                                          
24  Wanjiru Njoya, ‘The Interface between Redundancy and TUPE Transfers’ (2003) 32 (2) ILJ 123, 127. 
25 Walters (n 23). 
26  Hereafter the Acquired Rights Directive or ARD for convenience. 
27  See Article 8, ARD 2001. This article states: ‘This Directive shall not affect the right of Member 
States to apply or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable 
to employees or to promote or permit collective agreements or agreements between social partners 
more favourable to employees’. 
28  The 2001 ARD is the current European law on transfer of undertakings. Thus, reference to the ARD 
in this chapter is reference to the 2001 law except where reference to the 1977 directive is specifically 
made to that regime. 
29 Regarding the changes that have been made to aid business rescues, see chapter 7 of thesis. 
30 For a discussion on the problems the ARD posed rescues, see the section on ‘Perceived problems 
with the Original ARD’ below. 
31 Recital 7 of the 2001 ARD states that the amendment made to the original regime was ‘...in the light 
of the impact of the [ARD on the] internal market, the legislative tendencies of the Member States 
with regard to the rescue of undertakings in economic difficulties... ‘See also Oliver Brettle, ‘The EU 
Acquired Rights Directive and its Impact on Business Transfers’ (2008) 37 Benefits and Compensation 
International 4-7. 
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the principal source of the existing tension between the business rescue and 
employee protection policies of the UK regarding the transfer of insolvent 
undertakings. 
4.4 Why the ARD was adopted: facts and conjectures 
There are conflicting views on the main motivation for the adoption of the ARD. 
One view opines that it was purely economic and Common Market protection 
motivated. The other view, which is supported by the preamble to the 2001 
ARD32, posits a social and employee protection-motivated reason for its adoption. 
However, the legislative history of the ARD seems to reveal that there were both 
social and economic reasons that underpinned the Council of Ministers’ decision 
to adopt the first ARD in 1977. These reasons are considered briefly below. 
4.4.1 To protect the common market 
There is the notion that the adoption of the ARD was motivated by a desire to 
protect the Common Market.33 There were concerns that if economic trends in 
Europe were to bring changes in the structure of undertakings through transfers 
of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses to other employers as a result 
of legal transfers or mergers of the scale and frequency that was anticipated, it 
would lead to large scale redundancies and unemployment34 that could have a 
direct effect on the functioning of the Common Market. This fear was borne out of 
the differences that existed in the protection given to employees in the Member 
States in transfer situations. It was feared that these differences could push labour 
standards to low levels and distort competition between firms in the Common 
Market.35  
 
                                                          
32 According to its preamble, the ARD was adopted to ‘provide for the protection of employees in the 
event of a change of employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded’. 
33 Michael Shanks, ‘The Social Policy of the European Communities’ (1977) 14 CMLR 373; Davies (n 6). 
See also P Watson, ‘Social Policy after Maastricht’ (1993) Common Market Law Review 30, 481-513. 
34 Peter Hoeller and Marie-Odile Louppe, ‘The EC’s Internal Market: Implementation and Economic 
Effects’ (1994) 23 OECD Economic Studies 55. 
35 S Hardy and N Adnett `Entrepreneurial Freedom versus Employee Rights’: the Acquired Rights 
Directive and EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam (1999) 9 Journal of European Social Policy 130.  
163 
 
To avoid that happening, the EU thought it necessary to harmonise the discrete 
employment laws of the Member States.36 This has provided the basis for the 
argument that the main reason for the adoption of the ARD was to protect the 
functioning of the Common Market. The contention is that employee protection as 
a social goal was subordinate to the economic objective of preventing distortion 
to the functioning of the Common Market in the adoption of the ARD.37  
There are a couple of reasons that could support the veracity of the above view. 
First, the directives adopted in the period 1975-1986, that is, the period between 
the adoption of the Social Action Programme (SAP)38 and the Single European Act 
(SEA), were, as articulated, mainly measures directed at ‘limiting the social 
impacts of the economic crisis and of the industrial transformations that took place 
in Europe’.39 Second, as far as the EC Treaties were concerned, a common market 
presupposed an undistorted competition.  Besides, Article 100 of the Rome Treaty 
which provided the legal basis for the ARD required any measures proposed to 
be justified on the basis of removing obstacles which could directly affect the 
establishment or functioning of the Common Market. Therefore, the ARD, like any 
other social policy measures enacted on the basis of that article was expected to 
genuinely have as its object the improvement of conditions for ‘the establishment 
and functioning of the Common Market.’40 This requirement, it has been argued, 
was intended to strengthen ‘the economic basis for social measures and to 
prevent the express articulation of social policy as an end in itself.’41  
                                                          
36 The preamble to the 1977 ARD gives credence to this view. It states, inter alia that ‘these 
differences can have a direct effect on the functioning of the common market... Whereas it is 
therefore necessary to promote the approximation of laws in this field while maintaining the 
improvement described in Article 117 of the [Rome] Treaty. Article 117 concerns the agreement by 
the Member States on ‘the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard 
of living for workers’. 
37 B  Bercusson, European Labour Law (Butterworth, London 1996) 234. 
38  See full discussion on this in chapter 3.  
39 J Kenner, EU Employment Law: From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2003);  Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Balance Between Economic and Social Objectives in the European 
Treaties’ (2006) 5 Revue française des affaires socials <http://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-des-
affaires-sociales-2006-5-page-119.htm> accessed 30 April 2012.  
40 On this see Article 115 TFEU (ex  Art 95 EC/ ex Art. 100 1957 Rome Treaty). The Lisbon Treaty also 
defines the Internal Market as an area without distortions of competition under Protocol No. 27 (On 
the Internal Market and Competition). 
41 Davies (n 6) 329. 
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4.4.2 To protect employees during business transfers 
To claim that the ARD was adopted primarily to ensure an undistorted Common 
Market would be both erroneous and fallacious given that the ARD regime itself is 
all about the safeguarding of the rights of the employees during a business 
transfer resulting in a change in employer.42 The European economic integration 
process discussed in chapter 3 was expected to trigger a lot of business 
restructuring activities in the EU.43 The absence, both at the national and EU 
levels, of any legislation offering a robust protection for the rights of employees in 
business transfer situations was disturbing to the European Commission.44   
The closest to a prospect of statutory protection that workers affected by a 
business transfer had in the pre-ARD era was in the form of the Draft Third 
Mergers Directive (DTMC) 45  and the Draft International Mergers Convention 
(DIMC) respectively. These two regimes, however, had several limitations vis-à-
vis employee protection.  
Both incidentally touched upon the position of the workers. They lacked express 
provisions on protection of the workers’ rights. Both focused solely on asset 
mergers where the assets and liabilities of the acquired company were 
transferred to the purchasing company and the company acquired was then 
dissolved without liquidation. This type of ‘asset merger’ whilst banal in the 
original six founding members of the then EEC, is found in only in a small 
proportion in the UK46 and so the draft directives would have done little to bolster 
the protection of UK employees.  
The draft directives were also confined to mergers occurring in either one, or two 
Member States, where the companies merging were located. These directives 
were further limited by the fact that they were, in comparison to the ARD (see 4.6 
                                                          
42  See preamble to the 1977 ARD. 
43  Bob  Hepple,  ‘Workers’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals’ (1976) 5 ILJ, 197, 198. 
44 See e.g. Mary Ann S Bartlett, ‘Employees’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers-EEC Proposals and the 
American Approach,’ (1976) 25 ICLQ  621. See also similar sentiments expressed by the Commission in 
the Proposal for a Council Directive, on the Harmonisation of the Legislation of Member States on the 
Retention of the Rights and Advantages of Employees- In the Case of Mergers, Takeovers and 
Amalgamations, May 31, 1974, J O C E., No.-G104/I, Sept. 13, 1974 (Preamble). 
45 This Directive which had as its purpose the regulating of mergers between public limited liability 
companies from the same Member State was later adopted as ‘Third Council Directive 78/855/EC of 9 
October 1978   based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited liability 
companies.  
46 Bob Hepple, ‘Community Measures for the Protection of Workers against Dismissal’ (1977)14 CMLR 
489, 493. 
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on modus operandi below), conceived as tools of company law applicable only to 
one form of economic organisation: the limited company. The implications were 
that where an economic entity other than a limited company was acquired and, in 
a mode other than a merger, the employees in those entities were not protected.  
The limited nature of the draft directives in relation to employee protection in 
business transfers and the social injustice caused by the application of different 
provisions to employees impacted, in comparative terms, by business transfers in 
the Member States called for a European-wide legislative solution. Thus, it was 
thought necessary to adopt special legal rules to cope with the social impact that 
business transfers within the EU were expected to bring.47 One way of realising 
this goal was to offer a legislative response that was capable, not just of mitigating 
the immediate challenges that business transfers were expected to have for the 
workers, but to offer a lasting solution in the form of harmonised rules that can be 
applied in the management or resolution of any collective discontents that might 
arise, during and after, a legal business transfer involving a change in ownership 
in the Member States.48 The consensus was to promote laws that would keep 
workers in their jobs over those that would put them back on the labour 
markets.49 This is the type of law championed by the ARD.50 Therefore, it was 
borne out of genuine concerns for employee protection during transfers of 
undertakings or businesses that the ARD was adopted in 1977.51  
Based on the above analyses, a conclusion may be reached that, although there 
was an underlying economic goal of protecting the Common Market, the reason 
for the adoption of the ARD in 1977, however, was primarily to safeguard the 
rights of employees in business transfers situations involving changes in 
                                                          
47 C Ohly, ‘What Have We Learned about the Economic Effect of EC Integration?’ (1993) 103 Economic 
Papers; J M Burniaux & J Waelbroeck, ‘Effects of Firm Closures on Employment: is the Single European 
Market a Real Shock of the Third Kind? (1993) mimeo. 
48 D Marsden, ‘The ‘’Social Dimension’’ as a Basis for the Single Market’, in J T Addison & W S Siebert 
(eds) Labour Markets in Europe: Issues of Harmonization and Regulation (London, Dryden Press 1997). 
49 Upex & Ryley (62); R Upex, R Benny & S Hardy, Labour Law (2nd edn., OUP, Oxford 2006) 4. This 
approach, it is submitted, may not have been unconnected to the civil law tradition of some of the 
Member States, especially, the French, which has had a law dating back to 1928, providing for transfer 
of employees’ contracts of employment/ continuity of employment when there is a transfer of an 
undertaking. 
50 Hardy & Adnett (n 32); Mark Jeffery, ‘European Union Developments: European Labour Laws 
Relating to Business Restructuring’ (2003) 24 Comp. Labour Law & Policy Journal 670.  
51 See explanatory statement of Council proposal for a Directive on the harmonisation of the Member 
States relating to redundancies. COM (72) Brussels November 8, 1972.  
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ownerships of the businesses or undertakings that employ them in Member 
States.52 
4.5 Legal base of the ARD  
It was noted in chapter 353 that social policy played second fiddle to policies 
aimed at the attainment of economic goals.54 However, attitude towards social 
policy legislation at the European level started to change from 1974 following the 
adoption of the resolution on the Social Action Programme (SAP) by the Council in 
that year.55 In spite of the obstacle posed to employment legislation by the defect 
in the Rome Treaty, the European Council was determined to make legislative 
progress in the employment law field.56 The non-provision of a sound legal base 
for employment legislation by the 1957 Rome Treaty was navigated by using one 
of the Treaty’s provisions in Article 100. This article empowered the EU to take 
action concerning the approximation of national provisions directly affecting the 
Common Market. 57  Article 100 therefore provided the EU with the legal base for 
the adoption of the ARD.58 
4.6 The ARD: modus operandi 
It was noted above (see the discussion of why the ARD was adopted at section 4.4 
above) that although there were within the EEC some measures that were put in 
place to protect employees, these measures were limited in scope and effect. 
                                                          
52 This view is buttressed by the 3rd recital of Council Directive 2001/23/EC. See also Sebastian Krebber 
‘Status and Potential of the Regulation of Labour and Employment Law at the European Level,’ (2009) 
30 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 875, 882. 
53 See the section on ‘The 1974 Social Action Programme’ in chapter 3. 
54 Sandra Fredman, ‘Europe With a Social Face: Equality and Social Rights in the European Union’ 
(2001) 22  ILJ 1467;  Jo Shaw, Jo Hunt & Chloe Wallace, Economic and Social Law of the European 
Union, (Palgrave McMillan, Hampshire, 2007), 394; A Sapir, ‘Regional Integration in Europe’ (1992) 
102, The Economic Journal. 
55 Hoeller and Marie-Odile Louppe, (n 34) 417. 
56 Manfred  Weiss, ‘Fundamental Social Rights for the European Union’ (1997) 18 ILJ 417, 418. 
57 It seems that in spite of there being no direct treaty base, that even Article 235 of the Rome Treaty 
(which concerned the right of the Council to take actions to achieve the objectives of the Community 
where the Treaty has made no provision for such) could have suffice for adoption of the ARD. It is 
important to note also that Council Directive 75/129 1975 O.J. (L. 48) 29 (EC), on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies was also based upon this Article. 
58 It is pertinent to note that the EU institutions empowered to propose social policy measures are 
usually given some degree of flexibility in relation to the mode of instrument to be used. However, 
some Treaty articles actually dictate the type of instrument to be used. Article 100 (now Art. 115 
TFEU) chose directive as the mode of instrument for approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to transfers of undertakings, businesses or part thereof.  
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They were restricted to a particular type of limited companies and were confined 
to either one or two Member States meaning that the protections they offered to 
the employees were also circumscribed. This then begs the questions: how 
different is the ARD from these previous measures? Has the ARD succeeded 
where these other measures failed? How effective is the ARD in terms of 
protecting the employees’ rights in transfers? 
Far from being conceived as a tool of company law applicable to one form of 
economic organisation only (i.e. the limited company as was the case with the 
earlier measures discussed above), the ARD embraces the concept of the 
enterprise or undertaking. This means that, unlike previous attempts that were 
made to protect employees, its application is not restricted to limited liability 
companies and mergers, and the ARD goes further than mergers. It applies to 
various kinds of transfers.59 These include transfers where individual businesses, 
places of production, subsidiary businesses, organised work units or 
undertakings are transferred from one legal person to another in a manner that 
enables the latter to replace the former in its capacity as the new employer.60 The 
implication is that the social protection that it offers to employees, rather than 
being limited to a particular form of business (limited company) and one type of 
transfer (merger), covers a wide spectrum of business transfers61 so long as the 
transfer in question triggers a change in the identity of the employer.62   
Another characteristic of the ARD that differentiates it from the previous measures 
is that, the ARD is an EU-wide regime on business transfer. Unlike the measures 
above, it is not confined to one or two Member States. This is evidenced by its 
territorial coverage. 63  
                                                          
59 W Green, Encyclopaedia of Employment Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) Vol. 1, 4A-102.  
60 Hepple,  (n 43), 205. 
61 See Article 1, ARD 1977. The Directive, however, specifically excludes transfers of sea-going vessels 
(Art. 1(3)) and transfer effected through majority share transfer ownership of a business. 
62 Dubois, ‘European Social Law’ in (M Ellis & P Storm eds.) Business Law in Europe: Legal, Tax and 
Labour Aspects of Business Operations in the Ten European Community Countries and Switzerland 
(Springer, 1982); A L DaSilver, ‘Directive 77/187: The EEC’s Attempt to Protect Employees upon the 
Sale or Transfer of Businesses’ (1998)  11 B. C. Int’l & Comp. L Rev. 147. 
63  According to Article 1 (2) the ARD applies ‘where and insofar as the undertaking, business or part of 
the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the [EC] Treaty’ 
or a member country of the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein).  It is 
worthy of note that though not all member states of the EEA are members of the EU, the EEA 
however, includes all Member States of the EU and the EFTA states which, after the accession of 
Sweden, Finland and Austria to membership of the EU in 1995, now include Norway, Iceland and 
168 
 
Based on the difference it has made to the status of EU workers in transfers as 
discussed at section 4.2 above, and its impacts on business transfers, 64  the 
effectiveness of the ARD vis-à-vis the protection of employees’ rights is not in 
doubt. The regime is concerned with the protection of substantive individual 
rights of the employees during a relevant business transfer.65  This, it has done, 
through three main layers of protection.  
The first layer of protection is the establishment of the right to continued 
employment for the employees.66 Upon the occurrence of a relevant transfer, the 
ARD operates to transfer all existing or acquired rights of the workers from the 
transferor to the transferee. Since it is national laws of the Member States and not 
the ARD that define what rights the employees have, 67 the inference is that 
whatever the substantive scope of those rights was prior to the transfer, they 
should be no less under the new employer.68 That is, the ‘employees should 
retain a nationally defined pre-transfer level of protection.69  The aim, ultimately, 
is to maintain the legal position in which employees impacted by a business 
transfer would have been, had the change in the ownership of the business not 
occurred.70 That way, the ARD mitigates the effects of the business transfer on the 
employees and bolsters protection of employees’ rights in all Member States. 
The second layer of protection is the granting to the employees of conditional 
guarantee against dismissal.71 The rule against dismissal extends to constructive 
dismissal. For example, if, by reason of the business transfer, the contract of 
employment is terminated because there is a substantial change in working 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Liechtenstein. See John McMullen, ‘International Outsourcing and Transnational Transfers of 
Undertakings-A UK Perspective’ (2005) 26 Company Lawyer (10) 296, 298. 
64 Brettle (n 31); Hepple (n 46); Bob Hepple & Angela Byre, ‘EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom - A 
New Approach’ (1989) 18 ILJ 129.   
65 Bob Hepple, ‘Community Measures for the Protection of Workers against Dismissal’ (1977) 14 CMLR 
489. 
66 ARD 2001, Art. 3 (1). 
67 See Case C-105/84 Mikkelsen v A/S Danmols Inventar [1986] CMLR 316 ECJ. See also Adams and 
others v Lancashire County Council and another [1997] IRLR 436, CA; Rask and Christensen v ISS 
Kantinenservice A/S [1993] I.R.L.R. 133, ECJ; Havering College of Further & Higher Education v Ralton 
[2001] IRLR 738, EAT. 
68 Paul Davies, ‘Acquired Rights, Creditors’ Rights, Freedom of Contracts and Industrial Democracy’ 
(1989) Yearbook of European Law 21. 
69 Bob Hepple, ‘Report for the Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General: 
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs - Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of 
Council Directive77/187/EC’.  (1990)  
70 C Bourn & P Thorpe, ‘Preservation, Variation and Harmonisation of Terms and Conditions’, in Bourn 
(ed) The Transfer of Undertakings in the Public Sector (Ashgate, London 1999) 161. 
71 ARD 2001 Art. 4. 
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conditions to the detriment of the employee, the employer is regarded as 
responsible for that termination. This protection is not, however, absolute. It is 
subject to certain exceptions. Member States may exclude from the rule 
employees who are not covered by national protection against dismissal. Also, 
the employer retains the right to dismiss the employee for ‘economic, technical or 
organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce’.72 This provision, it is 
submitted, is intended to provide employers with a legally sanctioned excuse 
with which to use and make changes to their corporate structures whenever the 
need arises. It is intended to allow a balance to be struck between employee 
protections on the one hand and the preservation of distressed businesses on the 
other. Thus, where an insolvent but economically viable business could be 
rescued by dismissing some staff, the rule against dismissal should not stand in 
the way of such rescue. 
The third approach used by the ARD to protect employees is the mandatory duty 
it imposes on the employers to inform and consult their representatives when a 
transfer of an undertaking is envisaged.73 The employees are to be furnished 
(technically through their representatives) with the date, or proposed date of the 
transfer, the reason for the transfer, the legal, economic and social implications of 
the transfer for the employees and of any measures envisaged in relation to the 
workers. This provision is aimed at ensuring that the employees’ interests are 
taken into account by relevant employers when they have made plans for 
restructuring businesses. 74  This duty fulfills, it is submitted, one of the key 
objectives of the 1994 SAP namely the involvement of workers and management 
in the life of businesses in Member States (discussed in chapter 3). 
The ARD is a public policy. It is not possible to derogate from its provisions with 
impunity.75 The protection it offers to the employees cannot, for example, be 
waived even with consent of the employee. Equally, the employer cannot, either 
                                                          
72 Art. 4 (1), ARD 2001. 
73 Art. 7 ARD 2001. 
74 In Akavan Erityisalojen Keskusliitto AEK ry v Fujitsu Siemens Computers Oy [2009] IRLR 944 the ECJ 
made it explicitly clear that an employer is required to commence the consultation procedure only 
when either a strategic or commercial decision forcing him or her to contemplate the restructuring of 
the business  had been taken, but not before.  
75 See e.g. Katsiskas- Joined Cases 132, 138 and 139/91 Katsikas, Skreb and Schroll [1992] ECR 1-6577. 
In the earlier case of Daddy’s Dance Hall Case 324/86 [1986] ECR 739, the ECJ stated at para.14 that 
the provisions of the Directive and in particular of Art. 3(10) are mandatory. 
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by agreement with the employee,76 or otherwise, postpone its effects once a 
business transfer has occurred. 77 An employee is, however entitled to refuse the 
transfer of his or her contract to the new employer as demonstrated by case law.78 
However, the legal effect of refusal to transfer is a matter for the national law each 
Member State to determine. In the UK, for example, refusal to transfer has the 
legal effect of termination of the employment contract. The employee will not be 
treated as having been dismissed and therefore would not be entitled to any 
redundancy payments or other compensations for the loss of his or her job. The 
exception to this rule is if refusal to transfer was as a result of a detrimental or 
negative change in the employee’s working condition. Where that is the case, the 
employee will be treated as dismissed as opposed to a resignation.79 
In sum, the need to offer robust protection for workers’ rights, involve them in the 
decision making of an insolvent business and especially the right to refuse to be 
transferred to the workforce of the transferee, may have been borne out of the 
global recognition that workers are no longer simply an economic factor to be 
considered in the cost of production.80  It is recognition that the employees have 
become a working partner in a triangle collectively made up of shareholders, 
workers and management. This triangle, as articulated by Bartlett, 81 ‘represents 
the enterprise,’- which traditionally protected the interests of shareholders and 
creditors, has now been embraced, given legislative recognition and, used by the 
ARD to protect the rights of workers in transfers. This approach, it is submitted, is 
consistent with the Traditionalists’ employee protection ambitions generally and 
especially, that of team production theory. For team production theory, all those 
who make valuable contribution to the business or enterprise in its solvent state 
                                                          
76 See Joined Cases 144 and 145/87 Berg. 
77 Article 3 (1) ARD 2001; See also Case C -362/83  D'Urso v Ecole Marelli Elettromeccanica Generale 
SpA [1992] IRLR 136; Case C -305/94 Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA and IGC Housing Service 
[1997] IRLR 127 (ECJ); Celtic Ltd v Astley [2006]  IRLR 635. 
78 See Katsikas v Konstantinidis and Skreb [1993] IRLR 179. 
79 See University of Oxford v (1) Humphreys and (2) Associated Examining Board [2000] IRLR 183 CA. 
The recent and perhaps the most controversial refusal to transfer following a TUPE transfer is the 
situation at Rangers Football Club at the moment in Scotland where as many as ten players have 
refused to transfer their contracts to a Newco.  See Andy Hunter, ‘Rangers Newco to begin Pre-Season 
Training with Only Three Players’ Guardian News Wednesday 27 June 2012 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/jun/27/rangers-training-three-newco-players> accessed 4 
July 2012. 
80 See P O’Higgins, ‘Labour is not a Commodity – an Irish Contribution to International labour Law’ 
(1997) 26 ILJ 225. 
81 Bartlett (n 44) 625. 
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are working partners and therefore deserve to have their respective interests 
taken into account when the business is insolvent.82 
4.7 Intrusion of European legal developments into 
national employment law space: the range of 
possible effects of the ARD 
The ARD is not an employment law of national emanation. It is ‘foreign’ in the 
sense that it originates from the EU. Given the intent of the regime and the 
different traditions of the Member States regarding transfers of undertakings, it is 
very unlikely that the ARD would not have had a major impact on business 
transfers in Member States. The ARD imposes obligations on employers. The 
precise scope of the obligations varies from country to country. It has had 
differing effects on the labour and employment laws of the Member States. The 
adoption of the ARD has led to the legislation of certain employment rights and 
relationships in some Member States which hitherto were never legislated for.  
Whilst it has strengthened the generally weak level of protection employees used 
to have in going concern business transfers in most Member States, it has also 
impacted on employers’ abilities to restructure freely and on business rescues in 
these states. Using the UK as an example, the implementation of the ARD 
effectively overturned the common law rule on business transfers. The implication 
of implementing the ARD is the adoption of the practice of automatic-transfer of 
contracts of employment. This practice, hitherto non-existent in UK business 
transfer legal history, has now put the UK among the jurisdictions of the world 
adopting the ‘automatic-transfer’83 of employment contracts approach in business 
transfers.84  
Whilst the ARD-induced automatic-transfer of employees and novation of 
contracts rule may be a good legal development for the employees, the practice 
                                                          
82  See discussions on theories generally and, on team production theory in particular in chapter 2. 
83 The term ‘automatic-jurisdiction’ is used here to denote those jurisdictions in the world where 
employees automatically transfer from the transferor to the transferee when there is a business 
transfer. There are automatic transfer principle and countries outside the EU as well. These may be 
found in countries such as Korea where it applies to certain types of transactions, and in Singapore for 
certain types of employees. South Africa is another example of a jurisdiction outside the EU with 
compulsory transfer of employees from transferor to transferee.  See C A Spink & U Krudewagen, 
‘From Acquired Rights to Reverse TUPE: Employment Law Issues in Global Outsourcing Transactions’ 
(2009) 9 Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative law 1-54.  
84  ibid. 17. 
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could on the other hand impact negatively on the rescue of insolvent businesses. 
A major reason why this could be problematic for business rescues in Member 
States is because termination of employment contracts has now become far more 
onerous than what obtains in the ‘termination-and-re-hire’ or the ‘at-will’ 
jurisdictions of the world such as the US and the Asia Pacific.85   
The transfer of employees in a termination and re-hire jurisdiction in a business 
transfer situation requires an act by the transferor employer terminating existing 
employment, followed by an act by the transferee employer offering new 
employment.86 By contrast, termination of employment contracts in the UK and 
other Member States now involves the observation by the employers of several 
transfer related legal rules of EU emanation. The employer cannot dismiss 
workers to enhance the sale of the business. The transferee cannot cherry-pick 
employers he wishes to retain. Both the transferor and transferee cannot collude 
to dismiss employees before a transfer without incurring liability. Dismissing 
employees pre-transfer could result in employees having claims against both 
transferor and transferee for unfair dismissals. 
A business transfer imposes information and consultation duties on EU employers. 
The employers are statutorily obliged to notify and consult87 with the employees 
before a business transfer. While in countries such as the UK and France, there is 
no minimum period for the consultation to last, and the employees are informed 
through their representatives in the UK, in Germany on the contrary, all individual 
employees must be informed in writing about the proposed transfer before the 
transfer actually takes place. In the context of insolvent business transfers, the 
requirement that the transferee take on all the employees on their existing terms 
and conditions imposes additional costs on rescue. These are costs that a 
prospective purchaser might regard as outweighing the advantages derivable 
                                                          
85 Examples of countries within this jurisdiction include countries such as Argentina, Canada, Hong 
Kong and Japan to South Korea, Taiwan and the United States of America. 
86 While this is generally a very straightforward process involving issuance of a termination notice by 
the outgoing employer, and a new employment agreement or offer letter by the new employer, it is 
not without its pitfalls. 
87 See Article 7, ARD 2001. 
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from purchasing such businesses and which might lead them to abandon the 
purchase.88  
Also, even after the purchase, the transferee could still inherit previously 
unanticipated employees-related liabilities. Therefore purchasers of business 
often want to factor in these costs when buying a business. Where an agreement 
cannot be reached between the buyer and the seller, the deal would collapse 
exposing the employees to job losses.  
Lastly, the protective disposition of the ARD towards the employees could be a 
catalyst for prospective buyers of insolvent businesses to structure the transaction 
in a way so as to avoid its application. They could structure the deal in a way that 
ensures the purchased entity does not ‘retain its identity’ since the ARD only 
applies where the undertaking or business transferred retains its identity post-
transfer. It follows that if the business is broken up and is absorbed by the 
transferee’s existing business, rather than kept or treated as a separate and ring-
fenced part of his or her business (such that it does not maintain its identity), the 
ARD will not apply. This artificiality will be unhelpful for going concern rescues 
and ultimately for the employees who will lose their jobs. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The ARD has brought with it several changes in the way EU member countries 
conduct business transfers and protect employees’ rights during transfers. For a 
country such as the UK where the employment relationship in business transfer 
situations was fundamentally a personal relationship based on contract between 
the employee and the employer, the intrusion of the ARD into domestic transfers 
with its prescriptive approach to employee protection has caused serious 
distortions in the employee-employer relationship. In the UK, for example, a 
                                                          
88 This was, in the context of UK’ equivalent legislation, clearly the view of the Society of Practitioners 
of Insolvency  when in their evidence to the House of Lords Committee investigating changes to the 
ARD stated that: 
It has been well known since the Litster case in 1989 that the transfer of 
undertakings legislation is an impediment to the rescue of businesses in the context 
of formal insolvency and therefore has the opposite from its intended effect of 
preserving employment and employees’ rights. Insolvency Practitioners can cite 
numerous examples of cases where the prospect of taking over accrued liabilities 
under employment contracts has either deterred prospective purchasers of 
insolvent businesses from dealing altogether, or has caused them to discount the 
price they are prepared to pay. See Select Committee on the European 
Communities session 1995-96 5th Report. 
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business transfer is no longer regulated by domestic law in this regard. The 
common law practice of terminating all extant contracts upon the occurrence of a 
business transfers is now extinct. Rather, contracts of employment of employees 
who transfer to the transferee’s workforce in a business transfer survive the 
transfer intact. 
The changes that were forced on the UK’s employment relations by the ARD in 
relation to business transfers have tended to portray it in a bad light. These have 
led to the ARD being described as a radical law.89 It gives employees protection 
beyond those previously provided for them by national laws of several of the 
Member States. For the employees, the ARD is an invaluable law, but to sellers 
and buyers of businesses, especially insolvent businesses, the regime is nothing 
other than an impediment. Its application to transfers of insolvent businesses is a 
disservice to the rescue culture. 
The next chapter will consider business transfers in the UK from the common law 
era to 1981 when TUPE began to regulate transfers of undertakings. 
  
                                                          
89  Davies, (n 68). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM: FROM COMMON LAW 
TO THE TRANSFER REGULATIONS’ ERA 
5.1 Introduction 
The effect of United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union (EU) is evident 
from the previous chapter on the Acquired Rights Directive. EU laws in different 
spheres have intruded upon the UK’s domestic legal arena. This is a truism 
especially in the context of employment law where the intervention of EU’s 
business transfer regime has completely and radically altered the common law 
rule regarding the rights the employees and employers have when an insolvent 
business is transferred on a going concern basis. Without the intervention of the 
EU’s business transfer directive, the common law would still govern transfers of 
undertakings in the UK today.  
When ownership of a business is transferred from one person to another (legal or 
natural), the change in employer usually have consequences for the employees of 
the business transferred. The employees have several rights in the business the 
work for which deserve to be protected especially where the business becomes 
insolvent and is sold to a purchaser as a going concern. However, matters 
concerning the protection of employees’ rights when ownership of a business is 
transferred are not very easy to deal with. The transfer of an insolvent business in 
particular raises several fundamental issues. The key issue is usually whether the 
affected employee should have the right to continue working for the new 
employer. If so, should the contractual and all other employment rights which he 
enjoyed with the transferor employer be transferred to the new employer? Should 
the employee’s rights be respected by the transferee? These are very difficult 
questions which do not yield to any easy answers. 
The difficulty anyone attempting to address the above issues would face stems 
from the fact that the employee’s interests do not always align with those of the 
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transferee when a business is transferred. The employee and the transferee may 
want different things. The transferee, for example, may not be interested in 
retaining the services of the employee because the latter may be excess to his 
requirement. Where the employee is willing to work for the new employer, he or 
she could insist on doing so on the same terms and conditions as obtained with 
the transferor whereas the transferee may not be willing to take on the employee 
on the terms he or she enjoyed with the transferor. Conversely, the employee 
may not be willing to work for the new employer at all or be transferred to the 
transferee without his consent. However, the employee’s freedom to choose who 
to work for and the employer’s right to cherry-pick who to retain when there is a 
business transfer are considerably curtailed in the UK.1 This is due primarily to 
the effect of the business transfer regime operational in the UK (the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (hereafter the Transfer 
Regulations or TUPE),2 on transfers. TUPE transfers all subsisting employment 
contracts from the transferor to the transferee, irrespective of the parties’ wishes, 
upon a ‘relevant’3 business transfer. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of TUPE. The aim is 
to explore how transfers of undertakings were conducted under the common law 
before the coming into force of the European-induced statutory regime of TUPE 
and the effect this has had on especially insolvent business transfers in the UK. 
This chapter will consider the common law rule on business transfers with the aim 
of comparing the rights of the employees in transfers under the common law and 
under TUPE. The scope of the TUPE Regulations, the notion of ‘relevant transfer’ in 
relation to a TUPE transfer will be considered. This will then set the stage for 
analysing the Transfer Regulations in the context of insolvency in the next 
chapter. 
                                                          
1It is pertinent to pointed out, however, that the employee’s right to choose who to work for is not 
affected that much. The employee reserves the right not to be transferred to the services of the 
transferee by informing the transferor or transferee of his or her objection to be transferred. See 
TUPE 2006, Reg. 4 (7). However, objection to transfer effectively terminates the employee’s contract 
of employment and the employee ‘shall not be treated, for any purpose, as having been dismissed by 
the transferor’. See TUPE 2006, Reg. 4 (8).  In a similar vein there is no obligation on the part of the 
transferee to take on all of the transferor’s employees, or any automatic assumption that they were 
so taken on. However, a transferee who does not take on the employees is liable, under TUPE, to 
compensate them for the loss of their employment. See British Fuels Ltd v Baxendale [1999] 2 AC 52. 
See further W Njoya, ‘The Interface between Redundancy and TUPE Transfers’ (2003) 32 (2) ILJ 132. 
2 Reference to ‘Transfer Regulations’ is reference to the TUPE 2006. However, where reference to the 
original TUPE regime is made, TUPE 1981 or the 1981 Transfer Regulations will be used. 
3 The concept of ‘relevant transfer’ is considered below. 
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5.2 Transfer of undertakings: the common law4  era  
Currently, the rights of the employees in business transfers are statutorily 
regulated in the UK due to the operation of the TUPE Regulations (see below). 
However, prior to the emergence of TUPE, and even before the Employment 
Rights Act 1963 (which was the first statutory provision in respect of the rights of 
employees in the employment relationship), the rights of UK employees in 
business transfers was determined exclusively by the common law.5  
Under the common law, employment involves two key elements: a contract and a 
relationship. ‘The contract of employment is the legal frame by which one 
person’s labour is put, on agreed terms, at the disposal and under the authority of 
another.’6 The employment relationship, on the other hand, is a legal notion used 
globally to refer to the relationship which exists between a person who works 
(often referred to as the employee) and the person (legal or natural and often 
referred to as the employer) for whom the former is working under certain 
conditions in return for remuneration.7 Evidently, the employment relationship 
                                                          
4 The term ‘Common law’ can be used to mean three different things. It could be used in reference to 
a legal system, case law developed by judges and it can be used to refer to equity. The ‘common law’ 
is used in this context to refer to the legal tradition which evolved in England from the 11th Century 
onwards. This legal tradition is the basis of private law not only for England (as its country of origin), 
but also for Wales and Ireland. It is also the legal tradition followed by most states of the United 
States of America (except for Louisiana), most part of Canada (except from Quebec) and by several 
other countries in Africa and Asia that received the common law tradition as former colonies of the 
defunct British Empire. William Tetley, ’Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified) (2000) 60 La L Rev. 677-738 <http://www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/mixedjur.pdf> 
accessed 1 May 2012 
5 The common law in this context refers to law developed by judges through decisions of courts and 
similar tribunals, as opposed to law imposed by legislatures or other government officials through 
statutes or executive action. Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, L Rutherford and S Bone (eds.) (8th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London 1993). Judges develop the common law by applying their common sense 
and knowledge of legal precedent to the facts of each individual case that is brought before them. 
Following past decisions (stare decisis) on similar cases is very valuable to common law. The strength 
of the similarity among the cases and evaluating a new case on the basis of the reasoning applied to 
past cases with similar facts gives credence to the eventual decision reached on a new case. In Re 
Hallett (1880) 13 Ch. D  712, Sir George Jessel, MR noted that: ‘the only use of authorities or decided 
cases is the establishment of some principle which the judge can follow out in deciding the case 
before him.’ 
6  André Rouast, ‘Quelques Réflexions sur L’originalité Sociologique du Contrat de Travail’ Mélanges 
offerts  à  Jean Brèthe de la Gressaye (Bordeaux, 1969) 663. 
7 Tony Honore, ‘The Quest for Security: Employees, Tenants, Wives’ in the Hamlyn Lectures (34th 
series, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London 1982) 1. See also ILO: ‘The Employment Relationship’ (2006) 
Report V (1) of International Labour Conference, 96th Session, 3. In the context of the ARD and TUPE 
(discussed below), see Botzen v Rotterdamsche Droogbok Maatschappij BV [1985] ECR 519 in which 
the ECJ applied the ‘assignment test’ to define the employment relationship thus: 
An employment relationship is essentially characterised by the link existing   
between the employee and the part of the undertaking or business to 
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under the common law is purely contractual. It is predicated on the notion of 
personal service8 in that it involves day-to-day contact. 
The common law was very straightforward regarding what the ‘fate’ of the 
employee was when there was a business transfer resulting in a change of 
employer. A business transfer automatically put paid to all contracts of 
employment. The origin of this common law rule on transfer dates back to 1940, 
and specifically, to the House of Lords’ decision in the seminal case of Nokes v 
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.9 In that case, the respondents argued that 
consequent upon the court order transferring the business of the of Hickleton 
Main Co Ltd (HMCL), under section 154(1) of the Companies Act 1929, to 
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd (DACL), Nokes’ contract of employment 
with his previous employers, HMCL, ipso facto was transferred to them, 
irrespective of Nokes’ consent. Thus, by absenting himself from work, Nokes was 
in breach of contract. Both the Chancery Court and the Court of Appeal held 
Nokes liable to pay damages to the new employer under section 4 of the 
Employers and Workman Act 1875. Nokes refused to pay, contending that there 
was no contract between himself and HMCL. 
Reversing the CA’s decision, the House of Lords (HL) agreed with Nokes holding 
that his contract of employment did not transfer. The HL took the view that to hold 
otherwise would have produced a result in total contrast to the common law rule 
which provides that the services of an employee who is under a contract of 
employment cannot be transferred from one employer to another without the 
consent of the employee. It noted that: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
which he is assigned to carry out his duties. In order to decide whether the 
rights and obligations under an employment relationship are transferred it 
is therefore sufficient to establish to which part of the undertaking or 
business the employee was assigned. 
8 See e.g. Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 
2 QB 497, 515; Express & Echo Publications v Tanton [1999] ICR 409, 699-700. 
9 [1940]  AC 1014. See also other authorities on this point e.g. Stevens v Beenning [1855] 24 LJ Ch. 
153; Griffith v Tower Publishing Co Ltd [1897] 1 Ch. 21. In Denham v Midland Employers’ Mutual 
Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 QB 437,  Lord Denning noted that:  
No contract of service can be transferred from one employer to another 
without the servant's consent: and this consent is not to be raised by 
operation of law but only by the real consent in fact of the man, express or 
implied.  
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[A] free citizen, in the exercise of his freedom, is entitled to choose the 
employer whom he promises to serve, so that the right to his services 
cannot be transferred from the employer to another without his assent. 10 
According to the HL, ‘the right to choose for himself whom to serve’ is ‘ingrained 
in the personal status of a citizen’ under the common law. The citizen’s right to 
choose ‘constituted the main difference between a servant and a serf.’11 Nokes 
became the high-water mark in transfers of undertakings law that a contract of 
employment was a personal right arising from the employment relationship and 
so could not legally be assigned without the consent of the employee. Nokes may 
have served its purpose namely: freedom to choose one’s employer, but this was 
a negative right that prejudiced the interests of the employees collectively as far 
as job security was concerned. A business transfer, under the Nokes rule, had the 
inevitable consequence of terminating all contracts of employment since the 
transferee was under no obligation to continue the employees’ contracts post-
transfer. Also, the transferee had a corresponding right to ‘cherry-pick’ 12 
employees he or she wishes to retain following a business transfer.13  
In an economy or countries where jobs are difficult to come by and, where 
keeping the job a worker already has is of paramount importance, Nokes would 
not be good law. The principle inherent in the decision would be inimical to the 
employees’ interest job wise. This is because the Nokes decision, rather than 
operate to ensure that the employees already in employment keep their jobs 
(which, given the volatile labour market conditions is, arguably, what the 
employees themselves would prefer,14 and which in the context of an insolvent 
business transfer, would be the best outcome for them) Nokes would operate to 
put them back on the job market each time there was a business transfer 
                                                          
10  [1940] AC 1014 (Viscount Simon LC ) 1020.  
11  [1940] AC 1014 (Lord Atkin) 1026. 
12 See Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee protection, corporate rescue and “one unholy 
mess”’ (2000) CFILR 249 - 271. 
13 It appears that from a theoretical view point, the common law rule on business transfer would have 
pleased scholars of the Proceduralists orientation and the creditors’ bargain theorists, especially 
regarding insolvent business transfers. Nokes eliminated any obstacles to dismissals making the 
insolvent business command a higher sale price for the benefit of the creditors.  On the other hand, 
the decision would not have been popular with the Traditionalist if it was still the law today. On 
theories of insolvency law, see chapter 2. 
14  D T Mortensen and C A Pissarides, ‘Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of 
Unemployment’ (1994) 61 (3) Review of Economic Studies 397–415; M Merz 1995. ‘Search in the 
Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle’ (1995) 36 (2) Journal of Monetary Economics 269–300; 
Alejandro Cunat and Marc J Melitz, ‘Volatility, Labour Market Flexibility, and the Pattern of 
Comparative Advantage’ (2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136036> accessed 4 May 2012. 
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involving an insolvent transferor. If the common law still governed business 
transfers in the UK today, another implication of the decision for the employees 
would be that the employees who would be lucky to be retained by the 
transferee, would not be able to have their years of service with their previous 
employer transferred to the new employment. Continuity of employment15 would 
be broken as employees would have had to begin working for the new employer 
on a clean slate. They would be deemed as employed by the transferee on the 
day they commenced working for the new employer. 
5.3 Transfer of undertakings: Statutory provisions 
before 1981 
Before 1981, when the first TUPE Regulations were enacted, statutory employee 
protection laws had gradually begun to evolve in the UK.16 The significance of the 
statutory body of rights granted to employees by protective employment 
legislation is that they constitute an autonomous layer of employment law which is 
distinct from the contractual framework of employment relationship fostered by 
the common law.17 There is the view, however, that although most laws relating to 
job security derive from statute, that statutory rights ‘derive their normative and 
conceptual coherence from the common law.’18 What this implies is that statutory 
rights cannot be fully understood if the conceptual premise from which they 
derive their normative content is not identified.19 
                                                          
15 The importance of continuity of employment in UK law lies in the fact that an employee must 
complete a minimum period of ‘continuous employment’ to be eligible for certain rights in any 
employment relationship. The importance of continuity of employment is underscored by the fact 
that the length of continuous employment is an important factor in the assessment of any 
compensation which may be due to the employee if the employee is unfairly dismissed. The courts 
take the view that if the work (whether full or part time) carried out by the worker involves short 
engagements with gaps in between during which no ‘mutuality of obligation’ exists between the 
employer and the employee, there will be no continuity of employment. see Carmichael & anor v 
National Power Plc [1999] ICR 1226, HL. However, it seems that continuity will be preserved if the gap 
between the two employments is related to the machinery of the transfer. Macer v Abafast Ltd [1990] 
IRLR 477, HL. 
16 Robert Upex & Michael Ryley, TUPE: Law and Practice (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2006) 2. 
17  Steven Anderman,`The interpretation of protective employment statutes and contracts of 
employment’ (2000) 29 ILJ 223-43. 
18  Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (OUP, Oxford 2006) 10-11. 
19 It seems that the type of statutory rights conferred on the employees and, or the protection 
employees enjoy during transfers of undertakings in the UK, do not derive from contract at all. These 
rights, as will be seen when TUPE is considered below, arguably, go beyond contract. See Fox, Beyond 
Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (Faber, London 1974). The current law protecting 
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5.3.1 The Contracts of Employment Act 1963 
The first statutory provision regulating an employee’s continuity of service post- 
transfers of undertakings was Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act of 
1963 (CEA).20 The CEA 1963 was a novel approach to employee protection.21 It 
made provisions for new laws to protect workers’ rights and vested in them legal 
rights which they never had before. The 1963 Act obliged employers to give their 
employees, in writing, the terms and conditions of their contracts of employment 
prior to them commencing work.22 It also required both parties to give each other 
fixed notices before terminating the employment relationship.23 In spite of the fact 
that the protections the 1963 Act provided for the employees were limited,24 this 
Act was still widely acclaimed as ‘the first modern employment protection statute’ 
in the UK.25  
5.3.2 The Contracts of Employment Act 1972 
Schedule 1 to CEA 1963 made provisions for ascertaining the length of an 
employee’s period of employment and for determining whether that period of 
employment had been continuous. When the CEA 1963 was replaced with CEA 
1972, Schedule 1 to CEA 1963 became paragraph 9 of schedule 1 to the CEA 1972. 
Paragraph 9 (2) provided that: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
employees during transfers of undertakings has its origin in a foreign as opposed to a domestic 
source: the 1977 ARD. 
20 Paragraph 10 (2) CEA 1963. 
21 Cyril Grunfeld, ‘Contracts of Employment Act, 1963’ (1964) 27 MLR, 70; P O’Higgins, ‘The Contracts 
of Employment Act, 1963’, (1964) 22 The Cambridge Law Journal 220-225.  
22 Under this Act, it was a criminal offence, punishable by fine, for the employer to refuse to give the 
requisite written statement. But this was repealed by the Labour government in 1965.  
23 The employee was to give the employer not less than a week’s notice and the employer had to give 
(if the employee had worked for him for five or more years) four weeks’ notice to the employee. The 
CEA 1963 s. 1 
24 The CEA 1963 ‘deliberately’ excluded certain categories of workers from its protection. For 
example, for its protection to avail an employee, the Act required a weekly threshold of 21 hours 
work. According to the then Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of Labour (William Whitelaw 
MP), the imposition of this condition was deliberate. It was premised on a policy that was intended to 
exclude ‘people with spare-time occupations and those who [did] weekend jobs.’ It was also intended 
to remove from the scope of protection, or exclude cases where the employment relationship was 
not of substantial importance to the parties concerned. Those envisaged, somewhat insensitively, 
included shift workers who were nearly all women with domestic responsibilities. See Hansard, HC 
Deb, 1 May 1963 vol 676, col 1154. That threshold was carried into the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965 and the Industrial Relations Act 1971. However, for notice and terms of employment, the 
threshold was gradually lowered until it was finally abolished after it was held to be incompatible with 
the Equal Treatment Directive, 76/207/EEC, by the House of Lords in the case of R v Secretary of State 
for Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] IRLR 176.  
25 Simon Deakin and G  Morris, Labour law (4th edn., Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 194. 
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If a trade or business or an undertaking ... is transferred from one 
person to another, the period of employment of an employee in the 
trade or business or undertaking at the time shall count as a period of 
employment with the transfer, and the transfer shall not break the 
continuity of the period of employment. 
This section was often interpreted to determine issues on continuity of 
employment where there had been a business transfer and the employee 
continued his or her work as normal with the new employer.26 
5.3.3 The Redundancy Payments Act 1965 
Two years after the CEA was enacted, it was followed by the Redundancy 
Payments Act of 1965 (RPA). The RPA carried forward the employment conditions 
that were put in place by the CEA 1963. The RPA provided that the computation of 
the period of an employee’s period of continuous employment must take into 
account his or her employment with a previous employer.27 This provision was 
subsequently re-enacted in Schedule 1 to the Contracts of Employment Act 1972 
(see above. Thereafter, it was consolidated into Schedule 13, paragraph 17 (2) to 
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (EP (C) A). The RPA was 
subsequently consolidated into the EP(C) A 1978 which became Part VI of that 
Act.28 This provision has now been consolidated by the Employment Rights Act 
1996 discussed below. 
5.3.4 The Employment Rights Act 1996 
The provisions of Part VI of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 
are consolidated as Part XI of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). The 
provisions of Schedule 13, paragraph 17 (2) to EP(C) A are now found in Section 
218 (2) of the ERA. This is the section of the home grown law that allows, in the 
special case of employment by a number of different employers, an employee’s 
service periods with those previous employers to be carried over to a new 
employment where the business or undertaking employing him or her is 
transferred from one employer to another in which the employee in question is 
                                                          
26 See e.g. Young v Daniel Thwaites & Co Ltd [1977] ICR 877. 
27 See s. 8  of the RPA 1965 
28 See ss. 81-120. 
183 
 
part of the transfer.29 This then raises the question as to whether there is possible 
overlap between section 218 and TUPE on continuity of employment. This is 
further explored below. 
5.4 Overlap between section 218 of ERA and TUPE 
Whilst the cornerstone of the Transfer Regulations (discussed below) is the 
automatic transfer of the employees’ contracts of employment from the transferor 
to the transferee,30 no express mention of continuity of employment is made in 
them. TUPE may be silent on continuity, but there is no doubt whatsoever that 
once the employee’s contract transfers to the transferee, the employee’s service 
years in previous employments is carried over to the new employment. 
Continuity of service is not broken. In a similar vein, section 218 of ERA 1996 also 
preserves continuity of employment where there is a change in ownership of a 
business.   
The existence of two separate pieces of legislations preserving continuity of 
employment may be problematic in circumstances where continuity of 
employment is litigated given that the Transfer Regulations have not been 
repealed, altered or amended Section 218 ERA in any way. Difficulties may arise 
regarding which of these two laws should apply in a dispute. The contention 
might be whether the Transfer Regulations or section 218 of ERA 1996 is the 
applicable law. It appears that in an unfair dismissal scenario in which continuity 
of employment is at issue, the Transfer Regulations may not provide the best 
channel for a claimant to establish continuity of employment. To succeed, rather 
than rely on the provisions of TUPE, the claimant might have recourse to section 
218 of ERA.31  
This is not to say that TUPE is ineffective in this regard. In fact regulation 4 goes 
further than section 218 in that a relevant transfer has the effect of automatically 
transferring the employees’ contracts of employment to the transferee. The point 
                                                          
29 Section 218 (2) (a ) & (b) provide:  If a trade or business, or an undertaking (whether or not 
established by or under an Act), is transferred from one person to another – 
(a) the period of employment of an employee in the trade or business or undertaking at the 
time of the transfer counts as a period of employment with the transferee, and  
(b) the transfer does not break the continuity of the period of employment. 
30  See TUPE 2006, Reg. 4. 
 31 On the problem and uncertainty surrounding this point, see the recent case of Oakland v 
Wellswood (Yorkshire) Ltd [2009] IRLR 250. This case is discussed in detail in chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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however, is simply that section 218 ERA may be best suited for determining 
continuity of employment in TUPE and non-TUPE transfer situations. 
5.5 The transfer regulations: heralding a new era in 
business transfers 
Under the common law, the employment relationship was strictly contractual. This 
meant that unless the employment contract expressively granted employment 
protection rights to the employee, he or she remained, at common law, 
unprotected when a business was transferred from one employer to another.32 
The common law no longer determines what rights employees have during 
transfers of undertakings in the UK. 33 Currently, the rights of the employees 
during a business transfer are statutorily regulated (see TUPE Regulations below).  
Statutory regulation of employees’ rights in business transfers is a relatively new 
phase in UK business transfer law space. It is a phase made possible by the 
emergence of more positive legal and extra-legal institutional structures for the 
protection of the employees’ rights during transfers of undertakings. In other 
words, this new phase has led to the enforcement of mandatory and some non-
derogable employment standards in the UK. It is fair to say therefore that, in the 
context of UK business transfers, the protections employees enjoy currently were 
externally induced. They are primarily of European labour law emanation. They 
are as a result of the government’s fulfilment of its obligation to implement an EU 
directive (the ARD)34 in the UK.  
This new approach to employee protection during transfers of undertakings is 
problematic in the UK. It does not conform to the traditional common law rule on 
transfers vis-a-vis the rights of parties. Contrary to the prevailing norm where the 
employer had unfettered discretion to restructure his business, the new legal 
                                                          
32 Wanjiru Njoya, Property in Work: The Employment Relationship in the Anglo-American Firm 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000) 55. 
33 There were cases which, prior to the first Transfer Regulations in 1981, recognised the inherent 
weakness of the common law and the injustice that it visited on employees during business transfers. 
See e.g. Woodhouse v Peter Brotherhood Ltd [1972] ICR 186 CA; Melon v Hector Powe Ltd [1981] ICR 
43 HL. In Woodhouse, however, one important factor in a going concern transfer – goodwill - was 
missing. See HA Rencoule (Joineries and Shopfitters) Ltd v Hunt (1967) 2 ITR 475; Kenmir Ltd v Frizzell 
[1968] 1 All ER 414. 
34 Employment protection legislation is part of the EU’s effort to enact legislation on social policy for 
the Community. The origin of employment protection laws as a social policy instrument is discussed in 
chapter 3. 
185 
 
order limits (without completely destroying however) that prerogative. It is, 
arguably, a phase which operates to tip the balance in favour of suppliers of 
labour (employees) as against those who engage the services of labour 
(employers) during transfers of, especially, insolvent businesses in the UK.35 This 
has resulted in a conflict between the rights of the employees and those of the 
employers in business reorganisations in the context of insolvency. It has also 
created a tension between saving insolvent businesses and protecting the rights 
of employees during going concern transfers of insolvent undertakings in the UK.   
TUPE is the herald of this new wave in employee protection during transfers of 
undertakings (solvent or insolvent) occurring in the UK. As far as the protection of 
rights in business transfer scenarios is concerned, TUPE swings the pendulum 
towards the employees. Below, we consider briefly, the origin of TUPE. 
5.6 TUPE and transfer of undertakings: overview on 
its origin 
When the ARD was adopted in 1977, all Member States without laws compliant 
with the directive had an obligation to transpose the ARD into their domestic laws 
within a two-year time period.36 The UK did not have such a law in place and so 
the government had to enact implementing legislation to bring the ARD into 
effect. It was through the UK fulfilling its EU obligation of implementing the ARD 
                                                          
35Arguably, legislation seeking to protect the interests of the employees and vest in them rights they 
hitherto did not have in business transfers is a form of ‘social engineering.’ It involves the re-ordering 
of existing social arrangement vis-a-vis business transfers. Law, according to Roscoe Pound, is a tool 
for social engineering. Law is concerned with the ordering of human relations. See Roscoe Pound, 
Jurisprudence (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn 1959) 27-68. However, in choosing between social 
arrangements, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that while a change in the existing order 
(here the common law employer’s freedom to restructure his business and terminate all contracts of 
employment where that is necessary to save the business) will tilt the balance in favour of the 
employees (i.e. the transfer of their employment contracts/continuity of employment on the same 
terms and conditions to the transferee). It could, under certain circumstances (e.g. insolvency), be 
disadvantageous to the wellbeing of legal persons and ultimately of the employees themselves. It is 
therefore pertinent to always take into account the overall cost involved in making a change to an 
existing social arrangement (R Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 (1) J L Econ. 44) which in 
context of this thesis is the movement away from the old common law system on transfers to the new 
statute-based governance in business transfers. After all, the proper end of legislation is to make 
political and economic conditions such that one party while seeking its own good, will not inflict 
suffering upon others (See John Dewey, Ethics (Forgotten Books, 2010) 296). The point here is that 
efforts must be made to ensure that the new employment rights that legislation will give to the 
employees during transfers of insolvent businesses, in particular, does not deter the purchase and 
hence rescues of such businesses resulting, ultimately, in job losses  for the employees whom the law 
was meant to protect in the first place. 
36 ARD 1977, Article 8 (1). 
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that TUPE became part of UK employment law. TUPE is a statutory instrument,37 
adopted under the European Communities Act (ECA) of 1972 for the purpose of 
giving effect to an EU directive. 
TUPE began life with problems. The Conservative Government, to whom the task 
of adopting the Regulations fell, was very reluctant to bring them into force.38 
TUPE was perceived as an employment protection law with potentially 
detrimental effects on employment prospects for UK workers. 39  Perhaps this 
concern was the reason why the Conservative Government of the day 
procrastinated in implementing the ARD. Perhaps the delay in giving effect to the 
ARD, and the lackadaisical manner in which it was eventually done40 was purely 
political41 in the sense that the government did not want to be seen as giving teeth 
                                                          
37 Statutory Instruments are a form of legislation that allows provisions of an Act of Parliament to be 
subsequently brought into force, amended or altered by a primary legislation (if the Act contains a 
Henry VIII clause permitting it) without Parliament having to pass a new Act. See E.g. first Report of 
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Scrutiny of Delegated Powers of 1992-93 [HL 57 1992-93, 
para 10]. The clause derived its name from the Statute of Proclamations 1539, which gave King Henry 
VIII power to legislate by proclamation. Statutory Instruments are also referred to variously as 
secondary, delegated or subordinate legislation. Statutory instruments (SI) come in a variety of forms. 
Regulation is an example of SI. Statutory Instruments are a part of the law of England in the same way 
Acts of Parliament are. Acts of Parliaments are supreme and may overturn the common law. See e.g. 
Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75. 
38 See opinion of Mr Michael Meacher in the House of Commons debates:  Hansard HC Deb. 06 
February 1996 vol 271 cols 197-238 (see especially pt. 22). The Conservative Government of the day 
perceived the ARD as a social policy which required a trade-off between economic and social rights.  
They had always been of the view that the ARD would preserve pockets of inefficiency and induce 
distortionary compliance behavior in the UK economy. Nick Adnett, ‘The Acquired Rights Directive 
and Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the UK: An Economic Perspective’ (1998) Eur. J. of Law & 
Econs. 69, 70. 
39 R Lewis and B Simpson, Striking A Balance? Employment Law after The 1980 Act, (Martin Robertson 
& Co Ltd, Oxford 1981) 23. 
40 It is on record that when the draft Transfer Regulations were introduced on the floor of the House 
of Commons for adoption, the government spokesman at the time (David Waddington, MP, who was 
the Under Secretary for Employment), said that he was recommending them with ‘a remarkable lack 
of enthusiasm’ because according to him, the Government was implementing ‘...what may be thought 
a nonsensical bargain—or perhaps a good bargain—struck by the previous Government’. See 
Hansard, HC Deb. Vol. 14 col. 680. 
41 It is noteworthy that although the ARD was adopted during the British Presidency of the then EEC, it 
was adopted by a Labour Government. The problem was that it was left to a Conservative 
Government to implement. This was rather unfortunate given that the Conservative Government of 
the day did not subscribe to the idea of legislating on employment matters and was very unwilling to 
surrender control in that regard to the EU. For criticisms of the Government’s attitude to the ARD, see 
the view of Harold Walker, MP, who described the legislation that finally made it to the HC for 
adoption as a ‘butchered version’ that ‘suffered from political prejudice- and the interests of the 
Government’s friends in the city-to the detriment of the spirit and intention, and indeed, the words of 
the EEC directive which gave birth to those regulations’ Hansard, HC Deb. 7 December 1981 vol. 14, 
col. 685. See also the view expressed by Lord Wedderburn in the House of Lords, Hansard, HL Deb. 10 
December 1981, vol 425, col. 1490. 
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to the type of employment policy it has always derided.42 TUPE was adopted in 
the UK belatedly and, only after the EU Commission pursued infraction 
proceedings against the UK because it failed to honour the dateline for 
implementing the ARD. 43  With this kind of attitude, it is hardly difficult to 
appreciate why the first generation Transfer Regulations was controversial and its 
application to transfers in the UK very problematic. This was especially true of the 
1981 Regulations in the context of insolvent business transfers discussed in 
chapter 6. Below we consider the purpose and effects of TUPE. 
5.6.1 Purpose and Effects of TUPE 
The Transfer Regulations were enacted in the UK to give effect to the ARD on the 
safeguarding of the employees’ rights during business transfers. Like the parent 
law, TUPE is essentially ‘social legislation’44  for offering greater protection to 
employees impacted by business transfers where there is a change of 
employer. 45  The essence of the policy underlying the TUPE Regulations is 
contained in Regulation 4 which provides for the automatic transfer of contracts of 
employment to the transferee except where an employee objects46 to the transfer. 
The aim is to ensure, as far as possible, that the contracts of employment of the 
affected employees continue unchanged with the transferee. Put differently, the 
                                                          
42 The Conservative Government in power then had a deep suspicion of the value of regulating the 
labour market. This suspicion was rife whether or not the particular regulation derived from 
legislation directly regulating employment relationships or from collectively established norms 
between employers and the trade unions. Simon Deakin, ‘Transcending the Flexibility Debate? 
Deregulation and Employment in Britain 1979-1997’ (1999) ESRC Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 13. <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp132.pdf> 
accessed 11 November 2011; Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, ‘In Search of Coherence: Social 
Policy, the Single Market and Fundamental Rights’ (2000) 32 Industrial Relations Journal 331-345. 
Collective bargaining which denotes the negotiation of pay and other conditions of employment 
between an employer (or a group of employers) and a trade union acting for its members is a key 
focus in industrial relations. P Edwards, ‘The Employment Relationship and the Field of Industrial 
Relations’ 
<http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/978063
1222576/Edwards_C01.pdf> accessed 26 December 2011.  
43 C Brewster and P Teague, European Community Social Policy and its Impact on the UK (Institute of 
Personnel Management, London 1989) 120-21; W Derbyshire, S Hardy and S Maffey, TUPE: Law and 
Practice: An Overview of the New TUPE Regulations 2006 (Spiramus Press Ltd, London 2006) . 
44 Frisby (n 12). 
45 Smit has articulated that in relation to the parent law (ARD) ‘this essentially social objective was 
added by the court, rather than by the Commission, and [that] the objective at the start certainly was 
to prevent unfair advantages existing between member states’. See Nicola Smit, ‘Automatic Transfer 
of Employment Contracts and the Power to Object’ (2003) Journal of South African Law 465, 467. 
46 The courts have held in several cases that the transfer of contracts and other rights from the 
transferor to the transferee is automatic whether the transferee consents to it, or opposes this 
consequence. See generally Rotsart de Hertaling v J Benoidt SA [1997] IRLA; Celtic v Astley [2005] IRLA 
649; Newns v British Airways Plc [1992] IRLR 525 CA. 
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contracts are to have effect after the transfer as if originally made between the 
transferred employees and the transferee. The policy behind this provision is to 
prevent the workers affected by the transfer from being placed in a less 
favourable position solely as a result of the transfer.47  
Whilst the automatic transfer of contracts where there are transfers is done in the 
interests of the employees, does this practice not offer to the law a principle which 
detracts from the notion, which Lord Atkins in Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated 
Collieries Ltd 48  said was fundamental to UK employment law? 49  That is, the 
principle that the services of an employee should not be transferred from one 
employer to another without the consent of the employee, because that is what 
distinguishes the employee from the serf. Commenting on the automatic and 
‘compulsory’ TUPE transfer rule, Collins has articulated that the Regulations 
produce the ultimate commodification of labour because with TUPE the 
employees become intangible assets, to be sold along with ‘lock, stock and 
barrel’ at the transferor’s discretion.50 
The automatic transfer of contract is of course not the only effect of TUPE. There 
are several other effects. From the transferee’s perspective, the effect of TUPE is 
that where TUPE applies to a transfer, liability for anything done by the transferor 
before the transfer passes to the transferee. 51 This is because the transferee 
mandatorily steps into the shoes of the transferor inheriting virtually all of the 
latter’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities 52  in respect of the transferor’s 
employees employed in the undertaking or business ‘immediately before’53 the 
transfer.  
The obverse of the automatic transfer of contract rule is that, upon the happening 
of a relevant TUPE transfer (and subject to the employee’s right to object to 
transfer under regulation 4 (7) not being activated), the transferor rids himself of 
the employees as well as the obligations incurred under their contracts of 
employment by transferring them to the transferee without the consent of the 
                                                          
47 The ECJ has emphasised this point in relation to the parent law (ARD) in several caes. See e.g. Case 
C-362/89 D'Urso v Ercole Marelli Elettromeccanica Generale SpA [1992] ECR I-4105 ( para 9). 
48  [1940] AC 1014 HL. 
49 See Lord Wedderburn in House of Lords’ debates on TUPE. See Hansard, HL Deb 10 December 1981 
vol 425 col 1490. 
50  Hugh Collins, ‘Dismissals on Transfer of a Business’ (1986) 15 (1) ILJ 244, 247. 
51 TUPE 2006, Reg. 4 (2). 
52 The liabilities that will transfer in the context of a TUPE transfer are discussed in chapter 6. 
53 The meaning of these words is considered below. 
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employees concerned.54 The implication is that where the transferee refuses to 
take the workforce on, the transferor would be absolved from making 
redundancy payments since the employee’s previous right to claim against him is 
no longer applicable. It is the transferee that will be responsible for any 
redundancy payments to be made.  Evidently, TUPE imposes enormous costs on 
business rescues if the transferee becomes subject to these types of liabilities.  
A TUPE transfer also imposes information and consultation duties on the 
employer.55 Long before a relevant transfer, the employer is obliged to consult56 
with the employees’ representatives and inform them of the proposed transfer, 
date or proposed date of the transfer, the legal, economic and social implications 
of the transfer for any affected employees, the measures he envisages to take in 
connection with the transfer. Also, if an employee is dismissed, before or after a 
business transfer, the relevant employer may be liable for unfair dismissal if the 
sole or principal reason for the employee’s dismissal is the transfer itself or ‘a 
reason connected with the transfer that is not an economic, technical or 
organisational (ETO) reasons entailing changes in the workforce.57  
The flip side to the dismissal conundrum is that TUPE allows an employee to be 
dismissed for ETO reasons which entail changes in the workforce. There is the 
view that the reason why TUPE allows dismissals for ETO reasons which entail 
changes in the workforce is because since the Regulations derived from the then 
EEC directive – the 1977 ARD, they were ‘shot through with the competitive 
assumptions of the European Economic Community’.58 
In sum, these are some of the provisions of TUPE that have been very problematic 
when the regime is applied in the context of insolvency.59 These provisions have 
created a tension between business rescue and employment in going concern 
rescues of insolvent businesses in the UK. 
                                                          
54  See e.g. Newns v British Airways Plc [1992] IRLR 525 CA; Gabriel v Peninsula Business Services & 
Anor [2012] UKEAT 0190 11 2302. 
55  See generally TUPE 2006, Regs. 13 - 15. 
56 Case law has established that the requirement to consult with employees under TUPE applies 
whether or not the transfer actually takes place. See e.g. Banking Insurance and Finance Union v 
Barclays Bank Plc [1988] 3 CMLR 587; South Durham HA v UNISON [1995] ICR 495. 
57  TUPE 2006, Reg. 7. 
58  Lord McCarthy, Hansard, HL Deb 10 December 1981 vol 425 cc 1482-501. 
59  This argument is developed further in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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5.6.2 Scope of TUPE Regulations 
The Transfer Regulations apply to a range of business transfer situations where 
there is a transfer of control of an ‘economic entity.’ 60  These include the sale of 
part,61 or of the whole of the business (solvent or insolvent)62 executed through a 
binding agreement between the parties. TUPE also applies to transfers of 
subsidy63 and franchise.64 Transfers by gifts65and by lease66 are caught by them. 
The transfer of licences67 and transfers between subsidiaries68 are not exempt. 
The transfer of services,69 transfer by succession, transfer by operation of law70 or 
by a court order creating a transfer all constitute ‘relevant transfers’71 and come 
within the scope of the 2006 Transfer Regulations.  
Not all types of transfers are covered by the Transfer Regulations. For any type of 
transfer not covered, the consequence is that the protection of the Regulations will 
not avail the employees affected by such a transfer. The re-organisation of public 
administrative authorities or the transfer of administrative functions between 
public administrative authorities is not, by virtue of Regulation 3(5) of TUPE 2006, 
a relevant transfer.  
TUPE does not apply to transfers by way of share sales. This is because transfer 
by way of share sale does not constitute a ‘relevant transfer.’  The consensus at the 
time TUPE was enacted was that it should be confined to the traditional business 
takeover method72 in which the business is transferred from employer (often 
corporate) to another. The reference to a ‘transfer to another person’73 imposes 
the main limitation that TUPE has never applied to a business transferred by way 
of share capital takeover. There is, technically, no business transfer from one 
                                                          
60  TUPE 2006, reg. 3 (1) (a). 
61 See GD Ault (Isle of Wight) Ltd v Gregory (1986) KIR 590, 2ITR, 30, Div Ct. See also Secretary of State 
for Employment v Spence [1986] 3All ER 616. 
62 There is no distinction between a solvent and insolvent business in the TUPE Regulations. See TUPE 
2006, Reg. 3. 
63 See Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartol (C-29/91) [1992] IRLR 366. 
64 Merckx & another v Ford Motor Co. Belgium SA (C-171, 172/94) [1996] IRLR 467, ECJ. 
65 Brooks v The Grays Co-operative Society Ltd [1967] ITR 345. 
66 Berg & Busschers v Besselsen (C-144, 145/87) [1989] IRLR 447, [1990] ICR 396, ECJ. 
67 CWW Logistics v Ronald & Digital Equipment (Scotland) Ltd (EAT, 22 April 2002). 
68 See Allen v Amalgamated Construction Co. Ltd [2000] IRLR 119, ECJ. 
69 Kenny v South Manchester College [1993] IRLR 265. 
70 Charlton v Charlton Thermosystems (Romsey) Ltd [1995] IRLR 79, [1995] ICR 56. 
71 The concept of ‘relevant transfer’ is addressed below. 
72 John McMullen, ‘Atypical Transfers, Atypical Workers and Atypical Employment Structures – A Case 
for Greater Transparency in Employment Issues’(1996) 25 (4) ILJ 286-307. 
73  TUPE 2006, Reg. 3 (1) (a). 
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person to another in a share takeover since the legal identity or personality of the 
corporate employer does not change.74  TUPE will not apply to transfer by way of 
share purchases even if such a tactic is adopted deliberately to avoid the effects 
of the Regulations.75 
5.6.2.1 Exclusion of share transfer: Possible effects on 
employees 
Although the legal identity of the corporate employer does not change merely on 
account of a change in the identity of the principal shareholder(s) in a share 
transfer, it cannot be said with certainty that the result of a change in control may 
not, in some way, be ‘ruinous’ for the employees in the same way a business 
transfer carried out by other means could be in the absence of TUPE.76   
A transfer by share takeover could have several consequences for the employees. 
The fact that the employees’ contracts of employment continue in a takeover by 
share acquisition does not constitute complete protection from adverse 
consequences. It seems also that if an employee is dismissed in the course of a 
transfer by share takeover, such a dismissal is not likely to engage the protection 
against unfair dismissal rule under Regulation 7 in comparison to a dismissal 
made in relevant TUPE transfers which would be automatically unfair. In effect, 
the employees’ job security could be jeopardised as the Kraft-Cadbury takeover 
by share acquisition, for example, has shown. When the US food firm (Kraft P) was 
taking over the UK chocolate firm (Cadbury), Kraft promised to keep open 
Cadbury’s Somerdale chocolate factory near Bristol. Soon after the deal was 
done, Kraft reneged on its promise and shut the factory that employed 400 staff.  
Even in circumstances where the company taken over continues to trade, should 
the new controlling shareholder decide to implement strategies for redundancies 
or business reorganisation, job security could still be at risk. There is no legal 
requirement, for example, that such policies must be discussed with Union 
representatives prior to the share transfer as would be the case in a typical 
business transfer which TUPE applies. Thus, the employees affected would have 
                                                          
74 Henry v London General Transport Services Ltd EAT/960/97 
75 See e.g. Brooks v Borough Care Services [1998] IRLR 636 (EAT). 
76 See e.g. M R Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976) 341; P L 
Davies, The Regulation of Takeovers and Mergers, (London, 1976) Chapter VIII. See also Bob Hepple, 
‘Workers’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals’ (1976) 5 ILJ 197, 201; R W Painter and 
A E M Holmes, Cases and Materials on Employment Law, (8th edn, OUP, Oxford 2010) 590. 
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been deprived of the information and consultation rights that TUPE gives 
employees in transfers. 
The controlling shareholder may also want to introduce, for example, new 
policies and ideas for change. He or she may change (without consultation) the 
non-contractual work situation of the workers. Opportunities for voluntary 
overtime and other fringe benefits, for example, may be reduced as a result of a 
decision to transfer work to other plants.  The employees may be compelled by 
economic pressures to accept these changes even though these are not 
advantageous to them. Also, the need to integrate the employees of the acquired 
company into the existing workforce of the controlling shareholder could 
adversely affect prospects of promotion for the employees.  
5.7 TUPE and the notion of ‘relevant transfer’  
One of the accusations that were often levelled against the old TUPE Regulations 
was that there was a high degree of uncertainty surrounding when a transfer took 
place.77 It appears that is a generic problem in the sense that it is not confined to 
the Transfer Regulations. It is one problem that has plagued the parent law (ARD) 
as well.78 Arguably, a significant number of often conflicting cases which the 1981 
Transfer Regulations generated had to do with whether or not a transfer had 
actually occurred.79 
However, no inference should be drawn that the problem has abated under the 
2006 Transfer Regulations because it has not. The revised Transfer Regulations 
                                                          
77 M Dulovic, ‘A Sense of Deja-Vu: Remedies in Employment Claims’, cited by K Williams & N Johnson, 
‘Transferring Employment between the Public and Private Sectors in the United Kingdom: Acquired 
Rights and Revising TUPE’ (2007) <http://shura.shu.ac.uk/707/1/fulltext.pdf> accessed 01 February 
2009. 
78 The difficulty encountered in determining when there is a ‘relevant transfer’ under the ARD has 
arisen mainly in relation to service provision transfers. This is hardly surprising given that the ARD was 
conceived mainly to regulate mergers and acquisitions. The outsourcing industry and support services 
companies were not as active in the mid-1970s as they are today. See R Upex & M Ryley, TUPE: Law 
and Practice (Bristol, Jordan Publishing Limited, 2006) 46. Service provision changes which constitute 
the second type of relevant TUPE-transfer are outside the purview of this thesis. However, this is 
dealt with under Reg. 3 (1) (b) of TUPE 2006. See further Giuseppe Sigillo Massara, ‘Transfer of 
Undertakings: Insolvency Proceedings in the United Kingdom and in Italy and the European Court of 
Justice Case Law’ in Compliance with Labour Legislation: Efficacy and Efficiency (2010) Labour 
Administration and Inspection Programme, ILO Working Document (No 6) 74. 
79 Oliver Hyms,  Employment Aspects of Business Reorganisations (OUP, Oxford 2006); Upex & Ryley (n 
77) above; John McMullen, ‘An analysis of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006’ (2006) 35 ILJ 113-139.  
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have not done much in terms of defining what a relevant transfer of an 
undertaking is. The definition of a ‘transfer’ offered by TUPE 2006 simply reflects 
the meaning of a ‘transfer’ contained in the 2001 ARD.80 This definition is copied 
out from the spectrum of decisions made by the European court on the subject 
matter (see discussion on the ARD in chapter 4).  
The difficulty with the notion of ‘relevant transfer’ relates to ascertaining whether 
there has, in fact, been a transfer of an undertaking or not. 81  According to 
Regulation 3, TUPE applies to the: 
…transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or 
business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom 
to another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which 
retains its identity…82 
From the above statement, it appears that for a business transfer to be deemed a 
‘relevant transfer’ under the TUPE Regulations, four key conditions would have to 
be satisfied. The first major condition is that the entity transferred must have been 
‘situated immediately before the transfer’ in the UK.83 The second condition is that 
the business or undertaking the subject of transfer must have been transferred 
from one person to another in any of the legally acceptable modes of transfer 
listed above (see scope of TUPE in secion 5.6.2).   
The third subsidiary rule is that there must be an identifiable ‘economic entity’84 
meaning ‘an organised grouping of resources which has the objective of pursuing 
an economic activity, whether or not that activity is ‘central or ancillary’85 to its 
function. 86  The fourth condition is that not only must the economic entity in 
                                                          
80 See Article 1 (1) (a) ARD 2001. 
81 It could be argued, on the other hand, that in relation to the acquisition of a business, there is 
hardly any difficulty in deciding if the Transfer Regulations apply. Those who buy businesses seek to 
acquire an economic entity. In other words, economic entity is, arguably the only thing with value 
within the target which any buyer seeks to acquire. See Upex & Ryley (n 6) 46. What constitutes an 
‘economic entity’ was first defined by the ECJ in Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV [1986] 2 
CMLR 296. 
82  TUPE 2006, Reg. 3 (1) (a)  
83  Regulation 3(1) a) TUPE 2006. 
84 See Whitewater Leisure Management Ltd v Barnes and ors [2000] IRLR 456, EAT. 
85 TUPE 2006, Reg. 3 (2). 
86 According to the jurisprudence of the European court, an organised grouping of wage-earners who 
are specifically and permanently assigned to a common task may in the absence of other factors of 
production, amount to an economic entity. See e.g. Francisco Hernández Vidal SA v Gómez Pérez and 
others [1999] IRLR 132 ECJ; Sánchez Hidalgo and others v Asociación de Servicios Aser and Cooperativa 
Minerva [1999] IRLR 136 ECJ. 
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question be capable of being transferred to ‘another person,’87 it must retain its 
identity post-transfer.88 What this simply means is that after an economic entity 
has been transferred from one ‘person’ to another, its operation must be 
continued or resumed with the same or similar activities as was the case prior to 
the transfer.89 This condition carries also the implication that assets sale is not a 
relevant transfer under TUPE because it does not satisfy the ‘economic entity’ test. 
It remains the case that the question regarding whether ‘economic entity’ exists in 
assets sales is a question of facts for the tribunal to decide. The difficulty however, 
is that since ‘appeals from an Employment Tribunal to the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal lie only on questions of law, and not on questions of fact, decisions in this 
area are, in theory, difficult to challenge’.90  
5.8 Conclusion 
Before 1981, if a business was sold as a going concern in the UK all contracts of 
employment terminated. Today, business sales no longer have this effect due to 
TUPE. If TUPE applies to the sale employees’ contracts of employment 
automatically transfer to the purchaser. From the employees’ perspective 
therefore, TUPE is certainly not a bad law.  TUPE is not a home grown law. It has 
its origin in the European ARD. It follows that how TUPE is applied to business 
transfers in the UK is heavily influenced by European law. It is almost impossible 
to consider any point relating to TUPE in the UK without reference, at least, to one 
ECJ decision. Courts in the UK have adopted widely purposive (as opposed to 
literal) construction of TUPE’s provisions in order to achieve the effect intended 
by the parent law – the ARD. 
The House of Lords has often construed the Regulations purposively and, in 
accordance with ECJ’s decisions upon corresponding provisions of the Directive, 
                                                          
87 Whitewater Leisure Management Ltd v Barnes and ors [2000] IRLR 456, EAT. 
88 Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV [1996] 2 CMLR 296. See also Mathieson, Cheyne v United 
News Shops Ltd EAT 554/94. 
89 ibid. See also Allen and others v Amalgamated Construction Co Ltd [2000] IRLR 119 ECJ.  As far as 
UK case-law is concerned, the main guidance on the retention of identity post-transfer was laid down 
by the EAT in the case of Cheesman and ors v R Brewer Contractors Ltd [2001] IRLR 144, EAT in which 
the tribunal states, inter alia, that : ‘As to whether there is an undertaking, there need to be found a 
stable economic entity whose activity is not limited to performing one specific works contract, an 
organised grouping of persons and assets enabling (or facilitating) the exercise of an economic activity 
which pursues a specific objective...’ 
90 Transfer of Undertakings: Employment Law Handbook (Incomes Data Services, London 2011) 11. 
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which Parliament intended TUPE to effectuate.91 It follows that a concept, such as 
‘relevant transfer’ as it is understood today is nothing but a ‘judicially constructed 
fiction’ resulting from the creativity of the courts and employment tribunals and 
the desire to give TUPE the purposive construction required so that the rights of 
the employees in transfers can be maximally protected.  
Granted, the more types of transfer scenarios that are brought within the meaning 
of TUPE ‘transfer’ as a result of the ‘judicial engineering’,92 the better this is for the 
employees. This, in theoretical terms, will be seen by the employee protection 
acolytes (see discussion of the Traditionalists and their employee protection in 
business transfers standpoint in chapter 2) as a very important way of providing 
protection to the rights of employees in different transfer modes. This school of 
thought would argue that employees’ rights in transfer situations would not be 
effectively protected save for this type of inventiveness by the courts. There is the 
view however that the rights which were intended for the employees by the ARD 
have been snatched away ‘like some bicycle thief snatching purses in the night’93 
by TUPE due to the purposive interpretation approach adopted by the courts. The 
point here is that the protective disposition towards the employees, especially in 
relation to insolvent transfers (discussed in the next chapter), may not be in the 
best interests of the employees themselves. It may deter potential buyers of such 
businesses. To that end, TUPE impacts negatively on the rescue culture. 
The discussion in the next chapter will centre on TUPE and its application 
to insolvency. 
  
                                                          
91 See e.g. Pickstone v Freemans plc [1989] AC 66; Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 
1 AC 546.  
92 ‘Judicial engineering’ is used here to imply the interpretation of statutory provisions to give it its 
intended effect even if doing so would involve departing from the strict and literal application of the 
words which the legislature used. In effect, this is a way of using the judicial system as a tool for 
‘social engineering’ in business transfer scenarios. The term ‘social engineering’ was coined by Roscoe 
Pound. See Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence Vol. III (The Law Book Exchange Ltd, 2000). Pound used this 
term to mean finding a balance between the competing interests in society. What calls for social 
engineering in business transfers is the conflict of interests of employees and employers. TUPE is a 
social legislation that is meant to promote social justice for employees during business transfers (on 
the notion that TUPE is a social legislation, see Sandra Frisby (n 12) above). But whether judicial 
engineering actually promotes social justice better than strict legal interpretation is a moot point. 
93 Lord Wedderburn, Hansard, HL Deb 10 December 1981 vol. 425 col. 1490. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE TRANSFER REGULATIONS: 
APPLICATION AND EFFECTS ON INSOLVENT 
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
6.1 Introduction 
The Transfer Regulations discussed in chapter 5 have been central to the conflict 
between business rescue and employment protection.1 Granted, in the context of a 
business transfer, the employees are usually one of the most affected groups in the 
business2 in terms of job security. The employees deserve protection especially when 
their corporate employer becomes insolvent and is sold to a third purchaser so that the 
new owner does not walk over their rights. TUPE is social legislation enacted to remedy 
the hardship the common law visited on the employees in business transfer situations. 
From that perspective, TUPE may be seen as legislative intervention by the state to give 
some measure of social protection to the constituency (employees) often identified in 
the literature on corporate insolvency as the most vulnerable.3  
The problem with legislation (such as TUPE) is that, although it is often enacted to take 
care of perceived or real problems, legislation could end up creating problems of their 
own; some of which could be far worse than the ones they were originally intended to 
solve. Professor Dicey has unequivocally said of legislation that:  
The beneficial effects of state intervention, especially in the form of 
legislation, are direct, immediate, and so to speak, visible, whilst its evil 
                                                          
1 Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ 
[2000] CFIL 249-271; Richard Parr & Nicola Bennett, ‘The Recue Culture v Collective Employment 
Rights’ (2005) Insolvency Intelligence 156- 157; David Pollard, ‘TUPE and Insolvency: Part 2’ (2006) 
Insolvency Intelligence 102- 108; Jeremy Goldring & Grant Spooner, ‘New TUPE Regulations – Impact 
on Distressed Business Dispositions’, (2006) 26 IL &P. 
2 Leslie Braginsky, ‘How Changes in Employer Identity Affect Employment Continuity: Comparison of 
the United States and the United Kingdom’ (1995) 16 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 231. 
3 Donald Korobkin, ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L Rev.; Karen Gross, 
‘Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy An Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. U L Q 1031; Karen 
Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven, CT: YUP, 1997); Janis 
Sarra, ‘Widening the Insolvency Lens: The Treatment of Employee claims’ (2008) in P J Omar (ed.) 
International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008); Vanessa Finch 
& Sarah Worthington, `The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking Restitutionary Rights’ in F Rose (ed.) 
Restitution and Insolvency (Mansfield Press, London 2000). 
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effects are gradual, indirect and lie out of sight... Hence the majority of 
mankind must almost of necessity look with undue favour upon 
governmental intervention...4  
Professor Dicey’s observation holds true in respect of the Transfer Regulations. 
TUPE has, undeniably, been very effective in safeguarding the rights of 
employees in business transfer situations, but it has equally impacted negatively 
on transfers of insolvent business. Some of these negative impacts were either 
discounted or not contemplated at the time TUPE was enacted.5 In protecting the 
employees, the regime has tended to create more problems in the process than it 
has solved.  TUPE protects not just the employees’ jobs but also their terms and 
condition of employment. The employees’ contracts with the previous employer 
are compulsorily transferred to the transferee in the event of a relevant transfer 
irrespective of the wish of the transferee.6 There is the perception that TUPE 
‘over-deters’ purchases of insolvent businesses and so undermines the prospect 
of successful going concern rescues of such businesses in the UK.7  
To save a financially distressed business by way of a going concern sale, it might 
sometimes be expedient to scale down the workforce in order to achieve that goal 
but TUPE makes the use of this strategy very difficult to apply.8 TUPE’s principle 
                                                          
4  Albert V Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England in the 19th Century, Richard Vande Wetering (ed) 
(New Liberty Fund Book, Indianapolis, 2008) 257-58. 
5 Frisby, (n 1). 
6 TUPE 2006, Regs. 4 & 5. See also Parkwood Leisure Ltd v Alemo-Herron & Ors [2011] UKSC 26. The 
meaning of the words ‘shall have effect after the transfer as if originally made between the person so 
employed and the transferee’ was explored by Lord Bingham in North Wales Training and Enterprise 
Council  Ltd v Astley & Ors [2006] UKHL 29 (‘The Celtec case’) where he noted that:  
The benign intent of the legislation is not in question. But its effect is, 
inevitably, to introduce a fictional element into this tripartite relationship, 
since (where the legislative conditions are satisfied) the employee is 
treated as having been employed by the new employer all along when in 
fact such is not the case. 
7 Simon Deakin & John Armour, ‘Insolvency, Employment Protection and Corporate Restructuring: The 
Effects of TUPE’ (2001) University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 249; John McMullen, ‘An analysis 
of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ [2006] ILJ 113; H 
Collins, ‘Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency’ (1989) 18 ILJ 144; Wanjiru Njoya, ‘The Interface 
Between Redundancy and TUPE Transfers’ (2003) 32 (2) ILJ 123-128; John Armour, Audrey Hsu and 
Adrian Walters, ‘The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations and Costs in Corporate Rescue 
Proceedings: A Report Prepared for the Insolvency Service’ (2006) 
<http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.96...rep...> accessed 18 March 
2012; David Burdette, ‘Formalities for the Transfer of Insolvent Business: Obligatory Transfer of 
Employees in South Africa and the United Kingdom’ (2007) 3 INSOL International Technical Services 
Issue. 
8  Frisby (n 1). 
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of compulsory transfer of employment relationships9 and the significant liabilities 
associated with unfair or wrongful dismissals makes downsizing to rescue 
insolvent businesses difficult. Dismissals can no longer be made, before or after a 
business transfer, without an economic, technical or organisational (ETO) 
justification. 10  With TUPE in the picture, it is almost impossible to sell any 
insolvent businesses, or part of a business (including in a pre-pack), without 
certain liabilities transferring to the transferee. The problem is that where an 
insolvent business cannot be sold this could have dire consequences, not just for 
the continuous existence of the business, but for the employees employed by the 
business. In the absence of a buyer, the business would be liquidated and given 
that liquidation is terminal, it inevitably, results in job losses for the employees. In 
such circumstances, TUPE would be otiose as it would have worked against the 
very employees it was intended to protect. In other words, employee protection 
and business rescue do not to go hand in hand.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the interplay between employee 
protection and business rescue policies during going concern transfers of 
insolvent businesses. The discussion will focus on the negative effects that 
applying TUPE to insolvency have on rescues of insolvent businesses in the UK. It 
is intended to critically examine the purposive approach of interpretation that UK 
courts have been constrained to adopt in relation to TUPE and the negative effects 
this has had on the rescue culture. This chapter argues that while the purposive 
interpretation required for construing TUPE may have enhanced the protection of 
employees’ rights in insolvent business transfers, it is has not been helpful to the 
pursuit of business rescues.  
Cases generated by TUPE as a result of its application to insolvency will be 
analysed and used to demonstrate the ambivalence and the differing effects of the 
regime on the employees and on the rescue culture in the UK.  It will be illustrated 
that the negative impact TUPE has on the rescues of insolvent businesses is due 
                                                          
9  TUPE 2006, Reg.4(2). 
10 Giuseppe S Massara, ‘Transfer of Undertakings: Insolvency Proceedings in the United Kingdom and 
in Italy and the European Court of Justice Case Law’ (2010) in Compliance with Labour Legislation: Its 
Efficacy and Efficiency, ILO Working Paper <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_dialogue/---lab_admin/documents/publication/wcms_140685.pdf> accessed 18 March 2012; M 
Sargeant, ‘Transferring Liabilit for Employee claims’ (2000) JBL 188- 192; A Kastrinou, N Shah & O 
Gough, ‘Corporate Rescue in the UK and Effect of the TUPE’ (2011) 32 (5) Company Lawyer 131;  
Frisby (n 1); Goldring (n 1). 
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mainly to the strict conditions TUPE imposes on transferors and transferees alike 
and the rights it gives to employees during insolvent business transfers.  
6.2 TUPE and transfers in the context of insolvency 
Under the 1981 TUPE Regulations, it was very problematic determining the scope 
of the regime. It was not very clear whether or not TUPE applied to transfers 
effected in the context of insolvency. This was because TUPE 1981 did not contain 
any special provisions to cater for transfers of insolvent undertakings. This was 
because the 1981 Regulations failed to expressly include or exclude transfers 
where the business, the subject of insolvency proceedings (liquidation, 
administration or receivership) was transferred.  The lacuna or defect in the 1981 
Regulations could be attributed to the parent law- the 1977 ARD (see chapter 4) 
which failed also to state expressly whether or not a business or undertaking 
transferred in the context of insolvency was covered.11  
The absence of any express provisions on TUPE’s application or otherwise to 
transfers in the context of insolvency meant that the responsibility for establishing 
the precise scope of the regime fell to the courts. To do so, however, the English 
courts had to look to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for guidance. TUPE was 
enacted to implement the ARD. The ECJ is a referral (not appellate) court on all 
matters of EU law including those arising from the ARD which TUPE implemented.  
It follows that the UK courts and employment tribunals, like the courts of all other 
Member States, are obliged to follow the interpretations of the ARD and decisions 
handed down by the ECJ12 in relation to it.13  
                                                          
11 For analysis on the ARD, see chapter 4. 
12 Under S. 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 and in relation to matters of EU law, decisions 
of the ECJ are binding on all courts up to, and including the Supreme Court of UK. Section 3(1) 
provides:  
For the purpose of all legal proceedings any question as to the meaning or effect of 
any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any EU instrument, 
shall be treated as a question of law (and, if not referred to the European Court, be 
for determination as such in accordance with the principles laid down by and any 
relevant decision of the European Court). 
13 The problem with this is that the ECJ is not consistent in the way it makes decisions. Often, 
decisions made by the ECJ conflict with its previous decisions on the same issue. What is more 
frustrating, perhaps, is the fact the ECJ seldom gives explanations on why it holds a contrary view 
from its previous view. The court rarely explains whether a particular decision it has made is meant to 
be of general importance. A good example of this problem is the case of Boor v Ministere De La 
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Regarding whether TUPE 1981 applied or not to transfers of undertakings in the 
context of insolvency, the guidance that the UK courts got from the ECJ in relation 
to the parent law (the ARD) on the issue was not very helpful. The available ECJ 
case-law (see below) which could have provided judicial authority on the matter 
was tentative. It did not categorically state whether the ARD applied or not to all 
transfers effected in the context of insolvency. In the leading case of Abels v 
Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-Industrie en de 
Electrotechnische Industrie14 the ECJ was asked to decide whether the scope of the 
ARD extended to a situation in which the transferor of an undertaking who had 
been adjudged insolvent and was granted a judicial leave to suspend payment of 
its debts under the Netherlands’ equivalent legislation to TUPE.  
In its response, the ECJ did not completely rule out the possibility of the ARD 
applying in such situations. The court said that the ARD did not impose an 
obligation on the Member States to extend the rules laid down therein to transfers 
of undertakings, businesses or part of businesses taking place in the context of 
insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation 
of the transferor’s assets and which the proceedings in question is under the 
supervision of a competent judicial authority. In other words, the ECJ said in 
paragraph 24 of the Abels decision15 that it was possible for a Member State to 
apply the principle of the ARD wholly, or in part, to such a business transfer on the 
basis of their national law alone. It seems the ECJ’s response was guided by the 
perception that applying the ARD to insolvent enterprises might deter potential 
rescuers and ultimately impact on employees’ job security.16 
The ECJ effectively left the decision on whether or not to apply TUPE to transfers 
out of insolvency to the courts. The Abels’ decision did not shed light on whether 
the ARD, and by extension TUPE, apply to transfers of insolvent undertakings. The 
decision caused confusions for UK judges and insolvency practitioners alike and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Fonction Publique [2005] IRLR 61 ECJ which was contrary to well established principles on changes to 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment. The ECJ in that case said that it is sometimes 
legitimate for a transferee employer to vary terms and conditions following, and in connection with a 
transfer. But no explanation was given of why this case should constitute an exception. The 
unpredictability of the ECJ regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the ARD is, partly to 
blame, why TUPE (especially the first generation TUPE Regulations) has generated the mass of case 
law that it has in the UK. Malcolm Sargeant, ‘New Transfer Regulations’  (2002) 31 (1) ILJ 35-54 
14  Case C-135/83 [1985] ECR 469. 
15 Abels is discussed in details below. 
16 Malcolm Sargeant, ‘Business Transfers and Corporate Insolvencies –the Effect of TUPE’ (1998) 14 (1) 
IL & P 8, 11. 
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led to the view that TUPE prima facie applied if the transferor was insolvent and, 
irrespective of the type of insolvency proceedings that were opened in relation to 
it, but that the ARD did not necessarily require it to. The confusion may have been 
due, in part, to the Government’s position on the matter. It seems that the UK 
Government had ‘decided’ from the outset that if the protections contained in the 
ARD, (as implemented by TUPE 1981) were to apply to transfers at all, they should 
do so regardless of whether the transferor was solvent or insolvent.  
There were a couple of provisions in the 1981 TUPE Regulations, for example, that 
pointed to that intent. For example, Regulation 3 (2) which stated that the 
Regulations apply ‘whether the transfer [was] effected by a sale or by some other 
disposition or by operation of law’ gave no indication that transfers by insolvent 
transferors were not caught by TUPE. In fact, the choice of words Regulation 3 was 
couched, if anything, gave rise to the notion that TUPE 1981 applied to transfers in 
all types of insolvency situations including liquidation. For this reason, TUPE was 
regarded as having a more favourable disposition towards UK employees than 
did the ARD upon which it is based (see below). 
The old Regulation 4 of TUPE 1981(concerning the ‘hive-down’ mechanism)17  was 
also indicative of the Government’s intention to apply the Transfer Regulations to 
insolvent businesses.  Regulation 4 did not expressly apply TUPE, but it could be 
argued that it did so by implication. Regulation 4 provided that where a receiver, 
an administrator, or a liquidator in a creditors’ voluntary winding up hived down 
the business of the company to a wholly-owned subsidiary before selling the 
shares or business of the subsidiary to a buyer, the latter transaction alone was to 
be considered a transfer for the purpose of TUPE.18  
The reference to insolvency procedures in the old Regulation 4, so the analysis 
goes, implied that TUPE was intended to apply to insolvent transfers, ‘and 
because such an extension would be more favourable to employees, that  was 
                                                          
17 The purpose of ‘hiving down’ was well articulated in Pambakian v Brentford Nylons Ltd [1978] ICR 
665. 
18 See e.g. Gerard McCormack, Corporate Rescue Law: An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward Edgar 
Publishing, 2008) 230, Sargeant (n 9); Wynn Derbyshire & Stephen Hardy, TUPE: Law and Practice (2nd 
edn., Spiramus Press, London 2009); McMullen (n 7) John McMullen, ‘TUPE Transfers: Changing 
Conditions of Employment’ (2006) <http://www.info4security.com/story.asp?storycode=3081454> 
accessed 19 August 2011.  
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permissible under the then Article 719(now Article 8)20 of the ARD.21 Ironically, 
while the purpose of the ‘hiving-down’ provision under Regulation 4 was meant to 
strengthen the position of insolvent transferors in selling insolvent undertakings, 
it was not favourable, to say the least, to the interests of the employees whom 
TUPE was meant to protect.22 The ‘hiving-down’ of a business served to defeat the 
ARD’s purpose of enabling existing employees to move across to the transferee 
with their contracts of employment.23  
 It afforded parties the opportunity to structure transfer transactions in a way that 
ensured that liability for all employee-related matters remained with the insolvent 
transferor. It was not surprising that this ‘anti-avoidance’ technique, designed to 
evade the protective regime of TUPE was challenged in Litster and others v Forth 
Dry Dock and Engineering Ltd.24  
The House of Lords held in that case that the automatic transfer provisions applied 
not only to those employed ‘immediately before the transfer’25 but also to those 
                                                          
19 Robin Henry, ‘Application of the Proposed TUPE Regulations to Insolvency Proceedings’ (2005) 
Company Law Newsletter. 
20  Article 8 of the ARD 2001 states: ‘ This Directive shall not affect the right of Member States to apply 
or introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to employees 
or to promote or permit collective agreements or agreements between social partners more 
favourable to employees.’ 
21 There is doubt, however, whether the 1981 Regulations could validly have introduced provisions 
more favourable to the employees within the meaning of Article 7 of the 1977 ARD. This is because 
the 1981 TUPE Regulations were passed as a Statutory Instrument using the special procedure rule of 
section 2 (2) of the European Communities Act (ECA) 1972 (which deals with transposition of EU 
directives), rather than by a formal Act of Parliament. The question is whether legislation enacted 
under section 2(2) ECA 1972 must be directed specifically to the exact implementation of the 
European obligation, or whether it may go further than the obligation without being ultra vires its 
statutory limit. This issue came to a head in the Scottish case of Addison v Denholm Ship Management 
(UK) Ltd, [1997] ICR 770 where the issue before the EAT was whether regulations made under section 
2(2) of ECA 1972 applied to the crew of a floating hotel /ship in the North Sea. The employers of the 
crew had contended that TUPE 1981 did not intend to confer employment protection upon the crew 
but that if, on their proper construction, the TUPE Regulations did purport to do so, they would be 
ultra vires since this was not an EU obligation. The EAT was of the view that the words ‘related to’ in 
section 2(2)(b) of ECA 1972 (which counsel for the crew sought to rely on) could not be used to enable 
a minister to widen, by regulation, the main thrust or effect of the Directive it is seeking to 
implement. The EAT drew from Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC in Hayward v Cammell Laird Shipbuilders 
Ltd (No. 2) [1988] ICR 464, 473 where it observed that as a matter of general law in relation to 
primary and subordinate legislation, ‘if the Directive [ARD] is to be regarded as a parent law, the child 
[TUPE] cannot be larger, wider, or have greater implications than its parent allows.’ Thus, by 
implication, if the effect of TUPE is to ‘confer a lesser exclusion, and less wider benefit, to workers 
otherwise excluded by the Directive’ the former has to be considered ultra vires the enabling power.  
22 Henry (n 19). 
23 For the purpose of the ARD and discussion on the ARD generally, see chapter 4. 
24 [1989] ICR 341 (HL). 
25 The meaning of the words ‘immediately before the transfer’ is considered below. 
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who could show that they would have been so employed had they not been 
unfairly dismissed for a reason connected with the transfer.26 The Litster decision 
made illegal the kind of ‘cavalier’ treatment the employees were often subjected 
to during transfers of insolvent undertakings which the Court of Appeal (CA) had 
indirectly encouraged in its decision in Secretary of State for Employment v 
Spence.27 The commercial usefulness of ‘hiving-down’ was effectively halted by 
the court in Re Maxwell Fleet and Facilities Management Ltd (in Administration).28 
Prior to Litster and Maxwell respectively, the CA had held in Spence, that contracts 
of employment of employees who were dismissed roughly 4 hours before a 
business transfer took place, did not transfer to the transferee. 29  This 
interpretation drew lots of criticisms. It tended to render compliance with TUPE’s 
obligations ‘voluntary’ 30  and provided strong economic incentives for the 
transferee to collude with the transferor to effect such dismissals so as to avoid or 
limit costs payable as compensation for unfair dismissal and redundancy.31 It is 
possible that by inserting the ‘hiving-down’ principle into the original Transfer 
Regulations, the Government must have anticipated that TUPE would constitute a 
major impediment to going concern transfers of insolvent businesses. 
6.3 The Transfer Regulations and insolvent 
businesses: conflict between the ‘rescue culture’32 
and employee protection 
In the event of a business transfer, the employee, his contract of employment and 
all rights and liabilities arising in connection with his employment contract, 
automatically transfer to the transferee. The employee’s consent is not 
                                                          
26 In accordance with the old Regulation 8 of the 1981 TUPE Regulations (now Regulation 7(1)). 
27 [1986] ICR 651 (CA). This case is discussed in detail below. 
28 [2000] IRLR 368. 
29 This pattern of interpretation continued in subsequent cases even after Litster. Some of these cases 
are discussed the section on ‘transfer-connected’ dismissals below. 
30  Paul Davies, ‘Amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive’ (1988) 17 ILJ 249, 250. 
31  H Collins, ‘Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency’ (1986) 15 ILJ 144, 150. 
32 The term ‘rescue culture’ as used here denotes the legal and institutional responses to financial 
distress that is aimed, first and foremost, at saving a company experiencing cash-flow difficulty, and 
where that proves impossible, save the company’s business as a going concern, rather than simply 
shutting it down and distributing proceeds to creditors at the earliest sign of corporate ill-health. See 
also definition of terms in chapter 1. 
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necessary33 and the transfer is effective whether or not the employee was aware 
of the transfer and the identity of the transferee before the transfer.34 
In practice, applying TUPE to insolvency has created a tension between business 
rescue and employee protection. TUPE has been criticized for bringing confusion 
in business transfers in the context of insolvency to ‘new heights’.35 The problems 
TUPE pose to business rescues has made the Regulations to be described as an 
inadequate response to the UK’s obligation to comply with the ARD.36 Applying 
TUPE to insolvent transfers is perceived as impeding the rescues of such 
businesses. The evidence of the Society of Practitioners of Insolvency to the House 
of Lords corroborates this assertion. The Society stated that: 
It has been well known since the Litster 37  case in 1989 that the transfer of 
undertakings legislation is an impediment to the rescue of businesses in the 
context of formal insolvency and therefore has the opposite from its intended 
effect of preserving employment and employees’ rights. Insolvency Practitioners 
can cite numerous examples of cases where the prospect of taking over accrued 
liabilities under employment contracts has either deterred prospective 
purchasers of insolvent businesses from dealing altogether, or has caused them to 
discount the price which they are prepared to pay.38 
From the above, it is obvious that the perception amongst many is that there is a 
problem with applying TUPE to insolvency situations. Viewed from the employee 
protection perspective, the Transfer Regulations have proved very effective. They 
have enabled the courts to look behind the legal structures of companies in order 
                                                          
33 Berg v Besselsen (Joined Cases 144 and 145/87) [1988] ECR 2559. 
34 TUPE is conflict prone. For example, in Photostatic Copiers (Southern) Ltd v Okuda and Japan Office 
Equipment Ltd (in liquidation) [1995] IRLR 11, the ET was of the view that Reg. 4 does not take effect 
until and unless an affected employee is given notice of the fact of the transfer and the transferee’s 
identity without which the employee will not be able to exercise his or her right to object to the 
transfer. The Okuda decision has been criticised as not reflecting the correct position of the law. If it 
was correct it would be alarming because it would allow employers to short-change the employees. Transferor 
employers could deny employees their rights on a transfer simply by not telling them about the transfer. 
Morrison J in the later case of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Cook [1997] IRLR 150 (EAT) 
said the decision should not be followed. For the correct position on this point, see the ECJ’s decision 
in Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA and IGC Housing Service [1997] IRLR 127. 
35 See comments by Lord Hunt of Wirral in the House of Lords Debates of May 3, 2006 
<http://www.theyworkforyou.com/lords/?id=2006-05-03b.533.2> accessed 12 September 2008. See 
also S Bewick, ‘TUPE 2006- A Missed Opportunity’ (2006) 3 International Corporate Rescue 228. 
36John McMullen, Business Transfers and Employee Rights (4th edn., Butterworths Law 1998).  See 
also, Dennis Boyd, ‘Corporate Rescue and Employees’ Rights’ (1997) 48 N. Ir Legal Quarterly 297 – 
306. 
37 This case is discussed in detail below. 
38 Select Committee on the European Communities session 1995-96 5th report. 
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to protect the rights of the employees, especially in insolvent business transfer 
situations.39 From the time they were first introduced in 1981 and, as far as the 
protection of the employees’ rights during business transfers is concerned, TUPE 
has proved to be a good and very effective law.  
TUPE offers greater prospects of continuity of employment when the situation of 
an insolvent business is less than terminal and where a going concern sale of the 
business can be effected40 in comparison to the common law rule on transfers. 
The common law was, in comparative terms, ‘hostile’ to the interests of the 
employees in transfer situations. As discussed in chapter 4, a business transfer, 
solvent or insolvent, under the common law put paid to all employment 
relationships and terminated contracts of employment. TUPE operates in a 
completely opposite way. The transfer of a business automatically transfers all 
extant contracts of employment to the transferee. The underlying philosophy of 
the regime seems to be that restructuring which prevents employees from 
maintaining and, or ‘benefitting from their legal rights’ 41  should not be 
permitted.42 
However, TUPE’S application to insolvency situations has imposed costs on 
rescue. The risk of unknown liabilities, from activities carried out by the 
transferor, passing to the transferee is particularly high given the financial state of 
the insolvent transferor. The mandatory transfer of liabilities to the transferee is a 
major disincentive to prospective purchasers of insolvent undertakings. These 
have in turn affected the number of insolvent but viable businesses that could 
have been rescued and the number of jobs that could have been saved had TUPE 
not prevented the going concern sales of those businesses.43 It is in these types of 
scenarios that the role of TUPE in preserving employment rights becomes 
questionable.44 
Applying TUPE to insolvent transfers has therefore created a tension between 
business rescue on the one hand and employee protection on the other. The 
                                                          
39 Gill Sage, TUPE: A Practical Guide, (The Law Society, London 2002) 1. 
40 Frisby (n 3) 253. 
41  Kastrinou, Shah & Gough (n 16) 137. 
42 This echoes the views of the Traditionalists and in particular, those of LoPucki, the progenitor of the 
team production theory of bankruptcy reorganization. See Chapter 2 of thesis. 
43  Robert Upex & M Ryley, TUPE: Law and Practice (Jordan Publishing Limited, Bristol 2006) 103; 
Frisby (n 1) 252-255. 
44 Collins (n 31) 147 – 158; Paul Davies, ‘Employee Claims in Insolvency: Corporate Rescues and 
Preferential Claims’ (1994) 23 ILJ 141. 
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employer’s prerogatives, for example, to dismiss employees and sell a business 
that is insolvent in order to save it (and potentially some jobs), clash with TUPE’s 
aim to protect the employees against such dismissals. Dismissals can no longer be 
made by the transferor in connection with an insolvent business transfer without 
an economic, technical or organisational justification for dismissing the 
employees.45   
The point is not that the transferor cannot dismiss employees, what is problematic 
however is the fact that liabilities for the dismissals automatically transfers to the 
transferee. Also, the need to take on all the employees of the transferor does not 
make the insolvent business an attractive purchase target. TUPE increases the 
cost of the rescue process to the transferee.46 A prospective buyer may become 
reluctant to see the deal through first by potential employee-related liabilities and 
second if required, regardless of its own requirements, to take on what, in his 
estimation, is an overstaffed insolvent business.47 This is because ‘cherry-picking’ 
amongst employees, which was legitimate and easy to achieve when the common 
law regulated business transfers, is difficult and much more complex with TUPE 
transfers48 (see below). All of the above issues tend to militate against the ‘policy 
of the law seeking to facilitate corporate rescue’.49 
As discussed in chapter 7, changes have been made to the current Transfer 
Regulations to make it easier to sell insolvent businesses, but unfortunately even 
with these changes the conflict between the rescue objective of insolvency law 
and the employment protection goal of employment law has not been eliminated 
                                                          
45 Regulation 7 of TUPE 2006 (Dismissal of employee because of relevant transfer) reflects the 
language of the ARD by providing that: ‘Where either before or after a relevant transfer, any 
employee of the transferor or transferee is dismissed, that employee shall be treated for the purposes 
of Part X of the 1996 Act (unfair dismissal) as unfairly dismissed if the sole or principal reason for his 
dismissal is (a) the transfer itself; or(b) a reason connected  with the transfer that is not an economic, 
technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce.’ See also Wheeler v Patel [1987] 
ICR 631; Willis v McLaughlin & Harvey plc [1998] EuRL 22. See also the recent CA decision on 
Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillvoine [2011] EWCA Civ 1565 in which the court held that the claimant’s 
dismissal was not for an ETO reason. The dismissal was for transfer-connected reason and was 
automatically unfair. See further chapter 5. 
46 John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2): Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2000) 29 
(4) ILJ 395 – 402. 
47  David Pollard, ‘TUPE and Insolvency: Part 2’ (2006) Insolvency Intelligence 102, 104; Sargeant (n 
10). 
48  Frisby (n 1) 251. 
49  Armour & Deakin (n 9); Frisby (n 1); Collins (n 31). 
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completely.50 There are several factors that have made the application of the 2006 
Transfer Regulations to insolvent transfers cumbersome one of which is the notion 
of ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ discussed below. 
6.4 The concept of ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ 
According to Regulation 8, TUPE applies to transfers in the context of insolvency 
‘if at the time of the transfer the transferor is subject to relevant insolvency 
proceedings.’ The question then is: what are ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’?  
This is defined under Regulation 8 (6) as: 
...insolvency proceedings which have been opened in relation to the 
transferor not with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor 
and which are under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner.51 
It has been unclear from the above definition what proceedings in the UK are 
‘bankruptcy or analogous insolvency proceedings’ and in particular whether 
administration could come within this definition. While the above definition is 
convenient for the Government because it avoids the need to list out the different 
kinds of insolvency procedures to which TUPE applies, it carries with it the 
uncertainty contained in the ECJ case law test in D’Urso 52 because it will be 
difficult sometimes to ascertain whether or not TUPE applies to a transfer.53 
Broadly speaking insolvency situations in the UK can be divided into liquidation 
and alternatives to liquidation. There are three types of liquidation namely: 
compulsory liquidation, members’ voluntary liquidation and creditors’ voluntary 
liquidation. Likewise, there are three main alternatives to liquidation namely: 
company voluntary arrangement, administrative receivership and administration. 
These are considered below. 
                                                          
50 See the section on ‘application of the Transfer Regulations to insolvency: Effects on insolvent 
business’ below. 
51 The Government decided, it seems, to take the easy way out by ‘copying out’ the provisions of 
Article 5 (1) of the 2001 ARD. 
52 See discussion below. 
53 McMullen (n 7). See also the view of Lord Hunt of Wirral, House of Lords debate 25th Report from 
the Merits Committee, Hansard, 3 May 2006 col. 534 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060503/text/60503-25.htm> 
accessed 25 November 2011. There is further discussion on this point in chapter 7. 
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6.4.1 Company voluntary arrangement 
The company voluntary arrangement (CVA) procedure was introduced in 1986.54 
It owes its origin to the Cork Committee who felt the need to make it possible for a 
company, like an individual, to be able to enter into a binding arrangement with 
its creditors55 by a simple procedure in order to organise its debts. In a CVA, a 
proposal has to be submitted by the director, a liquidator or an administrator (if 
the company is in liquidation or in administration proceedings respectively) to a 
nominee, whose role is to act initially as nominee while the CVA is being 
proposed.  
If the proposal is acceptable to the nominee, he or she will first file a copy of the 
proposal with the court, and then call a meeting of the shareholders and creditors. 
If the proposal is approved56 during the meeting, it will bind each person (except 
secured creditors)57 who had notice of the meetings and was entitled to vote.58 
Once the CVA has been implemented, the nominee becomes the supervisor.59  At 
that point he or she becomes an officer of the court and is subject to the court’s 
control.60  Clearly, the TUPE Regulations will apply to CVA since this procedure 
does not have the characteristics of liquidation proceedings. The objective of a 
CVA is to facilitate the continuation of the business as a going concern.  
6.4.2 Administrative receivership 
An administrative receivership is: 
a receiver or manager of wholly (or substantially the whole) of a 
company’s property appointed by or on behalf of the holders of 
                                                          
54 The CVA procedure is set in Part 1 of the IA 1986 and Part 1 OF THE Insolvency Rules 1986. 
55 The courts have characterised the relationship between parties to a CVA as essentially contractual. 
See Re TBL Realisations plc, Oakley-Smith v Greenberg [2004] BCC 81; Whitehead v Household 
Mortgage Corp [2003] 1 All ER 319. 
56 The proposal needs to be approved by 75% of creditors voting in person or by proxy by reference to 
the value of their claims. 
57  IA 1986 s. 4 (3). 
58 IA 1986 s. 5 (2) (b). See also Wesley v Brelec Installations Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 576, 579g. It binds every 
person who was entitled to vote at the meeting whether such a person was present at the meeting or 
not, and if present, whether or not he or she voted in favour of the arrangement. The requirement to 
bind persons who did not receive notice of the meeting was added by IA 2000, s. 2 and Sch. 2. On why 
this is so see e.g. Johnson v Davies [1999] Ch 117, 129H-130A (it creates a statutory hypothesis that a 
person who had notice of the meeting and, was entitled to vote at it, is a party to an arrangement to 
which he has given his consent (Chadwick LJ). 
59 See IA 1986, part 1, paras 1(2) & 7 (2)(b). 
60 As an officer of the court he has an obligation to act honourably. He or she is subject to the rule 
in  Re Condon, Ex parte James (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609). 
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any debentures of the company secured by a charge which, as 
created, was a floating charge, or by such a charge and one or 
more other securities.61  
Administrative receivership is purely contractual and offers a means for the 
realisation and enforcement of security.  The receiver receives income and takes 
charge of the management of the company. An administrative receiver, typically, 
seeks to sell part or all of the business of an insolvent company as a going 
concern to a transferee. Assets transfer as elements of a going concern in the 
context of administrative receivership proceedings should not be confused with 
the transfer of assets as separate assets in liquidation. In D’Urso v Ercole Marelli 
Elettromeccanica Generale SpA (in special administration) and others62 and Spijkers 
v Gebroaders Benedik Abattoir  respectively,63 the Advocate General pointed out 
that  the transfer of assets as ‘a going concern’ is not the same thing as the transfer 
of assets as ‘separate assets’ in the course of liquidation. The former enables the 
business of the company to be maintained as far as possible while the latter does 
not.  
Given the fact that whether a particular insolvency procedure is covered by TUPE 
depends on the purpose of the procedure concerned and, taking into account the 
views of the ECJ in the above cases, administrative receivership would, clearly, 
be characterised as insolvency proceedings opened ‘not with a view to the 
liquidation of the assets of the transferor.’ This means that the TUPE Regulations, 
which must be construed in accordance with the ARD, will apply to any eventual 
transfer. Thus in relation to the discussion on ‘relevant insolvency proceedings,’ 
administrative receivership will come under the ambit of TUPE since it does not 
have the characteristics of liquidation proceedings. 
6.4.3 Administration  
The administration procedure introduced in 1986 is one of the most commonly 
used forms of insolvency procedure. It is designed to help in the rescue of 
companies.  Its inherent moratorium is a useful mechanism for freezing the 
enforcement of security by creditors or for barring creditors from presenting 
                                                          
61 IA 1986, s. 29 (2). On the advantages and disadvantages of the institution of administrative 
receivership, see ‘situating UK insolvency system within extant theories’ in chapter 2. 
62 [1991] ECR 1-4321. 
63 [1986] CMLR 296 
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petition for the winding-up of the company. This ‘buys’ the company time to 
negotiate with its creditors to see if the business can be saved without winding-up 
the company.  
Ordinarily, administration would come under the definition of ‘relevant 
insolvency proceedings,’ as the administration procedure is similar to the concept 
of ‘surseance van betaling’ (suspension of payments) under Netherlands law, 
which the ECJ, in Abels, held did not exempt a transfer from the ARD as such 
proceedings may allow the continuation of business. However, to reach such a 
conclusion would be hasty given the different objectives of administration.  
The provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 governing administration place a duty 
on the administrator to pursue the objective of the administration proceedings 
according to a strictly prioritised order.64 The Act directs the administrator of a 
company to perform his functions with the objective of ‘rescuing the company as a 
going concern.’65 This objective is aimed at the survival of the company intact. It 
is only if the administrator thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve 
this primal objective of administration that he or she is entitled to step down to the 
second objective66 of ‘achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a 
whole than would be likely if the company were wound up.’67 The administrator 
should pursue this objective only if he or she thinks it would achieve a better 
result for the company’s creditors as a whole.68 This objective may be achieved 
via the sale or transfer of the business of the company as a going concern to third 
party purchaser. It is only where the administrator thinks that either the first or 
second objectives  are not reasonably practicable that he or she is at liberty to 
pursue the third objective69 of ‘realising property in order to make a distribution 
to one or more secured or preferential creditors.70 
In light of the above, it appears that any administration having as its purpose the 
continuation or survival of the business (that is for a purpose within the meaning of 
Schedule B1 paragraphs 3 (1) (a) & (b) of Insolvency Act 1986), will be deemed 
                                                          
64 IA 1986 Schd.B1 para. 3(1).  
65 IA 1986 Schd.B1 para. 3(1) (a). 
66 IA 1986 Schd.B1 para. 3(3) (a). 
67 IA 1986 Schd.B1 para. 3(1) (b). 
68 IA 1986 Schd.B1 para. 3 (3) (b). 
69 IA 1986 Schd. B1 para. 3 (4) (a). 
70 IA 1986 Schd. B1 para. 3 (1) (c). Further, the administrator can only pursue this duty in a way that 
does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the company’s creditors as whole. IA 1986 Schd. B1 para 
3 (4) (b). 
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‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ and therefore within the scope of the Transfer 
Regulations.71 As a corollary, an administration for the sole purpose of the more 
advantageous realisation of the company’s assets than would be effected on a 
winding-up may not come within the scope of the Transfer Regulations.  It follows 
that if the administrator selects the third objective of administration at the outset of 
the administration, this may not qualify as ‘relevant insolvency proceedings.’ 
6.4.4 Liquidation 
Liquidation involves the termination of the existence of a company. This may take 
place whether the company in question is solvent or insolvent. The liquidation 
procedure can be a stand-alone procedure or it can be used following a 
receivership, CVA or administration.  Liquidation may either be voluntary or by 
court order. A voluntary liquidation may be either a members’ voluntary winding-
up or a creditors’ voluntary winding-up. Under the former, control of the winding-
up proceedings and the right to appoint a liquidator, remains with the 
shareholders. Under the latter, members cede control to the creditors. The 
creditors will also acquire the right to override appointment of a liquidator by the 
members. The liquidator’s main duty is to take over the powers of the Directors of 
the company, oversee the management of the business, realise the assets of the 
business,72 and use the proceeds to pay the debts of the business in the order 
prescribed by the Insolvency legislation.  
6.4.4.1 Is liquidation a ‘relevant insolvency proceeding?’ 
According to the ECJ’s jurisprudence in Abels, the ARD does not impose 
obligation on Member States to extend the rules laid down therein to transfers 
taking place in the context of insolvency proceedings which are instituted with a 
view to the liquidation of the transferor’s assets. This is without prejudice to the 
national legislator’s right to decide otherwise. The ECJ took the view that if it was 
                                                          
71In fact, in the recent case of OTG Ltd v Barke and other [2011] IRLR 272, the EAT held that the 
purpose of administration proceedings under the Insolvency Act 1986 is to rescue the business as a 
going concern, not to liquidate its assets. Accordingly, employees of a business in administration will 
transfer under the TUPE Regulations when the business is sold by the administrator to a transferee. 
72 Note however that while the liquidator is responsible for taking custody of the company’s assets, 
the assets in question do not automatically vest in him. This is the difference between the liquidator 
and a trustee in bankruptcy, in which the bankrupt’s estate vests immediately on appointment 
without the need for any conveyance, assignment or transfer. See Insolvency Act 1986, s. 306 (1). But 
in a compulsory liquidation, the liquidator can apply to the court for a vesting order. See Insolvency 
Act 1986, s. 145 (1).  See Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London 2005) 120. 
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intended for the ARD to apply to liquidation this would have been expressly 
stated by its drafters. 
It seems that it may be possible for TUPE to apply to liquidation in the UK but this 
will depend, however, on the type of liquidation procedure and the conduct of the 
liquidator concerned. To recap, ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ is defined by 
Regulation 8(6) as proceedings opened ‘not with a view to the liquidation of the 
assets of the transferor.’ It follows that in any insolvency proceedings, the most 
important consideration is the purpose of the proceedings (that is, whether they 
are aimed at the liquidation of the company’s assets or not), rather than their 
outcome.73 Thus, to ascertain whether any of the liquidation proceedings would 
be covered, the various types of liquidation procedures would have to be 
analysed. 
6.4.4.2 Members’ Voluntary Liquidation (MVL)  
The MVL is a solvent winding up of a company and is therefore not a relevant 
insolvency proceeding under Regulation 8(6). Thus Regulations 4 and 7 will apply 
to protect employees in MVL.  Regulation 8 is not applicable in this respect.  
6.4.4.3 Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) 
In circumstances where a liquidator transfers a business in a CVL procedure, 
Regulations 4 and 7 will not apply, pursuant to Regulation 8 (7). The CVL 
proceeding is usually under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner. The 
transfer of a business by a liquidator in a CVL would, in the absence of express 
agreement substituting the transferee as the employer, terminate the employees’ 
contracts of employment. Affected employees would then be entitled to claim 
against the state, (that is, through the National Insurance Fund) payments in 
relation to arrears of wages and redundancy payments etc. 
6.4.4.4 Compulsory Liquidation 
Where a company is wound up compulsorily by the court on grounds of being 
unable to pay its debts, 74 Regulations 4 and 7 will not apply to transfer the 
employees’ contracts automatically to the transferee. The reason is because once 
                                                          
73  D’Urso & ors v Ercole Marelli Ellectromeccanica Generale SpA & ors  Case C-362/89 [1991] ECR 1-
4105. 
74  IA 1986 ss 122 & 123. 
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a winding-up order is granted by the court, all existing contracts of employment 
are deemed automatically terminated. Contracts of employment may not however 
terminate where the liquidator elects to carry on trading the business with the 
consent of the court and where the employees continue to be employed by the 
business. The liquidator and the employees could agree that there is no 
termination of employment contracts. The same effect would be produced in a 
situation where a winding-up proceeding is converted into administration.  
In sum, the application of the Transfer Regulations to transfers in the context of 
insolvency may be seen as an attempt by the UK government to provide greater 
domestic law protection to UK employees that potentially would be impacted by 
transfers of insolvent undertakings. If that is the case, it could be argued that this 
reasoning aligns with the aim of those who were instrumental to the adoption of 
the ARD. The ARD was one of the social policy measures designed to protect the 
rights of EU workers in the context of business transfers as discussed in chapter 4.  
Whether the implementation of the ARD by TUPE 1981 to cover insolvent business 
transfers, that has been carried over by TUPE 2006, was deliberately done to 
achieve the ‘extended’ effect of granting enhanced protection to UK employees is 
a moot point. 75  One thing is certain: the enhanced protection the Transfer 
Regulations have given to the employees during business transfers would be 
acclaimed by the Traditionalists generally and by the progenitor of the team 
production theory of bankruptcy discussed in chapter 2. On the contrary, the 
Proceduralists and the creditors’ bargain theorists would consider the extended 
protection an impediment to the creditors’ ability to easily dispose of an insolvent 
business through the liquidation procedure (see discussion on theories in chapter 
2). 
Having analysed the various insolvency proceedings, it is important also to know 
when a business may become subject to ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ since 
any action taken prior to that moment may have consequences for the transferee 
in terms of liability. 
                                                          
75 David  Pollard, ‘Insolvent Companies and TUPE’ (1996) 25 ILJ 194. 
214 
 
6.5 When is a business subject to relevant 
insolvency proceedings? 
The fact that a business is insolvent does not mean that it is automatically subject 
to ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’. A condition of the TUPE 2006 insolvency 
provisions applying to a transfer is that at the time the transfer occurs, ‘relevant 
insolvency proceedings’ must apply and those proceedings must be under the 
supervision of an insolvency practitioner.76  
In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Slater & ors,77 the directors of CFG 
Site Services Limited (CFG Ltd) appreciated that the company was insolvent and 
on 25 July 2006 made a decision to put it into voluntary liquidation. 78On the same 
day the decision to liquidate the company was made (25 July 2006), the directors 
appointed a firm of accountants (Deliottes) to assist the company in preparing for 
its eventual winding up.  
The next day (26 July 2006), the accountants attended the company’s premises 
and CFG Ltd’s entire workforce (including Mr Slater) was given notice of 
redundancy by Mr Ramsbottom - a staff of Deliottes. On 27 July 2006, CFG Ltd’s 
business was transferred to a new company - CFG Site Services Nationwide 
Limited (CFG Nationwide – a company formed by some ex-Directors of CFG Ltd) 
as a going concern. CFG Nationwide then re-employed the staff (including Mr 
Slater). The sale of the business took place before the members and creditors’ 
meetings (the statutory two stage-procedures required) were held. CFG Ltd was 
not, however, formally put into voluntary liquidation until after these two meetings 
took place on 16 August 2006. 
The employees (including Mr Slater) wanted arrears of pay. They claimed that, 
following the transfer, the new employer (CFG Nationwide) owed them back pay. 
CFG Nationwide argued that it had not acquired any liabilities given that at the 
time CFG Ltd’s business was transferred to it, insolvency proceedings had 
                                                          
76  See TUPE 2006, regs. 8 (1) & 8 (6). 
77  [2007] IRLR 928 (Elias P). 
78The process in question was a creditors’ voluntary winding up which first required a members’ 
meeting to be called so as to agree on a winding up and then to be followed by a meeting of the 
creditors to confirm the members’ proposal. By virtue of section 98 of the IA 1986, the creditors' 
meeting is required to be called within 14 days of the members’ meeting.  Once these formalities 
have been completed, then a liquidator can be appointed. 
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already started therefore it was exempt from liabilities under Regulation 8 of 
TUPE 2006.  
The Employment Tribunal (ET) held that under Regulation 7 of TUPE 2006, ‘at the 
time of the transfer’ the transferor (CFG Ltd) was subject to ‘insolvency 
proceedings’. For that reason, the ET held that Regulation 4 of TUPE 2006 was 
excluded and that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (SS) was liable for 
debts under section 182 OF ERA 1996. The SS appealed arguing that though there 
were insolvency proceedings, they did not exist ‘at the time of the relevant 
transfer’. 
The EAT was ask to determine whether ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ had 
been commenced by the directors at the time the decision was made by them to 
wind up the company, or whether they were commenced following the formal 
appointment of a liquidator. The EAT was of the view that the liquidation of the 
company started as a consequence of the creditors’ voluntary liquidation  which, 
in turn,  commenced either as a result of the resolution of the members, or as a 
result of the creditors’ meeting. However, the liquidation proper did not occur 
until after liquidators were appointed and the business was transferred. Thus, 
there were no insolvency proceedings in place when the business was 
transferred. The EAT stated that even if there were insolvency proceedings, they 
were not under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner (as required by 
TUPE Regulations 8 (6) and (7)) since Mr Ramsbottom could not be properly 
described as an insolvency practitioner until the day he was appointed liquidator.  
The consequence of this decision was that the Secretary of State was not liable for 
the debts, that is, liable to make payments to transferred employees out of the 
insolvency fund, by virtue of Regulation 8. These liabilities, rather than remained 
with the insolvent company, where technically, they would have been the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State, transferred to the transferee. The core or 
significance of this decision, (as this relates to the notion of ‘relevance insolvency 
proceedings’) is that, where a business is insolvent, until formal insolvency 
proceedings have been instituted or opened in relation to it, such a business is 
not subject to ‘relevant insolvency proceedings.’ It also means that in all cases of 
transfers, the appointment of the supervisor (IP) must precede the business 
transfer itself before a TUPE-transfer could be deemed to have taken place.  
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In the section below, it is intended to explore how the Transfer Regulations 
function in practice and to evaluate whether the protection they give to 
employees interfere with insolvency proceedings and impair the rescue of 
financially distressed businesses as claimed.79 The aim is to conduct an ‘audit’ of 
the consequences of a TUPE-business transfer for the parties. 
6.6 Application of the Transfer Regulations to 
insolvency: effects on insolvent businesses 
The Transfer Regulations have a dual character. This dual character or goal is in 
conflict with each other.80 From the transferor’s perspective they are targeted at 
facilitating the transfer of insolvent undertakings. From the employee’s 
perspective, TUPE’s goal is to mitigate the effects of business transfers on them. 
TUPE uses a number of mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of employees in 
the business when there is a change of employer. Whilst these mechanisms have 
been very effective in the context of protecting the rights of employees, they have 
indirectly impinged on the transferor’s ability to sell insolvent businesses. Strict 
compliance with TUPE’s provisions in transfers involving insolvent businesses 
could prove disastrous to their rescues. However, relaxing the provisions of TUPE 
could expose the employees to job insecurity. Employees could be susceptible to 
mass dismissals in transfer situations as a result of the transferee’s unwillingness 
to take on all of the transferor’s employees.81 This scenario typifies the tension 
between employee protection and business rescue in insolvency. In order to fully 
appreciate how the employee protective regime of TUPE has potentially 
undermined the rescue culture, it is important to examine the operation of TUPE in 
the context of insolvency. 
                                                          
79  John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Insolvency and Employment Protection: The Mixed Effects of the 
Acquired Rights Directive’ (2003) 22 International Review of Law and Economics 443–463;  Parr & 
Bennett (n 1); Samuel E Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing 
Policies through the Lens of Theories’ (2011), 32 (4)  Company Lawyer 99 -113; Armour and Deakin (n 
9); Kastrinou, Shah & Gough (n 16); Davies (n 27); Collins (n 31). 
80  This claim is buttressed by the fact some while some provisions of TUPE 2006 (e.g. reg. 4) is 
targeted at the protection of the employees’ rights in a business transfer, others (e.g. regs. 8 & 9) are 
directed at facilitating free enterprise and business sales which threatens the employees’ job security. 
See also Guidance issued by the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills at 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file20761.pdf> 
81 Kastrinou, Shah & Gough (n 16) 131. 
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6.6.1 Transfer of employment contracts 
Regulation 4 (ex reg. 5) is central to the operation of the TUPE. It is a typical 
employee protection measure that prevents or alleviates the consequences of 
workforce reductions in employer insolvency and business transfers.  Regulation 
4(1) states: 
A relevant transfer shall not operate so as to terminate the contract of 
employment of any person employed by the transferor and assigned to 
the organised grouping of resources or employees that is subject to the 
relevant transfer, which would otherwise be terminated by the transfer, 
but any such contract shall have effect after the transfer as if originally 
made between the person so employed and the transferee. 
Regulation 4 (2) provides (subject to certain exceptions) that: 
...on the completion of a relevant transfer- (a) all the transferor’s rights, 
powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with any such 
contracts shall be transferred by virtue of this regulation to the 
transferee...82 
Deconstructing Regulation 4, it quickly becomes apparent that its provision, 
(which are the equivalent of Article 3 of the ARD),83 have several effects. One of 
the effects is that there is a statutory ‘novation’ of the contract of employment.84 
Novation (meaning the substitution of a third party for one of the original parties 
to a contract without the need for a tripartite agreement)85 is not new to general 
contractual principles. 86  In its traditional form, novation of contract usually 
requires the consent of all parties concerned and not by statutory intervention as 
is the case with TUPE. 87  There is usually an agreement by which a contract 
between parties A and B is discharged, and a new contract made between parties 
                                                          
82 Note: the general position set out in Reg. 4 (1) is subject to two qualifications. Regulation 4(7) 
provides that Regulations 4 (1) and (2) will not take effect if the employees inform the transferor or 
the transferee that they object to becoming employed by the transferee.  In such circumstances, a 
relevant transfer shall operate to terminate the employee’s contract of employment with the 
transferor but he or she will not be treated, for any purpose, as having been dismissed by the 
transferor. TUPE 2006, Reg. 4 (8). 
83 See chapter 5. 
84 Secretary of State for Employment v Spence and ors [1996] ICR 651, CA (Balcombe LJ). 
85  Look Chan Ho, ‘Novation, Variation and Rescission – A Question of Intention? (2008) 
<http://www.insolvencylawforum.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=407:novat
ion-variation-and-rescission-a-question-of-intention&catid=8:opinion-posts&Itemid=20> accessed 12 
April 2012. 
86  See Chitty on Contracts Hugh Beale (ed.) (29th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2004)1201. 
87 Transfer of Undertakings: Employment Law Handbook (Incomes Data Services, London 2011) 83. 
218 
 
A and C (with C being the new party that replaces party B).88 The effect of 
Regulation 4 is not, technically, to assign or transfer the contract per se.  Rather, it 
extinguishes the original contract and replaces it with a new one.89  
Because Regulation 4 operates to transfer both the benefit and burden of the 
contract from the transferor to the transferee, novation is required. This is 
because it is an established rule of English law that an assignment90 of a contract 
can only transfer the benefit of that contract (for example the right to receive 
payment or profits or the benefit of goods or services) to a third party91 and not 
the burden92 (i.e. contractual liability or obligations, for example, to perform 
certain services, deliver certain goods under the contract). This means that the 
burden of the contract remains with the assignor. To transfer both the benefit and 
burden of a contract usually requires novation. This, technically, is what TUPE 
does in transfers. 
6.6.2 Transfer of contracts: benefits for employees 
In relation to the employees, and viewed against what their position during 
business transfers was under the common law, Regulation 4 (1) is a ‘game 
changer’ given the benefits it bestows on them. The transfer of a business 
‘contemporaneously’ transfers all contracts of employment to the transferee.93 In 
effect, all employees employed in the business ‘immediately before the 
                                                          
88 See e.g. Davies and ors v Jones and anor [2009] EWCA Civ 1164. 
89 Habibsons Bank Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 1335. 
90 An assignment is a transfer, recognised by law, of the rights held by one person to another. An 
assignment in itself does not operate to create a contract between the assignee and the non-assigning 
party nor does it make the assignee a party to the original contract. In other words, assignment differs 
from novation because in the former, the parties to the contract do not change. It is also not possible 
to assign the burden of a contract, that is, the obligations. 
91 The only exception is if the contract contains a restriction on assignment or is a personal contract. 
See e.g.  Don King Productions Inc. v Frank Warren [1999] 2 All ER 218, where the contracts in 
question were personal contracts (i.e. between Frank Warren and the boxers he managed) and 
therefore not capable of assignment. 
92 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660. Collins MR stated 
at 668:  
It is, I think, quite clear that neither at law nor in equity could the burden of a 
contract be shifted off the shoulders of a contractor on to those of another without 
the consent of the contractee. A debtor cannot relieve himself of his liability to his 
creditor by assigning the burden of the obligation to somebody else; this can only be 
brought about by the consent of all three, and involves the release of the original 
debtor. 
93  Frisby (n 1). 
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transfer’94 become, by default, employees of the transferee.95 Moreover, these 
employees transfer with the same terms and conditions of employment they had 
with the transferor.96  
In North Wales Training and Enterprise Council Ltd v Astley & others97 the House of 
Lords noted a key effect of Regulation 4. Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed that 
Regulation 4 introduces a ‘fictional element into the tripartite relationship’ (i.e. the 
relationship between the transferor, the potential transferee and the employee in 
a TUPE business transfer), given that upon the satisfaction of the prescribed 
legislative conditions, the employee transferred is treated as having been 
employed by the transferee all along when in fact such is not the case.98  
Seen from the above perspective, it is safe to conclude that the purpose of 
Regulation 4 (1), as articulated by Balcombe LJ,99 is to override the common law 
contractual position. The common law rule on transfers was hostile to the interest 
of the employees in terms of job security. A business transfer terminated all 
contracts of employment. 100  It is this disadvantage that TUPE is intended to 
obviate. Granted, TUPE was not enacted purposefully to abolish the common law 
rule on business transfers (since it was enacted primarily to implement an EU 
Directive), the fact remains, however, that that is one of the effects of Regulation 4. 
Not only does TUPE supersede the common law rule on transfers, but it has 
abolished it completely.  
                                                          
94 This phrase is defined below. Once an employee’s contract of employment is transferred, the 
affected employee is barred from bringing claims against the transferor in respect of them. TUPE 
2006, Reg. 10 (3). Conversely, the transferor will also not be able to assert any of the rights 
transferred to the new employer against his or her former employees. Allan v Stirling DC [1995] ICR 
1082). 
95  Frisby (n 1). 
96 Note however that Regulation 4 (1) only transfers contracts of employment and enables them to 
have effect after the transfer as if originally made between the employees and the transferee. 
Regulation 4 does not give the employee a contractual benefit to which he or she was not entitled 
under his or her original contract with the transferor. See e.g. Jackson v Computershare Investor 
Services plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1065 (CA).   
97 [2006] UKHL 29. 
98 According to Lord Bingham of Cornhill: ‘In legal parlance, a matter is only deemed to be the case 
when it is not, or may not, in fact be so, or would not or might not be thought to be so if not deemed 
to be so. The complexity of this case, I think, derives from the fiction which underlies it’. North Wales 
Training and Enterprise Council Ltd v Astley & others [2006] UKHL 29 (para. 2) 
99Secretary of State for Employment v Spence and others [1986] ICR 651, CA (Balcombe LJ). Note 
however, that for Regulation 4 to apply however, employees for this purpose are those who have 
been employed by the out-going employer immediately before the transfer took place otherwise 
Regulation 4 will not apply. The significance of this requirement and its effect on the employee 
protection generally is further discussed below. 
100 For how employees fared during transfers under the common law, see chapter 5. 
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It has been noted elsewhere in this thesis101 that in an era where jobs are not easy 
to come by, this is the kind of outcome employees would welcome when the 
business that employs them becomes insolvent and is transferred as a going 
concern. It is also an outcome, from a theoretical viewpoint, that would please the 
Traditionalists but to the displeasure of their Proceduralists counterparts 
discussed in chapter 2. The benign intent of the Transfer Regulations 
notwithstanding, Regulation 4 has serious implications for the rescue culture. This 
is considered below. 
6.7 Transfer of contracts: possible consequences for 
business rescue 
There are a number of concerns raised by the provisions of Regulation 4.  
Regulation 4 is an anathema for the employers and the antithesis to business 
rescue. Very often, an attempt is made to rescue a business in financial difficulty 
by selling part or all of it to a third party purchaser on a going concern basis.  In 
such circumstances, the transferor’s ability to reduce the size of the workforce 
may be crucial where the sale of an insolvent undertaking is contemplated. Such a 
strategy is one of the easiest ways of attracting potential buyers to the business. 
However, selling a business (solvent or insolvent) on a going concern basis 
brings TUPE into play. Regulation 4 (1) of TUPE 2006 makes it difficult for the 
transferor to easily achieve that result without attracting liabilities.102 
From the transferees’ perspective, it seems that buying an insolvent business 
would be worth the trouble if staff surplus to requirements could be easily shed 
and without liability. Regulation 4 makes this very unlikely. Regulation 4 could 
hamper the purchase of an insolvent business with dire consequences for the 
employees as well. It is submitted that if the business to be transferred is already 
over-staffed (and if this was the reason for its insolvency), a rule which requires 
the buyer to buy the insolvent business, and to take on all of the transferor’s ex-
workers, does not offer the necessary incentive needed to buy such businesses. 
It is doubtful whether a prospective purchaser would want to purchase any 
business that is over-burdened with staff without being able, (subsequently and 
                                                          
101 See particularly the analysis on Nokes in chapter 5. 
102 An example of this type of scenario can be found in the 2011 Court of Appeal case of Spaceright 
Europe Ltd v Baillavoine and anor  [2011] EWCA Civ 1565 
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without much expenses), to dismiss employees surplus to his or her need.103  This 
type of rule could force prospective rescuers to abandon purchases of insolvent 
businesses. Even where a buyer agrees to buy the business, he or she is likely to 
demand a discount for it. In a situation where a deal cannot be mutually agreed 
between the parties, the transferor’s (insolvency practitioner) other option may 
be to sell the business on a break-up basis. This effectively means closing down 
the business and making all staff redundant. 
With such an outcome, not many, if any, will deny the fact that the well-intentioned 
pursuit of employee protection has inadvertently resulted in the legal demise of 
the business with consequential job losses for the employees. From this 
perspective therefore TUPE would be self-defeating. The picture painted above 
further reveals the tension between the employee protection goal of TUPE and the 
pursuit of the rescue of insolvent but viable businesses in the UK. 
6.7.1 Transfer of rights and liabilities  
Another major effect of Regulation 4 is that a relevant transfer operates to transfer 
all of the transferor’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities in connection with the 
employees’ contracts of employment to the purchaser by virtue of the transfer.104 
In effect, the incoming employer (transferee) steps into the shoes of the transferor 
and assumes responsibility in relation to those rights and obligations. 105 The 
transferee shoulders the entire burden 106  and cannot pick and choose from 
                                                          
103 Transfer of Undertakings: Employment Law Handbook (Incomes Data Services, London 2011) 253. 
104 Reg. 4(2)(a) TUPE 2006. 
105 Note however, that Reg. 4, to be precise Reg. 4 (2) (a) must be construed in light of Article 3 (1) of 
the ARD which states that rights and obligations that can transfer are those ‘... existing on the date of 
a transfer...’ See also Secretary of State for Employment v Spence and others [1986] ICR 651 
(Balcombe LJ). 
106 In relation to TUPE and the UK, this may be seen as a matter of choice. The ARD attempted to 
mitigate this hardship on transferees. Article 3 provides that Member States may provide that after a 
transfer, the transferor and transferee are jointly and severally liable with regards to the obligations 
which arose before the date of a transfer, but which based on an employment contract or relationship 
that was in force on the date the transfer actually took place. While the joint-liability option has been 
taken up and enacted in many Member States such as Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, the UK has not. In practice, however, the joint-liability approach gives the Member 
States the option of distributing employment-related liabilities arising in business transfers between 
the buyer and the seller. See O´Leary Siofra, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice Judicial 
Structures, Policies and Processes. (Hart Publishing Oxford, Portland Oregon 2002). 
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them.107 Case law has demonstrated that the transfer of rights and obligations is 
automatic.108  
Rights and liabilities transfer on the same day the business is transferred109 and so 
cannot be put forward to a future date at the instance or will of either the 
transferor or the transferee.110  The transfer is mandatory111 therefore the parties’ 
consents are unnecessary.  
6.7.2 What transfers?  
The question then is what rights and liabilities actually transfer to the purchaser. 
The Transfer Regulations do not elaborate on this, but there are a few cases that 
have provided guidance on the liabilities which the transferee could inherit.  
However, given the obligation of the UK courts and tribunals to construe the 
Regulations (which is an EU-derived law) purposively,112 so as to bring them into 
conformity with the protective intent of the ARD, it is to be expected that 
Regulation 4(2) would be given a broad construction by them whenever 
possible.113 This intent has already been demonstrated by the courts in several 
cases relating to Regulation 4.114 The English courts have made it very clear that 
the aim of the Transfer Regulations is neither to create new rights, nor augment 
existing rights for employees.115 Regulation 4(2) is aimed at safeguarding the 
employees’ rights as they existed at the time the transfer took place.  
                                                          
107 See Stirling District Council v Allan [1995] ICR 1082. 
108 Case C-362/89 D’Urso v Ercole Marelli Ellectromeccanica General SPA [1991] ECR 1-4105 (para 20). 
109 It is pertinent to note that the ECJ in Celtec Ltd v Astley and others [2005] IRLR 647, made it 
expressly clear that a business transfer takes place on an objectively identified specific date. The court 
held in that case that Article 3(1) of the 1977 ARD must be construed as meaning that the ‘date of a 
transfer’ is the date on which the employer's responsibility for carrying on the business of the entity 
transferred shifts from the transferor to the transferee. That date is a particular point in time, which 
cannot be postponed to another date at the will of either the transferor or transferee. 
110 Case C-305/94 Rotsart de Hertaing v J Benoidt SA (in liquidation) and anor [1996] ECR I-5927 (para 
18); Case C-362/89 D’Urso and Others [1991] ECR I-4105, (para 20); Whent v T Cartledge Ltd [1997] 
IRLR 153. 
111  Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall A/S (Case 324/86) [1988] ECR 739, 
para 14 
112 See e.g. Case 14/83   Sabine Colson and anor v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] E.C.R. 1891; Case 
C-106/89, Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion [1990] ECR I-4135. 
113 Upex & Ryley (n 43)92. 
114 See Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd. [1983] 2 A.C. 751; Litster v. Forth Dry Dock & Engineering 
Co. Ltd. and Anor [1990] 1 A.C. 546.  
115 Computershare Investor Services plc v Jackson [2008] ICR 341, CA; Werhof v Freeway Traffic 
Systems GmbH &Co KG [2006] IRLR 400, ECJ. 
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There are judicial authorities confirming that both contractual and non-contractual 
rights and liabilities that pre-date116 the transfer of the business could pass to the 
transferee under Regulation 4(2).117 In Secretary of State for Employment v Spence 
and others118 (a case which arose under the old Regulation 5 (2) of TUPE 1981, 
now 4 (2)), the CA indicated that obligations other than contractual, could also 
transfer following a relevant transfer. In that case the CA noted that the words ‘or’ 
in Regulation 4(2) (b) (ex 5 (2)) of TUPE clearly have the effect of transferring 
obligations other than those which are contractual. This means that non- 
contractual obligations arising, for example, in tort are capable of transferring 
too. 
6.7.3 Contractual rights and liabilities 
In respect of contractual rights and liabilities, case law indicates that in addition to 
terms and conditions of employment, any arrears of wages and holiday pay owed 
the employees and all collective agreements subsisting on the date of the transfer 
will be inherited by the transferee.119 Also, the employer compulsory liability 
insurance (where that is in place),120 rights in relation to share option schemes121 
and the contractual right to enhanced severance schemes122  all transfer to the 
purchaser following a relevant business transfer. In Morris Angels and Sons Ltd v 
Hollande123 the CA held that the right to enforce a restrictive covenant against a 
departed employee (i.e. post-termination restraints) is also capable of 
transferring to the transferee.  
6.7.4 Non-contractual rights and liabilities 
In order that employees impacted by transfers are not short-changed, Regulation 
5 (2) of the 1981 TUPE Regulations was given very wide interpretation by the 
courts to include non-contractual rights and any potential claims which had arisen 
                                                          
116 However, contingent liabilities that are subsequent to a business transfer are capable of 
transferring to the transferee. See  Martin & ors v South Bank University [2004] ICR 1234, ECJ. 
117 For ECJ case law, see Case 135/83  Abels v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metallindustrie en de 
Electrotechnische Industrie [1985] ECR 469; Arie Botzen and others v Rotterdamsche Droogdok 
Maatschappij BV (Case 186/83) [1985] ECR 519, para 16. 
118 [1986] ICR 651. The insurance must be is in place otherwise the court’s decision in Bernadone will 
be of no value. 
119 In Whent v T Cartledge Ltd [1997] IRLR 153, Hicks J held that there was no reason why a collective 
agreement which is constantly updated could not bind an employer. 
120 Bernadone v Pall Mall Services [2001] ICR 197. 
121 Unicorn Consultancy Services Ltd v Westbrook [2000] IRLR 80. 
122 Jefferies v Powerhouse Retail Ltd [1996] UKEAT 1328. 
123 [1993] ICR 71. 
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prior to the transfer due to acts or omissions by the transferor. Regulation 4 (2) of 
the 2006 Regulations is no different.  
Following a business transfer, the transferee may be liable for the tortious act of 
the transferor provided the act in question was committed against an employee 
who was employed in the undertaking transferred. 124  Thus, the transferor’s 
liability in respect of negligence or breach of statutory duty committed prior to 
the transfer of the undertaking taking place passes to the buyer. 125  In BSG 
Property Services v Tuck & ors,126 both the transferor and transferee mistakenly 
thought that the transfer of a service was not covered by the Transfer Regulations. 
Based on that notion, the transferor issued a notice of termination of contracts of 
employment to the employees. The court held that, for the reason given by the 
transferor, the dismissal was unfair. Accordingly, the notice was deemed to have 
been a notice given to the employees by the transferee for the same reason. 
Therefore liability for the unfair dismissal was held to have transferred to the 
transferee. 
The employee’s right to continuity of employmentalso transfers to the purchaser. 
In Green-Wheeler v Onyx (UK) Ltd, 127  the EAT relied on the speech that Lord Lyle 
gave in the House of Lords when the Transfer Regulations were passing through 
Parliament128 to find that the legislature had intended to include continuity of 
employment in the rights and liabilities that transferred under the Regulations.  
6.7.5 Contingent and unknown liabilities 
A major concern for prospective buyers of insolvent businesses is liabilities to 
which the buyer could become subject, but which were non-existent or unknown 
at the time of the purchase. This is very common in injury cases and in cases 
involving diseases that may manifest years after the transfer. A typical example 
would be asbestos-related disease cases. The problem with long-tail disease 
litigations is that in most cases, the employment would have ceased many years 
before the sickness manifests. In spite of that, it is possible for an employee to 
                                                          
124 See Bernadone v Pall Mall Services [2001] ICR 197 (Peter Gibson LJ). 
125 See Wilson & ors v West Cumbria Health Care NHS Trust (Unreported 3/8/1994). 
126 [1996] IRLR 134 EAT. 
127 EAT/925/92. See also Euro-Die (UK) Ltd v Skidmore EAT 1158/98. 
128 See Hansard, 10/12/1981, paras. 1482-1500. 
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commence action for personal injury years after the business has been 
transferred to a third party purchaser.129 
In Martin v Lancashire County Council 130 (a public sector case), the claimant 
commenced his personal injury action in 1995, even though the business in 
connection to which the injury arose was transferred in 1993. While it was not 
established that the transferee in that case was unaware of the potential 
liabilities, the case represents one instance where a transferee could potentially 
become subject to unknown liabilities following a business transfer.  
Bernadone v Pall Mall Services Group131 is another injury case that arose under the 
old Transfer Regulations. This case had to do with transfer of liability in tort for 
personal injury sustained by an employee. In that case, an employee had an 
accident at work and suffered injury. Several years after the business was 
transferred, the employee brought proceedings against the transferor employer 
for negligence and breach of duty under section 2 of the Occupiers Liability Act 
1957. In that case, the court was asked to address two issues one of which was 
whether liabilities in tort were liabilities ‘under’ or ‘in connection with’ the 
contract of employment. The court approved the decision in Taylor v Serviceteam 
and LB of Waltham Forest132 where it was held that the duty of care arose out of the 
contract of employment. 
The second question arose in connection to a claim brought after the business had 
been transferred. The question was: who was the correct defendant to be sued? 
That is, who, if the claimant became successful, should be responsible for the 
payment of the damages? Should it be the transferor, who was the claimant’s 
employer at the time of the accident, or should it be the transferee, to whom the 
employee’s contract of employment has been transferred? The court took the 
view that because the Transfer Regulations were introduced to give effect to the 
protective intent of the ARD, a purposive interpretation of the Regulations was 
                                                          
129 The UK’s Statute of Limitations, which was introduced in 1980, is strict about when claims for 
compensation can be made. There is a three year window for claims. It is only in very exceptional 
circumstances that the time limit can be extended. For example, when a disease is contracted which 
takes time for the symptoms to be displayed, the UK’s Statute of Limitations is applied differently. In 
such a case it is not the date of injury which marks the start of the three year claim window, but the 
‘Date of Knowledge’ or ‘Date of Discovery’ of the disease. See Limitations Act 1980. 
130 (1998) PIQR P201. 
131 [2000] IRLR 487 (CA).  
132 [1998] PIQR 201 City Ct (Mr Recorder Pawlak Q. C.). 
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required.133 The court came to the conclusion that since the transferee was liable 
for the acts and omissions of the transferor under Regulation 4 (ex reg. 5) of TUPE, 
the former was thus not exempted from liability for personal injury claims of the 
employee transferred to his workforce.134  
The CA went on to note, however, that where the transferor has in place an 
employer’s liability insurance policy (as required under the Employer’s Liability 
(Compulsory) Insurance Act 1969), the employer’s right to indemnity under the 
policy also transfers to the transferee.135 This meant that the transferee should be 
able to call on that cover to meet any personal injury liabilities incurred while the 
business or undertaking was still in the hands of the transferor but which has now 
transferred to him or her as the new employer following the business transfer. 
The effect of this decision is that where a relevant TUPE transfer of an undertaking 
takes place, the transferor’s liability in tort to an employee will transfer to the 
transferee notwithstanding that the tort was committed prior to the business 
transfer. Bernadone exemplifies how a transferee who was never in the picture at 
the time when an employee sustained an injury could become subject to 
liabilities. This case is also judicial authority that non-contractual liabilities are 
capable of transferring to a transferee even where there was no contractual 
relationship in existence between the parties (as in the instant case between the 
insurance company and the transferee). Depending on the industry in which the 
business operates, if buyers take into account these types of scenarios happening 
before buying a business, this could have serious consequences for business 
rescues. 
In DJM International Ltd v Nicholas,136 a non-contractual liability in respect of an 
employee’s right to claim for sex discrimination137 against the transferor was held 
to have transferred following a business transfer. Mrs Nicholas was employed by 
D J Mouldings Ltd from October 1967 until July 1992 (when she claimed that she 
was forced to retire). In July 1992, she was re-employed on a part-time basis by D 
J Mouldings. In September of the same year there was a transfer of an undertaking 
                                                          
133 See  Marleasing SA v LA Commercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA  [1999] 1 CMLR 205. 
134 Bernadone v Pall Mall [2000] IRLR 487 (CA)  (Blofeld J). 
135The court took the view that it would be unjust to allow for the insurance company, having 
accepted the risk, and having taken the premium, to walk away from its obligation under the 
circumstances. 
136 [1996] IRLR 76. 
137 DJM International Ltd v Nicholas [1996] ICR 214. See also Tsangacos v Amalgamated Chemicals Ltd 
[1997] ICR 154. 
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from D J Mouldings to DJM International Ltd. Mrs Nicholas then worked for DJM 
International until she was made redundant in February 1993, after which she 
complained of unlawful sex discrimination to an industrial tribunal. 
The tribunal found that any liability in respect of the act of sex discrimination 
complained of by Mrs Nicholas (which according to her, forced her retirement in 
July 1992), transferred from DJ Mouldings in September 1992 to DJM International 
the transfer of the business from the former to the latter. In the tribunal’s view, the 
act complained of, need not have arisen out of Mrs Nicholas’s contract of 
employment existing at the date of the transfer from DJ Mouldings to DJM 
International: it could have arisen under her earlier contract of employment with 
DJ Mouldings which had ceased to exist before the date the business was 
transferred. 
On appeal to the EAT, the EAT rejected DJM International’s argument that it was 
not liable, because it failed to take into account the width of the wording in what 
was then Regulation 5(2) (b) of TUPE 1981.138 The provisions of Regulation 5(2) (b) 
applied, not only to things done before the transfer in respect of the contract in 
issue, but also to anything done in respect of a person employed in the business 
or undertaking prior to its transfer. Accordingly, anything done in respect of such 
a person or tort committed against the individual would be taken to have been 
done by the transferee. According to the EAT, the issue was not whether what was 
done was in respect of a particular contract, but whether it was in respect of a 
particular person who was employed in the undertaking  transferred. It followed 
that since there was an employment relationship between Mrs Nicholas and DJ 
Mouldings on the date its business was transferred to DJM International, liabilities 
in respect of the act committed against her (sex discrimination) also transferred 
under the old Regulation 5 (2) (b) of TUPE 1981. The appeal was dismissed. 
The cases analysed above demonstrate the problems that the Transfer 
Regulations could pose to the rescue of insolvent businesses. The courts have 
                                                          
138 The wording of Reg. 5(2) (b) reflected the reference in Article 3(1) of the 1977 ARD to ‘an 
employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer.’ This, arguably, had a more extended 
meaning than ‘obligations arising from a contract of employment’. What this means is that reference 
to anything done in respect of a person employed in an undertaking in Reg. 5(2)(b) had to be read in 
the light of, and consistently with, the reference to ‘an employment relationship’ in Article 3(1). This 
should also be construed as referring to obligations other than those which arose out of the particular 
contract of employment. In other words, Reg. 5(2) (b) was not limited to those obligations which 
arose out of the particular contract in existence at the date of the transfer. 
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construed the TUPE Regulations in a way that makes liabilities dependent upon 
the existence of an employment relationship between the employee and the 
transferor on the date of the transfer. The effect is that whatever happened to the 
employee during his or her time with the transferor will be deemed to have 
happened during the employee’s employment with the transferee. These types 
of unforeseen and unbudgeted costs can impact on going concern rescues. The 
wider the types of liabilities the more risky and potentially expensive a business 
purchase will be. Ultimately, the employees are the ones whose interests may be 
prejudiced if the weight of employee-related obligations prevents a going 
concern sale of the insolvent business from being achieved.139 
6.8 Transfer-connected dismissals  
The rescue insolvent but viable businesses in the UK are also hampered by the 
rule on dismissal. The scheme of employee protection envisaged by the Transfer 
Regulations’ is re-enforced by the provision of Regulation 7 (ex reg.8). Regulation 
7 (1) (which implements the provisions of Article 4 (1) of the ARD) makes certain 
transfer-related dismissals automatically unfair.140 By virtue of Regulation 7 (1), if 
an employee is dismissed before or after a relevant transfer and, the sole or 
principal reason for the dismissal is the transfer itself or a reason ‘connected with 
the transfer’141  that is not for ‘an economic, technical or organisational (ETO) 
reason entailing changes in the workforce’142 the dismissal will be automatically 
unfair. 143  
Apparently, Regulation 7 (1) is intended to reinforce extant statutory protection 
against unfair dismissals available for employees in the general unfair dismissal 
                                                          
139  Simon Deakin and G S Morris, Labour Law, 4th ed. (Harts Publishing, Oxford 2005) 216-235. See 
also evidence presented by  the Society of Practitioners of Insolvency to the Select Committee on the 
European Communities  that investigated the feasibility of the ARD, Session 1995-96, 5th Report 
(HMSO, 1996) 66. 
140 Kerry Foods Ltd v Creber [2000] ICR 556. 
141 It is important to point out that the old Reg. 8(2) did not contain the words ‘reason connected with 
the transfer’ now found in Reg. 7(2) of TUPE 2006. The lack of clarity in that respect was very 
controversial. The difference between the old Regulations 8(1) and (2) was contested at the CA in 
Warner v Adnet Ltd [1998] ICR 1056 where it was argued on behalf of the employee that Regulations 
8 (1) and (2) were mutually exclusive, and that if the tribunal concluded that the dismissal of the 
employee was for a reason that fell within Reg. 8(1), it was precluded from considering the case under 
Reg. 8(2). 
142 TUPE 2006, Reg. 7(2) & (3). 
143 The CA has reaffirmed this position in Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine and anor [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1565. 
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law contained in ERA 1996.144 The primary aim is to prevent the use of transfers 
by a relevant employer as a pretext for dismissing employees and then re-hiring 
them under new contracts on (presumably) wholly revised and inferior terms.  
The flip side to Regulation 7 (1) is that a dismissal for an ETO reason may be 
potentially (but not automatically) fair.145 The burden of proof, however, is on the 
dismissed employee to show that his or her dismissal was carried out because of 
the transfer or for a reason connected with it. For the employer, it seems that 
redundancy146 or ‘some other substantial reason’ within section 98(1) (b) of ERA 
1996 would provide valid ETO justifications for dismissals.  
Regulation 7 (1) is however problematic because of the uncertainty surrounding 
the meaning of the word ‘the’ (as used in the phrase ‘connected with ‘the’ 
transfer). The meaning has been elusive for more than 16 years now since the first 
tribunal decision on this issue was handed down in 1994.147 Does it mean that a 
pre-transfer dismissal must be connected only to a ‘contemplated’ transfer or is it 
that a dismissal can be connected to any transfer that eventually occurs, 
notwithstanding that the exact transfer in itself was not contemplated at the time of 
the dismissal.  
UK judges are not agreed on the exact meaning of the words. On a straight 
forward reading, it would appear that ‘the transfer’ means that the dismissal must 
be for a reason connected with a transfer contemplated at the time of the 
dismissal. This reading has found support in some decided cases. But so too has 
the opposite reading been given judicial blessing in other decided cases (see 
discussion below on timing of dismissals). Most of the decided cases on ‘transfer-
connected dismissals’ were based on the old Transfer Regulations, but the TUPE 
Regulations 2006 has retained the same wording and offers no more clarity. It 
seems that for the ETO defence to avail an employer, the timing of the dismissal 
                                                          
144 See in particular Part X of ERA 1996. 
145 In Meade and Baxandale v British Fuels Ltd [1998] ICR 387, the CA held that a dismissal which falls 
under what is now Reg. 7(1) (formerly Reg. 8(1)) had to be construed in light of Article 4 (1) of the 
ARD and that, if construed in that manner, a dismissal covered by it terms would be void and 
ineffective rather than merely automatically unfair. 
146 In Gorictree Ltd v Jenkinson [1985] ICR 51, for example, the EAT said that an ‘economic reason’ for 
dismissal would include redundancy. But it does not include a broad economic reason such as 
dismissal effected for the purpose of obtaining an enhanced price for the business or a desire to 
achieve a sale. See Wheeler v Patel [1987] ICR 631. In Whitehouse v Charles A Blatchford & Sons Ltd 
[2000] ICR 542, the CA said that a transfer could be the occasion for the reduction in workforce 
without necessarily being the cause or reason for the reduction. 
147  See Ibex Trading Co Ltd v Walton & ors [1994] ICR 907, EAT discussed below. 
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and the interpretation adopted by courts in relation to Regulation 7 will be crucial 
factors. 
6.8.1 Dismissals and transfer of liabilities: timing of 
dismissals 
The problem with TUPE and dismissals is that it is very difficult to judge with 
absolute certainty how early or late dismissals can be carried out prior to the 
actual business transfer without these being deemed transfer-connected by the 
courts due to conflicting authorities on this issue since 1994.148 The courts have 
moved the goalposts several times on this issue therefore there is no specific 
authority that can be relied upon regarding a definite time span. One problem for 
buyers of insolvent businesses is that a dismissal in advance of sale may still be 
regarded as transfer-connected. 
The difficulty with timing dismissals in advance of sales is reflected in the number 
of cases TUPE has generated over the years and the differing outcomes of these 
cases. These differences may be attributed to the different interpretational 
approaches adopted by different English judges on the matter. While some 
judges adopt a broad interpretation to questions of ‘pre-transfer’ and ‘transfer-
connected’ dismissals, others adopt a narrow approach which seems to support 
the proposition that a specific transfer must be in contemplation at the time of 
dismissal in order to establish the necessary nexus.  There is uncertainty also 
regarding post-transfer dismissals effected in the context of TUPE transfers. 
Below are some cases on pre-transfer dismissals and the narrow interpretation 
adopted by the courts on them. 
6.8.2 Pre-transfer dismissals: narrow interpretation approach 
There are, as noted earlier, conflicting authorities on whether or not a dismissal in 
the face of a putative business transfer is connected with the transfer and 
therefore automatically unfair in the absence of an ETO reason. Instances abound 
where the courts and tribunals have appeared ready to sacrifice employee 
protection on the altar of business rescue. Some decisions appear contrived by 
                                                          
148 The reading that was approved by the court in Ibex Trading v Walton in 1994 was completely 
opposite to the one supported in Harrison Bowden v Bowden (both cases are discussed in detail 
below) also in the same year by a differently constituted EAT. See case analysis below. Though these 
cases were decided under the old regulations, the 2006 Transfer Regulations retained the same 
wording and offer no more clarity. 
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judges to promote rescues of insolvent undertakings. However, the courts have 
said that every case is determined based on its own facts. This is capable of 
producing different results even in situations where the facts of two cases may be 
similar. Nevertheless, by adopting a narrow interpretational approach to the 
words ‘transfer-connected dismissals’, it seems courts are determined to save 
insolvent but viable businesses in spite of TUPE.149  
One of the earliest cases on transfer-connected dismissal was Ibex Trading v 
Walton and ors.150 This case provides judicial authority for the proposition that a 
specific transfer must be in contemplation at the time of a dismissal in order to 
establish the necessary ‘connection’ between a dismissal and the eventual 
transfer of the undertaking (the narrow interpretation approach). In Ibex, the 
claimants were employed by ITC Ltd when in August 1991 administrators were 
appointed to run the affairs of the company. The administrators decided to relieve 
the company of its debts by selling its business. To achieve that aim, they sought 
to reduce the size of the workforce and lower the wages of those who remained. 
On 16 October of 1991, 40 of the 94 staff employed by ITC were given notices of 
dismissal for reason of redundancy. The actual dismissals took effect on 4th of 
November of the same year. Nine days later the administrators received an offer 
for the business, and the sale was completed in February of the following year. 
Walton and six of his ex-colleagues brought unfair dismissal claims against the 
transferor and the transferee. 
The Employment Tribunal (ET) and the EAT were not convinced that the 
dismissals carried out were connected with the subsequent transfer of the 
business. The EAT held that while it could be said that the employees were 
dismissed for a reason connected with ‘a’ possible transfer, they had not been 
dismissed for a reason connected with the transfer that eventuated.  It opined that 
at the time the dismissals occurred the transfer of ITC’s business was a ‘mere 
twinkle in the eye and might well have never occurred.’ Clearly here the court gave 
business rescue the edge over employment protection. 
                                                          
149 It is important to mention that most of the cases that will be reviewed below in relation to 
transfer-connected dismissals happened under the old Regulation 8 of TUPE 1981. Also, although not 
all of the dismissals in the cases discussed below took place in the context of insolvency, the same 
principle applies to dismissals made in the context of insolvent business transfers. 
150 [1994] ICR 907, EAT. 
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In Dynamex Friction Ltd & anor v Amicus & anor151  the Court of Appeal (CA) had to 
consider whether the dismissal of the employees, (claimed to have been 
necessitated by an ‘economic’ reason rather than for a transfer-related reason, as 
held by the ET), was justified. The facts of the case are that Mr Smith was the sole 
Director of Friction Dynamics Limited (FDL). Following an application by him, 
joint administrators were appointed. The administrators immediately dismissed 
the entire workforce because there was no money to meet their wage bills. FDL’s 
production line and customers were subsequently taken over by Dynamex 
Friction Limited (DFL). DFL also took on 60 of FDL’s former employees. DFL had 
been set up by an ex-Friction employee with support from Mr Smith who later 
acquired a controlling shareholding. Parts and machinery of FDL were sold to 
Ferotec Realty Limited (FRL) (controlled by Mr Smith himself) that owned the 
premises from which FDL operated its business. 
Claims were brought by the employees dismissed by FDL’s administrators. The 
contentious issue was whether the pre-transfer dismissal was stage-managed by 
the administrators in order to create an avenue for the eventual transferee to 
avoid taking the employees on and evade liability under TUPE. The ET found that 
there was no collusion between the administrator and Mr Smith meaning that the 
employees were dismissed for an economic reason. Liability for the employees’ 
claims therefore fell to the state and not to the transferee. 
The EAT disagreed. However, on further appeal to the Court of Appeal (CA), the 
CA upheld the ET’s decision. It held that when an ET is determining the reason for 
a dismissal, what counts is the thought process of the decision maker. Here, the 
decision maker (who was the administrator) dismissed the employees because 
there was no money to pay wages. As far as the CA was concerned, the reason for 
the dismissal was not the prospective transfer. Rather, the reason was purely an 
economic one based solely on the company’s poor cash-flow situation. Here 
again, it seems that the need to save the business must have influenced the CA’s 
decision. The conflict between business rescue and employee protection was 
once again decided in favour of business rescue by construing the words 
‘transfer-connected dismissals’ under Regulation 7 narrowly. 
Notwithstanding the unfavourable outcome of the Dynamex decision for the 
employees, the case is, without a doubt, confirmation that the motive or thought 
                                                          
151 [2008] ECWA Civ 381. 
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process of those who actually take the decision to dismiss will be crucial in 
establishing  whether or not a particular dismissal is transfer connected. Granted, 
in the instant case, the transferee was not held liable. This does not, however, 
detract from the fact that the transferee may be liable for dismissals made before 
the business was transferred even though at the time of the dismissals he or she 
was not in the picture. 
6.8.3 Pre-transfer dismissals: broad interpretation approach 
It seems that in relation to TUPE, and especially on matters of dismissals in 
connection with business transfers, the employees find favour with the courts any 
time they cast their net wide. That is to say, the employees’ right not to be unfairly 
dismissed during transfers is most protected when courts adopt a broad 
interpretation approach in relation to Regulation 7.  
In Harrison Bowden Ltd v Bowden,152 the company (NGS) experienced serious 
financial difficulties and went into receivership in January of 1991. NGS’s business 
was run by G on behalf of the receivers. On the 29th of January 1991, G placed an 
advertisement in the Financial Times for the sale of NGS’s business. The following 
day HB Ltd responded to the advert and showed interest in buying the business. 
On 31st January 1991 majority of NGS’s employees (including the claimant) were 
dismissed by G for reason of redundancy while the sale was completed 8 days 
later. Bowden brought a claim for unfair dismissal. 
The ET held that the dismissals that were made were transfer-connected because 
they were aimed at facilitating a proposed transfer.  The transferee (HB Ltd) 
appealed against the decision, arguing that Regulation 7 can only have effect 
where there is an actual or where a prospective buyer had been identified by the 
transferor (here the receiver) at the time dismissals are effected. The EAT 
rejected the transferee’s argument. It held that the dismissals were for a reason 
connected with the transfer, and so automatically unfair, despite the fact that at the 
time of the dismissals no actual or prospective buyer had been identified.  
In reaching its decision, the EAT adopted the ECJ’s approach in Bork,153 in which 
the latter noted that it was necessary to look back in time and take into account the 
objective circumstances in which a dismissal occurred if a subsequent transfer 
                                                          
152 [1994] ICR 186, EAT. 
153 See P Bork International A/S v Foreningen af Arbejdslederen i Danmark [1989] IRLR 41. 
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took place. The EAT’s decision must have been made on policy grounds. It must 
have feared that to take any action to the contrary could set a bad precedence and 
potentially open a loophole in the Transfer Regulations to be exploited by 
transferees and transferors alike to the disadvantage of the employees during 
transfers of undertakings. Although the Bowden decision is capable of affecting 
decisions to purchase insolvent businesses, it can be argued that the EAT’s 
interpretation of Regulation 7 was a purposive one intended to give effect to the 
protective intent of TUPE. With this approach, the tension between employee 
protection and business rescue in insolvent business transfer, was decided, it 
seems, in favour of the former. 
In CAB Automotive Ltd v Blake & anor,154 after RDS Automotive Interiors Ltd went 
into administration, only those employees who were deemed necessary to fulfill 
existing contracts were retained by the administrator. All other employees were 
dismissed on grounds of redundancy. Subsequently, RDS's assets were 
transferred to CAB Automotive Ltd. The dismissed employees brought claims for 
unfair dismissal against RDS and CAB Automotive Ltd. The EAT held that the 
administrator's intention in dismissing the employees was to ensure that the 
business would be attractive to buyers. Therefore, the dismissals were connected 
with the transfer. The EAT was of the view that the protection provided to 
employees against dismissals in a TUPE business transfer apply even in 
circumstances where potential buyers are merely interested in buying the 
business but at the time of the dismissal no firm agreement had been reached on 
the sale of the business. This approach favours the employees. It restricts 
transferors’ ability to dismiss employees and dispose of the business. It aligns 
with the Traditionalists ideals on employee protection (see chapter 2). 
Coutinho v Vision Information Services (UK) Ltd and another155  concerned Vision 
Information Services (VIS) which entered in 2003 into negotiations to sell its 
business to Deluxe Media Services (DMS). At the time, Coutinho was the highest 
earning employee at VIS and was made redundant in March 2004. VIS’s business 
was subsequently sold to DMS in July 2004. Coutinho brought a claim for unfair 
dismissal and race discrimination. He argued that his dismissal was for a reason 
related to the transfer. The tribunal found that there had been a relevant transfer 
                                                          
154 [2007] UKEAT/0298/07 
155EAT/0469/07, 31.10.07, (unreported). See also Vision Information Services (UK) Ltd v Coutinho 
EAT/0466/06, 20 August 2007 (unreported). 
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from VIS to DMS and that Coutinho was dismissed in order to facilitate the sale of 
the business. The dismissal was therefore for a reason connected with the transfer 
which the ETO defence could not avail the transferor. Consequently, DMS was 
liable for damages for unfair dismissal and race discrimination. This is clearly 
another case in which employee protection is privileged over business rescue. 
In the 2011 case of Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine and anor,156 the CA upheld 
the decisions of both the ET and the EAT that the dismissal of the Claimant (Mr 
Baillavoine) was for a reason connected with the transfer therefore automatically 
unfair. The claimant (Mr Baillavoine) was employed as Chief Executive Officer of 
Ultralon Holdings Limited (‘Ultralon’), a company that manufactured office 
equipment. In May 2008, the company went into administration and the same day, 
Mr Baillavoine’s employment was terminated. A month later, the business and 
assets of Ultralon were sold as a going concern to Spaceright Europe Limited 
(‘Spaceright’). Mr Baillavoine claimed that the eventual transfer was a ‘relevant 
transfer’ under the TUPE Regulations 2006 hence his dismissal was automatically 
unfair because it was connected with ‘the’ transfer.  
Both the ET and the EAT took the view that the reason for the claimant’s dismissal 
was related to the sale of the business and therefore the dismissal was unfair. On 
further appeal to the Court of Appeal (CA), the key issue brought before the court 
centred on the meaning of the phrase : ‘a reason connected with the transfer that is 
not an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the 
workforce’ in Regulation 7(1) (b). Was the phrase to be construed as requiring a 
specific transfer to be in contemplation at the time of dismissal? Or was it to be 
interpreted more widely so that a dismissal would be deemed connected with a 
transfer even though no actual prospective transferee had been identified at the 
time the dismissal was effected? (See earlier articulation on this point above).  
The CA did not accept the Administrator’s evidence of the reason behind the 
dismissal. It adopted the second and broad interpretation holding that Mr. 
Baillavoine’s dismissal was necessitated mainly by a desire on the transferor’s 
part to attract the purchaser. What the CA’s decision simply means is that there 
need not be a specific intent to sell in order for a dismissal to be deemed 
connected with the eventual transfer. This decision encapsulates and reinforces 
                                                          
156 [2011] EWCA Civ 1565. 
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previous case law157 by confirming that employees dismissed before a business 
sale can argue that their dismissals were connected with an eventual transfer. 
Thus, affected employees may not need to show that a specific transferee had 
been identified at the time of dismissal.158  
In relation to pre-transfer dismissals, and as it stands, Spaceright is the latest 
authority. Whether this will be the last we will hear on this point is hard to tell. The 
decision is further demonstration of the different types of TUPE liabilities to which 
a purchaser of an insolvent business could be exposed. This will exacerbate the 
problem by putting further pressure on the amount prospective purchasers of 
such businesses would be willing to pay for them. Granted, the broad 
interpretation tends to favour workers and aligns with the Traditionalists, such an 
approach, it is submitted, could be detrimental to the rescue culture. It could 
‘over deter’ purchases which is a major concern of the Proceduralists.159   
While it makes sense for courts to hold that where a transfer is contemplated 
(rather than a specific sale), dismissals around that time should be deemed 
effected to facilitate the sale and should therefore be automatically unfair, there is 
a real danger of a presumption that administrators are never dismissing 
employees for business conduct. To hold such a view, it is submitted, is not only 
unfair to insolvent transferors, but could be harmful to insolvent business rescues 
since there are genuine underlying economic reasons for dismissals in some 
cases. In any case, this problem reflects the inherent tension between rescues 
oriented insolvency law and employment protection legislation in transfers.160 
Whilst it is desirable to have a legal authority to which reference could be made 
in future on this point, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that this will be 
the last we will hear of this issue. This is a truism as each case will be decided 
based on its unique facts.  
                                                          
157 See particularly the EAT’s decision in Morris v John Grose Group Ltd [1998] IRLR 499 and  
Harrison Bowden Ltd v Bowden [1994] ICR 186. 
158 Charles Wynn-Evans, ‘Transfer-related dismissals – the latest case law’ (2008) ELJ 7. 
159 See chapter 2 on theories. 
160 It seems that by the time the CA made its earlier decision in the Dynamex case, courts and 
tribunals may have had an ideological shift from employee protection to facilitating going concern 
rescues of insolvent undertakings. However, such a conclusion would be hasty or premature given 
that there is no consistent pattern on how courts construe the provision of the Transfer Regulations 
on dismissals that could be pointed to since 1994. Confusion looms.  
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What is evident in the two approaches (i.e. the broad and narrow interpretations) 
adopted by the courts in the construction of TUPE’s provision vis-à-vis pre-transfer 
dismissals is that, the narrow approach tended to prioritise business rescue over 
employment protection. This approach ensured that employees-related liabilities 
did not deter the purchases and rescues of insolvent but viable undertakings. On 
the other hand, the application of the broad interpretation approach favoured the 
employees. It was employment protection friendly because it ensured that the 
employees of insolvent businesses were not unfairly dismissed during transfers.  
6.9 Post-transfer dismissal case law 
Regulation 7(1) is not limited to pre-transfer dismissals. It covers post-transfer 
dismissals as well. It states: 
Where either before or after161 a relevant transfer, any employee of the 
transferor or transferee is dismissed, that employee shall be treated for 
the purposes of Part X of the 1996 Act (unfair dismissal) as unfairly 
dismissed if the sole or principal reason for his dismissal is—(a) the 
transfer itself; or (b) a reason connected with the transfer that is not an 
economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the 
workforce. 
The transferee, like the transferor (in the context of pre-transfer dismissals) could 
be liable for unfair dismissals effected long after the business had been 
transferred. The difficulty faced by transferees, like their transferors counterparts, 
is that there is no specific authority on a time limit in which a post-transfer 
dismissal may or may no longer be deemed transfer-connected. This is because 
in spite of when the dismissal was done, it may still be possible for it to be linked 
to the transfer that took place. This however will depend on the circumstances that 
led to the dismissal. The onus is however on the employee. If the affected 
employee can establish that his or her dismissal was due to the eventual transfer, 
or for a reason connected with it, the dismissal would amount to a breach of 
Regulation 7(1) of TUPE 2006.  
In Taylor v Connex South Eastern Ltd,162 Taylor (T) refused to accept changes to his 
terms and conditions which were introduced (for purposes of harmonisation) two 
                                                          
161  Emphasis mine. 
162 EAT 1243/99 
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years after his employment transferred under TUPE from British Rail to CSE. For 
refusing to accept those terms, T was dismissed and he brought an unfair 
dismissal claim. T’s argument that he was dismissed for a reason connected with a 
relevant transfer, contrary to TUPE, was accepted by the ET. The ET noted that 
there is no specific time after a business has been transferred that a dismissal that 
was effected and which was transfer-connected will cease to be so deemed. In 
other words, what the ET was saying is that the passage of time may break the 
chain of causation, but the mere passage of time without anything happening will 
not suffice. The important consideration is not the elapse of time; rather it is what 
has occurred in that time to break the link between subsequent changes to the 
employment contract and the transfer that took place.163 
On appeal, the EAT overturned the ET’s decision based on the reason it found for 
T. However, turning to the facts, the EAT found that T’s dismissal was transfer-
connected because it was one of the important terms of his contract that 
transferred under TUPE that was the subject of CSE’s attempt to change T’s 
contract.  
In London Metropolitan University v Sackur and ors164 (a public sector case) a 
similar conclusion was reached by the EAT. The case concerned the merger of 
two universities to form London Metropolitan University (LMU). Post-merger, the 
new university (LMU) tried to harmonise terms and conditions of employment. 
After negotiations broke down, the employers imposed the new terms. Staff 
subsequently claimed unfair dismissal. The Employment Tribunal held that 
employees dismissed two years post-transfer, in order to effect harmonisation 
changes, had been dismissed for a reason connected with the original transfer.  
At the EAT, the question turned on whether the employer’s actions could be 
justified on the basis of an ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce.165  The 
EAT was of the view that for the ETO defence to apply there had to have been a 
reduction in the number of employees employed or a change in the job functions 
                                                          
163  See also the case of Sackur below. 
164 EAT 0286/06 
165 There is no definition of ‘workforce’ in either the Transfer Regulations or the ARD- from which it 
derives. However, case law has established that the word ‘workforce’ covers more than just 
employees. It encompasses all individuals working within the organisation, whether as employees, 
franchisees or individuals working under some other arrangements. See e.g. Hardy and others v Meter 
U Ltd, ET/1700982/10 to ET/1700986/10. Regarding what the phrase ‘entailing changes in the 
workforce’ means, see Delabole Slate Limited v Berriman [1985] IRLR 308, CA (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson) . 
239 
 
of the entire workforce.166 As there was no reduction in the workforce in this case 
but simply a desire on the part of the employer to change the terms and 
conditions on which existing employees continued to work, the EAT held that the 
ETO defence did not avail the university meaning that the employees were 
unfairly dismissed.167  
The main difficulty envisaged with the EAT’s decision is that the provisions in the 
revised 2006 TUPE Regulations, which appear to allow employers to change 
employment terms where there is an ETO reason, may also be otiose if the 
employer cannot, at the same time, establish a workforce reduction.168  This case 
is, once again,169 illustrative of the difficulty transferees may face where they seek 
to change employees’ terms of employment to bring them into line with the rest of 
the workforce post business transfers. 170  Granted, the further away a given 
transfer is from a dismissal, the less likely it is that it will be deemed connected to 
it, but this will always be a matter of fact and degree for the ET. What will always 
be of paramount considerations is whether there is a link between the eventual 
transfer and the dismissal; and whether that connection was the main reason 
between the dismissal and the transfer. However, not every dismissal will be held 
transfer-connected and hence in breach of Regulation 7 as each case is decided 
on its own facts.  
In sum, the benign intention of Regulation 7 is not in doubt. It protects workers 
against unfair dismissals in transfer situations. However, Regulation 7’s (over) 
protective disposition could adversely harm the very employees it was meant to 
protect as it threatens their job security. When a business is insolvent, its survival 
may depend on the transferor’s ability to sell it as a going concern. In most cases, 
ability to sell an insolvent business is dependent on whether the terms of sale are 
                                                          
166 Delabole Slate Ltd v Berriman [1985] IRLR 305 CA. The Court of Appeal in that case upheld the 
EAT's decision that a dismissal which occurred as a consequence of a change in terms of employment 
following the transfer of an undertaking was not a dismissal for ‘an economic, technical or 
organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce’, and so was automatically unfair under reg. 
8(1) of TUPE 1981. 
167 See also Vallance v Maes Corporation Ltd ET Case No. 1101491/09 
168  John McMullen, ‘Much Lies in Store for TUPE Laws in 2007’ (2007) 
http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/2007/01/09/38777/much-lies-in-store-for-tupe-laws-in-
2007.html accessed 30 March 2012. 
169  See Delabole Slate Ltd (n 123) above. 
170  It is pertinent to note however that a dismissal which is automatically unfair by virtue of reg. 7(1) 
of the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations can become effective if it is ‘accepted’ by the employees 
transferred. This was the view taken by the EAT in the case of Cornwall County Care Ltd v Brightman 
and others [1998] IRLR 228 EAT. 
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favourable to the prospective buyer. Sometimes, as a pre-purchase condition, a 
prospective buyer may request the transferor to downsize the workforce.171  
However, as the various cases analysed above demonstrate, it is difficult to 
achieve that result without the courts treating the dismissals as carried out with 
the aim of facilitating the eventual transfer. 172  Whether the transferor can 
successfully argue that the dismissals were necessary for the survival of the 
business, and that they were not effected merely to satisfy the transferee’s pre-
purchase condition, is difficult to say. This is a burden173  that is very difficult to 
discharge.174 Case-law has demonstrated that arguments by transferors that pre-
transfer dismissals are not transfer-motivated do not always prove successful. The 
situation is further compounded by the facts that there is no specific authority on 
when it might be considered safe to dismiss employees before or after a business 
transfer and because of the requirement to construe the provisions of TUPE 
purposively to achieve its employee protection purpose.175 These issues, it is 
submitted, do not augur well for the rescue culture. For potential transferees, the 
fear of potential liabilities would be the beginning of wisdom not to buy such 
insolvent businesses. Ultimately, the closure of the business would be most felt by 
the employees who would lose their jobs.176 
                                                          
171 For example, in Longden v Ferrari [1994] BCC 250, a prospective transferee gave the receivers a list 
of workers to retain. The receivers then dismissed the remaining employees at the instance of the 
would-be transferee. However, in spite of the available evidence that there was collusion between 
the eventual transferee and the receivers, the EAT refused to set aside the Industrial Tribunal’s finding 
of fact that the dismissals were eventuated by financial constraints and pressure from the appointor, 
rather than because the receivers had received a request or instruction from the prospective 
purchaser. 
172 Frisby (n 1) 257. 
173 Regarding claims on transfer-connected dismissals, the burden of showing that the dismissal was 
necessitated by a reason other than the transfer itself and which makes it fall within Regulation 7(2) 
shifts to the transferor. See the House of Lord’s view on this in Litster v Forth Dry Dock Engineering Co 
Ltd [1989] ICR 341, 353-54 (Lord Templeman). See also Gateway Hotels Ltd v Stewart [1989] IRLR 287. 
174 This burden can only be successfully discharged if the transferor can demonstrate that the 
dismissals were objectively necessary and were not effected just to facilitate the sale that eventuated. 
See Willis v McLaughlin and Harvey Plc, [1996] NI 427 (Kerr J) at 444. 
175 See Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. See also Marleasing SA v LA Commercial 
Internacional de Alimentacion SA  [1999] 1 CMLR 205.  
176 Collins (n 31); Frisby (n 1); Massara (n 10); Anneli Loubser, ‘The Interaction Between Corporate 
Rescue and Labour Legislation; Lessons to be Drawn from the South African Experience’ (2005) 14 Int’l 
Insol. Rev. 57-69; Parr & Benett (n 1); Sargeant (n 16); McMullen (n 7); Burdette (n 7); Etukakpan (n 
77). 
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6.10 Transfer Regulations: interpretations and 
effects of other provisions on business rescue and 
employment protection  
The 2006 revised Transfer Regulations now contain special provisions to aid 
transfers of insolvent undertakings. 177  Prior to these measures, transferors of 
insolvent businesses had to carefully navigate TUPE’s provisions in order to avoid 
liabilities during transfers. Successful utilisation of these mechanisms depended, 
however, on how the courts interpreted them where they were legally contested. 
Whereas some of the provisions of the original TUPE Regulations have been 
retained in the 2006 regime, the ‘hiving-down’ provision of the old regulation 4 
(see discussion above) considered a major way of rescuing insolvent businesses 
has not. This is because even though the mechanism was rescue friendly, it was 
detrimental to the employees’ interests in business transfer situations. It defeated 
TUPE’s purpose of protecting the employees’ rights during business transfers.178  
Below we consider the interpretations the courts have given to some words and 
concepts and their effects on business rescue and employment protection. 
6.10.1 The ‘employee’ in the context of TUPE 
According to Regulation 4(3) of TUPE 2006 an employee is: 
… a person employed by the transferor and assigned to the organised 
grouping of resources or employees that is subject to a relevant transfer, 
is a reference to a person so employed immediately before the transfer, or 
who would have been so employed if he had not been dismissed in the 
circumstances described in regulation 7(1)... 
This seems to suggest that both the transferor and the transferee of an insolvent 
business may be able to avoid liabilities where the employee could be dismissed 
in advance before the transfer because he or she would no longer be considered 
an ‘employee’ under the terms of Regulation 4(3). The view then was that if the IP 
made dismissals as close to the point of transfer as possible, no employee would 
be employed immediately before the transfer. This would then ensure that no 
employee transferred and the transferee could avoid inheriting employee-related 
liabilities.   
                                                          
177  These provisions are contained in Regulations 8 & 9 of TUPE 2006 discussed in chapter 7. 
178  See the courts’ views on this in Litster v Forth Dry Dock Engineering Co Ltd [1989] ICR 341 and Re 
Maxwell Fleet and Facilities Management Ltd (in Administration) [2000] IRLR 368 discussed above. 
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Dismissing employees very close to the period of the actual business transfer was 
a shrewdly contrived stratagem to ensure that the IP could secure the services of 
the employees for as long as possible and use them to continue the business to 
the very moment before the business was transferred.179 Usually, if there is any 
prospect of rescuing the company’s business in administration proceedings, for 
example, the IP must be able to sustain the essential activities of the business for a 
period while an assessment is made to determine whether a rescue is feasible. 
This allows time for negotiations to be commenced with potential buyers of the 
business as a going concern.180 In relation to TUPE 1981, the success or failure of 
this practice depended however, on how the courts interpreted the old Regulation 
5(3) (now 4 (3)). 181  That is, whether the regulation was given a literal or 
purposive, wide or narrow construction as discussed above in relation to the other 
provisions.  
A literal and narrow interpretation aided rescues of insolvent businesses whereas 
a purposive and wide orientation tended to work in favour of employment 
protection. In any case, each case was decided based on facts unique to it. The 
courts will take into account factors such as whether a temporary period between 
dismissal and the transfer of the business could quash any argument that an 
employee was not employed in the business or undertaking when the transfer 
took place.  The result of each case depended on how the courts construed the 
words: ‘a person employed immediately before the transfer’.  
6.10.2 Judicial construction of the words ‘immediately before 
the transfer’ 
As far as the interpretation of the phrase ‘a person employed immediately before 
the transfer’ under Regulation 4 (3) of TUPE 2006 is concerned, there was 
confusion regarding its real meaning and intent. Under the original TUPE, while 
some judges appeared uncomfortable with the employer’s ability to circumvent 
TUPE simply by terminating employment slightly before the transfer, others 
tended to condone it perhaps to promote business rescues.  
                                                          
179  Frisby (n 1) 254. 
180 This practice which has come under scrutiny by the courts in recent times may have personal 
liability consequences for the office-holder in relation to ‘adoption of contracts’ of employment of the 
employees retained for that purpose. See e.g. Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394: an employment 
contract is ‘adopted’ if the administrator causes the company to continue the employment 
relationship beyond the 14 days’ grace period after his or her appointment. See also Section 19 and 
44 of IA 1986. 
181  Frisby (n 1) 255; Massara (n 10); McMullen (n 7). 
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Judges who tended to support employee protection tried to prevent late 
dismissals with impunity and to the disadvantage of the employees, by focusing 
on the meaning of the words ‘immediately before the transfer’ in early cases and 
gave them purposive and broad interpretations. It was held in several cases that 
the words ‘immediately before’ did not mean a precise instance of time but could 
mean a period of time before the transfer.182  
In Kestongate v Miller, 183  for example, contracts for the sale of R Ltd (R) to 
Kestongate Ltd (K) were exchanged on 20 August 1984. Four days later the 
employee was told that she would be dismissed on 31 August. On 14 September 
the sale of R’s business to K was completed. The employee complained to an 
industrial tribunal (now employment tribunal)184 claiming compensation for unfair 
dismissal from K Ltd by reason of Regulation 5 of the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, on the ground that she had been 
employed ‘immediately before the transfer’ within the meaning of the old 
Regulation 5(3) of TUPE 1981 (now Reg. 4(3) under TUPE 2006). The tribunal held 
that the Regulations applied.  
The flexible and broad and purposive interpretation approach that was adopted 
by the tribunal in that case, apart from not striking a chord of popularity with 
transferors and transferees alike, created legal uncertainty. It was not also helpful 
to the rescue culture. It inhibited the transfer and hence rescues of insolvent 
businesses. It was not surprising that other judges (who were pro-business 
rescues?) took the view that intervals of perhaps a day or even a weekend 
between dismissal and transfer could be ignored.  
Secretary of State for Employment v Spence185 typified this alternative perspective. 
In that case the employer went into receivership in November 1983.  On Monday 
28 November, the receiver dismissed the entire workforce of the company three 
hours before selling the undertaking on a going concern basis to the buyer on the 
same day. The transferee then re-engaged all dismissed employees the following 
morning under fresh contracts of employment. The employees claimed 
                                                          
182  See e.g. Apex Leisure Hire v Barratt [1984] 3 All ER 795; Kestongate v Miller [1986] ICR 672). 
183 [1986] ICR 672).  
184 Industrial Tribunals were created in the UK by the Industrial Training Act 1964. Under the 
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998, the name Industrial Tribunals was changed to 
Employment Tribunals from 1 August 1998. The change in nomenclature does not affect their 
function as Employment Tribunals perform the same function as did the Industrial Tribunals. 
185  [1986] ICR 651 (CA). 
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redundancy payments from the transferor. As the transferor was insolvent, a claim 
for reimbursement was made to the Secretary of State who refused to pay on 
grounds that liabilities transferred to the transferee as the employees dismissed 
were employed in the business immediately before the transfer. Both the industrial 
tribunal and the EAT found in favour of the employees and held that the transferor 
was liable which meant that the Secretary of State had to reimburse.  
However, on further appeal by the Secretary of State to the CA, the latter favoured 
a narrow interpretation of Regulation 5 and construed the words ‘employed 
immediately before the transfer’ to mean employed up to the very point the 
business is transferred. The CA took the view that as the employees were 
dismissed moments before the transfer of the undertaking took place, there was 
nothing on which Regulation 5 of TUPE 1981 could bite. Regulation 5(1) did not 
therefore apply, as it related only to an employment contract subsisting at the 
very time the transfer occurred.186 What the CA was implying was that unless 
there is a subsisting employment relationship at the very moment a transfer is 
effected, the protection TUPE offers to the employees against unfair dismissal 
would not avail them. 
For a while, Spence was regarded as the judicial authority on the notion that 
contracts of employment of employees dismissed prior to a transfer, however 
close to it, do not transfer to the transferee. The decision was rescue friendly but 
had some limitations. It allowed IP’s to utilise the services of the employees and 
keep the business going up to the point when they were ready to sell the business 
before dismissing them. 187  It promoted business rescues by eliminating the 
possibility of buyers being potentially liable for dismissals. Sales arrangements 
were made in a way that ensured that liabilities for pre-transfer dismissals 
                                                          
186 The ramification of this decision was that earlier decisions of the EAT such as Apex Leisure Hire v 
Barratt [1984] IRLR 224, which adopted a contrary interpretation of the 1981 regulations, were 
wrongly decided. 
187 See how the courts reacted to this practice, however, in Powdrill v Watson [1995] 2 AC 394 (HL) in 
the context of of adoption of contracts of employment. The decision may be regarded as a conscious 
and vigorous attempt by the courts to protect the employees against this sort of practices in 
insolvency. It was to discourage receivers and administrators from retaining the employees and 
obtaining value-enhancing services from them without providing them with any corresponding job 
security in return. ‘In other words, the decision served to put office-holders on notice that adopting 
employees’ contracts of employment and enjoying the benefits of those contracts by utilising their 
services to keep the business going and then rejecting the burdens accompanying those contracts by 
dismissing affected employees just before a sale will not be condoned’. See Etukakpan (n 79) 106. 
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remained with the insolvent transferor, technically with the Secretary of State, and 
paid out of the National Insurance Fund (NIF).188  
Granted, the approach in Spence aided rescues of insolvent businesses, but it also 
had its down side. The CA’s interpretation of the phrase ‘immediately before the 
transfer’ was too restrictive and had the effect of curbing the full range of 
protections to which UK employees are entitled under the ARD. 189  While 
dismissals just before transfers provided the incentive to buy insolvent 
businesses, some prospective purchasers took the practice to the extreme. As 
part of the pre-purchase agreements, not only did they request the transferor to 
repudiate some contracts of employment and dismiss the employees that may be 
‘surplus’ to their requirements, but some prospective purchasers often requested 
the dismissal of the entire workforce. This afforded them the opportunity to 
‘cherry-pick’ those they wanted to retain, free and clear of accrued rights190 (such 
as continuity of service, redundancy payments etc.). Spence, arguably, was a 
return to status quo. It took employees back to the Nokes era (see discussion in 
chapter 5) and to the very injustice TUPE was meant to remedy. 
6.11 Litster v forth dry dock: game changer 
The legality of the extreme practice perpetuated by Spence was put to the test in 
the landmark House of Lords case of Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering 
Company Ltd.191 To summarize, Litster concerned a dispute where an insolvent 
company (Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Ltd) was put into administrative 
receivership and the receiver dismissed 12 workers including Litster an hour 
before the sale of the insolvent company’s undertaking took place. The reason for 
the dismissals was so that there would be no staff to transfer to the new entity and 
liabilities would not transfer to the buyer. Forty-eight hours later, some of the 
dismissed employees were re-hired by the transferee on less attractive terms and 
conditions. The dismissed employees contested their dismissals and brought 
claims for unfair dismissal against the company. The company argued that those 
                                                          
188 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn., Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) ; J McMullen (n 7); Oliver Hyams, Employment Aspects of Business Reorganisations, 
(OUP, Oxford 2006); Frisby (n 1) 256. 
189 Amie Jasmine Ahanchian, ‘Reducing the Impact of the European Union’s Invisible Hand on the 
Economy by Limiting the Application of the Transfer of Undertakings Provision’ (2002) 2  The Journal 
of International and Comparative Law, 29, 49. 
190 See e.g. Harrison Bowden Ltd v Bowden [1994] ICR 186. 
191 [1989] 1 All ER 1134, [1989] IRLR 161. 
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dismissed could not be said to be employed immediately before the transfer. The 
Court of Session held, following Spence, that none of the employees were 
employed ‘immediately before’ the transfer. The employees appealed. 
The House of Lords was asked to consider whether the time between the 
dismissals and the transfer there could have been contracts of employment in 
existence so as to enable liabilities for unfair dismissals to pass to the transferee 
under Regulation 5 (3) of TUPE 1981. Their Lordships were of the view that it was 
incumbent on Member States’ courts to construe national legislation (TUPE) in 
conformity with the spirit of the ARD. 192 In Lord Oliver’s view, the remedies 
provided in the case of an insolvent transferor would be ‘largely illusory unless 
they can be exerted against the transferee.’193 Therefore TUPE must be construed 
teleologically to give effect to the ARD. To achieve that aim, Article 4 of the ARD 
require a purposive construction of the phrase ‘immediately before the transfer’ as 
used in the TUPE Regulations. 
The House of Lords made the point that the construction of the words to a person 
employed in an undertaking in Regulation 4(3) of TUPE as meaning a person so 
employed immediately before the transfer should not be allowed to derogate from 
the requirements of the ARD. The HL noted that the automatic transfer provision 
under Regulation 4 (3) not only applies to workers employed immediately before 
a transfer, but that the rule apply also to employees who are able to show that 
they would have been so employed had they not been unfairly dismissed for a 
reason connected with the transfer in accordance with Regulation 7(1) TUPE 
2006).194 For these reasons, the HL held that the reason for the dismissals was the 
transfer of the business. It appears that what their Lordships did in Litster was add 
                                                          
192 Member States have an obligation arising from an EU Directive to achieve the result envisaged by 
the Directive. They also have a duty under Article 5 of the Rome Treaty to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation. That obligation is 
binding on all the authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the 
courts. It follows that, in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted 
before or after the Directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far 
as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve the result 
pursued by it. The aim is to ensure that the way national courts interpret a Directive comply with the 
third paragraph of Article 189 of the Rome Treaty. See Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA (1990) C- 106/89. 
193 [1989] IRLR 161, 172. 
194 In fact, the change in approach following the Litster decision was such that in the case of G4S 
Justice Services (UK) Ltd v Anstey and others [2006] IRLR 588 EAT, the EAT was able to hold that even 
employees dismissed for gross misconduct prior to a TUPE transfer, but whose appeals were 
subsequently upheld, were employed ‘immediately before’ the transfer, to the effect that their 
employment transferred to the transferee. 
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a qualification to Regulation 4(3) to enable an interpretation that is in consonant 
not only with the terms of the ARD, but also with the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
developed in relation to the ARD in  P Bork International A/S v Foreningen af 
Arbejdslederen i Danmark.195 In that case, the ECJ had stated that whenever within 
the framework of contractual relations, there is a change in the natural or legal 
person responsible for running the undertaking, and that person enters into 
contractual obligations as employer with the employees, then the ARD will apply. 
Litster represented a strong philosophical commitment to upholding and 
developing EU-derived employment rights. It reflected the English courts’ intent 
to construe implementing legislation purposively to accord with the spirit and 
letter of EU directives.196 Perhaps the HL used Litster to warn stakeholders in 
insolvent transfers that it may be prepared to recharacterise certain transactions 
by pushing at the boundaries of the statutory language as a way of limiting the 
scope for novel attempts to structure transactions with a view to avoiding the 
effects of TUPE. The decision represented the first step towards harmonising TUPE 
with the ARD. 
6.11.1 Effects of Litster on business rescue and employment 
protection 
The decision in Litster had both positive and negative effects. The judicial 
creativity in Litster trod upon new grounds. It altered the operation of the Transfer 
Regulations.197 Besides re-writing the plain words of the Transfer Regulations so 
as to facilitate an interpretation consistent with European law, the judgment also 
had wider legal consequences. The HL in that case put relevant employers on 
notice that, even in circumstances where termination of a contract of employment 
may be accepted by an employee, Regulation 4(3) still bites where an employee, 
                                                          
195 [1989] IRLR 41. The question put to the ECJ in Bork centred on whether the ARD applied in a 
situation in which the owner of a building, installations and machinery that were used to operate a 
factory took over its main elements after the termination of the lease and some interruption in the 
operations of the undertaking and ultimately transferred them to a third party (transferee) who 
shortly afterwards returned the undertaking to trading without recruiting new staff. Bork was a 
unique case because the transferee, rather than employing new staff, re-engaged about half of the 
transferor’s workforce that was retained by the lessee without reaching any new agreement with the 
latter or with the transferor. 
196 See e.g. Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-WestfalenCase 14/83 [1984] ECR 1891  para 28. 
197 P Wallington and R Lee, ‘Transfer of Undertakings: EEC law and judicial creativity’ [1989] JBL 513-
518,  516. 
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dismissed by reason of a business transfer, is later re-engaged by the 
transferee.198  
The questions provoked by Litster therefore are: (1) should dismissals which have 
already been made be regarded as never having taken place, or (2) should it be 
accepted that there had indeed been a dismissal, but because they were 
automatically unfair the employees’ contracts are therefore statutorily novated? 
The consensus seems to be that the second interpretation should prevail. The 
dismissals are to be treated as ineffective and the employment statutorily 
continued since there is no concept of ‘nullified dismissal’ in English law as 
obtains in the employment laws of some other Member States.199  
From the employees’ perspective, Litster was a game-changer. The decision gave 
back to the employees the protection intended for them by the ARD threatened 
by the practice encouraged by the Spence decision. For some, Litster conferred 
‘super-priority’ status on the employees of insolvent undertakings.200  
Litster may have succeeded in restoring the protection envisioned by the ARD for 
the employees, but it was not in any way helpful in terms of promoting the ‘rescue 
culture’ in the UK. This is because inability to downsize the workforce (albeit in 
Litster the timing was too close to the transfer) increases the cost of the rescue 
process. The prospect of inheriting liabilities could mean that a prospective buyer 
would either ask for a price discount or abandon the purchase deal altogether. A 
‘no deal’ situation for an insolvent transferor invariably means that the IP would 
have to break the business up and sell it piece meal. This option ‘while leaving 
shareholders and creditors comparatively unscathed’ would impact negatively on 
the employees in terms of job security. For the employees, the best outcome 
would have been the emergence of a buyer who would continue the business as a 
going concern and preserve as many jobs as practicable.201 It is in this type of 
                                                          
198 It would appear that from the decision of the HL, the interval between the two contracts is 
irrelevant. What matters is that the contracts of employment of employees dismissed and re-engaged 
would be deemed as never terminated in the first place. This is an improvement on the literal 
interpretation of reg. 5 that was adopted by the CA in Secretary of State for employment v Spence 
[1986] ICR 651 which was that the employee must be employed ‘up to the point of the transfer’ to be 
protected by TUPE.  
199 F R Younsen, Employment Law and Business Transfers,(1989) 107. 
200 John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2) - Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2000) 29 
ILJ 395, 396. 
201 ibid. 
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situation that the role of the Transfer Regulations in safeguarding employment 
rights is often called into question.202 
In sum, it is important to note that Litster did not outlaw dismissals. It only 
discouraged the practice instituted by the CA’s decision in Spence. Lister merely 
requires that dismissals in business transfer situations, especially in those 
involving insolvent undertakings, should be made fairly, lawfully and 
reasonably.203 Through Litster, the HL demonstrated a fidelity to the protective 
purposes of TUPE. Litster may be regarded as a warning from the courts that it will 
not condone the use of transparent devices such as the ‘hiving-down’ mechanism 
to deprive employees of the protection intended for them by the ARD and TUPE 
during transfers.  
The hiving-down route having been severely restricted by the courts, it seems 
that an employer’s ability to successfully dismiss employees without incurring 
liability for unfair dismissals would be dependent on how effective the relevant 
employer can make use of the economic technical or organisational (ETO) 
defence as an escape route. 
6.12 Using the ‘ETO’ defence as an escape route 
Not all dismissals carried out by the employers in connection with business 
transfers will be automatically unfair. This is made possible by the ETO provision 
under Regulation 7(2). There is no statutory definition of what an ‘economic, 
technical or organisational reason’ is and so employers have been reluctant to use 
this provision for fear of being challenged in an employment tribunal. However, 
Regulation 7(2) operates to disapply Regulation 7(1) in certain circumstances by 
providing that a dismissal connected with a transfer will not be automatically 
unfair if the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is an ETO reason entailing 
change in the employer’s workforce. In such circumstances, the dismissal would 
be treated as having been necessitated either by redundancy or by some other 
substantial reason within the meaning of section 98(1) (b) of ERA 1996.  
                                                          
202  Collins (31) 147-158. 
203  With regard to reasonableness, the test is whether the employer’s decision to dismiss fell within 
the range of reasonable responses available to it. See e.g.  (1) Post Office v Foley (2) HSBC Bank PLC v 
Madden [2000] ICR 1283, CA. 
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Regulation 7(2) may be viewed as ‘a defence to the automatic unfairness 
presumption’204 of Regulation 7(1) if the two paragraphs are read together.205 
Clearly, what the ETO exception has done is provide the relevant employer with 
an escape route to avoid liabilities for transfer-connected dismissals. The use of 
this ‘leeway’ will depend, however, first, on what constitutes an ETO reason and 
second, on how broadly the courts construe this concept. Frisby has articulated 
that, ‘the broader the view taken of this concept, the less critical becomes the 
TUPE dilemma’.206  
It follows that the ETO defence, if expansively construed by the courts, is capable 
of restoring the pre-Transfer Regulations’ advantages of transferring a business 
free of its employees and all pre-transfer employee related obligations since the 
employer can dismiss an employee lawfully for an ETO reason.207 The implication 
is that in a business transfer scenario, the transferor, for example, can 
strategically and lawfully dismiss an employee if he or she can show that the 
dismissals were necessitated by an ETO reason.208 However, this strategy must be 
carefully managed because if an employee is wrongfully dismissed, and the 
dismissal is not for an ETO reason, liability will still pass to the transferee.  
The flipside to this argument is that, the narrower the interpretation accorded the 
ETO defence by the courts, ‘the more employees are protected against strategic 
dismissals.’209 The inevitable result would be that rescues of insolvent businesses 
would be very difficult to achieve in the UK. 
6.12.1 The ‘ETO’ provision: broad or narrow construction? 
Perhaps compelled by the need to ensure that the employers’ prerogative to 
restructure the operations of their businesses is not completely eroded by TUPE 
and the ARD, the ETO shield was made available. The strategy may also have 
been conceived out of the need to foster the policy of giving distressed but 
                                                          
204 See Frisby (n 1) 260;  MacMullen (n 7). 
205 See Warner v Adnett [1998] IRLR 394. 
206 Frisby (n 3) 260. 
207 This was the approach sanctioned by the ECJ in Jules Dethier Equipement SA v Dassy and 
another.207 The ECJ held in that case that both the transferor and the transferee may lawfully dismiss 
employees for an ETO reason without incurring liability for unfair dismissal based on Article 4(1) of 
the ARD.  
208 Warner v Adnet [1998] IRLR 394; Kerry Foods Ltd v Kreber [2000] IRLR 10. 
209  Frisby (n 1) 260. See also McMullen (n 7); Ahanchian (n 189); Massara (n 10). 
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economically viable businesses ‘a second chance’ of survival. The English courts 
have demonstrated their commitment to supporting this objective.  
The broad construction the courts have given to the ETO concept in certain cases 
ensures that employee-related liabilities do not inhibit transfers and hence 
rescues of insolvent businesses. The availability of this defence shifts the burden 
of proof onto the dismissed employee. That is, a dismissed employee seeking to 
make the relevant employer liable for an unlawful dismissal will have to prove 
that: (1) he or she was dismissed for a reason connected to the transfer and; (2) 
that the dismissal was not made for an ETO reason entailing changes in the 
employer’s workforce. 210  This provision has tended to reduce the protection 
envisaged by the ARD for the employees as it is considered employer-friendly.211  
Instances abound where dismissals were made by transferors for the obvious 
reason of facilitating the sales of an insolvent undertaking, but the courts found 
creative and permissive ways of construing TUPE by holding that they were made 
for an ETO reason. Perhaps, this type of creative construction of the Regulations 
was invented by the courts as a way of supporting the rescue culture that was in 
the air in the early 1980s.212 The courts may have come to this conclusion on the 
view that TUPE curtail employers’ freedom to reduce the workforce in an 
insolvent business and make finding solutions to corporate financial difficulties 
more difficult to achieve. 213  Perhaps the approach taken to interpreting the 
provision is further reflection of the conflicting lines of reasoning in relation to the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Transfer Regulations highlighted in some of 
the cases already discussed above and the few below.  
                                                          
210 See e.g. Michael Peters Ltd v Farnfield, [1995] IRLR 190. See also Honeycombe 78 Ltd v Cummins 
[2000] UK EAT 4, December 10, 1999, where the tribunal held that liability for pre-transfer dismissal 
did not pass to the transferee where the administrator had made the dismissal for an economic 
reason.  
211  Ahanchian (n 189) 49. 
212 The Cork Committee Report in the 1980s did put a great deal of emphasis on reforming the 
existing insolvency law, but more so on the need for the system to have a mechanism capable of 
preserving insolvent but economically viable businesses which, in spite of their financial difficulty, 
could continue to contribute to the economic life of the country. See the various reports by the Cork 
Committee, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558; A 
Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms: Report by the Review Group, 
the Insolvency Service (London: HMSO, 1999). The Committee was chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, and 
its membership included representatives of the legal and accountancy professions as well as three co-
opted members, authorities on insolvency law. The Committee first met in February 1977 and ran for 
five years. 
213 F Baumann, ‘On Unobserved Worker Heterogeneity and Employment Protection’ (2010) 29(2) E.JL 
& E, 155-175. 
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In Anderson v Dalkeith Engineering Limited,214 for example, the Scottish EAT held 
that pre-transfer dismissals made at the request of the prospective purchaser of 
the business were made for an economic reason covered by Regulation 8(2) of 
TUPE 1981. Dalkeith Engineering Ltd (DEL) went into receivership in 1983.  
Anderson (A) was made redundant on March 11 of the same year. On 21 March, 
Precision Machining (PM), having completed the purchase of the business earlier, 
re-commenced the business and re-engaged some of DEL’s ex-employees. The 
applicant (A) was not among those re-engaged so he brought a claim for 
redundancy payment against PM.  
It was held that Regulation 5 of TUPE 1981 did not apply to transfer A’s dismissal 
claim to PM because he was not employed at the point of the transfer. A then 
claimed unfair dismissal under Regulation 8 of TUPE 1981 against the company in 
receivership. The ET dismissed A’s claim. It held that there was an ETO reason 
entailing changes in the workforce215 which made A’s dismissal not automatically 
unfair under Regulation 7 (old reg. 8 of TUPE 1981).  Normally, dismissals on 
grounds of redundancy would be for ETO reasons,216 but the employer will need 
to make sure that the redundancy is fair within other employment legislation 
provisions.217  
However, the approach adopted by the ET in Dalkieth caused consternation. The 
ET appeared to have ‘shut its eyes’ to the fact that the dismissal was made at the 
instance of the eventual purchaser. It also failed to take into account the fact that 
the seller’s willingness to oblige the prospective buyer’s request to dismiss 
employees was motivated purely by a desire to secure the sale of the business. 
Not even the fact that there was a contractual stipulation to that effect in the 
vending agreement could change the outcome of the case. A’s dismissal, 
according to the ET, was necessitated purely by an economic reason. The 
                                                          
214 [1985] ICR 66. 
215 Rarely do courts make a distinction between each of the three ETO categories. They often treat 
them as a single concept. The courts have held the words ‘entailing changes in the workforce means a 
change in the numbers of people employed or a change in employees’ particular functions. See 
Berriman v Delabole Slate Ltd [1985] ICR. The ET in that case stated that there is a requirement that 
the change in the workforce is part of the economic, technical or organisational reason. This means 
that ‘...the employers' plan must be to achieve changes in the workforce. It must be an objective of 
the plan, not just a possible consequence of it.’ See also Whitehouse v Chas A Blatchford & Sons Ltd 
[1999] IRLR 492; London Metropolitan University v Sackur (EAT/0286/ 06). 
216  Wheeler v Patel [1987] IRLR 211; Willis v McLaughlin & Harvey plc [1998] EuLR 22. 
217 One of the key requirements is that the selection of workers for purposes of redundancy must be 
fair and not biased. See e.g.Stacey v Babcock Power Limited [1986] IRLR 3; Howarth Timber (Leeds) Ltd 
v Biscomb [1986] IRLR 52. 
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vendor’s compliance with the purchaser’s request was not unfair unless there was 
an additional oblique motive. Under normal circumstances, the ETO reason does 
not apply, if the reason relied on does not relate to the future conduct of the 
business as a going concern but is related, for example, to bringing about a sale 
of the business at an enhanced price.218 
A possible explanation for the ET’s decision in that case would be that UK judges 
were beginning to embrace the ‘rescue culture’ philosophy that was in the air 
round about the time Dalkieth was decided. Here, we see the court construing 
TUPE’s provision in a way that ensures that TUPE does not obstruct the rescue and 
continuation of the insolvent undertaking. This type of judicial creativity ensured 
that in a situation where the award of compensation for unfair dismissal could 
have affected the effective functioning of the undertaking post-transfer was 
avoided. 
Similarly, in Thompson v SCS Consulting Ltd and others219 the EAT followed the 
approach in Dalkeith and held that employees dismissed 11 hours before the 
insolvent business was transferred was for economic reason which made those 
dismissed surplus to the requirement of the business. The court was of the view 
that notwithstanding the timing of the dismissals, they were unconnected with the 
transfer and because there was a genuine ETO (economic) reason, the dismissals 
were therefore not automatically unfair. 220 
In Nationwide Building Society v Benn and ors221 several employees resigned and 
brought claims for unfair dismissals following the transfer of the undertaking that 
employed them from Portman Building Society (PBS) to Nationwide Building 
Society (NBS) in August 2007. The employees cited a number of fundamental 
changes to their contract terms and other detriments as reasons for their 
resignations. These ranged from a diminution in skills and responsibilities of their 
jobs when they were assimilated into NBS’s workforce.  They also cited violation 
of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in the assimilation process as 
                                                          
218 Whitehouse v Chas A Blatchford & Sons Ltd [2000] ICR 542. Buxton LJ had said in that case that: 
‘the reason for dismissal must be related to the conduct of the business and a dismissal that is simply 
related to the sale of the business does not so qualify.’ 
219 EAT (3 Sept. 2001). 
220 See also Dynamex Friction Ltd & anor. v Amicus & ors [2008] EWCA Civ 381 discussed above. 
Collins LJ dissenting in the Dynamex case favoured a more liberal interpretation of Regulation 8 of 
TUPE 1981 which, in his opinion, permitted a transferee's motive to be taken into account in such 
circumstances.  
221 UKEAT/0273/09/JOJ. 
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well as the application of a substantially less beneficial bonus scheme to them to 
argue that they had been constructively and unfairly dismissed for reasons 
related to the transfer under the 2006 Transfer Regulations.  
Their argument was premised on the fact that Regulation 7(2) of TUPE 2006 
requires an ETO reason to entail changes in the workforce as a whole but, given 
that the changes in NBS’s workforce only affected transferred employees, the 
requirement of Regulation 7(2) of TUPE 2006 was therefore not satisfied. The 
workers’ arguments were rejected by the ET.  
On appeal, the EAT held that the employees who resigned in protest at their jobs 
being downgraded and their bonus entitlements being reduced following the 
business transfer were constructively dismissed. However, the dismissals were 
not automatically unfair even if connected to the transfer, as they were made for 
valid ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce. The EAT went on to opine 
that the phrase ‘entailing changes in workforce’ does not imply that an ETO (in 
this case organisational) reason for dismissal must entail changes in the entirety of 
the workforce.  
This type of ingenious interpretation of the ETO provision by UK courts and 
tribunals, it is submitted, is aimed at ensuring that transfers of insolvent 
undertakings are not overly hampered by employee-related liabilities. However, 
it has to be pointed out that for the ETO defence to avail the relevant employer, 
the scope of the ‘economic’ limb of Regulation 7(2)) of TUPE 2006 has to be 
confined to something related to the conduct of the underlying business. It follows 
that whilst true redundancy would be an ETO reason for dismissals, an outright 
desire to achieve a sale of a business or to receive an enhanced price for the 
business may not suffice as ETO defence. 222 
The problem with the ETO route as far as the rescue culture is concerned is that 
the transferee must first take on all of the transferor’s employees before he or she 
can make some of them redundant. It is submitted, that in addition to the special 
insolvency measures discussed in chapter 7 which were introduced into TUPE 
2006 to aid business rescues, the ‘rescue culture’ would be further boosted if the 
law could be changed so that transferors could validly make employees 
                                                          
222 Pollard (n 47) 103.  For cases where this position was upheld, see generally Ibex Trading v Walton 
[1995] IRLR 190; Wheeler v Patel & J Golding Group of Companies, [1987] IRLR 211; Gateway Hotels 
Ltd v Stewart [1988] IRLR 287. 
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redundant using the ETO defence before transferring the undertaking or business 
to the transferee. This, in addition to avoiding a situation whereby an employee is 
taken on by a transferee company only to be immediately declared redundant, 
would also facilitate the process of rescuing a business which is in administration 
by relieving the transferee of the burden of redundancy costs for those 
employees they would not, but for TUPE, wish to take on because one of the 
reasons for the business becoming insolvent was excess workforce. 
6.13 Danger of misinterpretation and over-stressing 
the protective purpose of TUPE 
It has already been shown that the way the provisions of the Transfer Regulations 
are interpreted by courts and tribunals is problematic. Confusion is the name of 
the game vis-a-vis TUPE. In his criticism of the literal approach to statutory 
interpretation, Lord Reid stated unequivocally that: 
...to apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intent of the 
legislature. To achieve the intent and produce a reasonable result, 
[the court] must do some violence to the words.223  
In effect, what his Lordship is implying is simply that a purposive approach is the 
way forward if the purpose of a given statute is to be achieved. However, the 
requirement to apply a ‘purposive interpretation’ to the Transfer Regulations 
carries with it certain risks. It results, as argued, in   
... a tension between the need for legal certainty, which is one of 
the fundamental elements of the rule of law, and the need to give 
effect to the intention of Parliament, from whatever source that 
(objectively assessed) intention can be gleaned.224  
In relation to the TUPE Regulations, there is the risk that judges could over-
emphasise or even misinterpret the purpose of the legislation by virtue of their 
lack of experience in the application of the purposive method of interpretation. 
This could have detrimental effects on either the rescue culture or on employment 
protection.  Examples of such misinterpretations abound.  
                                                          
223 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593. 
224  See R v SOS for the Environment ex parte Spath Home (2001) 1 AER 129 HL (Lord Nicholls). 
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In Milligan and Another v Securicor Cleaning Limited,225 for example, the EAT 
found that employees who claimed that their dismissals were automatically unfair 
under the 1981 TUPE Regulations, were not required to fulfil the statutory two 
years’ continuous service normally required to bring an unfair dismissal claim. 
The EAT opined that the second part of Article 4(1) of the 1977 ARD permitted the 
exclusion of certain specific categories of employees, but they found nothing in 
Regulation 8 of TUPE 1981 that had the effect of excluding employees with less 
than two years’ service from that protection. According to the EAT, any such 
exception would have to be identified specifically. 
This decision, it is submitted, is confusing given that normally statutory protection 
from unfair dismissal only avails employees with two years’ of continuous 
service,226 save in exceptional circumstances where there is no qualifying period. 
This exception, for example, applies to dismissals on grounds related to trade 
union membership or activities and dismissals on grounds of pregnancy or 
childbirth. Whereas the decision could be regarded as representing an important 
extension to the rights of employees dismissed in connection with the transfer of 
an undertaking in circumstances where TUPE applies, it is contestable both on 
grounds of policy and interpretation.  
Both the ARD and TUPE are concerned principally with the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights on a change of employer as opposed to creating new ones but 
the interpretation given to it by the EAT in the Milligan case, arguably, went 
beyond the safeguarding of the employees’ acquired rights in transfer situations, 
to creating new rights. Usually, employees with less than two years’ of continuous 
employment with the employer are vulnerable to dismissal for a range of unfair 
reasons without being in a position to seek remedies from an employment 
tribunal notwithstanding how capricious or unfair the reason for the dismissals 
would have been. However, under the Milligan principle, it would be possible to 
bring claims.  
The problem of misinterpretation was once again evident in Allan v Stirling DC,227 
where the Scottish EAT held that the transferor and transferee were jointly and 
severally liable for any dismissals which were automatically unfair by virtue of 
                                                          
225  [1995] IRLR 288, EAT. 
226  Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, s. 64. 
227 [1994] ICR 34. 
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TUPE. This decision was in spite of the fact that the option to make the transferor 
jointly liable in such circumstances (provided by the ARD to the Member States) 
has not been taken up or implemented by the UK. This decision, it is submitted, 
was wrong in the light of the discretionary provision of Article 3(1)228 and, on 
account of the ECJ’s ruling in Wendelboe.229   
On appeal, the EAT’s decision was overturned by the Scottish Court of Session.230 
Construing the wordings of the 1981 TUPE Regulations, the Court of Session 
confirmed that the old Regulation 5(2) clearly did not provide for any continuing 
liability on the part of the transferor. However, this clearly demonstrates how easy 
it is to misinterpret the provisions of TUPE. While the purposive interpretation has 
its advantage, it is laden with uncertainties.231 These cases further demonstrate 
the problems judges could face in applying non home grown laws. It also 
demonstrates that misinterpretation of TUPE resulting in the ‘over-protection’ of 
the employees could ‘over-deter’ purchasers and hinder business rescues. 
6.14 Conclusion 
TUPE is an important plank of UK’s employment law. It regulates the transfer of a 
business or of an undertaking from one employer (legal or natural) to another. 
TUPE is a social legislation. With it the employment contract is no longer seen as 
one involving an exchange of ‘labour for money’.232 Rather, it has become the 
‘principal distributive mechanism for wealth, status, and social power’ which 
provides the ‘necessary context for an individual to attribute meaning to his or her 
                                                          
228 To recap, Article 3(1) provides: 
 
The transferor's rights and obligations arising from a contract of 
employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a 
transfer within the meaning of Article 1(1) shall, by reason of such transfer, 
be transferred to the transferee.  
 
Member States may provide that, after the date of transfer within the 
meaning of Article 1(1) and in addition to the transferee, the transferor 
shall continue to be liable in respect of obligations which arose from a 
contract of employment or an employment relationship. 
229 Case 19/83 Wendelboe v LJ Music [1985] ECR 457. 
230  Stirling District Council v Allan & ors [1995] IRLR 301 Ct. Sess.  
231 Peter Wallington, ‘TUPE Update’ <http://www.11kbw.com/articles/docs/TUPEUPDATE.pdf> access 
25 January 2012 
232 ibid. 
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life’.233 Therefore, it should be safeguarded as much as practicable. This is what 
the Transfer Regulations aim to achieve. 
While TUPE has been effective in enhancing the social rights of the employees, it 
failed to correspondingly increase entrepreneurial freedom.234  Its application to 
insolvency has been particularly problematic. TUPE’s protective stance inhibits 
taking actions, such as reducing the size of the workforce, whenever economic 
exigencies in relation to an insolvent business demand such action to be taken in 
order to save the business. There may be an economic argument that to require 
an employer to pay compensation for dismissals carried out in order to save an 
insolvent business is tantamount to punishing the employer for trying to save jobs 
through purchasing and continuing an otherwise liquidation and eventual legal-
death destined business.  
In other words, TUPE increases the costs of business rescues. These costs are 
borne solely by the transferee. This is because, rather than spread the burden of 
transferable liabilities between the transferor and the transferee, the UK chose to 
cast the full burden of liability on the transferee.235 This, from a theoretical and 
Proceduralists standpoint, serves to ‘over-deter’ going concern sales of insolvent 
businesses. For the Proceduralists, the Transfer Regulations do nothing other than 
take into account extraneous interests which impede the sales and realisations of 
full going concern value of insolvent businesses. Discounted sales of insolvent 
businesses to account for employees’ liabilities deprive the creditors, according 
to the Proceduralists, of the extra monies that would have been available for 
distribution to them. At the other end of the spectrum, Traditionalist will 
appreciate what the Transfer Regulations have done to protect employees’ rights 
in insolvent business transfer situations. For them, TUPE satisfies their yearnings 
to make the protection of employees’ rights in transfers in the context of 
insolvency a legitimate goal of insolvency law albeit this is done externally by a 
different body of law.236 
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234 See S Hardy and N Adnett `Entrepreneurial Freedom versus Employee Rights’: the Acquired Rights 
Directive and EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam (1999) 9 Journal of European Social Policy 130. 
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does not make the transferor so liable, once a relevant transfer occurs, the transferor is discharged 
from obligations by reason of the transfer leaving the transferee to shoulder all such obligations. 
236 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 354-55; D 
G Korobkin, ‘Employee Interests in Bankruptcy’ (1996)4 American Bankruptcy Inst. L. Rev. 5; J Sarra, 
‘Widening the Insolvency Lens: The Treatment of Employee Claims’ in P J Omar (edn) International 
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Given the tension generated by TUPE between business rescue and employee 
protection in insolvency, perhaps what is needed are laws that would 
demonstrate a commitment to protecting the rights of employees while 
maintaining corporate employers’ abilities to operate their businesses with as 
limited restrictions as possible. What is desirable are rescue friendly laws as 
opposed to laws that will accelerate the ‘strangulating’ of business already in 
‘financial straits’.  
Such a law will require a balance to be struck between social policy legislation 
aimed at protecting employees’ rights during transfers of undertakings and 
business-friendly laws that will enhance free market principles. Laws that are 
business friendly will ensure that insolvent but viable businesses are given a 
second chance to continue trading in order to provide jobs for UK workers. This 
will require, it seems, ensuring that insolvent transferors, rather than legislation of 
EU emanation, determine the decisions made in relation to employees of 
insolvent transferors during transfers of insolvent businesses.  
However, such an approach must have mechanisms to ensure also that employees 
are not left without any protection at all during the process of insolvent business 
transfers. This thinking might have informed the revisions to the ARD and TUPE 
respectively. There are a number of changes (see chapter 7) in TUPE 2006 that 
have been specifically introduced to cater for insolvent business transfers. 
In the next chapter, the task will be to explore how the revised Transfer 
Regulations set out to strike a balance between the social rights of the workers 
and entrepreneurial freedom of UK corporate employers. The analysis will focus 
on the so-called rescue provisions of the revised ARD and TUPE 2006. The aim is 
to examine why these changes were made. It is intended to explore if the new 
provisions were intended to foster business rescues, whether they have actually 
succeeded in doing so. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives, (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire 2008); L Lopucki, ‘A 
Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganisation’ (2003) UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ 
Research Paper No. 3-12. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=397801> accessed 26 December 2011. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
RESCUES OF INSOLVENT BUSINESSES: 
NAVIGATING THE OBSTACLES POSED BY THE 
TRANSFER REGULATIONS  
7.1 Introduction 
Corporate restructuring is usually aimed at altering the structure of a business or 
making a change in the business activities of a company.1 However, where a 
business is insolvent, its continuous survival may be predicated on the 
transferor’s ability to sell it to a third party purchaser. During the common law era 
on transfers, insolvent businesses were attractive targets to purchasers because 
where the purchaser acquired the undertaking of a company, that undertaking 
did not include obligations in relation to employees’ contracts of employment.2   
TUPE has radically altered the previously well-established common law practice 
whereby an insolvent business could be sold free of the employees and all 
associated liabilities.3  
Whilst TUPE has proved to be a very effective legal regime for safeguarding the 
employees’ contractually acquired rights during transfers of insolvent 
undertakings, it must however, be remembered that ‘the cost of exercising a right 
is always the loss suffered elsewhere in the consequence of the exercise of that 
right.’4  This is no different with TUPE. The full exercise by the employees of the 
rights TUPE gives to them when the business that employs them becomes 
insolvent and is transferred as a going concern is not unlikely to be detrimental to 
other stakeholders with economic interests in the insolvent business. 
                                                          
1 See G B Stewart and D M Glassman, ‘The motives and methods of corporate restructuring’ (1988) 1 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 79-88; P A Gibbs, ‘Determinants of corporate restructuring: The 
relative importance of corporate governance, takeover threat, and free cash flow’ (1993) 14 Strategic 
Management Journal, 51-68. 
2 Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and “One Unholy Mess”’ 
[2000] CFIL 249, 250. 
3 At common law a business transfer automatically terminated all contracts of employment. See 
Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 HL. In the context of a business 
transfer or sale effected by a privately appointed receiver, see Re Foster Clark Ltd’s Indenture Trusts 
[1966] All ER 43; Griffiths v Secretary of State for Social Services [1973] 3 All ER 1184. 
4  Ronald H Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 44. 
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There is a perception that TUPE’s application to insolvency hinders the going 
concern rescues of insolvent businesses.5 TUPE tends to vest in the employees 
certain ‘dormant’ rights which are triggered only when the business employing 
them is transferred on a going concern basis to a third party purchaser.6  The 
protection TUPE gives to the employees in the context of insolvency increases 
costs for transferees due to employee-related liabilities. The problem is that when 
an insolvent business becomes ‘pregnant’ with employee entitlement obligations, 
it ceases to be an attractive purchase target. 7  Inability to sell an insolvent 
business comes with a price for not just the creditors of the business who might 
not get paid what they are owed, but also for the employees who would inevitably 
lose their jobs if the business is liquidated.8 
The 1981 TUPE Regulations were very rigid in the way employees were 
protected. TUPE tended to privilege employee protection over rescues of 
insolvent businesses. There were no inbuilt mechanisms in TUPE 1981 to 
incentivise purchases of insolvent undertakings. Like the 1977 ARD, TUPE did not 
contain any special provisions to cater for business transfers in the context of 
insolvency. This was rather surprising given that where a company is insolvent 
and its underlying business is economically viable, its rescue sometimes depends 
on the transferor’s ability to sell the business to a third party buyer.9  
However, as a result of there being no special provisions in the original Transfer 
Regulations to cater for transfers of insolvent undertakings, there was no balance 
between employee protection and business rescues. There was a real need for an 
effective balance to be struck between the business rescue and employee 
protection policies’ goals in insolvent business transfer situations. 
                                                          
5 McMullen, ‘An analysis of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
2006’ [2006] ILJ 113; H Collins, ‘Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency’ (1989) 18 ILJ 144; Frisby (n 
2); Wanjiru Njoya, ‘The Interface between Redundancy and TUPE Transfers’ (2003) 32 (2) ILJ 123-128. 
John Armour, Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters, ‘The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations 
and Costs in Corporate Rescue Proceedings: A Report Prepared for the Insolvency Service’ (2006) 
<http://www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.96...rep...> accessed 18 March 
2012. 
6 John Amour & Simon Deakin, `Insolvency, Employment Protection and Corporate Restructuring: the 
Effects of TUPE’ University of Cambridge CBR Working Paper No. 204 (2001) 10. 
7 Michael Sloan, ‘Close but no Cigar: Reform not Rescue’ (2008) 20 Australian Insolvency Journal 10; 
‘Model Agreement to Promote Company Restructuring’ (2008) 20 Australian Insolvency Journal. 
8  Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (3rd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2005) 119-
127. 
9 In Litster v Forth Dry Dock Engineering (1989) IRLR 161, Lord Keith of Kinkel said insolvencies were ‘a 
situation commonly forming the occasion for a transfer of an undertaking.’ 
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This chapter considers the Transfer Regulations in the context of insolvency. The 
aim is to explore how rescues of insolvent businesses have been boosted by the 
special insolvency measures introduced into the revised 2001 ARD and TUPE 
Regulations 2006 respectively. It will be argued that the measures were 
necessitated by the desire to strike a balance between business rescue and 
employee protection during transfers of insolvent businesses. In order to fully 
appreciate the difference the insolvency measures have made to the rescue 
culture, this chapter will explore the perceived problems with the original ARD 
and TUPE regimes and how these affected business rescues. Thereafter, a brief 
overview of how the 1977 ARD and TUPE 1981 were revised and why they were 
revised is presented. Then the substantive changes made to these regimes and 
how these have aided rescues of insolvent businesses is considered. Lastly, the 
potential difficulty posed by adopting the ‘purpose of insolvency’ approach 
developed by case law to determine whether or not TUPE applies to a particular 
transfer in the context of UK insolvency proceedings so as to determine whether 
or not the employees are protected is examined.  
7.2 Perceived problems with the original ARD 
The 1977 ARD was heavily criticised by Member States for its inflexibility in 
situations where transfers took place as part of an insolvency procedure and other 
shortcomings. Because of these issues, the first generation ARD was the subject of 
a plethora of cases before the European Court of Justice (ECJ)10 and national 
courts of the Member States due to inherent legal uncertainties and defects as 
well as problems associated with its transposition to Member State legislation. 
These cases resulted in a deluge of often conflicting rulings that were handed 
down by the court. There were concerns among the Member States about the 
impacts of the ARD on transfers of insolvent businesses. The consensus was that 
the ARD needed to be revised to address the criticisms levied against it. Before 
looking at the process of its revision and the substantive changes that were made 
                                                          
10 Expressing concern about the number of litigations that arose in relation to the various directives in 
1992, the Commission noted that of the three directives that were adopted as part of the 1974 SAP to 
protect employees’ rights (viz Council Directive 75/129/EEC; Council Directive 77/187/EEC and Council 
Directive 80/987/EEC discussed in chapter 3), the ARD was by far the one that was problematic 
because it engendered the most litigations before the ECJ.  See Commission Report to the Council 
2/6/92- SEC/92/857. At the time the Commission made this observation, a total of 12 judgments had 
already been handed down. See Professor Rolf Birk, ‘The Contracting-out: Report for the Commission 
of the EC’ DG V (1994) 1-46. 
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to the regime, it is intended to first summarise the perceived defects in the 1977 
ARD. 
7. 2.1 Drafting defects 
A key problem with the original ARD relates to the imprecise way in which it was 
drafted. This defect was responsible for the legal uncertainty and inconsistency in 
the ARD. Imprecise drafting of the legislation generated considerable debates on 
the meanings of certain key terms and concepts. Two of the most debated issues 
(which could still give rise to future litigations even in the revised version),11 
pertained to the precise meanings of ‘transfer’ and ‘undertakings’ in the context 
of the ARD. Also, there was very little assistance in the text regarding what was an 
‘economic, technical or organisational’ reason for dismissing an employee. 12 
Imprecise drafting of the legislation created confusion for stakeholders in 
insolvency in the Member States since it was difficult to determine whether or not 
the regime applied to certain transactions. For example, it was difficult to 
ascertain when to dismiss employees before a business transfer without falling 
‘foul’ of the ARD. In the UK for example, the fear of incurring liabilities deterred 
buyers from buying insolvent businesses (as discussed in chapter 6). 
7.2.2 Interpretation problems 
The corollary of the imprecise drafting problem was that the definitions of key 
terms and the interpretation of the provisions of the ARD were left to the ECJ. The 
ECJ adopted a purposive interpretation approach to the ARD and in the process 
widened the scope of the regime to cover modes of transfers that were not 
envisaged by the original authors of the ARD. The expansion of the scope of the 
ARD by ECJ case law was a major source of confusion in the Member States 
regarding the level of social protections their implementing legislations should 
actually give to their employees.13  
                                                          
11 See e.g. Vivien Shrubsall, querying whether the new definition of ‘transfer’ in the amended 
Directive is capable of resolving the uncertainty surrounding such transfers as the transfer of labour-
intensive service contracts, particularly in the context of the contracting-out and competitive 
tendering for support services. V Shrubsall ‘Employment Rights and Business Transfers- Changes to 
the Acquired Rights Directive’ <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue5/shrubsall5.html> accessed 06 
December 2011. 
12 See chapters 5 and 6. 
13 J M Henderson, ‘The Institutional and Normative Significance of the European Union’s Acquired 
Rights Directive’ (1996) 29 George Wash Journal of Int’l Law & Economics 803, 827. 
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For example, it was not very clear whether the ARD was to be interpreted to 
protect only those employees who, at the time of a business transfer held 
contracts of employment, or whether employees who would have held contracts 
of employment at the time of the transfer had they not been unfairly dismissed 
days or just hours before a business transfer were to be protected too.14 The 
drafters of the TUPE Regulations which implemented the ARD into UK law also 
misconstrued the meaning of certain concepts such as ‘undertaking.’ Regulation 
2(1) of TUPE 1981 stated that an ‘undertaking’ included ‘any trade or business’ but 
did not include ‘any undertaking or part of an undertaking which is not in the 
nature of a commercial venture.’15   
English judges tended to give judicial blessings to this limited interpretation of 
‘undertaking’.16 For example, in Woodcock and others v Committee for the Time 
being of the Friends School, Wigton17 where a school (initially operated by the 
Quakers as a registered charity) was sold to a company, the key issue was 
whether or not this type of transfer was within the scope of TUPE 1981 (the UK 
equivalent of the ARD).  The Industrial Tribunal (IT)18 held that the school was not 
‘in the nature of a commercial venture’ as it was not a business in which capital 
was invested with a view to profit. On appeal, both the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT) and the Court of Appeal (CA) agreed with the IT that the school 
was not a business or undertaking ‘in the nature of a commercial venture’.19  
                                                          
14  TUPE 1981 only protected those who were employed ‘immediately before’ the transfer. However, 
in Litster v Forth Dry Dock Engineering Ltd, the House of Lords having enquired into the purpose of the 
ARD, interpreted TUPE by reading in additional words to protect workers not only if they were 
employed ‘immediately before’ the time of transfer, but also when they would have been so 
employed if they had not been unfairly dismissed by reason of the transfer. 
15 C-29/91, Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting, [1992] I ECR 3189, which concerned the transfer of activities 
of a foundation financed wholly out of public funds.  
16 It is pertinent to note, however, that English courts and tribunals took this view prior to the ECJ 
accepting, at least, impliedly, that in the context of social law (see Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting case 
[1992] ECR I-3189) and competition law (see Hofner v Macrotron GmbH (Case C-41/90) [1991] ECR I-
1979), that a body might be engaged in economic activities and be deemed an ‘undertaking’ for the 
purposes of Community law even though it does not operate with a view to profit. 
17 [1987] IRLR 98. 
18 Currently, industrial Tribunals are known as Employment Tribunals. On when the name was 
changed to employment tribunal, see fn. 184 in chapter 6. 
19 The EAT took a broad view in that case and adopted the first impression test – a test which the CA 
in its later decision agreed with and also adopted. The EAT held that:  
…. the proper meaning of the words 'in the nature of a commercial venture' 
is very much a matter of first impression. The majority form the view that 
undoubtedly the operation conducted by the first respondents was an 
undertaking in the sense at least of being a trade or business but that the 
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Woodcock demonstrates the English courts’ proclivity to draw a distinction 
between the facts that before a transfer the ‘undertaking’ was not operated for 
profit whereas after the transfer it was so operated. This distinction was in spite of 
the ARD, which TUPE implemented, making no such distinction.20 
 It was this type of restricted interpretations of the regimes’ provisions that the 
European Commission took issues with. The infraction proceeding brought by the 
European Commission against the UK in Commission of the European Communities 
v UK 21  was as a result of this type of limited interpretation of the ARD.22 The 
European Commission felt that the UK’s interpretation of ‘undertaking’ was too 
restricted and so short-changed employees of the full protection the ARD 
intended for them. The Commission was of the opinion that the contentious words: 
‘in the nature of a commercial venture’, must be interpreted as referring to the 
investment of capital with a view to making profits and accepting the risk of losses 
that goes with the investment. It follows that although an undertaking not set up 
specifically with profit-making in mind is unlikely to come within the meaning of a 
‘commercial venture,’ such an undertaking may nevertheless still operate as 
‘businesses’ offering products or services for remuneration which brings it within 
the ambit of the ARD as held in Stitcting.23  
                                                                                                                                                                      
operation was excluded from being an undertaking within the meaning of 
the Regulation because it was not in the nature of a commercial venture. 
The way that it was organised, conducted (particularly the way its finances 
were conducted), the fact perhaps above all of its charitable status 
combined, in the judgment of the majority, to make it an enterprise which 
could not fairly be described as an undertaking in the nature of a 
commercial venture. 
20 See e.g. Article 1 of ARD 2001. In fact, ECJ case-law has established that the ARD apply to all 
undertakings - inclusive of those undertakings not aimed at profit-making. See particularly Case C-
29/91, Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartol [1992] ECR 1- 3189. 
21 [1994] ICR 664. 
22 Other complaints against the UK in that case included failure to provide for compulsory designation 
of employee representatives,  the requirement for a transfer of ownership of the undertaking (with 
reference to two judicial decisions: Robert Seligman Corp. v Baker  [1983] ICR 770; Hadden v 
University of Dundee Students' Association [1985] IRLR 449, the Commission argued that the decided 
case law in the United Kingdom in matters relating to the surrender of franchises, the termination of a 
subcontract or other transfer of management functions did require a transfer of ownership in order 
for the provisions of the 1981 Regulations implementing the 1977 ARD to be applicable). There were 
also complaints regarding the limited substantive obligations to inform and consult with employees’ 
representatives and the inadequate sanctions provided for violation of these requirements.  
23 Case C-29/91, Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v Bartol [1992] ECR 1- 3189. The UK was not the only 
guilty party with regards to defective implementation of the ARD. Other Member States such as 
Belgium and Italy also had infringement proceedings brought against them under Article 169 of the 
Treaty of Rome of 1957. There were also several requests made by national courts of Member States 
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7.2.3 Lack of flexibility 
A major problem with 1977 ARD was that although it strengthened the rights of EU 
employees during transfers of undertakings, it failed to correspondingly increase 
entrepreneurial freedom. 24  The ARD failed to provide greater flexibility for 
transfers involving businesses experiencing serious economic crises 25 and so 
failed to reconcile the objective of employment security and that of labour market 
flexibility.26 There were no measures to aid the sales of insolvent businesses. It is 
unimaginable that a labour legislation intended to protect employees potentially 
impacted by business collapse failed to consider or even contribute to the 
rescues of such businesses since that would be the best outcome for the 
employees in terms of job security.27 
With all these shortcomings, it was apparent that the ARD was not going to have a 
trouble-free ‘life’.  It was obvious that the 1977 ARD needed to undergo a major 
revamping if purchases of insolvent businesses were to be encouraged. The 
original ARD has been revised twice. The first revision was in 1998 and the 
second in 2001. Below is a brief overview of how the 1977 ARD was revised. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for preliminary rulings under Article 177 most of which were in 
relation to the interpretation of provisions of the 1977 ARD. For instance, Spijkers v Gebroeders 
Benedik Abbatoir CV and another, Case 24/85 (1986) CMLR 296; Schmidt v Spar und Leihkasse der 
Fruhern Amter Bordeshol Kiel und Cronshagen, Case 392/92 (1994) ECR 1-1311; Ledernes 
Hoversorganisation, acting for Rygaard v Dansk Aebejdsgiverforening, acting for Stro Molle Akustik 
A/S, Case C-48/94 (1995) ECR 2745 were all Article 177 references from the Dutch Supreme Court, the 
Scleswig-Holstein Regional Court of Germany, the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court to the ECJ. 
According to a report published in 1994 by Professor Rolf Birk, the number of judicial rulings by the 
ECJ in relation to the ARD after 17 years of its existence was 458 in total. These were: Belgium, 
approximately 30 rulings; Germany, approximately 130; France, approximately 260; Luxembourg, 
approximately 3 and the Netherlands, approximately 35. See Rolf Birk, ‘The Contracting-out: Report to 
the Commission’ (1994). 
24  S Hardy and N Adnett, ‘Entrepreneurial Freedom Versus Employee Rights’: the Acquired Rights 
Directive and EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam’ (1999) 9 European Journal of Industrial Relations, 127. 
25 See opinion of the Commission in the explanatory memorandum on the proposal for the 
amendment of Council Directive 77/187/EEC. 
26 S Hardy and N Adnett, ‘Entrepreneurial Freedom versus Employee Rights’: the Acquired Rights 
Directive and EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam’ (1999) 9 European Journal of Industrial Relations, 127. 
27 A Loubser, ‘The Interaction between Corporate Rescue and Labour Legislation: Lessons to be Drawn 
from the South African Experience’ (2005) 14 Int’l Insolv. Rev, 57-69; M Armstrong and A Cerfontaine 
‘The Rhetoric of Inclusion? Corporate Governance in Insolvency Law’ (2000) Ins. Law 38. 
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7.3 Amendments to the ARD: overview of the 
revision process 
Due to the application of the ARD to business transfers in the Member States of the 
EU, it has been contended that the field of employment rights in business 
transfers has witnessed more cases being brought before the ECJ than any other 
topic in EU employment law.28 By 1994, the ECJ had made over 40 rulings on the 
ARD and the spate of litigation showed no sign of abating. Conscious of all the 
controversies generated by the original ARD and, particularly the adverse effects 
of the regime on rescues of insolvent businesses, the European Commission 
moved to put things right seventeen years after the ARD was adopted. The 
Commission tendered proposals for amendments to the 1977 ARD in 1994.  
The first set of the Commission’s proposals made pursuant to Article 189A (2) of 
the EC Treaty ran into a great deal of opposition within the European Parliament 
and amongst trade unions. They were widely discussed, and in part, heavily 
criticised by the European Parliament (EP).29 What was initially intended as a 
straightforward ‘housekeeping’ measure, became a very politicised battle with a 
host of restructuring techniques of more recent vintage (e.g. outsourcing, 
competitive tendering etc.) having been brought within the ambit of the ARD 
following decisions by the ECJ. The opposition to the draft proposals forced the 
Commission to withdraw them.  
The revised proposals submitted by the Commission took into account the 
concerns and opinions of several Committees. These included the views of the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions adopted in 
March and April 1995 respectively.  They also took on board the amendments 
made to the original draft proposals by the European Parliament. All these bodies 
were unanimous in requesting that several technical improvements be made to 
the wording of the ARD so as to make for legal certainty and consistency.30 
However, given that the final amended scripts were also based on a number of 
ECJ rulings, clarity was really lacking as we still have to look to case law for 
                                                          
28 Gavin Barrett, ‘Light Acquired on Acquired Rights: Examining Developments in Employment Rights 
on Transfers of Undertakings’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review. 1053 – 1105. 
29 OJC 124, 21. 4. 1997. COM (97) 60 final, 
30 COM (97) 60 final of 24. 02. 1997, 94/0203 (CNS). 
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further explanation. 31  This was rather surprising given that lack of clarity 
(discussed above) was one the things that triggered the amendment in the first 
place. 
7.3.1 The Principle of subsidiarity32 and the revised ARD 
Due to the conflict between the EU and Member States regarding what role the 
former has, or should have, in social policy generally and in employment matters 
specifically discussed in chapter three, the 1977 ARD was revised based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. 33  Currently, most draft employment directives take 
cognizance of national legal diversity.34 This principle underlies everything the 
EU does today in areas or on matters which it does not have exclusive 
competence to legislate. 35  Subsidiarity 36  allows for some sort of ‘division of 
labour’ on EU legislation between the central (EU) and the national governments 
                                                          
31 Adam Wickes, ‘The Reformation of TUPE Regulations in 2006 Sought to Reinforce Previous UK 
Regulations by Implementing the Amended Acquired Rights Directive. Provide a Critique of the 
Domestic legislation’. 
<http://www.appartnership.co.uk/files/Critique%20of%20the%20TUPE%202006%20Regulations.pdf> 
accessed 30 April 2012. 
32 Subsidiarity entered into the political agenda of the EU in the 1990’s due to concerns expressed by 
some Member States that the EU’s progressive acquisition of powers (under Article 308 TEC) and 
exercise of competences was increasingly encroaching on ‘policy issues where domestic legislative 
competence lay with the sub-national rather than national government’. See N Burrows, C Carter & A 
Scott, ‘Subsidiarity and the Draft Treaty’ (2004) Sub Rosa Discussion Paper 
<http://www.regleg.eu/downloads/activities/9.doc> accessed 03 April 2012. 
33 In 1992, prior to the entry into force of the EU Treaty, (Article 3b of which referred explicitly to the 
principle of subsidiarity), a compulsory procedure was introduced within the Commission whereby all 
draft proposals to the Council and Parliament were to be reviewed based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. See ‘Report to the European Council on the Application of the Subsidiarity Principle 1994’ 
Com (94) 553 final 25.11.1994. See also comment by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 
Department of Employment (Lord Henley) in the House of Lords debates on the amendments of the 
ARD. HL Deb 22 June 1994 vol 556 cc268-9. 
34 Paul Teague, ‘Deliberate Governance and EU Social Policy’ in C Pierson & F G Castles (eds.) The 
Welfare State Reader (Polity Press, Cambridge 2006) 275.  
35 Wolf Schafer ‘Harmonisation and Centralisation versus Subsidiarity: Which Should Apply Where?’ 
(2006) 41 (5) Intereconomics, Brugel Forum (September / October) 246 -249. 
36 The legal basis for the principle of subsidiarity is Article 5 (3) Treaty of the European Union (TEU).36  
Article 5 (3) states that:  
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level. 
See further V Harrison, ‘Subsidiarity in Article 3b of the EC Treaty—Gobbledegook or Justiciable 
Principle?’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 431-439; Van Kersbergen and B 
Verbeek ‘The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1994) 32 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 215-36. 
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of Member States at the European level.37 Subsidiarity in the context of EU law 
means that in the absence of a clear rationale to support EU level action to uphold 
the internal market, national governments should rule. 38  Conversely, it also 
means that the functions handed over to the EU level government are those which 
Member States, at the various levels of decision making, can no longer discharge 
satisfactorily.’ 39 One of the significant legal functions of subsidiarity is that it 
imposes a certain onus on the various EU institutions to justify their actions40 
otherwise the action by the directive or regulation may be considered 
disproportionate. If justification for an action cannot be provided, to avoid the 
enacting of disproportionate directives or regulation, there is the view that only 
coordination, recommendations or consultations should be pursued. 41  The 
principle also requires that whatever action is taken at the European level has to 
be able to secure greater freedoms for the individuals in the Member States.42 
In relation to the ARD, revising it based on the principle of subsidiarity 
demonstrated the Commission’s readiness to take into account the opinions of the 
Member States and those of the social partners when reviewing existing social 
policy legislations and in the enactments of future ones.43 It also showed that the 
EU respects the multiplicity of the economic, social and legal traditions of the 
Member States44 and that it is making genuine efforts to balance its social policy 
legislations (such as the protection of employees’ rights in business transfer 
                                                          
37 Anna Verges Bausili, ‘Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Exercising Powers in the EU: 
Reforming Subsidiarity and National Parliaments (2002) Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/02 
<http://www.centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/02/020901.rtf> accessed 8 May 2012.  
38 L Brittan, Europe: The Europe We Need (Hamish Hamilton Ltd, London 1994) 17;  Grainne De Burca, 
‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity's Significance after Amsterdam’ (1999) Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper No. 7 
39 See also ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity: Communication of the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament’ SEC (92) 1990 Final. 
40 Grainne De Burca, ‘Re-appraising Subsidiarity's Significance after Amsterdam’ (1999) Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper No. 7/99 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.html>  
accessed 11 March 2012. 
41  Jacques Pelkmans, ‘Testing for Subsidiarity’ (2006) 13 Burges European Economic Policy Briefings 
<http://www.coleurope.eu/file/content/studyprogrammes/eco/.../BEEP13.pdf> accessed 18 April 
2012 
42 Philippe de Schoutheete, The Case for Europe: Unity, Diversity, and Democracy in the European 
Union (Lynne Reinner Publishers Ltd, 2000) 42; D Z Cass, ‘The Word that saves Maastricht? The 
Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers within the European Community’ (1992) 29 CMLR 
1107; J Peterson, ‘Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit any Vision?’ (1994) 47 Parliamentary Affairs 116-
132. 
43  Andrew Beale and Roger Geary, ‘Subsidiarity Comes of Age?’ (1994) 144 NLJ 12. 
44  Jo Hunt, ‘Success at Last? The Amendment to the Acquired Rights Directive,’ (1999) 24 (3) 
European Law Review 215- 230; Teague (n 34).  
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situations) against the national practices of the individual Member States.45 The 
principle was instrumental to the quantity of discretions granted Member States in 
the 2001 ARD.46 
Council Directive 98/50/EC which was adopted at the Cardiff Summit in June 1998 
officially amended Council Directive 77/187/EEC.  It replaced Articles 1-7 of the 
1977 ARD with new Articles 1-7b. Member States were given three years to 
implement the ARD into their respective national laws.  The 1998 ARD made a 
substantial advance in the area of insolvency with the introduction of measures to 
help those businesses that can be rescued. It also made efforts to align European 
and Member State legislations with ECJ case law. Outside of this, the vast majority 
of the changes made to the ARD from the 1977 version were word alterations.47 
However, before the three years allowed for the implementation could lapse, 
further updates were made to the regime in 2001.  
7.4 Council Directive 2001/23/EC 
Council Directive 2001/23/EC codify Council Directive 77/187/EEC as amended 
by Council Directive 98/50/EC. The codification concerns a number of formal 
aspects of the texts of previous legislations only, with no implications for their 
contents. It does not in any way alter their contents which remains unchanged. To 
encourage rescues of insolvent businesses, the 2001 ARD has provided two 
options that may be used to enhance the sales of such businesses. These options 
are considered below. 
7.5 Measures introduced to aid rescues of insolvent 
businesses  
The lack of flexibility in the ARD discussed in section 7.2.4 above and, the adverse 
effect this had on transfers of insolvent undertakings prejudiced the interests of 
                                                          
45  Cass (n 42). 
46  Giuseppe S Massara, ‘Transfer of Undertakings: Insolvency Proceedings in the United Kingdom and 
in Italy and the European Court of Justice Case Law’  in ‘Compliance with labour legislation: 
its efficacy and efficiency’ ILO Working Paper No. 6 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
ed_dialogue/---lab_admin/documents/publication/wcms_140685.pdf>  accessed 21 April 2012. 
47 Shrubsall (n 11); Paul Davies, ‘European Developments - Amendments to the Acquired Rights 
Directive’ (1998) 27 ILJ 365. 
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the very employees the regime was meant to protect.48 The Commission therefore 
felt that a better articulation of the basic individual rights of the employees was 
needed. This does not, however, translate into increasing the employees’ formal 
legal rights.49 In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. It will be shown later in 
the thesis 50 that in a bid to promote the going concern rescues of insolvent 
businesses, the amending Directives rather than increasing the employees’ 
formal legal entitlements reduced them instead.51  
What was not certain at the time the amendments were made was whether in 
return for a reduction in their legal entitlements, the employees would be 
guaranteed greater substantive job protection.52 This, however, is doubtful given 
that employers continue to have the ETO defence which they could legally use to 
terminate the employee’s contract of employment following a business transfer. 
The main provisions protecting employees’ rights during transfers of 
undertakings which were perceived as hampering business rescues under the 
original ARD are found in Articles 3 and 4 of the 2001 ARD.53  
Although these provisions remain the law and continue to apply to transfers other 
than those effected in the context of insolvency, some measures to incentivise 
purchases of insolvent businesses have however been introduced into the 
framework of the 2001 ARD.  Article 5 of the 2001 ARD provides for a two-fold 
exception to the primary protection afforded to the employees by Article 4 to 
facilitate going concern sales of insolvent businesses.  
                                                          
48 Hunt (n 44) 215, 217. 
49 Davies (n 47) 365. 
50  See the section on ‘drawbacks of Article 5’ below. 
51 Davies (n 47). 
52 Davies (n 47). 
53 Article 3(1) (a) & (b) states: ‘The transferor’s rights and obligations arising from a contract of 
employment or from an employment relationship existing on the date of a transfer shall, by reason of 
such transfer, be transferred to the transferee’. Article 4(1) provides: ‘The transfer of the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by 
the transferor or the transferee. This provision shall not stand in the way of dismissals that may take 
place for economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce’. 
Article 4 (2) states: ‘If the contract of employment or the employment relationship is terminated 
because the transfer involves a substantial change in working conditions to the detriment of the 
employee, the employer shall be regarded as having been responsible for termination of the contract 
of employment or of the employment relationship’. 
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7.5.1 Rescue measure one: capping of transferable liability 
The first measure introduced to aid business rescue is contained in Article 5 (2) 
(a). This provides that:  
...the transferor's debts 54 arising from any contracts of employment or 
employment relationships and payable before the transfer or before the 
opening of the insolvency proceedings shall not be transferred to the 
transferee, provided that such proceedings give rise, under the law of that 
Member State, to the protection at least equivalent to that provided for in 
situations covered by Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer...55  
The broad effect of Articles 5 (2) (a) is to exclude the application of the ARD to 
transfers in which the transferor is insolvent and is subject to insolvency 
proceedings, other than bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency 
proceeding, instituted with a view to the liquidation56 of its assets and which are 
under the supervision of a competent public authority. 57 In such situations, a 
Member State is at liberty to provide that the transferor’s debts58 (arrears of 
payments, damages or other liabilities)59 arising from the contract of employment 
or employment relationship and payable before the transfer of the undertaking or 
due prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings shall not be transferred to the 
transferee. Instead, those debts are to remain with the insolvent transferor where 
they will be paid by the Member State’s guarantee institution established for that 
                                                          
54 The use of the word ‘debts’ in this new Article 5 provision designed to facilitate rescues of insolvent 
businesses is significant. This is because the word used in Article 3(1) is ‘obligations’ which is 
suggestive of the fact that only accrued and liquidated amounts may be excluded from transferring to 
the purchaser. This, for example, would include arrears of wages and salary or accrued holiday pay. 
See further Insolvency Act 1986, Schd. B1, para 99 (6). For what does not constitute ‘wages’ see Re 
Huddersfield Fine Worsted Ltd [2005] 4 All ER 886 and Re Allders Department Stores Limited [2005] All 
ER (D) 231 both of which, though decided on different points of law, defined wages. 
55  Article 5 (2) (a) ARD 2001 
56 In the context of UK insolvency system, these proceedings will include administrative receivership 
and the administration proceedings discussed in chapter 6. See particularly the section entitled: ‘the 
concept of relevant insolvency proceedings’. 
57  Article 5(1) ARD 2001. 
58  On the definition of debts, see fn 17 in chapter 1. 
59  At law, the word ‘liability’ is widely defined to cover a liability to pay money or money’s worth, any 
liability under enactment, any liability for breach of trust, any liability in contract, tort or bailment, 
and any liability arising out of an obligation to make restitution. See Insolvency Rules 1986, r. 13. 12 
(3) and r. 1312 (4). 
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purpose as required by Council Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event 
of the insolvency of their employer.60 
7.5.2. Rescue measure two: modification of the principle of 
compulsory transfer of contracts of employment on existing 
terms and conditions 
The second measure is found in Article 5 (2) (b). This measure, while less 
problematic in principle, is much more problematic operationally. This measure 
which can either be adopted as an alternative to, or in conjunction with, the 
Article 5 (2) (a) option above provides that: 
...the transferee, transferor, or person or persons exercising the 
transferor's functions, on the one hand, and the representatives of the 
employees on the other hand may agree alterations, insofar as current law 
or practice permits, to the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment designed to safeguard employment opportunities by 
ensuring the survival of the undertaking, business or part of the 
undertaking or business. 
What this means is that Member States are permitted to make provisions in their 
implementing legislations for downward negotiation of terms and conditions of 
employees’ contracts of employment where the business or undertaking is 
insolvent and is transferred as a going concern. Under the 1977 ARD, modification 
to terms and conditions was firmly rejected by the ECJ and by UK national 
courts.61 This provision is very helpful to business rescues. It ensures that the 
employees’ rights could be waived in order to rescue an insolvent but viable 
business where the transfer of such terms would impede the rescue of the 
business employing them. Although modification to terms is now permissible 
under the revised 2001 ARD, there are however certain conditions that must be 
satisfied before variation to terms and conditions can be valid. 
                                                          
60 Article 3(1) of Council Directive 80/987/EEC provides: ‘Member States shall take the measures 
necessary to ensure that guarantee institutions guarantee, subject to Article 4, payment of 
employees' outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships 
and relating to pay for the period prior to a given date.’ 
61 See e.g. C -324/86  Foreningen of Arbejdslere I Danmark v Daddy’s Dance Hall A/S [1988] ECR 739; C 
-209/91 Rask v ISS Katinenservice A/S [1993]ECR 1 -5755. For UK case law, see Wilson v St Helens 
Borough Council and Meade & Baxendale v British Nuclea Fuels [1997] IRLR 505 and Credit Suisse First 
Boston (Europe Ltd v Litster [1998] IRLR 700 CA.  
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7.5.2.1 Conditions for modifying terms of employment  
There are important safeguards in the ARD to prevent employers from making 
changes to terms that would be detrimental to the employee. First, to make valid 
changes to employees’ terms, Article 5 (2) (b) requires a tripartite and consensual 
agreement involving the transferee, transferor (or any person or persons 
exercising the transferor’s functions), and the representatives of the employees to 
effect the changes. The second safeguard is that variation to terms and conditions 
must be subject to what ‘current law and practice’ in the Member State permits.62 
The implication is that the changes that may be agreed by the parties cannot be 
inferior to what obtains in the Member State. In effect, employees’ representatives 
are to enter into what may be described as ‘concession bargaining’ and not to 
agree to terms that are inimical to the employees’ interests.63  
The third condition is that changes must be targeted specifically at safeguarding 
employment opportunities for the workforce by ensuring the survival of the 
undertaking, business or part thereof that is transferred.64  Lastly, recognising the 
degree of flexibility that Article 5 (2) (b) gives to employers, the asymmetry in 
bargaining power between the employer and employees and the possibility of 
employers misusing insolvency proceedings to alter terms unnecessarily, 65  
Article 5(4) requires Member States to take ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent the 
use of insolvency proceedings to make changes to terms that may be detrimental 
to the employees. It is pertinent to note also that the agreement to vary terms is 
permitted only where the undertaking is already subject to ‘relevant insolvency 
proceedings’.66  
The above safeguards are put in place to prevent employers from making 
unilateral changes to the employees’ terms of employment. However, what is not 
immediately clear is whether the agreement to vary terms of employment is to be 
reached before or after the transfer of the undertaking has occurred. Article 5 (2) 
(b) merely says that the parties may agree to vary terms but does not state 
                                                          
62  Article 5 (2) (b) ARD 2001. 
63 Armour and Deakin have also discussed this issue in the context of the TUPE Regulations. See John 
Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2): Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2000) 29 ILJ, 395-
402. 
64  ibid. 
65 Stephen Hardy and Richard W Painter, ‘The New Acquired Rights Directive and its Implication for 
European Employees Relations in the Twenty-first Century’ (1996) 6 (4) MaastJECL, 336, 378.  
66  This concept is discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
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whether this is to be done before or after a transfer. The substance of the 
agreement is, however, very clear: it is to all intents and purpose aimed at 
modifying the principle of compulsory transfer of the employees’ contracts of 
employment on their existing terms and conditions to transferees. This measure is 
to help foster the rescues of insolvent but viable businesses in Member States. 
7.5.3 Appraisal of the Article 5 ‘rescue’ measures 
The relief provided by the Article 5 options is very significant for insolvent 
transferors and for the rescue culture. In transfers involving insolvent businesses, 
knowing that the transferor’s debts will not pass to the purchaser is a great way of 
incentivising potential purchasers.67 However, the introduction of measures to aid 
business rescue and the flexibility that comes with this has equally raised other 
issues of grave concern. Below we examine the advantages and disadvantages of 
the flexibility that Article 5 has introduced to aid transfers of insolvent businesses. 
7.5.3.1 Significance of the Article 5 provisions 
In the context of an insolvent business, given that the transferor would be 
insolvent at the time the business is transferred, there are likely to be a backlog of 
substantial and unmet debts, in such a situation, Article 5 (2) (a) operates to 
ensure that the transferee is not liable for such pre-transfer liabilities. Rather, this 
provision ensures that the transferee is contractually liable only for debts arising 
from future transactions involving the business transferred. This measure ensures 
that insolvent businesses are attractive purchase targets to prospective buyers by 
not being unnecessarily encumbered with employee-related liabilities. From the 
transferor’s perspective, once the business has been relieved of its debts, it could 
easily be sold and, perhaps, for a higher price. The sale would be of benefit both 
to the company’s creditors and at least, some of the employees whose jobs the 
transferred business will undoubtedly preserve. 
From the employee‘s perspective, it might appear as if the Article 5(2)(a) 
requirement not to allow pre-transfer debts to transfer to the transferee could 
                                                          
67 McMullen (n 5); John Armour & Simon Deakin, ‘Insolvency, Employment Protection and Corporate 
Restructuring: the Effects of TUPE’, CBR, University of Cambridge CBR Working Paper No. 204 (2002), 
2; P Davis, ‘European Developments-Amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive’ (1998) 27(4) ILJ 
367; Shrubsall (n 11); Samuel E Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Employment Protection: Analysing 
Policy through the Lens of Theory’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 99-113. 
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deprive them of the opportunity to claim money owed to them, by the transferor, 
from the transferee (who presumably would be solvent).  This seeming problem is 
effectively taken care of by the additional requirement (in the concluding part of 
that article) that Member States should give employees equivalent protection that 
is provided for in situations covered by Council Directive 80/987/EEC. This part is 
to be construed as implying that those employee claims unmet by the transferor, 
and which are not capable of being claimed against the transferee, are to be paid 
out of a guaranteed fund financed by the tax payer as required by the Insolvency 
Directive of 1980.68  
On its part, Article 5 (2) (b) is very useful for prospective purchasers of insolvent 
businesses. This option seems to suggest that certain contracts can, if necessary, 
be overridden in the overall interest of the insolvent business. The rationale for 
this may be that legal rules that protect parties from the effect of fundamental 
corporate change rather than increase the overall value of the businesses that 
must comply with them tend to have the opposite effect. They reduce their value 
instead.69 This option could also benefit transferees in ‘a continuing way into the 
indefinite future’70 since there is no express provision limiting how many times an 
employer is permitted to vary contract terms. Thus, it may be possible for the 
transferee to vary terms whenever the economic situation of the business 
demands. Also, not only is it possible for the changes that may be agreed by the 
parties able to produce a package of terms and conditions, which may be 
completely different but overall as favourable as those that were in place prior to 
the transfer, but it seems the transferee can effect changes that overall could 
                                                          
68 What this means in respect of the UK, for example, is that the transferor’s debts falling within the 
scope of those listed in section 184 of ERA 1996 are frozen upon the occurrence of a relevant transfer 
of an undertaking. The transferee is relieved from their payments. They are to be paid instead, by the 
Secretary of State- technically by the National Insurance Fund (NIF).This is supposed to be a statutory 
protection for the employees flowing from the social security system of the Member States. See e.g. I 
Clarke and H Rajak, ‘Mann v Secretary of State for Employment’ (2000) 63 MLR 895; H Collins, K Ewing 
& A McColgan, ‘Labour Law Text and Materials (2nd edn, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005) ch. 10. The 
advantage of the NIF entitlements for the employees, as articulated by Finch, is that they are 
guaranteed as opposed to preferred. See V Finch. Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and 
Principles (2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 2009) 757. This means that the employees are certain to be paid 
up to the statutory limit whether or not the insolvent employer has funds. See  e.g. McMeechan v 
Scretary of State for Employment [1997] ICR 549, CA; Everson & Barras v Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry and Bell Lines Ltd (in liquidation) [2000] IRLR 202 (ECJ). For analysis on this, see R 
Morgan, ‘Insolvency and the Rights of Employees’ [1989] Legal Action 21; V Finch. Corporate 
Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 2009) 757. 
69 Jonathan R Macey, ‘Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of 
Fundamental Corporate Changes’ (1989) Duke Law Journal 173, 180. 
70  Davies (n 47) 568. 
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produce a package of rights that is less favourable than what obtained before the 
changes.71  
The employer’s ability to modify the employees’ existing terms and conditions of 
employment is of great significance to UK employers given that the introduction of 
this measure came at a time when the English courts appeared to be totally averse 
to all modifications to terms. The English courts were adamant that alterations to 
terms were not permitted under the ECJ’s interpretation of the 1977 ARD. In 
Wilson v St Helens Borough Council and Meade & Baxendale v British Nuclear 
Fuels,72  the Court of Appeal (CA) ruled that upon the happening of a transfer of a 
business, the employees’ terms cannot be varied lawfully for a reason connected 
to the transfer. Variations were not permitted even if the employees consented.73   
7.5.3.2 Drawbacks of Article 5 
The first main criticism that may be leveled against the Article 5 measures is that 
while they contribute to business rescues, the level of protection they guarantee 
employees is low.  Rather than advance the cause of employment protection 
which the ARD was enacted to achieve, these measures reduce them. The ARD, 
for example, allows employers to make downward variations to employees’ 
original terms and conditions of employment. However, it could be argued that 
this is the employees’ way of contributing to the survival of businesses that 
employs them when they become insolvent. Accepting a reduction to their 
contractual rights is to reciprocate the provision of continued employment by the 
transferee.74 
                                                          
71 However, any alterations must be subject to what current law or practice in the Member State 
permits as required under Article 5 (2) (b). 
72 [1997] IRLR 505. This case is discussed further below. 
73  The ECJ had in an earlier case taken the same view in Foreningen v Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] IRLR 
315. Note however that although variation is permitted under the 2001 ARD, case laws have 
demonstrated that where an employee challenges changes to his or her contract of employment, the 
courts may declare a variation invalid even though the variation in question was to that employee’s 
advantage. See Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v Litster [1998] IRLR 700 CA; Martin v South 
Bank University [2004] IRLR 74 ECJ.  
74 Team Production theory of corporate bankruptcy acknowledges the fact that this type of sacrifice 
would be necessary in times of insolvency so that some employees can keep their jobs. For more on 
this, see chapter 2 of this thesis. For an extensive review of the theory, see generally Lynn M LoPucki, 
‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’, UCLA Law School, Law and Econ Research 
Paper 3-12 (2003), at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=397801> accessed 27 
January 2011; M M Blair and L.A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Va. L 
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The second drawback of Article 5 is that it threatens contractual freedom in the 
context of business transfers. The practice whereby employees’ representatives 
(and not the employees themselves) have to agree variations to terms is not likely 
to yield a better result for the employees in transfer situations.  This is because 
whatever agreement is reached collectively is capable of depriving the workers 
of their real legal entitlements which, but for the collective agreement, they would 
have been able to assert individually.  Granted, the agreement reached by the 
representatives on behalf of the employees may, overall, be to the benefit of the 
employees as a group yet, individual employees may be considerably worse off 
in the end.  
The third issue with the Article 5 provision is that it inevitably creates a tension 
between the acquired rights of the employees and the rights of the creditors of 
the insolvent entity. Theoretically, the Article 5 (2) derogation of the rights of the 
employees may be seen as a form of wealth transfer from the employees to the 
creditors of the insolvent business.75 For others, the effect of the compulsory 
transfer of employment relationships rule is that ‘the employees are treated more 
favourably than all other creditors because there is no risk of their claims not 
being met in full’.76 Moreover, the depressing effect that employees’ liabilities 
could have on sales of insolvent businesses short-changes the creditors. The 
argument here is that since a prospective buyer would only be willing to pay a 
discounted price for the insolvent business to offset whatever monies he or she 
would pay for employees-related liabilities, this reduces the amount that will be 
available for distribution to the creditors.77 
In the next section, we will explore how the Government responded to the 
changes made to the ARD. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rev 247; Donald R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the normative foundations of bankruptcy law’ 
(1993) 71 Tex. L Rev. 554. 
75  Davies (n 47) 368. 
76  Massara (n 48).  
77 T H Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale 
Law Journal 857, 860; D G Baird, ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations’ (1986) 15 Journal of 
Leg  Stud.127, 133. 
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7.6 Aligning the TUPE Regulations with the revised 
2001 ARD 
The TUPE Regulations (discussed in chapter 5) have been very effective in 
protecting the rights of employees in transfer situations. However, the 1981 TUPE 
Regulations were very problematic and controversial. Their applications to 
transfers in the UK gave rise to lots of litigation with contradictory decisions and 
were, therefore, in need of amendments. There were several gray areas in the 
1981 Regulations that needed clarification. For example, the meaning of concepts 
such as ‘undertaking’ and ‘relevant transfer’ and the scope of the Regulations 
(which the Commission in the Commission v UK case discussed in section 7.2.2 
above felt was too narrow in comparison to the ARD) all of which were left to the 
courts to interpret needed to be properly defined. 78  The Government 
deliberately excluded transfers of charitable or not-for-profit undertakings, 
government departments and local authorities from the scope of the 1981 TUPE 
Regulations.  
The revision also provided an opportunity for concerns expressed by 
stakeholders about the impact of TUPE on outsourcing to be addressed. There 
was need to ensure that in addition to providing an appropriate level of employee 
protection, outsourcing operated within a commercial and legal environment 
which provided value for money. That is, it was important for outsourcing to 
operate in a way that can deliver the optimum combination of quality and cost to 
the clients of the business outsourced. Another issue that needed to be attended 
to pertained to the question of whether or not to make the transferor and the 
transferee jointly liable for employees unfairly dismissed prior to a business 
transfer. Also, the issue concerning workers representation during transfers 
involving businesses or undertakings where no Trade Unions existed or in 
situations where Unions existed but were not recognised. This was one of the 
sticking points in the infraction case brought by the Commission against the UK.79 
One other significant change made to the previous regime is employee right to 
resign and claim unfair dismissal if substantial and materially detrimental changes 
to terms and conditions results from the transfer. 
                                                          
78 McMullen (n 5) 113; K Williams & N Johnson, ‘Transfering Employment between the Public and 
Private Sectors in the United Kingdom: Acquired Rights and Revising TUPE’ (2007) 
<http://shura.shu.ac.uk/707/1/fulltext.pdf> accessed 22 March 2010. 
79 See Commission v UK C-382/92) [1994] ECR 1-2435. See also fn 22 above. 
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However, it was the problems caused by applying TUPE to insolvency that 
needed to be addressed. TUPE 1981 had no special provision to limit its 
application or to mitigate the effects of its two principles of automatic transfer of 
contracts of employment and unfair dismissal contained in the old regulations 5 
and 8 on insolvent transferors. These core precepts made it very difficult for 
employers to either reduce costs by downsizing the workforce, or reduce the 
level of pay of the employees transferred to their workforce after a business 
transfer without the possibility of incurring liability. The full application of TUPE to 
insolvent business transfers without exception was perceived to be detrimental 
not just to the ‘rescue culture’ but also to the employees the regime was intended 
to protect in terms of job security where an insolvent business could not be sold.   
It was therefore obvious that TUPE needed to be amended so that some degree of 
flexibility in relation to insolvent transferors could be introduced. In general 
terms, a new TUPE was needed so that the changes made to the ARD (discussed in 
section 7.5 above) in 1998 and 2001 respectively could be incorporated into the 
regime. There was need for TUPE to be revised so that clearer and more practical 
regulations with legal certainty could be achieved. It was also important for a 
revised TUPE Regulations to reflect important developments in case-law across 
the 25 years during which TUPE 1981was in force. 
TUPE 1981 was eventually revised in 200680  after a long period of consultations 
which eventually shaped and brought TUPE 2006 up to date with the ARD. Below, I 
present a brief summary of the general changes made to TUPE Regulations 1981 
as well as analysis on the special measures introduced aid transfers of insolvent 
businesses. 
                                                          
80 It is important to note that the 2006 revision was not the first time the Transfer Regulations were 
amended. In 1993 the 1981 Transfer Regulations were amended by the Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act 1993. TUPE 1981 was also amended in 1995 and 1999 by the Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations SI 
1995/2587 and SI 1999/1925. These amendments were made in order to correctly align the 1981 
Regulations with the original ARD following litigation against the UK (see EC Commission v United 
Kingdom (C-382/92) [1994] ECR 1-2435) at the ECJ where the court upheld the Commission’s 
argument that the UK had failed to fulfil its obligation under Community law. The ECJ ruled that, by 
not providing an adequate system for the designation of employees’ representatives in an 
undertaking in which the employer refused to recognise a trade union, the UK failed to properly 
implement the 1977 ARD. 
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7.6.1 TUPE 2006: substantive changes introduced by the new 
regime 
The changes introduced into the 2006 Transfer Regulations include widening the 
scope of the TUPE Regulations to cover employees in service provision change 
situations which the 1981 Regulations did not cover. The Government has taken 
steps to address, inter alia, the confusion created by case law81 regarding the 
applicability or otherwise of the Transfer Regulations to service provision 
changes. Regulation 3 (1) (b) of the 2006 Regulations now provides that TUPE 
applies to service provision changes.82 The 2006 Regulations do not, however, 
apply where the service provision relates to the supply of goods (rather than 
supply of services) or where there is a ‘one-off’ purchase of services.83  
A new requirement for the transferor to notify the transferee of the identity of the 
employees and of various rights and liabilities that would pass to the latter has 
been introduced under Regulation 11 of TUPE 2006. Joint and several liabilities in 
respect of obligations, which, hitherto used to fall on the transferee84 and, which 
                                                          
81  A particular source of conflict arose from the ECJ decision in Ayse Suzen v Zehnacker 
Gebäudereinigung. GmbH Krankenhausservice [1997] IRLR 225, which sought to distinguish between 
labour-intensive (i.e. services such as cleaning and security services where there was little need for 
equipment or materials) and asset -intensive industries (where the transfer of labour was less 
important to the business than machinery and equipment that were used). The ECJ ruled in that case 
that in the absence of a transfer of assets or the taking over of an essential part of the workforce, the 
ARD was not applicable. In relation to TUPE 1981, this meant that in a labour-intensive business, 
importance was attached to the question of whether a significant proportion, in terms of number or 
function, of the employees transferred and, if they did not, TUPE did not apply. In asset-intensive 
cases however, the transfer of employees was secondary to the question of whether or not a 
significant proportion of the assets used in the business had transferred.  
82  Regulation 3(1) (b) TUPE 2006 defines a service provision change as a situation in which: 
 (i) activities cease to be carried out by a person (“a client”) on his own behalf and 
are carried out instead by another person on the client’s behalf (“a contractor”); 
(ii) activities cease to be carried out by a contractor on a client’s behalf (whether or 
not those activities had previously been carried out by the client on his own behalf) 
and are carried out instead by another person (“a subsequent contractor”) on the 
client’s behalf; or 
(iii) activities cease to be carried out by a contractor or a subsequent contractor on a 
client’s behalf (whether or not those activities had previously been carried out by 
the client on his own behalf) and are carried out instead by the client on his own 
behalf... 
83 See e.g. Hunt v Storm Communications Ltd (1); Wild Card Public Relations Ltd (2); Brown Brothers 
Wine (Europe) Ltd (3) ET/2702546/06. 
84  Prior to this provision being introduced, it was held in the case of Alamo Group v Tucker [2003] 
IRLR that liability was transferred to the transferee, even where the duty to inform the workforce had 
fallen on the transferor. The 2006 TUPE Regulations have therefore reversed this position. It is 
pertinent to note however, that since TUPE 2006 do not deal with the failure to inform and consult in 
a redundancy situation, Kerry Foods Ltd v Creber [2000] IRLR, will continue to be the law. This means 
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without the regulation would have continued to do so, have now been introduced 
in two areas. Under Regulation 15 (9), the transferor and the transferee would be 
jointly and severally liable for failure to inform and consult appropriate employee 
representatives as required under Regulation 13. 
However, it is in relation to insolvency that TUPE 2006 has made very important 
and specific changes. These changes were intended to promote the ‘rescue 
culture’. Before considering the specific insolvency-related changes made by 
TUPE 2006, it would be useful to, first, summarise some of the problems the 
original Transfer Regulations posed to insolvent transferors. 
7.6.2 TUPE and transfers of insolvent businesses: the old law  
Prior to 2006 when the revised TUPE Regulations came into force, TUPE 1981, 
there was a perception that the Regulations were pro employment protection and 
‘contra85 business rescues. TUPE 1981 deterred potential buyers from buying 
insolvent businesses by according maximum protection to the rights of 
employees during transfers of insolvent businesses.  There was no in built 
mechanism in the original TUPE to limit its application or to cushion the effects of 
protecting the acquired rights of the employees in relation to insolvent businesses 
which could have been rescued via going concern sales. There were two major 
obstacles that stood in the way of business rescues under TUPE 1981. Although 
these have already been considered in the previous chapter, it is important to 
recap what these obstacles were so as to fully appreciate, subsequently, the 
difference that the new and special insolvency measures introduced by TUPE 
2006 have made to the ‘rescue culture’ in the UK. The two most problematic issues 
with the 1981 TUPE Regulations are summarised below. 
7.6.2.1 Compulsory transfer of employment contracts 
In the context of insolvent business transfers, a major problem with TUPE 1981 
was that upon the occurrence of a relevant transfer, not only was the transferee 
obliged to take on all of the transferor’s employees and on their existing terms of 
employment, the transferee was also obliged to take over all existing liability of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that liability for failure to inform and consult in redundancy situations will continue to transfer to the 
transferee. 
85 This view does not, however, discount the usefulness of the ETO route discussed in the previous 
chapter which, if carefully employed by the transferor could facilitate business rescue. See ‘using the 
ETO defence as an escape route’ in section 6.12 of chapter 6. 
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the transferor to its transferred employees in tort and for anything done by the 
transferor that was capable of resulting in a dismissal or discrimination based 
claim.86 This practice created a disincentive for prospective buyers who would 
otherwise have wanted to step into the shoes of insolvent transferors. The 
prospect of inheriting onerous and sometimes uncertain or unpredictable 
liabilities provided no incentive for potential buyers to buy such businesses.  
7.6.2.2 Inability to make changes to terms of employment 
Another problem with the old TUPE Regulations was that it was very inflexible in 
respect of the employers’ ability to make changes to employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment post-transfer. An employer may need to change the 
employee’s terms of employment for practical economic, organisational and 
employee relations’ reasons after the business has been transferred. For instance, 
in respect of the transferee employer, changing terms and conditions of 
employment may be necessary to avoid having two sets of employees with 
different terms and conditions within the transferee’s workforce so as to avoid 
potential equal play claims by employees on inferior terms. Changes to terms 
may also be needed simply for reasons of fairness and work place harmony and 
for administrative efficiency of the acquired business.  
However, the 1981 Transfer Regulations made making changes to employees’ 
terms and conditions extremely difficult if the transfer of the undertaking was the 
reason for the changes.87 To be able to lawfully make changes to terms and 
conditions, the employer was required to demonstrate that the change entailed 
‘changes in the workforce.’ This was interpreted by relevant employers to mean 
that there had to be a reduction in the employer’s entire workforce. 88 If this 
construction of the provision was correct, it could be argued that this was contrary 
to the promotion of employment protection as the requirement was capable of 
increasing the number of redundancies rather than foster continued employment 
following the transfer of a business. 
Perhaps the biggest problem was the fact that the rule against variation to terms 
and conditions post transfer of an insolvent business applied whether or not the 
employee consented to the change and even if the package of changes to the 
                                                          
86  TUPE 1981, reg. 4. 
87  See  Daddy’s Dance Hall case [1988] ECR 739. 
88 See the Court of Appeal’s decision in Berriman v Delabole Slate Limited [1985] ICR 546. 
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employees’ terms was overall to the employee’s advantage.89 In effect, transferee 
employers were generally not allowed to ‘buy out’ onerous or inconvenient terms 
within the contracts of transferring employees even in circumstances where doing 
so could have helped in rescuing the insolvent business and preserve some jobs90 
given that changes to terms and conditions are generally considered as a means 
of avoiding job losses and redundancies. 
The consequences of requiring an employer to take on all transferring employees 
on the same terms and conditions as they enjoyed with the transferor was that 
apart from extinguishing the common law freedom that employers had in respect 
of negotiating changes to the employees’ contract terms, the provision was 
damaging to the rescue culture. This view held true in respect of a transferred 
insolvent business in which its survival was predicated on the transferee’s ability 
to harmonise the contract terms of the transferred employees and those of its 
existing workforce.91 
7.7 Towards fostering the ‘rescue culture’: the new 
law 
It was in recognition that the application of TUPE without qualification to insolvent 
business transfers operated as a disincentive to potential purchasers from 
acquiring such businesses, that the Government decided to revise the TUPE 
Regulations to bring them in line with the ARD.  It was obvious that each time a 
buyer could not be found to buy an insolvent but viable business due to employee 
liabilities’ concerns represented a missed opportunity to rescue such a business. 
This, in turn, was to the disadvantage of the employees TUPE was originally 
intended to protect when viewed against the employment protection background 
of the regime. A business closure is also a big loss to the local community in 
which the business is situated. It represents loss of revenue to the tax authority 
and to auxiliary businesses that provide services to it. 
The stated purpose of TUPE 2006 in relation to insolvency is to incentivise 
purchases of insolvent businesses by lessening the burdens assumed by potential 
purchasers of such businesses. This, the Government sets out to achieve by 
                                                          
89  Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Ltd v Litster [1998] IRLR 700. 
90  ibid. 
91  See Charles Wynn-Evans, ‘The Ongoing Saga of TUPE and Contractual Variations’ (2007) 36(4) ILJ 
480. 
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ensuring that the liabilities that pass across to a purchaser following a business 
transfer are significantly reduced 92  so that both the ‘rescue culture’ and 
employees’ job security are not imperilled by TUPE. Accordingly, the two 
liberalising or optional provisions of Article 5 introduced into the 2001 ARD 
discussed above and, which were introduced to foster rescues of insolvent 
businesses in Member States, have been taken up by the UK Government and 
incorporated into the 2006 TUPE Regulations. 
In the context of insolvency and, particularly, with a view to ensuring the 
continuous survival of insolvent but viable businesses, some flexibility is allowed 
Member States by virtue of Article 5 of the consolidated 2001 ARD. The flexibility 
introduced is a compromise meant to institute a cooperative partnership 
philosophy to business transfers - a partnership capable of fostering 
competitiveness and employment flexibility by helping insolvent transferors 
transfer businesses on a going concern basis without walking over the rights of 
the employees affected by the transfer.93 The Article 5 measures of the ARD were, 
in other words, intended to strike a fine balance between the employment 
protection goals of employment law on the one hand and, the rescue objective of 
insolvency law on the other.94    
The two special95 insolvency provisions which are expected to promote rescues 
of insolvent businesses in the UK are contained in Regulations 8 and 9 of TUPE 
2006. In theory, the new provisions have taken cognizance of the fact that the 
existing obligations to employees often contribute to the problems leading to the 
insolvency of businesses and have therefore provided the prospective purchasers 
with the opportunity to address the issue when purchasing businesses that are 
insolvent. It appears, however, that in practice, the new provisions continue to be 
beset with problems of clarity just as the provisions of the original Transfer 
Regulations were.  
Below we consider the two insolvency provisions, how they operate, how they 
might help promote rescues of insolvent businesses (which will indirectly protect 
                                                          
92 McMullen, (n 5)132; M Sargeant, ‘Business Transfers and Corporate Insolvencies-the Effect of TUPE’ 
(1998) 14 IL & P 4. 
93 This was the view expressed by Mr McCartney, the then DTI (now BIS) Minister of State during the 
Council of Ministers meeting in Luxemburg on June 4, 1998. 
94 Catherine Barnard, EC Employment Law, (2nd ed. OUP, Oxford 2000), 445. 
95 There are special insolvency provisions because there only apply to businesses which at the time of 
transfer are subject to ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’. See generally TUPE 2006, Regulations 8 & 9. 
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employment opportunities for employees), and whether they are effective or not 
in that respect.  
7.7.1 The Regulation 8 option: partial transfer of debts  
One of the new provisions introduced to advance the rescue of insolvent 
businesses is to limit the liabilities which transfer to buyers of such undertakings 
or businesses in a relevant TUPE-transfer. The aim is to free prospective buyers 
from the burden of liabilities which, otherwise, would have applied in certain 
defined circumstances. According to Regulation 8(5), in relevant insolvency 
proceedings,96 ‘Regulation 497 shall not operate to transfer liability for the sums 
payable to affected employees under the relevant statutory schemes.’ 98  The 
questions therefore are what the effect of Regulation 8 is and how does this 
provision assist business rescue initiatives? 
7.7.1.1 Effects of Regulation 8  
The main effect of Regulation 8 TUPE 2006 is that in a TUPE-transfer involving an 
insolvent business, certain accrued and employee-related liabilities will not 
pass 99  to the buyer of the business or undertaking. Rather, the relevant 
employees (including those dismissed before the transfer took place in the 
circumstances that Regulation 7(1) makes automatically unfair) will retain their 
claims against the National Insurance (NI) Fund under the statutory provisions of 
ERA 1996 instead. 100  Technically, what Regulation 8 does is to mitigate the 
employees’ liabilities that pass to the purchaser of an insolvent business both by 
                                                          
96 The term ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ is defined in chapter 6. 
97 Regulation 4 TUPE 2006  requires contracts of employment and all of the transferor’s rights, 
powers, duties and liabilities to automatically transfer the transferee following a business transfer) 
98 The relevant statutory schemes applicable here are (a) Chapter VI of Pt XI of the ERA 1996 Act; and 
(b) Pt XII of the ERA 1996 Act. It is pertinent to note also that according to the recent EAT’s decision in 
Pressure Coolers Ltd v Molloy [2011] IRLR 630, the relevant debts had to arise before the transfer in 
order to come within the Secretary of State’s guarantee under Part XII of ERA 1996 insolvency 
payments. 
99 It would have been much more helpful and indeed easier to ascertain which liabilities will or will 
not pass to a transferee if the Regulations had spelled this out clearly. But as it is, it is difficult to know 
exactly which liabilities the Secretary of State is prepared to let the NI Fund to pay or not. In fact, on 
April 3, 2006, only three days before the Regulations were due to come into force, the Redundancy 
Payment Office (RPO) issued a statement of its own. In the statement, the RPO suggested that where 
there is a transfer or an unfair dismissal made in connection with a transfer, it will only pay the 
arrears of pay and accrued holiday pay- which are often minimal or even non-existent. This, it is 
submitted, is going to be another area that will breed controversies and litigation. However, for the 
possible liabilities that will transfer, see chapter 6, particularly the section on: ‘What Transfers’. 
100 The relevant statutory schemes applicable here are (a) Chapter VI of Pt XI of the ERA 1996 Act; and 
(b) Pt XII of the ERA 1996 Act. 
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means of a statutory cap and the operation of the state guarantee scheme, which 
throws certain past liabilities on to the Secretary of State (and presumably) then 
technically back on to the insolvent transferor through the Secretary of State’s 
right to subrogate having paid out.  
In effect, this is a remedial approach which amounts to subsidising going concern 
sales of insolvent businesses by the Government. It is the Government’s effort to 
foster business rescues in the UK.101 There is no doubt that with the partial relief 
afforded to prospective buyers by Regulation 8, insolvent businesses may 
become attractive purchase targets under TUPE 2006 in comparison to what they 
were under the original TUPE. However, it is unclear whether the Regulation 8 
provision will, in practice, promote the rescue culture since transferees could still 
inherit substantial liabilities, such as back pay and contractual redundancy 
entitlements over and above the statutory guaranteed payments. The possibility 
of increased business rescues would have been enhanced even further, it is 
submitted, if transferees were given an entirely clean slate on all pre-transfer 
debts owed to the employees by insolvent transferors. Another way the 
Government could promote the rescue culture may be to amend insolvency 
legislation to allow some of the liabilities that pass to transferees to be paid to 
affected employees by the NIF instead. That way, the liabilities that potential 
purchasers would inherit would be further reduced and more insolvent 
businesses would be rescued.  
7.7.2 The Regulation 9 option: variations to contract terms 
In addition to capping the liabilities that can pass to a transferee, TUPE 2006 has 
also provided greater scope for making variation to employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment in rescue situations. Under Regulation 9, when a 
transferor is involved in relevant insolvency proceedings ‘permitted variations’ of 
contract can be agreed by either the transferor or transferee (or an insolvency 
practitioner) and the representatives of the employees.102  
                                                          
101 See generally R Dhindsa, The Draft TUPE Regulations and Insolvency’ (2006) 19 Insolvency 
Intelligence 8; Malcolm Sargeant, ‘TUPE- The Final Round’ [2006] JBL 549. 
102 TUPE 2006, Regulation 9 (1). 
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7.7.2.1 Effects of Regulation 9 
Under Regulation 9 the transferee may be able to reduce pay and establish other 
inferior terms and conditions of employment post-transfer. The rationale behind 
this provision is that the employees of an insolvent business should be able to 
agree variations to their terms and conditions if this is necessary to save their 
jobs. It is submitted that this provision would help to reduce the equal pay 
disputes that characterised the old TUPE. However, the collective mechanism 
through which the agreement to vary terms may be obtained is, as shown below, 
a cumbersome one. 
7.7.2.2 Conditions for varying terms 
Although ‘permitted variations’ to employees’ terms and conditions following a 
business transfer is now allowed under the new Regulation 9 of TUPE 2006, this is 
subject to several strict rules. The first condition that must be satisfied for 
variation to be valid is that the transferor must be subject to ‘relevant insolvency 
proceedings.’ This means that variation to employees’ terms is permitted only if 
the business employing the employees is insolvent. 
The second requirement is that any variations must be agreed with appropriate 
representatives of the employees. This makes it unnecessary for the employees 
themselves to individually agree to the changes made to the terms of their 
employment contracts for the variations to be valid. It is sufficient, and indeed 
essential, that the representatives of the affected employees give their consent to 
the variations.  
Professor McMullen has argued that this provision ‘coincides with the model role 
for employment law in the context of insolvency and restructuring’ as it allows 
employees’ acquired rights to be waived only ‘through the mechanism of 
employee representation’.103 Whilst this is an important safeguard against abuse 
of the right to makes changes to terms by employers, the time it takes to reach 
agreements between the relevant employer and the employee representatives 
may, in practice, trivialise or hamper the intended effects of the provision. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the Regulations that says what can, or should be 
                                                          
103 McMullen (n 5) 134. John Armour and Simon Deakin have also echoed the same view. See J 
Armour & S Deakin, `Insolvency, Employment Protection and Corporate Restructuring: The Effects of 
TUPE’ (2001) University of Cambridge CBR Working Paper (No. 204) 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp204.pdf> accessed 11 May 2011.  
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done, in a situation where there is a protracted negotiation or where an 
agreement cannot be reached by the parties on the issue at all. Perhaps, it would 
be time saving and important for the preservation of the value of the insolvent 
business to have a default provision which allows new terms to be substituted on a 
temporary basis pending when an agreement can be reached by the parties. 
The third condition for varying terms is that variation must only be done if it would 
safeguard ‘employment opportunities’ by ensuring the survival of the business 
transferred. The words ‘employment opportunities’ rather than ‘employment’ 
were carefully chosen because they have wider connotations. Apart from offering 
justification for varying terms, they allow variations to terms to be argued 
expansively on the basis that the business is rescued and that this will in turn 
safeguard employment opportunities that may be created by it in the near or 
distant future.104  
7.8 TUPE 2006: ‘new wine in old wineskins’ or ‘old 
wine in new wineskins?’105 
Whilst the new insolvency measures introduced are commendable, it is not clear 
whether they will achieve the aim of making insolvent businesses more attractive 
purchase targets or whether these provisions simply displace old problems by 
introducing new ones, which will take some time and costly litigation to address. 
There is the view that the 2006 Transfer Regulations are no different from their 
predecessors as they are drafted in an unclear and ambiguous language. 
Concerns have been expressed about the way the 2006 Transfer Regulations are 
drafted. It has been contended that due to the way they are drafted, the 2006 
Regulations are as problematic as their predecessors. They are said to be drafted 
in: 
 …a language that is so loose and imprecise it is not possible to discern 
with any clarity how they are supposed to work. Instead of bringing 
clarity, they bring confusion to new, unprecedented heights.106 
                                                          
104 See Malcolm  Sargeant, ‘Legislative Comment: TUPE-The Final Round’ [2006] JBL 549, 563. 
105 In one of the several parables told by Jesus in the New Testament, Jesus told his disciples that ‘no 
one tears a patch from a new garment and sews it on an old one. If he does, he will have torn the new 
garment, and the patch from the new will not match the old’ and ‘no one pours new wine into old 
wineskins. If he does, the new wine will burst the skins, the wine will run out and the wineskins will be 
ruined.’ Luke 5: 26-37. 
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The major problem with the 2006 Regulations is that they have failed, once again 
to expressly specify the types of insolvency proceedings in the UK to which they 
are intended to apply. TUPE 2006 transposes the vague generic language 
employed by Article 5(2) (a) of the 2001 ARD107 without attempting to specify how 
they are to apply in the context of specific UK insolvency proceedings. TUPE 2006 
merely consolidates the ECJ’s position in Abels v Administrative Board 108  by 
drawing a distinction between two types of insolvency proceedings: those 
opened with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and those 
opened not with that intent. What this means is that whether a particular 
insolvency procedure is covered by the Regulations will depend on the purpose 
of the procedure opened. This approach has been described as ‘unsatisfactory 
and incoherent.’109  On a straight reading, the distinction between the different 
types of proceedings makes no sense at all in the context of UK insolvency since 
assets are sold in virtually all insolvency proceedings. From the UK perspective, 
therefore, it is unclear what the phrase ‘not with a view to the liquidation of the 
assets of the transferor’ means precisely since it is almost impossible to ascertain 
from the outset what the purpose of a particular procedure is going to be. 110  
This lack of clarity and specificity, it is submitted, will only serve to create more 
confusion. The consequence will be that the chances of rescuing insolvent 
businesses and preserving jobs will be reduced significantly.  This then raises the 
question: is TUPE 2006 a case of ‘new wine in old wineskins’ or putting ‘old wine 
into new wineskins’- that is, a much more hopeful but still perilous enterprise?  
Whichever way one looks at this, the point here is whether the new and special 
insolvency provisions introduced into the 2006 Regulations are merely patch work 
designed to dress up the ‘image’ of an already defective regime, or whether they 
are capable of achieving the purpose for which they were introduced to achieve?  
                                                                                                                                                                      
106  Lord Hunt of Wirral, House of Lords debate, Hansard May 3, 2006 Col. 534 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo060503/text/60503-25.htm> 
accessed 25 November 2011. 
107 The Government has taken the easiest route by ‘copying out’ the provisions of Article 5 of Directive 
2001/23 which provides in a similar manner that Articles 3 and 4 of the 2001 ARD do not apply to 
insolvency proceedings instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor under 
the supervision of a competent public authority. 
108 Case 135/83 (1985) ECR 469 
109 Paul Davies, ‘Acquired Rights Directive, Creditors Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial 
Democracy’ (1993) Yearbook of European Law. 
110 McMullen (n 5) 132; M Sargeant, ‘Business Transfers and Corporate Insolvencies-the Effect of 
TUPE’ (1998) 14 IL&P  4. 
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This is an apt question as ‘cracks’ are already beginning to appear in the 
application of the ‘purpose of insolvency’ approach vis-a-vis the UK insolvency 
system. The difficulty in determining whether TUPE applies or not to a business 
transfer based on the purpose for the insolvency proceedings opened in relation 
to the transferor came to a head in the two recent cases of Oakland v Wellswood 
(Yorkshire) Ltd 111  and OTG Ltd v Barke and ors 112  in which two conflicting 
decisions were also reached by the courts.  
In Oakland, the question was whether the ‘pre-packed’ sale of a business of an 
insolvent company (Wellswood) to a Newco by the administrator was caught by 
Regulation 8(6) (meaning that the insolvency proceedings that were opened in 
relation to it was not with a view to the liquidation of its assets) or whether 
Regulation 8 (7) applied (meaning that the insolvency proceedings that were 
opened in relation to the transferor were ‘with a view to the liquidation of its 
assets) because if they were, the employment contract of the claimant  would not 
transfer. Both the ET and the EAT found that the claimant’s employment contract 
had not transferred to Newco under TUPE because of the exception in Regulation 
8 (7).  
The implication of the tribunals’ decisions was that the transferor employer (even 
though in administration at the time) was subject to an insolvency proceeding 
instituted with a view to the liquidation of its assets. The decision was influenced 
by the fact that the administrators themselves admitted that selling the business as 
a going concern was not going to be achievable and that their primary concern 
was to maximise creditor return. It follows that both the ET and EAT had formed 
the view that the administrators were appointed with the aim of liquidating the 
business which meant that Regulation 8 (7) applied to prevent the contracts of 
employment of the transferor’s employees from automatically transferring to the 
transferee.  
These decisions contradicted the guidance113 issued by the Government which 
stated that administration would always fall within Regulation 8(6) rather than 
                                                          
111 UKEAT/0395/08. 
112 UKEAT/0320/09/RN. 
113 This guidance was issued by the then Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform’s 
(BERR) (currently the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills –BIS). Note however that this 
guidance is not binding and has been widely criticised particularly by R3- the Association of Business 
Recovery Professionals. The body had argued that the use of generic wording resulted in uncertainty 
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Regulation 8(7) as its purpose (or main purpose) is to enable the business to 
continue trading rather than liquidating it. According to the guidance, ‘the correct 
approach is to look at the main or sole purpose of the procedure rather than its 
outcome in a particular instance. The main purpose of bankruptcy proceedings is 
to realise free assets and expenses amongst all the debtor’s creditors. This, it is 
submitted, is not the main purpose of administration.114 
However, on further appeal the CA reversed the EAT’s decision. In coming to its 
decision the CA focused not on TUPE, but on section 218(2) of the Employment 
Rights Act 1996.115 The section states (irrespective of the application of TUPE) that 
the transfer of a business does not break the continuity of any employee who 
transfers with it. In spite of not making its decision based on the TUPE Regulations, 
the CA did indicate (obiter dictum) that it considered that it was unlikely that 
Regulation 8(7) would apply in relation to pre-packed administration sales. 
Oakland is another good example of how far the courts may be willing to push at 
the boundaries of statutory language to protect employees in insolvent business 
transfer situations. The case also exemplifies the tension between business rescue 
and employee protection that exists when an insolvent undertaking is transferred 
on a going concern basis. Here, whilst the ET and EAT’s decisions were pro-
business rescue, they would not, if they had stood, have afforded the employees 
the full protection the ARD intended for them in business transfers caught by 
TUPE. It could be argued that the CA’s decision, on the other hand, was pro 
employees and contra business rescues because whilst the decision was good for 
the employees in terms of job security and continuity of service, it had the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
about the types of insolvency procedures covered by the regulations and that interpretation of 
regulation 8(7) to exclude administration was flawed because: 
 
(a) while the purpose of administration is set out in the form of a hierarchy, with 
the first objective being rescue of the company, this objective can rarely be 
achieved. In most cases the purpose of the administration will be achieved 
through the second objective of achieving a better result for the creditors as a 
whole than would be likely on a winding up. This will usually be effected 
through the sale of the whole or part of the business (the business being an 
asset of the company) or the sale of assets on a piecemeal basis. Such activity 
should be characterised as a realisation, i.e. liquidation, of assets; and. 
(b) it was wrong to state that administration is not instituted ‘with a view to’ 
liquidation of the assets on the ground that the first objective is to rescue the 
company and that the other objectives only come into play once that objective 
proves impossible. It may be apparent at the very beginning of the process that 
it will not be possible to save the company.  
114  For the purpose of administration, see IA 1986, Schd. B1, para. 3 
115 On this, see the section on ‘overlap between section 218 and TUPE’ in chapter 5. 
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potential of reducing the use of pre-packs to rescue insolvent businesses. From a 
theoretical perspective the tribunals’ decisions would have pleased the 
Proceduralists and the creditors’ bargain theorists as it meant that the business 
could be sold freely and, perhaps, for its full market value, without the 
encumbrances of employees’ liabilities. On the contrary, TPT and the 
Traditionalists would have applauded the CA’s decision for the protection it gave 
to the employees.116 
The Oakland ‘drama’ was not the last. One of the most recent cases that looked at 
whether TUPE apply to sales by companies which have gone into administration 
under Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is OTG Ltd v Barke and Ors.117 This 
case involved five conjoined appeals.118 If TUPE apply to administration sales, the 
new employer will be liable under Regulation 4 for all of the employees’ accrued 
liabilities transferred to him or her. Prior to the case going to appeal, the 
employment tribunal had to decide whether administrations could never fall 
within Regulation 8(7) (the absolute approach); or whether they could if, as a 
matter of fact, it is found that the administration proceedings were instituted with a 
view to the liquidation of the transferor's assets (the fact-based approach). The ET 
followed the EAT’s decision in Oakland which required that tribunals decide the 
question as one of fact based on the reason for which the company went into 
administration. Accordingly, the ET held that Regulation 4 of TUPE was disapplied 
by the application of Regulation 8 (7) because the administrator in that case had 
clearly been appointed with a view to the liquidation of the assets of OTG. 
On appeal to the EAT, the question was whether administration proceedings 
under Schedule B1 constituted ‘insolvency proceedings’ within the meaning of 
Regulation 8 (7) of TUPE.  A differently-constituted EAT from that in the Oakland 
case took cognizance of the fact that in insolvency-related business transfers, 
there is usually a tension between safeguarding the rights of individual workers, 
namely those who are likely to be dismissed or to have their terms of employment 
downgraded on the one hand, and the interests of the workforce and the company 
more generally on the other hand, but that the ARD chooses not to allow the rights 
                                                          
116  The views of Proceduralists and Traditionalists on insolvency law are discussed extensively in 
chapter 2. 
117 UKEAT/0320/09/RN 
118 Olds v Late Edition Ltd (UKEAT/0321/09/RN); The Sec. of State for Business, Innovations and Skills v 
Coyne (UKEAT/0444/09/RN); Key2Law (Surrey) LLP v De’ Antiquis UKEAT/0493/09/RN; Head 
Entertainment LLP v Walker (UKEAT/0302/10/RN).  
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of the employees to be trumped altogether in such situations. Accordingly, the 
EAT took a different view from the one in Oakland. It followed what it called the 
‘absolute approach’119 and decided that administrations (including pre-packs) are 
not capable of constituting bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency 
proceedings, instituted with a view to liquidation of the assets of the transferor’ 
within the meaning of Regulation 8(7) of TUPE 2006. The effect of this decision is 
that the normal TUPE principles under Regulation 4 on transfer will continue to 
apply to sales effected by administrators: the employees transfer to the buyer as 
do all their outstanding and unmet liabilities.  
TUPE’s primary purpose is to safeguard the rights of the employees in the event of 
a business transfer resulting in a change of employer. This objective, it is 
submitted, is best realised through the application of the ‘absolute-approach’ 
rather than the ‘fact-based’ approach as the latter approach could allow 
employees to be left without the protection afforded to them by the ARD and TUPE 
in several transfer situations. It is submitted, that there will certainly be times in 
which employees would be better off as a result of the OTG ruling since TUPE will 
apply.120 Particularly, in a situation in which the employees are made redundant, 
they will be able to bring claims for unfair dismissal against the new employer. 
However, this approach has to be balanced with the fact that overall, its strict 
application could make the employee worse-off. It could result in fewer 
businesses in administration being bought. This will in turn impact negatively on 
business rescues due to the employee-related costs which TUPE will induce. 
Ultimately, the collapse of a business that could have, save for TUPE, been 
rescued would leave employees without jobs.  Tribunals and courts need to have 
a rethink about the ‘absolute-approach’ since a ‘fact-based’ approach (although 
capable of increasing the likelihood of disputes over who would be liable for the 
                                                          
119 The EAT preferred this approach to what was termed ‘the fact-based approach’- in which the 
application of TUPE’s automatic transfer provisions was said to be dependent on individual 
circumstances of each administration. See, ‘Sale of a business by administrators automatically 
transfers employees to buyer’ 
<http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2011/mar11/29994.pdf> accessed 
06/December/2011. 
120 The Court of Appeal’s decision in Key2Law (Surrey) LLP v De’ Antiquis [2011] EWCA Civ 1567. has 
helpfully clarified the applicability or otherwise of TUPE in insolvency situations.  The CA in that case 
held that all administrations fall outside the scope of Reg 8(7) of TUPE because they are not 
insolvency proceedings ‘instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets’ of the transferor. Thus, 
the law is that all administration proceedings are covered by TUPE Regulations and are not exempt by 
virtue of Regulation 8(7). 
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transferor’s obligation, and could result in costs, delay and uncertainty) has 
greater potential of yielding high percentages of business rescues and job 
preservation in comparison to the ‘absolute-approach’. 
7.9 Conclusions 
The flexibility introduced through Regulations 8 and 9 for transferees of insolvent 
businesses is a very important feature of TUPE 2006. It represents a sensible 
panacea to the disincentive problem posed to business rescues by applying TUPE 
to insolvency. Limiting the amount of liability that can transfer to the transferee 
may be an excellent fillip for an already waning desire to purchase insolvent 
businesses in the UK. Potentially, more insolvent businesses would be rescued 
since buyers know that there is now a ceiling on the liabilities that can pass to 
them under TUPE 2006 in comparison to what obtained under the 1981 
Regulations. In a similar vein, the rescue culture would also be strengthened by 
the employer’s ability to vary the employees’ terms and conditions of employees’ 
employment following the transfer of an insolvent business. This will avoid 
problems of equal pay disputes between the employer’s existing and transferred 
workforce and will ultimately boost the efficiency of the transferred business. 
These changes demonstrate how the revised TUPE Regulations have attempted to 
secure a trade-off between employee protection and business rescue: certain of 
the employees’ acquired rights are waived so as to ensure the continuity of the 
business employing them. On the other hand, when the business survives (albeit 
under a different management post transfer) the new owner is obliged to 
compensate the employees by ensuring that they in turn keep their jobs. From 
this perspective it could be argued that TUPE 2006 represents the type of labour 
legislation which, though intended to protect employees during transfers of 
insolvent businesses, has also given consideration to, and indeed even 
contributed to, the rescue of such businesses.121 The revised TUPE has somehow 
managed to reconcile employment security with labour market flexibility. There 
is a balance between the rescue of insolvent businesses’ objective pursued by 
English insolvency law and that of employment protection championed by 
employment law on the other hand.  
                                                          
121 Loubser (n 29) 57-69. 
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In theoretical terms, the concerns of the Proceduralists and creditors bargain 
theorists that the TUPE-type protection ‘over-deters’ sales of insolvent businesses 
is cured to some degree by the provisions of Regulations 8 and 9 which now 
makes it easier to sell an insolvent business as a going concern for the benefit of 
its creditors.. Also, the Traditionalists and TPT’s concerns that ‘over-incentivising’ 
business rescues could lead to a diminution or complete erosion of the protection 
TUPE was intended to give to  the rights of employees during going concern 
transfers of insolvent undertakings have also been allayed, first, by the distinction 
made in the type of insolvency proceedings to which TUPE will or will not apply 
and second, by the stringent conditions the employer has to satisfy before it could 
avail itself of the new insolvency measures. However, whether or not these 
measures will aid business rescues in the UK will depend on their construction by 
the courts.  
The next chapter will offer normative justifications for the policies behind the 
rescue of insolvent businesses and employee protection and then conclude the 
research. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
   CONCLUSION  
8.1 Introduction 
The relationship between business rescue and employee protection is not an easy 
one. Where rescue of an insolvent business takes the form of a going concern sale 
of the business, there is a strong tension between business rescue and employee 
protection policies. This is due, first, to TUPE’s ‘over’ protective disposition 
towards the employees and second, to its application to transfers in the context of 
insolvency. TUPE involves compulsory novation of contracts and the preservation 
of the pre-transfer terms and conditions of the employees’ contracts of 
employment. 1  These have posed serious problems to sales and rescues of 
insolvent businesses. 
This chapter concludes the research. It summarises how theory has been used to 
explain the tension arising between business rescue and employee protection in 
transfers involving insolvent undertakings in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
chapter highlights the main insights that emerged from the research. It offers 
normative justifications for business rescue and employee protection policies. 
Lastly, the original contribution made by the research to knowledge and the 
limitations of the study are highlighted. 
8.2 Research focus and insights 
The research focused on the tension between business rescue and employment 
protection in corporate insolvency and how theory can help to achieve an 
appropriate balance. The study has traced the genesis of the employment 
protection legislation in the United Kingdom to the EU’s inclusion of social goals 
within its legislative sphere of competence. It traced how EU’s social policy 
actions have impinged on the UK.2 A notable example is the impact that the social 
protection courses of actions pursued by the EU has on UK domestic businesses. 
                                                          
1 TUPE 2006, Reg. 4 
2 S Leibfried and P Pierson, European Social Policy: Between fragmentation and integration (Brookings 
Institute, Washington DC 1995).  
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One major implication of EU social policy for the UK is that employment matters 
that hitherto used to be the exclusive preserve of the UK employment law can no 
longer be determined solely by domestic developments without reference to EU 
labour law. The encroachment of EU law into the UK’s employment law space has 
forced changes in certain aspects of employment relationships.3  
It was noted in chapters 3 and 4 that it was through the UK’s mandatory fulfilment 
of its EU obligation in the context of implementing the European Union Acquired 
Rights Directive (ARD) on the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of a 
transfer of the business or undertaking employing them to another person that 
TUPE became part of the UK’s employment law. The implementation of the ARD, 
which was adopted in 1977 as social policy legislation by way of TUPE, altered the 
balance that once existed in business transfers when the common law regulated 
transfers of undertakings in the UK. 4   As far as the rights and status of the 
employees in the context of insolvent business transfers are concerned, TUPE has 
completely ‘rewritten’ employees’ rights and altered the status of the employee 
when an insolvent business is transferred to a third party purchaser on a going 
concern basis.5 With TUPE, the beneficial pendulum in business transfers has 
swung in favour of the employees to the disadvantage of the employers when 
compared to what it was when the common law regulated business transfers.6   
The research found that applying TUPE to transfers of insolvent business has not 
been helpful to the rescue culture. Rather, TUPE’s application to insolvency has 
tended to harm the business rescue course. It was evident in the study that 
sometimes rescuing a business requires radical measures such as reducing the 
size of the workforce to be taken if the business is to be sold as a going concern, 
but that TUPE makes the use of this technique to rescue very difficult.7  The 
research has demonstrated that from the employee protection perspective, TUPE 
                                                          
3 Bob Hepple, ‘Individual Employment Law’ in G S Bain (ed.), Industrial Relations in Britain (Blackwell, 
Oxford 1983). 
4 B Bercusson, European Labour Law (Butterworth, London 1996); J McMullen, ‘An Analysis of the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ [2006] ILJ 113. 
5 Bob Hepple, ‘Workers’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals’ (1976) 5 ILJ 197; S Hardy 
and N Adnett, ‘Entrepreneurial Freedom versus Employee Rights’: the Acquired Rights Directive and 
EU Social Policy Post-Amsterdam (1999) 9 Journal of European Social Policy 127.   
6 See Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 (HL). See further chapter 5 of 
thesis. 
7 Sandra Frisby, ‘TUPE or not TUPE? Employee Protection, Corporate Rescue and ‘’One Unholy Mess’’’ 
(2000) Company Financial & Industrial Law Review. 249 -271; H Collins, ‘Transfer of Undertakings and 
Insolvency’ (1989) 18 ILJ 144-158; Paul Davies, ‘Amendments to the Acquired Rights Directive’ (1989) 
27 ILJ 365-375. 
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is a very good law. TUPE’s application to insolvent business transfers is beneficial 
to the employees because it has limited the transferor’s ability to dismiss them to 
facilitate a sale which used to be permissible under the common law rule that was 
enunciated in the seminal Nokes’ case8  discussed extensively in chapter 5.  
However, it has been argued in this study that the effects of TUPE should not be 
considered solely from the employment protection perspective. Looking at TUPE 
from a sale and business rescue perspective, it was evident from the analysis 
carried out in this thesis that TUPE is a cog in the wheels of insolvent business 
rescues.  A key finding of the research was that TUPE not only hinders business 
rescues by obstructing the transferor from effecting dismissals to achieve a sale, 
but it also impedes rescues in its requirement that the transferee has to take the 
insolvent business with all of the transferor’s employees on the same terms of 
employment in addition to debts owed to them.  This practice was identified in the 
thesis as increasing the costs of business rescues to the transferees. The study 
noted that consequent upon this approach to employee protection, the weight of 
employee-related obligations ‘over-deters’ purchasers. The consequence is that 
the prospects for successful going concern sales of insolvent businesses are 
undermined. It was noted that where a business cannot be sold on a going 
concern basis, its closure inevitably results in job losses for the employees.9  
8.3 Normative justifications for business rescue and 
employee protection policies 
It was evident in the study that in circumstances where a sale could not be 
achieved, the only option open to the Insolvency Practitioner is to close down the 
business, make the employees redundant and sell its assets piecemeal. It was 
noted that where that happens, TUPE would not, as articulated by Frisby, 
represent ‘...so much a route to job security as a threat to it’.10 TUPE would be 
counter-productive to its professed aim of protecting the rights of the employees 
since the closure of the business means job losses for all affected employees. 
However, in spite of this obvious problem with the regime, employee protection 
                                                          
8 Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 (HL). 
9 John Armour & Simon Deakin, ‘The Rover Case (2) –Bargaining in the Shadow of TUPE’ (2000) 29 ILJ 
395; Frisby (n 7); Collins (n 7). 
10 Frisby (n 7) 253. 
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acolytes11 are concerned that ‘over-incentivising’ going concern business rescues 
by carving insolvent business transfers wholly out of TUPE would seriously 
jeopardise the protection given to the employees during transfers.12  
In spite of the problem that TUPE poses to business rescues, its continued 
relevance and application to insolvent business transfers, provides an opportunity 
therefore for considering normative justifications for the employment law 
objective of employee protection and the insolvency law goal of business rescue 
during transfers of insolvent undertakings. The use of theory has enabled an 
argument to be made that TUPE ‘is a necessary evil’. That is, even those who do 
not like TUPE understand that it has to be accepted sometimes or that TUPE has to 
exist if the rights of employees are not to be trampled upon during transfers. The 
use of theory has also provided the means to normatively examine the revisions 
made to the ARD and TUPE on the policy trying to balance the policy goals of 
employment and insolvency laws respectively as these relate to insolvent 
business transfers. 
Given that in theoretical terms the Proceduralists generally and, in particular, the 
creditors’ bargain theorists’13 core argument is that insolvency law should limit 
itself to protecting the interests of the creditors only, the implication is that these 
theorists would only support an insolvency law framework that facilitates going 
concern sales of insolvent businesses on the theory that the preservation of going 
concern value of the business is beneficial to the creditors. This is based on the 
notion that the preservation of a business maximises its sale value for the 
creditors as the legal owners of the assets of the insolvent business.14 It follows 
                                                          
11 D Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas 
Law Review 541; L M LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 57 
Vanderbilt Law Review (3) 741, 769; K Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy 
System (YUP, New Haven 1997); K Gross, ‘Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy An 
Essay’ (1994) 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1031; E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 800; 
E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World’ (1993) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336-387. 
12 Samuel Etukakpan, ‘Business Rescue and Continuity of Employment: Analysing Policy through the 
Lens of Theory’ (2011) 32 Company Lawyer 99, 109. 
13  See chapter 2. 
14  Thomas Jackson, for example, has opined that under much modern corporation law it is most 
useful to view shareholders, unsecured creditors, and secured creditors as the owners of the firm. 
They have different packages of rights to the assets at different times, but they all have the right to 
call on the firm’s assets under one set of circumstances or another… Once one identifies those with 
rights against the assets, one has the pool of owners. Jackson T H, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy, 
(HUP, Cambridge, MA 1986) 32. See furher D G Baird, ‘Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of 
the Absolute Priority Rule’ (1988) 55 Uni. Chi. L Rev 738; W J Blum, ‘The Law and Language of 
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therefore, that any restriction imposed within the structure of the insolvency law 
framework which is likely to reduce the capacity of the creditors to capture full 
going concern value of the sale of an insolvent business, would be regarded by 
these schools of thought as a ‘foul’.15 What this means is that the Proceduralists in 
general and the creditors’ bargain theorists in particular would loathe TUPE for 
the type of protection it offers to the employees during transfers of insolvent 
businesses. However, it seems that without the external interference of TUPE, 
these theorists would acclaim English insolvency law for its creditor friendly 
disposition in insolvency.16 
The study has shown on the other hand that, based on their employee protection 
stance, Traditionalists in general, and LoPucki, the progenitor of team production 
theory of bankruptcy reorganisation (TPT), in particular, would be likely to 
support TUPE’s maximum protection for continuity of employment.  
Traditionalists in general do not have any issues with TUPE applying to insolvent 
transfers since these theorists contend that insolvency resulting in the sale of the 
business is when employees’ need protection the most.17 This group of scholars 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Corporate Reorganization’ (1950) 17 Uni. Chi. L Rev. 565; Blum, ‘The “New Directions” for Priority 
Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganization’ – A Reappraisal’ (1958) 25 Uni. Chi. L Rev. 417. 
15 Jackson (n 9) above; T H Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 857, 860; T H Jackson, ‘Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 36 
Stan. L. Rev. 725; Jackson T H & Scott R, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy 
Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 Virginia L. Rev. 155; D G Baird  & T H Jackson, ‘Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate 
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51 U Chicago L. Rev. 97; D G Baird, ‘The Uneasy 
Case for Corporate Reorganizations’ (1986) 15 Journal of Leg. Stud. 127,133; D G Baird ‘Loss 
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren’ (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 815; D G 
Baird, ‘A World without Bankruptcy’ (1987) 50 Law & Contemp. Probs 173; C W Mooney  Jr., ‘A 
Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy Law As (Is) Civil Procedure’ [2003] Institute for Law 
and Economics Research Paper (No. 03-27), University of Pennsylvania Law School 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract id=425120> accessed 10 January 2009. 
16  See discussion on ‘aligning English insolvency law with extant insolvency theories’ in chapter 3. 
17Warren (n 11a & b); V Finch & S Worthington, `The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking Restitutionary 
Rights’ in F Ross (ed) Restitution and Insolvency (London, 2000); V Finch, Corporate Insolvency law: 
Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge 2002); M Frank, `The Rights of Employees in the 
Event of the Employer’s Insolvency: A comparative Approach to the Rights of Employees during 
Restructuring in the United States and Europe’ (2005) 1 New Zealand Postgraduate Law E-Journal 7; 
M Gronow, ‘Insolvent corporate groups and their employees: The case for further reform’ (2004) 
Legal Studies Research Paper No.130, Melbourne Law School <http://ssrn.com/abstract=81424> 
accessed 27 January 2011; Gross (n 11a & b); D Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative 
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas Law Review 541; J  Sarra, ‘Creditor Rights and the 
Public Interest: Restructuring Insolvent Corporations’ (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2003); J 
Sarra ‘Widening the Insolvency Lens: The Treatment of Employee Claims’ in Paul J Omar (ed.) 
International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire 2008)  L M 
LoPucki, ‘The Unsecured Creditors’ Bargain’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, 1887, 1896 -1902.  L M 
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would argue that TUPE is not designed to deliberately prevent business owners 
from restructuring their businesses whenever the economic need to do so arises - 
even though this is how TUPE is sometimes perceived especially where the 
business cannot be sold due to its effects. For them, what TUPE does is to ensure 
that relevant employers do not walk over the rights of the employees during 
transfers and especially during insolvent business transfers. 18 The mandatory 
nature of TUPE makes it more difficult for parties to have arrangements, however 
mutually desirable, to circumvent the effects of TUPE in transfer situations.19   
In theoretical terms, TUPE provides the necessary checks and balances on 
managerial (IP’s) prerogatives on many fronts. It inhibits, without completely 
eroding, the transferor’s ability to pursue wealth maximisation for the creditors 
during insolvent business sales without due regard to the interests of the 
employees who have made value enhancing human capital contributions to the 
business. The transferor’s capacity to increase creditors’ wealth in a transfer 
involving an insolvent business is limited by how stringent the conditions are that 
TUPE places on achieving sales or enhanced prices for insolvent business via a 
reduction in the size of the workforce. It does not prevent or outlaw dismissals, 
but that they have merely required that dismissals should be made in a legal and 
fair manner. For Traditionalists, TUPE re-emphasises the notion that employees 
dismissed should be compensated for their loss of employment. They argue also 
that contrary to what it seems is the case; TUPE does not vest employees with new 
rights. It does not give them rights over and above what they already had. What 
TUPE does is to preserve the employees acquired rights. From that perspective 
                                                                                                                                                                      
LoPucki (n 11); L M LoPucki & W C Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations of Large Publicly-held Companies,’ (1993) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
669-800.  
 L M Lopucki & J W Doherty,  `Bankruptcy Fire Sales’ (2007), UCLA School of Law, Law and Economics 
Research Paper Series, 5 research paper No. 07-07  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=980585> accessed 22 
October 2009; S Whelan & L Zwier, ‘Employee Entitlement and Corporate Insolvency and 
Reconstruction’<http://www.cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/researchpapers/Protection%20of%20employe
e> accessed 12 December 2009.  
18 Roger Tynan, ‘TUPE and Insolvency: Interpreting the Regulations’ (2009) Employers’ Law Magazine 
<http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/2009/07/07/50077/tupe-and-insolvency-interpreting-the-
regulations.html> accessed 14 May 2012. 
19 On transfers and the effect of TUPE on structuring a transfer to circumvent TUPE, see the House of 
Lords decisions in e.g.  Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546; Celtec Ltd v 
Astley [2006] IRLR 635 ; G4S Justice Services (UK) Ltd v Anstey [2006] IRLR 588. On changes in the 
contractual terms of employment, see Foreningen AF Arbejdsledere I Danmark v Daddy's Dance Hall 
A/S [1988] IRLR 315. Contrast this with the House of Lord’s decision in Power v Regent Security 
Services Limited [2007] IRLR 226. 
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therefore, Traditionalists would regard TUPE as a good law that is worthy of 
having. 
The important role theory plays as a tool for explanation and interpretation is 
ostensible throughout in the research. Theory provides a lens through which to 
explain not just the tension between business rescue and employment protection 
but also the values of the policies behind rescue and employee protection 
practices. By refining TPT to accommodate the UK context of business rescue as 
opposed to corporate reorganisation, theory helped in explaining how a balance 
could be achieved between business rescue and employee protection.  
Through theory, the need for achieving a balance between the incompatible 
policy goals of employment and insolvency laws during transfers of insolvent 
businesses was highlighted. It was possible to demonstrate that balancing will 
ensure that the existing tension between competing policy goals during insolvent 
business transfers is effectively managed. Balancing ensures that employment 
protection oriented law does not undermine the rescues of insolvent but viable 
businesses and vice versa. In theoretical terms, the balancing of these competing 
policy objectives is sacrifice implicit. For the employees, this may involve the 
waiving, under clearly specified conditions, of their acquired rights in order to 
facilitate rescues of insolvent businesses and safeguard employment for some of 
the employees.20 For the employers, balancing may involve limiting managerial 
powers to restructure businesses as freely as they would have wished to. This 
invariably means that managers of insolvent businesses can no longer dismiss the 
entire workforce when selling an insolvent business on a going concern basis to a 
third party as was the case in the common law era.  
Using theory, the research has been able to demonstrate how a balance between 
rescue and employee protection in insolvency has been achieved. It was argued 
in chapter 7 that this balance, broadly speaking, has been effectively struck by 
the trade-offs made in the revised ARD and TUPE regimes.  TUPE 2006 places 
greater emphasis than the 1981 version on the rescue and sale of businesses as a 
going concern. The advantage of rescuing a business lies in its ability to 
potentially preserve, to a greater or lesser extent, employment opportunities for 
                                                          
20 J Amour & S Deakins, ‘Insolvency, Employment Protection and Corporate Restructuring: The Effects 
of TUPE’ (2001) University of Cambridge CBR (Working Paper No. 204); J McMullen, ‘An analysis of the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006(2006) ILJ 113. 
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the employees.21 Thus, in the revised 2006 TUPE Regulations, the basic protective 
starting point in the original legislation has been watered down by the inclusion of 
special insolvency provisions aimed at furthering business rescues. The 
obligation placed on the transferee by the old TUPE to assume all debts in relation 
to the employees of the insolvent transferor and to take on the affected employees 
on their existing terms and conditions have been amended. 
Under TUPE 1981, a relevant transfer of an undertaking had the effect of 
transferring all existing contracts of employment including liabilities, rights and 
obligations in connection with the contracts to the transferee. The limitless 
transfer of liabilities was criticised as problematic to the achievement of going 
concern business rescues. This problem has now been remedied under the 2006 
Transfer Regulations to bring them in line with the revised ARD. There is now a 
statutory cap on the amount of liability that may transfer to the purchaser. Under 
Regulation 8 (5), if at the time of a relevant transfer the transferor is subject to 
‘relevant insolvency proceedings’, 22 some of its debts vis-a-vis any contracts of 
employment or employment relationships payable to the relevant employees 
under the relevant statutory schemes shall not pass to the transferee. Thus, while 
preserving continuity of employment, TUPE 2006 limits the extent of liability that 
may transfer to the transferee.  
The ‘rescue culture’ is given a further boost by the 2006 TUPE Regulations. The 
statutory capping of transferable liabilities so as to boost sales of insolvent 
businesses is followed by the introduction of another rescue mechanism to be 
found in the regulation 9 provisions. The rule which tended to hamstring 
employers from making changes in the contracts of employment if the sole or 
principal reason for them was the transfer itself or a reason connected with the 
transfer23 that was not an ETO24 reason entailing changes in the workforce25 (see 
below) has also been relaxed.  
                                                          
21 P L Davies, ‘Employee Claims in Insolvency: Corporate Rescues and Preferential Claims’ (1994) 23 ILJ 
141. 
22 Under Reg. 8 (6) of TUPE 2006, ‘relevant insolvency proceedings’ simply denotes in insolvency 
proceedings which have been opened in relation to the transferee not a view to the liquidation of its 
assets and which are under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner (IP). 
23 Wilson v St Helen's Borough Council [1996] IRLR 320 . 
24 As part of the effort to bring clarity to the TUPE Regulations, the new reg. 7(3)(b) of TUPE 2006 
makes it clear that redundancy is an example of an ETO reason. 
25 See e.g. Delabole Slate Ltd v Berriman [1985] IRLR 305 CA; Gibson v Ciro Citterio 
(Menswear) plc (EAT/276/97); Martin v South Bank University [2004] IRLR 74. 
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Regulation 9 (7) provides a leeway for a tripartite and consensual26 agreement to 
be reached between the transferee, the transferor (or person or persons 
exercising the transferor's functions e.g. an IP) and the representatives of the 
employees jointly, to make ‘permitted variation’27 to terms and conditions of the 
employees’ contracts of employment only in transfers involving insolvent 
undertakings or businesses.28 Thus, it is possible to make variations to contract 
terms whether or not the transfer of the undertaking is the sole or principal reason 
for the variation or whether the variation is connected to the transfer of the 
business or undertaking in issue.29  
While the regulation 9 provision recognises the need for employers to continue 
running organisations as effective and profitable businesses, it also accentuates 
the ambivalent nature of TUPE: TUPE’s core objective is the safeguarding of 
employees’ rights, but we see here how the employees’ legal entitlement to 
unaltered terms and conditions of employment (provided for under reg. 4) in a 
relevant business transfer is compromised in a bid to foster the rescue of 
insolvent businesses. Thus, in dealing with the problem of disincentive vis-a-vis 
business sales, TUPE 2006, rather than enhancing the protection available to the 
employees affected by transfers in the context of insolvency reduces them 
instead. On the other hand, and especially taking into account the Regulation 9 (7) 
safeguards, it may be correct to say that the TUPE regime, in itself, represents the 
most efficient default rule protecting workers in situations where their livelihoods 
                                                          
26 Power v Regent Security Services Limited [2007] IRLR 226. Note however that in the earlier cases of 
Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] IRLR 355 (ECJ) and Credit Suisse First Boston v Lister [1998] IRLR 700 held 
that an employer cannot avoid the doctrine by showing that on a fair view of the contract as a whole, 
the employee was better off under the varied contract.  
27 Regulation 9 (7) defines ‘permitted variations’ as variations allowed to the contract of employment 
of an assigned employee where (a) the sole reason for it is the transfer or a reason connected with 
the transfer that is not an ETO reason entailing changes in the workforce; and (b) variation designed 
to safeguard employment opportunities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking or business or 
part of the undertaking or business that is the subject of the transfer. 
28  The contractual variations rule in non-insolvency cases continue to apply. Regulation 4(4) provides: 
...in respect of a contract of employment that is, or will be, transferred by paragraph 
(1), any purported variation of the contract shall be void if the sole or principal 
reason for the variation is the transfer itself, or a reason connected with the transfer 
that is not an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the 
workforce. 
Conversely, reg. 4(5) provides:  
Paragraph (4) shall not prevent the employer and his employee, whose contract of 
employment is, or will be, transferred by paragraph (1), from agreeing a variation of 
that contract if the sole or principal reason for the variation is (a) a reason 
connected with the transfer that is an economic, technical or organisational reason 
entailing changes in the workforce, or (b) a reason unconnected with the transfer. 
29  TUPE 2006, reg. 9 (7) (a). 
306 
 
are at risk and simultaneously granting them the freedom to negotiate (albeit 
technically via their representatives) with the employer for a waiver or diminution 
of their acquired rights where the strict application of its (TUPE) provisions would 
have yielded a less efficient result (i.e. business closure and loss of jobs) for the 
employees as a group.30 
Traditionalists would arguably regard the revisions made to the ARD and TUPE 
respectively as a sensible balance between the laudable policies goals of rescue 
and employee protection. They would contend that though some would argue that 
employment protection and business rescue do not go hand in hand as is evident 
in the research findings, yet the two can mutually co-exist.  They would argue that 
even though the changes were aimed at facilitating sales of insolvent businesses 
by transferors, they are poised in a way that rescue is achieved without walking 
over the rights of the employees. What this demonstrates in theoretical terms is 
that if business rescue is pursued carefully it could help not only to preserve the 
economic value contained in the business but also to retain employees that 
otherwise would have been made redundant in order to facilitate the business 
sale. Changes to the regimes also demonstrate that employees’ rights can be, and 
should be, protected, but not tenaciously so as not to ‘over-deter’ purchases and 
hence going concern rescues of insolvent businesses.31 
8.4 Research contribution to knowledge 
This research has made original contributions to knowledge in the area of 
corporate insolvency law. The work is the first attempt to consider from a 
theoretical perspective the existing tension between business rescue and 
employee protection in corporate insolvency. The research has examined the 
protection TUPE provides for the employees during the transfers of insolvent 
businesses and how these deter the rescues of these businesses by looking at the 
competing theories of insolvency. It concludes through the use of theory that 
employee protection and business rescue are not mutually incompatible.  
The research has demonstrated that neither rescue policy nor employee 
protection policy should be sacrificed to achieve or foster the other. It became 
                                                          
30 Wanjiru  Njoya, ‘The Interface between Redundancy and TUPE Transfers’ (2003) 32 ILJ 123-8.  
31 See Adrian Walters, ‘The impact of employee liabilities on the administrator’s decision to continue 
trading’, (2005) 26 Company Lawyer 321; B Hepple, ‘Workers’ Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The 
EEC Proposals’ (1976) 5 ILJ 197-210, 207. 
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apparent in the research that if business rescue is carefully pursued it could lead 
to job preservation for employees. Likewise, where employee protection is 
appropriately limited, it may be possible to guarantee the continuity of insolvent 
but viable businesses which will in turn provide employment, at least, for some 
employees. What was required was an effective balance between both policy 
goals and this balance in theoretical terms has been achieved through the 
changes made to the employee protection regimes of the ARD and TUPE.  
8.5 Research limitations 
There were several limitations to the research. First, most of the extant insolvency 
theories applied in the study have their origins in the American bankruptcy 
reorganisation law. This posed serious challenges as they had to be adapted and 
refined to suit the UK context of business rescue. It was equally difficult to find 
materials analysing TUPE purely from an insolvency perspective. The bulk of 
materials available for the researcher consider TUPE from an employment law 
viewpoint. Only passing comments were made in the literature as to TUPE’s 
impact on businesses. Most of the cases that have been considered TUPE took 
place in the context of solvent transfers resulting in changes of employers and in 
modes of transfers other than sales and therefore the principles had to be applied 
to transfers in the context of going concern business sales and in insolvency. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The initial problems TUPE posed to business rescues, the significance of the 
changes made to the regime under the Acquired Rights Directive 2001 and TUPE 
2006 and the difference that these changes have made to the rescue culture 
generally are perhaps indicative of the fact that policy-makers should never lose 
sight of the possible impacts that the interaction of laws can have in corporate 
insolvency and on business preservation specifically. In the context of this thesis, 
the focus has been on the interaction between employment protection (TUPE) and 
business rescue laws, and how the former could impact negatively on the rescue 
of insolvent businesses in the UK. This thesis has contributed to knowledge in the 
area of insolvency law by examining how theory may be employed to address the 
tension that arises between rescue and employee protection when an insolvent 
business is transferred as going concern. On the one hand, the research has 
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demonstrated through the use of theory that to ‘over-incentivise’ business rescues 
by carving insolvent businesses wholly out of TUPE will allow employers to ‘walk-
over’ the rights of employees during transfers. On the hand, it has also showed 
that the type of protection TUPE gives to UK employees ‘over-deters’ going 
concern sales of insolvent businesses. These are the major concerns of the 
Traditionalists and Proceduralists respectively in relation to the transfer of an 
insolvent business on a going concern basis. These concerns, the research has 
shown, have enabled the most appropriate balance between business rescue and 
employee protection to be achieved.  
With the aid of theory, this research has shown that a fine balance has now been 
achieved following the measures introduced into the revised 2001 ARD and TUPE 
Regulations 2006 to cater specifically for transfers of insolvent businesses. Theory 
explains the rationale for the balance and demonstrates that this has been done in 
a way that employee protection does not hinder business rescues without 
completely stripping the employees of the protection TUPE gives to them in 
transfer situations. On the one hand, employees waive some of their acquired 
rights to ensure that insolvent businesses can be rescued. On the other hand, an 
insolvent business that has been rescued via a going concern sale cannot 
continue under new ownership without, at least, some of the transferor’s 
employees transferring with it. 
While it cannot be stated unequivocally that the balance that has now been 
achieved is the ultimate panacea for the existing tension between business rescue 
and employment protection in the context of going concern transfers, the present 
situation is, arguably, the best we can hope for in an imperfect system. The 
balance that has been achieved by the changes effected in the regime would, it is 
submitted, be satisfactory to both the Proceduralists and the Traditionalists as 
their concerns regarding ‘over-deterrence’ to purchases of insolvent businesses 
(by the protections TUPE gives to employees in transfers) and ‘over-incentivising’ 
of going concern rescues (by carving out insolvent business transfers wholly out 
of TUPE to the detriment of employment protection) respectively have  now been 
remedied.  
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